Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

S.G. Krishnam Raju vs The Registrar Andhra University on 23 March, 2023

Bench: Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD

          WRIT PETITION No. 30031 OF 2018


ORDER:

Heard the submissions of Ms. Popuri Lakshmi

Priyanvitha, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of

Ms.A.Padma, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner and

Ms.Sanutha Patcha, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri

V.Sai Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the Respondents.

2. The prayer in the Writ Petition is as under:

"It is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondent though the mistake committed by the 2nd respondent by issuing proceedings vide No.E1(Supdt)/Genuinness verification/2018, dated 23.07.2018 refusing to correcting the date of birth from 14.09.1976 to 14.06.1978 is as illegal, improper and arbitrary and consequently be set aside the impugned proceedings vide No.E1 (Supdt)/Genuinness verification/2018, dated 23.07.2018 and pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."

3. The case of the Writ Petitioner is that he is an

employee in Dr.Reddy Labs, Hyderabad and that the

employer pointed out discrepancy in the Date of Birth of

the Writ Petitioner, based on several documents submitted

by the Writ Petitioner. It is submitted that the Writ

Petitioner's correct Date of Birth is 14.06.1978, whereas in

the Matriculation Certificate issued by the Andhra

University on 13.11.1992, his Date of Birth is wrongly

recorded as 14.09.1976 instead of 14.06.1978. Ld.

Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioner further submits

that incorrect recording of the Writ Petitioner's Date of

Birth by the Matriculation Board is affecting his age of

superannuation and the Writ Petitioner seeks to rectify the

said date. It is his case that the Respondents namely the

Registrar and Chief Controller of Examination of the

Andhra University have declined to make any changes by

passing the Impugned Order, dated 23.07.2018 (Ex.P1).

4. Ld. Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioner

has submitted the following:

1) VII Class certificate (Ex.P4) - DOB 14.06.1978.

2) Matriculation Certificate (Ex.P5) - DOB 14.09.1976 issued on 13.11.1992.

3) Certificate issued by the Grampanchayat, Jaggampeta, East Godavari District (Ex.P3)- DOB 14.06.1978 issued on 13.08.2008.

4) Aadhar showing the year of birth as 1976.

5) Pan No.BPXPS5494H - DOB 14.09.1976.

6) Passport - DOB 14.09.1976.

5. Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner submits that

in the first document, i.e., the Writ Petitioner's VIIth Class

Certificate, his Date of Birth is recorded as 14.06.1978.

6. Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner also places

reliance on the Certificate issued by the Grampanchayat,

dated 13.08.2008 to establish that Date of Birth of the Writ

Petitioner is 14.06.1978. Ld. Counsel for the Writ

Petitioner submits that since these are the documents,

which are the earliest in point of time, the Date of Birth

mentioned therein, i.e., 14.06.1978, is to be taken as the

correct Date of Birth.

7. Ld. Counsel appearing for the Respondents

submits that the Writ Petitioner has approached the

Respondents Authority belatedly and as per the Rules, the

candidates who are desirous of getting their Date of Birth

altered/modified should approach the Respondent

Authority within three years from the date completion of

Matriculation Examination, whereas, admittedly, the Writ

Petitioner has approached the Respondents Authority only

in the year 2018 (i.e. after 26 years from the date of issue

of Matriculation Certificate). Ld. Counsel appearing for the

Respondents submits that even the record pertaining to

the Writ Petitioner may not be traceable at this point of

time. It is further submitted by the Ld. Counsel appearing

for the Respondents that as per G.O.Ms.No.430,

EDUCATION (EE.1) DEPARTMENT, dated 31.12.1992, the

alteration/modification concerning Date of Birth can be

made only within three years from the date of completion of

course.

8. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent has placed on

record a Judgment rendered by the Composite High Court

of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in (2017) 4 ALD 268 :

(2017) 3 ALT 271 titled as Ch.Chinnakishore Venukoti

vs. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Commissioner

& Director of School Education and submitted that the

claim made by the Writ Petitioner is clearly barred by time.

9. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents has referred to

Paragraph Nos.8, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of the said Judgment,

which are usefully extracted hereunder:

"8. The only point that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the request of the petitioner for correction of the date of birth in the educational certificates issued by the competent authorities can be directed to be corrected after a period of 19 years?

12. CIDCO (supra) is a case relating to the entry of date of birth in the service records. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held that the organization is bound by the date of birth shown in the official records. In the said decision, though it was held that deaths and births register maintained by the statutory authorities raises a presumption of correctness, such entries made in the statutory registers are admissible in evidence in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act and would prevail over an entry made in the school register. The aid of such observations cannot be taken in the present case, which is initiated after 19 years.

13. In Mohd.Yunus Khans case (supra) the Supreme Court noticed that no time frame was prescribed by the Rules and as it found that there was still four more years of service left to the employee and the employee having applied for correction immediately after coming to know of the mistake, it was held that the case of the employee requires to be considered. The relevant observations are as follows:

No material has been placed before us in regard to existence of a statutory rule fixing a time-frame for filing an application for correction of the date of birth in the service record. Even if there was such a provision, the same, in our opinion, would not be of much significance as the respondents had not shown that the mistake in the matter of recording of date of birth in the service

record was known to the appellant at any earlier point of time. If the appellants contention is correct that he came to learn about it only in April 1988 whereafter he filed a representation, it must be held that there was no delay on his part in this behalf. An employee may take action as is permissible in law only after coming to know that a mistake has been committed by the employer.

17. The Supreme Court in T.V.Venugopalan and Khadeer Khadri cases (surpa) upheld the orders of the Government rejecting the request for correction of dates of birth long after the expiry of the prescribed period specified in the rules. In Mohd.Sarifuz Zamans case (supra), the Supreme Court upheld the prescription of three year period in the regulations for correction of date of birth. In the said case, the student applied for correction of his date of birth within 8 years of passing the matriculation examination. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are found in the following paras:

10. Nobody can claim a right to have an entry corrected in a certificate solemnly issued by an educational institution, that too the one enjoying the status of a statutory Board under the Act. The right of the applicant to have an error or mistake corrected is accompanied by a duty or obligation on the part of the Board to correct its records and the certificate issued by it. Not only it is a corresponding duty or obligation, it has also to be perceived as a power exercisable by the Board to correct an entry appearing in the certificate issued by it. People, institutions and government departments etc. - all attach a very high degree of reliability, near finality, to the entries made in the certificates issued by the Board. The frequent exercise of power to correct entries in certificates and that too without any limitation on exercise of such power would render the power itself arbitrary and may result in eroding the credibility of certificates issued by the Board. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the contention that the applicants seeking correction of entries in such certificates have any such right or vested right.

11. Lastly, the submission cannot also be countenanced that the regulatory measure engrafted into the Regulations on the subject of correction of errors in the certificates is absolute in nature. The Regulation permits correction but subject only to reasonable restrictions.

12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys the remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit of discretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss of limitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is a principle based on public policy and utility and not equity alone. There ought to be a limit of time by which human affairs stand settled and uncertainty is lost. Regulation 8 confers a right on the applicant and a power coupled with an obligation on the Board to make correction in the date of birth subject to the ground of wrong calculation or clerical error being made out. A reasonable procedure has been prescribed for processing the application through the Inspector of Schools who would verify the school records and submit report to the Board so as to exclude from consideration the claims other than those permissible within the framework of Regulation

8. Power to pass order for correction is vested on a high functionary like Secretary of the Board. An inaccuracy creeping in at the stage of writing the certificates only, though all other prior documents are correct in all respects, is capable of being corrected within a period of three years from the date of issuance of certificate.

13. Three years period provided by the Regulation, is a very reasonable period. On the very date of issuance of the certificate the concerned student is put to notice as to the entries made in the certificate. Everyone remembers his age and date of birth. The student would realize within no time that the date of birth as entered in the certificate is not correct, if that be so, once the certificate is placed in his hands. Based on the certificate the applicant would seek admission elsewhere in an educational

institution or might seek a job or career where he will have to mention his age and date of birth. Even if he failed to notice the error on the date of issuance of the certificate, he would come to know the same shortly thereafter. Thus, the period of three years, as prescribed by Regulation 3, is quite reasonable. It is not something like prescribing a period of limitation for filing a suit. The prescription of three years is laying down of a dividing line before which the power of the Board to make correction ought to be invoked and beyond which it may not be invoked. Belated applications, if allowed to be received, may open a pandoras box. Records may not be available and evidence may have been lost. Such evidence - even convenient evidence - may be brought into existence as may defy scrutiny. The prescription of three years bar takes care of all such situations. The provision is neither illegal nor beyond the purview of Section 24 of the Act and also cannot be called arbitrary or unreasonable. The applicants seeking rectification within a period of three years form a class by themselves and such prescription has a reasonable nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved. No fault can be found therewith on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution.

18. In the instant case the petitioner completed Post Graduation on the basis of the date of birth mentioned in the school records at the time of admission. He cannot attribute lack of knowledge. This Writ Petition was filed only when he realized that he would be crossing the maximum age prescribed by the UPSC for attending Civil Services examination. Based on the date of birth recorded in the school records, the petitioner might have taken several steps during the past years and though there cannot be any dispute with regard to the birth certificate issued by the proper authority supported by evidence of the hospital authorities, no direction can be given in the instant case based on those certificates after lapse of 19 years."

10. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents has submitted

that such stale claims cannot be entertained. She has

further submitted that as per the academic practices

adopted by the Respondents, in order to enable a candidate

to appear in the Matriculation Examination, the candidate

should have completed 14 years age by August of that

year. It is further submitted that the Matriculation

Certificate is issued on 13.11.1992, wherein the Date of

Birth of the Writ Petitioner is correctly shown as

14.09.1976. It is submitted that if the claim of the Writ

Petitioner is entertained and the Date of Birth is to be

construed as 14.06.1978, the Writ Petitioner would be only

13 years 2 months and 16 days by August, 1991, and

therefore, he could not have been eligible for pursuing the

Matriculation course commencing from June, 1991 and

could not have appeared in the Matriculation Examination

for that academic year. Therefore, by necessary

implication, the Writ Petitioner would have completed 14

years by August, 1991 if his Date of Birth is to be reckoned

as 14.09.1976, for which reason, he was permitted to be

admitted to study Matriculation and also eventually appear

in the examination.

11. After having heard the contentions on either

side and after having perused the pleadings and the

documents filed by the Writ Petitioner and the

Respondents, this Court finds that the Birth Certificate

produced by the Writ Petitioner, which is issued by the

Office of the Gram Panchayat, Jaggampet, on 30.08.2008,

shows the Date of Birth of the Writ Petitioner as

14.06.1978; whereas, the Matriculation Certificate, the

Passport, the PAN, as well as the Aadhar indicate that the

date, month and year of birth of the Writ Petitioner is

14.09.1976. The Writ Petitioner thereafter has graduated

himself and secured a job. As the age of superannuation

in private service is 58 years, the Writ Petitioner has

decided to get the Date of Birth rectified as 14.06.1978

instead of 14.09.1976 so that his date of superannuation

can be delayed for about 2 years, in other words, he could

retire/superannuate two years later which is a great

benefit in the employment.

12. It appears from the record that there is

overwhelming evidence against the Writ Petitioner to the

effect that his Date of Birth would be 14.09.1976, while the

proposed Date of Birth indicating as 14.06.1978 is not

satisfactory to this Court.

13. It is settled law that the stale claim cannot be

entertained by the Official Respondents inasmuch as the

record/evidence would not have been available due to

mutilation or destruction due to afflux of time. This apart,

the very conduct of the Writ Petitioner in approaching the

authorities only in the year 2018 to rectify his Date of

Birth, that too, several decades later (after 26 years) is not

inspiring any confidence. This Court is in agreement with

the submission made by the Ld. Counsel appearing for the

Respondents to the effect that if this Court would construe

his Date of Birth to be 14.06.1978, he could not have

qualified himself to seek admission in Matriculation in

June, 1991 and consequently appear in the Matriculation

Examination that would be conducted in April/May, 1992;

and therefore, the Court holds that it is highly improbable

that his Date of Birth would be 14.06.1978. It is,

therefore, highly probable that his Date of Birth is

14.09.1976.

14. Delay and Laches:

Delay defeats Equity. Law protects only the vigilant and not the indolent is the well settled legal position. Precedents laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India are as under:

(a) In State of Orissa &Anr. Vs. Mamata Mohanty: (2011) 3 SCC 436 at Para 53, while dealing with the effect of Delay/Laches, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

"53. Needless to say that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and the writ petitions are dismissed at the admission stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay scale medium rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the Court may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In the instant case, the respondent claimed the relief from 1-1-1986 by filing a petition on 11-11-2005 at the High Court for some unexplained reason granted relief with effect from 1-6-1984 even the Notification dated 17-1989 makes it applicable w.e.f 1-1- 1986."

(b) In Baljeet Singh (dead) through LRs. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Coram 3): (2019) 15 SCC 33, at Para 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

"7. The matter requires examination from another aspect viz. laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the unreasonable delay........................................... To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he could be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles of sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-

existent." (Emphasis supplied)

(b) In C.Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and Mining and another: (2008) 10 SCC 115, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

"13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage

indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.

14. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for "consideration". If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing "consideration" of such claims.

15. The present case is a typical example of "representation and relief". The petitioner keeps quiet for 18 years after the termination. A stage is reached when no record is available regarding his previous service. In the representations which he makes in 2000, he claims that he should be taken back to service. But on rejection of the said representation by order dated 9-4-2002, he filed a writ petition claiming service benefits, by referring the said order of rejection as the cause of action. As noticed above, the learned Single Judge examined the claim, as if it was a live claim made in time, finds fault with the respondents for not producing material to show that termination was preceded by due enquiry and declares the termination as illegal. But as the petitioner has already reached the age of superannuation, the learned Single Judge grants the relief of pension with effect from 18-7-1982, by deeming that he was retired from service on that day. We fail to understand how the learned Single Judge could declare a termination in 1982 as illegal in a writ petition filed in 2005. We fail to understand how the learned Single Judge could find fault with the Department of Mines and Geology, for failing to prove that a termination made in 1982, was preceded by an enquiry in a proceedings initiated after 22 years, when the Department in which the petitioner had worked had been wound up as long back as in 1983 itself and the new Department had no records of his service."

15. Therefore, the prayer in this Writ Petition is not

only hit by laches but it is also devoid of any merits in view

of the above discussion. The Writ Petition is dismissed

with costs of Rs.10,000/-. The costs of Rs.10,000/- shall

be deposited into the account of the Andhra Pradesh High

Court Bar Association within a period of four weeks from

the date of uploading of Order on the Website of this Court.

16. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed

in terms of this Common Order.

________________________________ G. RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J

Dt: 23.03.2023.

SDP