Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

A Bala Ganeshaiah vs The Special Court Under Ap Land ... on 5 October, 2023

     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

                                    AND

       THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO


                    WRIT PETITION No.25382 of 2021

ORDER:- (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Cheekati Manavendranath Roy)

       This Writ Petition for Certiorari is filed challenging the

judgment, dated 30.11.1992, passed in L.G.A. No.5 of 1990 on the

file of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition)

Act, Hyderabad, confirming the order, dated 16.04.1990, passed

in L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 on the file of the Chairman (District

Judge) Tribunal under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

Anantapur, as arbitrary and against the law and consequently

prayed to set aside the judgment and decree, dated 16.04.1990

passed in L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 which was confirmed in L.G.A.

No.5 of 1990.


2.     Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ghanta

Rama Rao, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.47.

3. On 02.11.2021, this Court, as per the request made by

learned counsel for the petitioners, permitted the petitioners to

cause personal notice on respondents 1 to 46 and file proof of

service within three weeks from that day. But the petitioners did

not take any steps to serve personal notice on respondents 1 to 46

and as per the Registry endorsement made on the proceedings

sheet, dated 02.11.2021, no proof of service was filed by the

petitioners. Therefore, as the petitioners failed to take notice to

respondents 1 to 46 despite the order of this Court, petition

against respondents 1 to 46 is liable to be dismissed.

4. As per the facts emanating from the record, originally

respondent No.3 - G. L. Kantha Rao and respondent No.4 - G.

Lakshmi Narasaiah filed L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 on the file of the

Chairman (District Judge) Tribunal under the A.P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, Anantapur, against the respondents therein for

eviction from the schedule property and for recovery of possession

of the said property on the ground that the respondents therein

have encroached on to the said land and grabbed the said

property. The said petition was allowed as per the order, dated

16.04.1990, passed in the said L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983.

Challenging the said order, the respondents therein have preferred

an Appeal in L.G.A. No.5 of 1990 on the file of the 1st respondent -

Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

Hyderabad. The said appeal also came to be dismissed as per the

judgment, dated 30.11.1992. The respondents therein did not

further challenge the said judgment. Therefore, the orders passed

in L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 which was confirmed in the Appeal in

L.G.A. No.5 of 1990 became final and it attained finality long back

in the year 1992. Thereafter, in the year 2021, the present Writ

Petition has been filed by the third parties, who are not parties to

the said L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 and L.G.A. No.5 of 1990.

Precisely, it is the case of the writ petitioners herein, who are the

third parties, that the petitioners 1 to 4, 7 and 11 have purchased

the property in question from the alienees of respondent No.1 in

L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 after filing of the said L.G.O.P. No.120 of

1983 and after its disposal respectively and thereby they are

claiming right over the said property and sought the aforesaid

relief in this Writ Petition.

5. The other petitioners i.e., petitioners 5, 6, 8 to 10, 12 and 13

have been claiming title over the said property by virtue of certain

unregistered gift deeds and unregistered sale deeds said to have

been executed in their favour by the third parties. Although

petitioner No.14 also claimed title over the said property, the

source of title is not pleaded in the Writ Petition. She is not

claiming any title over the property by virtue of any registered or

unregistered document as per the pleadings in the Writ Petition.

6. Since this Writ Petition is filed by third parties to the

original L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983, we are of the considered view

that when the order passed by the 2nd respondent - Tribunal in

L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983, was affirmed in the Appeal in L.G.A.

No.5 of 1990 long back on 30.11.1992 and when the same became

final, it is not open to the writ petitioners herein who are third

parties to the said proceedings to challenge the said orders by way

of filing this Writ Petition for Certiorari.

7. Further, petitioners 1 to 4, 7 and 11 are only claiming title

through the alienees of the 1st respondent. When the 1st

respondent himself has no title to the said property and the

Tribunal held in L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 that he is a land grabber

and ordered for his eviction, even if any document was executed

by him in favour of his alienees through whom these petitioners 1

to 4, 7 and 11 are claiming title over the property cannot claim

any better title in respect of the said property. When the 1st

respondent in L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 himself has no title to the

said property, he cannot convey any better title in respect of the

said property to his alienees and his alienees also, who have no

valid title to the said property, cannot convey any title in respect

of the said property in favour of petitioners 1 to 4, 7 and11.

Further, Section 17 of the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act

prohibits any alienation of the property after filing of the petition

in L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 or subsequent thereto. So, any

alienation that takes place in respect of the said property after the

petition was filed in the Tribunal will not confer any valid title in

respect of the said property in favour of the alienees of respondent

No.1 in the said L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 and in favour of the

present petitioners 1 to 4, 7 and 11, who are claiming title

through them and they are null and void under Section 17 of the

Act. Therefore, on the said sole ground, the Writ Petition filed by

petitioners 1 to 4, 7 and 11 is liable to the dismissed.

8. As regards the other petitioners are concerned, as can be

seen from the pleadings in the Writ Petition, they have been

claiming their title over the said property by virtue of certain

unregistered gift deeds and unregistered sale deeds said to have

been executed by some third parties. Any transfer of immovable

property either by way of gift or by way of sale shall necessarily be

by way of registered sale deed or gift deed. Section 54 of the

Transfer of Property Act defines sale and it clearly mandates that

a sale in respect of immovable property which is of more than one

hundred rupees value shall necessarily be by way of registered

sale deed. Similarly, Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act

also mandates that any gift of immovable property shall

necessarily be made by way of a registered document.

9. The very pleadings of the petitioners in the Writ Petition

clearly show that they are claiming title over the property by way

of unregistered gift deeds and unregistered sale deeds said to have

been executed by some third parties. So, they are not admissible

evidence and they will not confer any valid title or right in respect

of the said property. So, the other petitioners also cannot claim

any better title in respect of the said property.

10. A careful perusal of the Writ Petition clearly shows that it is

undoubtedly a speculative litigation that has been initiated by the

petitioners to defeat the order passed by the Tribunal in L.G.O.P.

No.120 of 1983 that was obtained by the petitioners therein.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to assail the

impugned orders passed in the said L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983 on a

technical ground contending that Section 1(3) of the Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act mandates that the Act applies only to

lands situated within the limits of urban agglomeration as defined

in Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and

Regulation) Act, 1976, and a Municipality and as these lands are

not situate within the limits of urban agglomeration or a

Municipality and as these lands are situate within the rural area

outside the purview of the Municipality and the urban area that

the L.G.O.P filed in the Tribunal itself is not maintainable and on

that ground, the orders are liable to be set aside.

12. As can be seen from the impugned order passed in L.G.A.

No.5 of 1990, the said contention was already raised before the

appellate Court. The appellate Court has directed the appellants

therein to produce evidence in proof of the fact that the lands are

not situate within the urban areas or within the municipality and

that they are situate outside the purview of the said urban area or

the Municipality. They failed to produce any such evidence before

the appellate Court. Therefore, the appellate Court clearly held in

the judgment that as they failed to produce any evidence to

substantiate their contention that the lands in question are not

situate within the urban area or within the municipal area and

thereby negatived the said contention. Therefore, it is not open to

the petitioners herein now to contend that the lands are not

situate within the urban area or within the Municipal area so as

to contend that the Act has no application. Further, it is

significant to note that as can be seen from the schedule of

original L.G.O.P. No.120 of 1983, it is clear that the lands are

situate within the municipal limits. A careful perusal of Section

1(3) of the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act clearly shows that the

Act applies to all lands situate within the limits of urban

agglomeration and also a Municipality. So, when the schedule

clearly shows that the lands are situate within the municipal

limits and the same is not denied or controverted in the Tribunal

at the first instance, it is not open to the petitioners in the Writ

Petition, who are third parties to the said proceedings, now to

contend that the Act has no application to the said lands.

Therefore, the said contention is absolutely devoid of merit and

holds no water and the same cannot be countenanced. Therefore,

the Writ Petition lacks merit and it is liable to be dismissed.

13. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of

certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising

the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is

not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation

necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior

court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence

cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error

of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be

corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it

may appear to be. Further, it is well-settled law that writ of

certiorari may lie generally when a Court has acted without or

in excess of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court exhaustively

explained the brief history and the essential features of writ of

certiorari in the case of T.C.Basappa v. T.Nagappa1. It is held

that "in granting a writ of certiorari, the superior court does not

AIR 1954 SC 440

exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or

reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior

tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it

considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but

does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior

tribunal..."

14. Relying on the said judgment rendered in the case of

T.C.Basappa1, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in

the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque2 laid down

the following propositions as well established:

(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of

jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts

without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to

exercise it.

(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal

acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted

jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an

opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the

principles of natural justice.

(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of

a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. The

AIR 1955 SC 233

consequence of this is that the court will not review

findings of fact reached by the inferior court or

tribunal, even if they be erroneous.

15. The said legal position is again re-affirmed by the Apex

Court recently in the case of Central Council for Research in

Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das3.

16. None of the aforesaid legal requirements to entertain this

writ petition filed for certiorari are satisfied in this writ petition

filed by the third parties to the said proceedings. So, the writ

petition is not maintainable.

17. Resultantly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending,

shall stand closed.

______________________________________________ JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

_____________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO Date: 05.10.2023 AKN