Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Valmiki Nalla Swamy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 4 October, 2023

           HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

                     IA Nos.1 and 2 of 2023
                              in/and
                Criminal Petition No.2777 of 2022

Common Order:

      This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has been filed

by the petitioner herein, seeking to quash the proceedings in S.C.No.10

of 2021 on the file of the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge,

Kurnool.

2.    A charge sheet was filed against the petitioner for the offences

punishable under Sections 448, 342, 332, 323 and 307 IPC.

3.    It is represented that both the parties have settled the dispute

amicably out of the Court at the intervention of their elders and well

wishers. In view of the settlement arrived between both the parties,

they filed I.A. Nos.1 and 2 of 2023 seeking to permit them to

compound the offences and to record the compromise.


4.    It is stated by 2nd respondent-defacto complainant in the

affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.1 of 2023 that as per the advice of

the well wishers and family elders of both sides, he compromised the

matter. He further stated in the affidavit that there is no coercion,

force or misrepresentation from anybody in giving the said affidavit or

in compounding the present case and out of his free will and wish, he

was giving the affidavit.

5. In a decision in Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi &

another1, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:

"12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh v. State of Punjab1, which read thus:

"29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the

(2022) 8 Supreme 341

criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court

has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship.

14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power.

15. The facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove are peculiar in the present case. Respondent No. 2 is a young lady of 23 years. She feels that going through trial in one case, where she is a complainant and in the other case, wherein she is the accused would rob the prime of her youth. She feels that if she is made to face the trial rather than getting any relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing the trial.

16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No. 2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case, even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts.

17. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in order to give succour to Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings."

6. Today, when the case is called, both the parties are present

before this Court. They produced their respective Aadhar cards in

proof of their identity. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the

learned counsel for 2nd respondent identified both the parties in the

open Court. This Court questioned the de facto complainant with

regard to compromise and he has categorically stated to that extent

that he has voluntarily entered into compromise with the petitioner

herein.

7. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court and

as the parties have entered into a compromise and compounded the

offences, continuation of the impugned proceedings is nothing but

abuse of process of Court, and accordingly, the proceedings in