Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Vijay Singh Thakur, vs The State Of Ap Rep By Its Pp Hyd., on 2 August, 2024
APHC010088402008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3367]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE SECOND DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V SRINIVAS
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1229/2008
Between:
Vijay Singh Thakur, ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Ap Rep By Its Pp Hyd ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Petitioner:
C SHARAN REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Assailing the judgment dated 06.08.2008 in G.S.C.No.112
of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned Metropolitan Sessions
Judge at Visakhapatnam, convicted the accused, on his
admission, for the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal
Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"), the petitioner/accused
filed the present criminal revision case under Section 397
r/w.401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
2. The revision case was admitted on 18.08.2008 and the
sentence of imprisonment imposed against the petitioner was
suspended, vide orders in Crl.R.C.M.P.No.1667 of 2008.
3. The shorn of necessary facts are that:
i). On 19.05.2006, when the de facto complainant
attending bundo-bust duty at Steel Plant,
Vishakapatnam, the accused with an intention to kill
him stabbed with a knife on the abdomen, resulted, he
sustained injury to the left armpit and also near left
wrist. Then the accused escaped from the spot on his
motorcycle.
ii). Based on the complaint of de facto complainant,
Gajuwaka police register a case in Cr.No.262 of 2006 for
the offences under Section 307 of IPC and investigated
into.
4. After completion of investigation, police laid charge sheet
and the same was numbered as P.R.C.No.8 of 2007 on the file of
the Court of learned III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
at Visakhapatnam, and committed to the Court of Sessions,
numbered as G.S.C.No.112 of 2007 on the file of the Court of
learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam, on
admission of accused, under Section 240(2) Cr.P.C.
examination, convicted him for the offence under Section 307 of
IPC, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three
(3) years and to pay fine of Rs.100/-, in default to suffer simple
imprisonment of one month.
5. Aggrieved by the same, the present criminal revision case
was preferred by the petitioner/accused.
6. Heard Sri Md.Ismail, learned counsel representing Sri
C.Sharan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
S.Dheera Kanishk, learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor
for the respondent-State.
7. Now the point that arises for determination in this
revision is "whether there is any manifest error of law or flagrant
miscarriage of justice in convicting the petitioner on admission
by the Trial Court?"
8. Sri Md.Ismail, learned counsel representing Sri C.Sharan
Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial
Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the alleged offence;
that the judgment of the trail Court itself shows that the
accused mental condition was not good, thereby, the conviction
passed against the accused on the admission is liable to the set
aside.
9. Against the same, Sri S.Dheera Kanishk, learned Special
Assistant Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State submits
that the trail court on the categorical admission made by the
accused at the time of initial examination itself, convicted him
for the said offence, as such, there are no grounds urged by the
petitioner to interfere with the conviction and sentence passed
by the trial court. In support of the above contention, he relied
on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh v.
State (NCT of Delhi)1.
10. In view of the above rival contentions, this Court perused
the material available on record. It is not in dispute that on the
very first examination of the accused, under Section 240(2)
CR.P.C., he admitted the guilt by stating that "as he was not in
good mental condition, he stabbed the complainant underneath
the stomach with an intention to kill him." On the said
admission, the trial Court convicted him for the said offence.
11. Now, it is relevant to refer the pronouncement of Apex
Court, which is relied upon by the learned Special Assistant
Public Prosecutor, in Prem Singh case (referred to supra),
wherein at paragraph Nos.71 to 76 held as follows:
71. In the relied upon passage in the decision of
Gujarat High Court cited on behalf of the appellant in
1 (2023) 3 SCC 372
case of Manjuben (supra), the Court had explained the
basics relating to the operation of Section 329 CrPC
and its distinction from Section 84 IPC in following
terms: -
"43........ 23. Section 329 of the Cr.P.C. on the other
hand, provides for a procedure in case of a person of
unsound mind tried before the Court. Section makes
it clear that in a trial before the Magistrate or Court
of Sessions, if the accused appears to be of unsound
mind and consequently incapable of making his
defence, then the Court shall, in the first instance,
try the fact of such unsoundness of mind and
incapacity and if satisfied in this regard, shall record
a finding to that effect and shall postpone the
further proceedings. This Section is similar to
Section 328 of the Cr.P.C. with this difference that
the latter relates to an enquiry before a Magistrate,
while this Section relates to the trial before the
Magistrate or Court of Sessions. However, both the
Sections relate to unsoundness of mind at the time
of inquiry or trial ......that the accused is of unsound
mind. A Magistrate cannot act on his own opinion.
He must have before him a statement of medical
officer, who must be examined. Where the Court
decides that the accused is of unsound mind and
consequently incapable of making his defence, the
trial is to be postponed. As provided in Section 330
of the Cr.P.C. such a person may be released on
sufficient security being given that he shall be
properly taken care of and shall be prevented from
doing injury to himself or to any other person or for
his appearance when required before Magistrate or
the Court. The Court or the Magistrate is also
entitled to direct the accused to be detained in safe
custody in such a place and manner as it may think
fit if it is of the view that the bail should not be
taken or sufficient security is not given. Section 331
of the Cr.P.C. thereafter talks of resumption of
enquiry or trial, when the concerned persons cease
to be of unsound mind. Section 332 of the Cr.P.C.
prescribes a procedure to proceed with the trial or
enquiry as the case may be.'"
72. The aforesaid expositions on the scope of the
provisions relating to accused person of unsound mind
are not of much debate. However, nothing of the
aforesaid principles could apply to the present case, for
there had been no material on record and no other
reason appeared during trial for which, the Trial Court
would have been obliged to take recourse of the
procedure contemplated by Section 329 CrPC.
73. Similarly, the suggestions about defect in trial or
failure on the part of the investigating agency to get the
appellant examined through psychiatrist with reference
to the decision of the Bombay HC in case of Ajay Ram
Pandit (supra) remain too far stretched. In the said
case, it was noticed that the investigating officer
became aware of the fact after apprehending the
accused that he was mentally unstable and in fact, the
people in his locality used to consider him as a mad
man. The fact situation of the present case is entirely
different.
74. In the given set of facts and circumstances, we are
not dilating on the other decisions cited by the learned
counsel for the appellant for being not relevant for the
present purpose. Fact of the matter in the present case
remains that there is nothing on record to show that
the appellant was a person of unsound mind, whether
at the time of commission of crimes or during the
course of trial.
75. Apart that there was no fault on the part of the
Trial Court or the investigating agency, it is also
noteworthy that contrary to even a trace of want of
mental capacity of the appellant at the time of
commission of the crimes in question, the manner of
commission, with strangulation of the children one by
one; throwing of their dead bodies into the canal;
appellant himself swimming in the canal and coming
out; and immediately thereafter, stating before several
persons that the children had accidentally slipped into
the canal so as to project it as a case of accidental
drowning, if at all, show an alert and calculative mind,
which had worked with specific intent to cause the
death of the children and to cause disappearance of
evidence by throwing dead bodies into the canal and
thereafter, to mislead by giving a false narrative. By no
logic and by no measure of assessment, the appellant,
who is found to have carried all the aforesaid
misdeeds, could be said to be a person of unsound
mind.
76. Thus, we are clearly of the view that the appellant
was neither suffering from any medically determined
mental illness nor could be said to be a person under a
legal disability of unsound mind. Hence, neither
Section 84 IPC applies to the present case nor Section
329 CrPC would come to the rescue of the appellant."
12. In view of the above categorical observations made by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the present case also, this Court is
of the considered opinion that, the trial Court did not commit
any error in convicting the petitioner for the said offence on the
admission made by him. It is required to be noted that there is
nothing on record to say that the petitioner was a person of
unsound mind at the time of his admission of offence. Thereby,
the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the trial Court erred in convicting the petitioner on the
ground that his mental health condition was not good has no
legs to stand. As such, in view of the gravity of the offence
committed by the accused, this Court is not inclined to interfere
with the judgment of the trial Court in convicting the accused
for the said offence.
13. However, while arguing the matter, learned counsel for
the petitioner/accused submits that the accident had occurred
on 19.05.2006 and there are mitigating circumstances to reduce
the sentence imposed against the petitioner by the trial Court,
which was confirmed by the Sessions Court. He also brought to
the notice of this Court a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in Nand Ballabh Pant v. State (Union
Territory of Delhi)2, wherein the APEX Court considered the
facts and reduced the period of sentence of imprisonment
2AIR 1977 SC 892
imposed on the appellate from two (2) months to one (1) month
rigorous imprisonment.
14. He also brought to the notice of this Court another
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Jagdish
Chander v. State of Delhi3, wherein also the APEX Court
considered the relevant circumstances and reduced the
sentence of imprisonment to that of already undergone but
increased the sentence of fine from Rs.500/- to Rs.700/-.
15. In this connection, it is relevant to make a mention a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nagaraj v. Union of
India4, wherein at paragraph Nos.18 and 19 held that "the
appellant/accused has already undergone one month jail
sentence; second, the offence in question neither against the
society nor it involves any moral turpitude and nor it has
resulted in causing any harm or injury to any human being
except causing some damage to the railway property, viz., one
railway crossing gate; and lastly, the offence is now 13 years
old. In view of the aforementioned three reasons and in the
interest of justice, therefore of the considered opinion that the
six months jail sentence awarded to the appellate by the three
3AIR 1973 SC 2127
42019 (1) ALT (Crl.) 209
Courts below deserves to be altered to what he has already
undergone by the appellant till date."
16. As well in Mohinder Singh v. State of Haryana5, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.2 that "they are
not inclined to interfere on the merits of the case and at the
same time, they cannot lose sight of fact that the occurrence
took place more than a quarter of century back and to send the
accused in prison after 25 years, would be travesty of justice."
17. No doubt, in the present case also the incident was said
to have happened on 19.05.2006 and by this time seventeen
(17) years have already lapsed.
18. Having regard to the above discussion and in view of the
above pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction is upheld,
however, to meet the ends of justice, the sentence of
imprisonment is reduced to one year from three (3) years for the
offence under Section 307 of IPC.
19. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed in
part, modifying the sentence of imprisonment imposed against
the petitioner/accused to that of one-year rigorous
imprisonment instead of three (3) years for the offence under
52019 (3) Crimes 89
Section 307 of IPC. The rest of the judgment dated 06.08.2008
in G.S.C.No.112 of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned
Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam, shall stands
confirmed. The period of sentence, if any, already undergone by
the petitioner/accused, shall be given set off under Section 428
Cr.P.C. The petitioner/accused is directed to surrender before
the Court of learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at
Visakhapatnam to serve the remaining sentence, if not, the
learned Sessions Judge concerned shall take steps against the
petitioner.
Interim orders granted earlier if any, stand vacated.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,
shall stand closed.
_______________________
JUSTICE V.SRINIVAS
Date: 02.08.2024
Krs
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.SRINIVAS
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1229 of 2008
DATE: 02.08.2024
Krs
