Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
T.Muthyala Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 10 March, 2023
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO
Writ Petition Nos.350 and 390 of 2020
COMMON ORDER:
Petitioners pray for Writ of Mandamus declaring the award
No.1 of 1998, dt.12.03.1998 in respect of their lands situated in
Vedanthapuram Village, Tirupathi Mandal, Chittoor District is
arbitrary, illegal, contrary and violation of articles 14, 21 and 300-
A of Constitution of India and contrary to Section 24(2) of Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short „the
REFCTLARR Act, 2013‟) as the said award was lapsed and
consequently declare earlier acquisition proceedings as lapsed and
direct the respondents not to interfere with the possession of
petitioners lands.
2. Writ Petition No.350 of 2020 filed by the petitioner seeking
the above prayer in respect of his land in extent of Ac.0-67 cents in
Sy.No.204/7 situated in Vedanthapuram Village, whereas Writ
Petition No.390 of 2020 is filed by three petitioners in respect of
their lands in an extent of Ac.0-50 cents in Sy.No.203-3N; Ac.0-90
cents in Sy.No.203-30; Ac.0-51 cents in Sy.No.203-3P; Ac.0-43
cents in Sy.No.203-3Q; Ac.0-44 cents in Sy.No.203-3R are totaling
Ac.2-78 cents also situated in Vedanthapuram Village, Tirupathi
Mandal, Chittoor District.
3. The case of the petitioners is thus:
(a) The petitioners are owners of their respective lands. The
2nd respondent vide proceedings Roc.No.D6/17412/92, dated
09.11.1992 approved the acquisition of Ac.25-22 cents in
Sy.Nos.196, 202, 203 and 204 of Vedanthapuram Village, on the
request of 3rd respondent for acquisition of the land for the purpose
of "Sites and Services". After issuing notification under Section
4(1) and Section 6, the 4th respondent passed award No.1/98, dated
12.03.1998. The respondent authorities assured to provide house
plots to the petitioners but the same was not complied.
(b) Since the petitioners and some others did not agree for
the compensation as provided by the Land Acquisition Officer, he
referred the matter under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(for short "the Act, 1894) and same was numbered as
L.A.O.P.No.341 of 1998 and the said O.P was disposed on
28.08.2012 confirming the value fixed by the Land Acquisition
Officer (LAO). However all these years no compensation was paid
to the petitioners and in spite of the award being passed in 1998, all
the land owners including petitioners have been in continuous
possession of their respective lands and the respondents have never
taken possession of the lands. Thus, the purpose of acquisition was
not fulfilled.
(c) Subsequently, in the year 2007 when the respondents
issued similar notification vide Roc.No.G3/8810/2007, dated
24.07.2007 for acquiring neighbouring lands in Sy.No.202/3B of
Vedanthapuram Village for an extent of Ac.2-52 cents for the
similar purpose of "Sites and Services", the said notification was
challenged by the respective owners by filing writ petition before
High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the purpose for
which the lands was sought to be acquired i.e., "Sites and Services"
is vague. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated
14.07.2016 which became final as the same was not challenged by
the respondents therein.
(d) While so, in the instant case also the purpose i.e.,
"Sites and Services" mentioned in the notification issued by the 2 nd
respondent is vague since it is not clarified as to what is meant by
"Sites and Services" and for whose benefit the said "Sites and
Services" was proposed. The State cannot acquire land of a citizen
except in the public interest and for public benefit. In the absence
of details as to the alleged public purpose for which the land is
sought to be acquired, no one can comprehend as to why the land is
being acquired.
(e) In the instant case, as stated supra the purpose is too
vague and though respondents claim that they took symbolic
possession of the land, in fact the petitioners and other owners have
been in continuous possession of the land. In view of the facts that
the possession has not been taken and the compensation has not
been paid to the petitioners, Section 24 of the REFCTLARR Act,
2013 will apply and thereby the earlier Land Acquisition
Proceedings will be lapsed automatically by virtue of the Section
24(2) of the said Act.
(f) The petitioners and other owners who are affected by
the above Land Acquisition Proceedings, submitted representations
dated 19.04.2018 and 17.05.2019 to the 1st respondent requesting
to drop the proceedings as the same are hit by Section 24 of
REFCTLARR Act, 2013 as stated supra. However, there is no
response from the respondents, on the other hand after the lapse of
more than 20 years, respondents are now trying to interfere with
the possession of the petitioners in respect of their lands and trying
to evict them. Earlier in the year 2017, when the respondents
similarly tried to dispossess some of the land owners, they filed
Writ Petition No.70 of 2018 and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
directed the respondents not to interfere with the possession of
petitioners therein pending writ petition. The said writ petition is
pending adjudication before this High Court. Again the
respondents are now trying to meddle with the lands of the
petitioners.
Hence the writ petition.
4. Respondents 2 and 4 filed counter opposing the two writ
petitions contending as follows:
(a) In 1992 after obtaining orders from Government vide
letter No.460/I2/92-2 MA, dated 15.07.1992 the 3rd respondent
placed requisition before the 4th respondent and accordingly the 4th
respondent initiated proceedings for acquisition of Ac.25-22 cents
of patta land in Vedantapuram Village under the provisions of the
Act, 1894 under „Sites and Services‟ programme. A notification
under Section 4(1) was issued and declaration under Section 6 of
the Act, 1894 was published for the following lands:
Sy.No. Extent
196/2A 0.40
196/2B 0.53
196/2C 1.41
196/2D 0.94
196/2E 1.10
202/1A 0.09
202/1B 0.05
202/2 0.22
202/3A 10.32
203/3A 0.10
203/3B 0.08
203/3C 0.03
203/3D 0.10
203/3E 0.35
203/3F 0.12
203/3G 0.71
203/3H 0.61
203/3I 0.34
203/3J 0.34
203/3K 0.34
203/3L 0.34
203/3M 0.44
203/3N 0.50
203/3‟O‟ 0.90
203/3P 0.51
203/3Q 0.43
203/3R 0.44
204/3A 0.02
204/3B 0.04
204/3C 0.05
204/3D 0.05
204/3E 0.05
204/3F 0.05
204/4 0.68
204/5 0.33
204/6 0.66
204/7 0.57
204/8 0.02
204/9 0.72
204/10 0.10
TOTAL 25.22
(b) Award No.1/1993, dated 16.06.1993 was passed initially
for Ac.13.26 cents only out of total extent by excluding an extent
of Ac.11.96 cents for the reason that the interested persons
including the mother of the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 filed
writ petitiones questioning the notification and obtained stay
orders. After dismissal of the writ petitions and writ appeals,
Award No.1/1998 was passed on 12.03.1998 for the remaining
extent of land. Both the awards were passed by strictly following
due process of the Act, 1894. It is false to contend that the
respondents promised to allot house plots to the owners of the
acquired lands.
(c) It is also false to contend that compensation was not paid.
In fact after passing of the award No.1/1993, dated 16.06.1993
compensation was paid to the awardees and possession of the
entire land of Ac.13.26 cents was taken and handed over to 3 rd
respondent vide acknowledgment dated 21.06.1993.
(d) So far as land owners covered by award No.1/1998,
dated 12.03.1998 are concerned, they filed W.P.Nos.5320/93,
5327/93, 5367/93, 5539/93, 5540/93, 5569/93, 5282/93, 8226/93,
9298/93 and 11236/93 challenging the validity of 4(1) notification
on the ground that the acquisition for „Sites and Services" is vague
and ambiguous. Those writ petitions were dismissed by a common
order dated 13.06.1994. The writ appeal No.1071/1994 which was
fled assailing the common order was also dismissed by the order
dated 25.03.1996. After exhausting all the legal impediments, the
4th respondent passed the award No.1/1998 in respect of remaining
Ac.11.94 cents and after passing of the award, the petitioners and
some others started second round of litigation by filing
W.P.No.3131/2012 challenging the award No.1/1998 on the same
ground that the purpose of notification namely "Sites and Services"
is ambiguous. The said petition was also dismissed by order dated
15.02.2012. Ergo, the petitioner now cannot question the said
issue once again at this length of time, as the previous orders in
W.P.s, W.A.s will operate as res judicata.
(e) Other contention of the petitioners that in respect of
neighbouring Sy.No.202/3B for an extent of Ac.2.52 cents a
notification was issued and same was challenged and the writ
petition was allowed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is
concerned, the said issue is irrelevant in the present case as both
the notifications are separate. The neighbouring lands are
concerned, a separate notification under Section 4(1) of the Act,
1894 was issued in the year 2007 which was challenged by the land
owners and notification was quashed. The said order was passed
without taking into consideration the earlier orders dated
30.06.1994, 25.03.1996 and 15.02.2012 wherein the similar
contention raised by the petitioners was negatived by this High
Court.
(f) It is further stated that challenging the award No.1/1998,
dated 12.03.1998, the mother of the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020
and some others filed W.P.Nos.17076, 17077, 17078, 17108,
17109 and 17110 of 2000 and those writ petitions and their
corresponding writ appeals i.e., W.A.Nos.317, 320, 321, 322, 323
and 325 of 2003 and even SLP No.3972/2007 filed before Hon‟ble
Supreme Court were all dismissed on 21.01.2003, 22.12.2006 and
09.03.2007 respectively.
(g) It is further contended that the contention of the
petitioners that after passing of the award in the year 1998 no
compensation was paid to the petitioner and others and they are in
continuous possession is not true and correct. In fact the total
award amount of Rs.19,01,607/- under award No.1/1998, dated
12.03.1998 was deposited in the Court of III Additional District
Judge, Tirupathi vide bankers cheque No.264237, dated
13.07.1998 and referred the matter under Section 30 and 31 of the
Act, 1894 since the interested persons including mother of the
petitioner did not attend for enquiry and produce documentary
evidence to prove title before the LAO in respect of the acquired
lands though statutory notices were served on them. Learned III
Additional District Judge conducted enquiry in L.A.O.P.No. 341 of
1998 and disposed the case by order dated 28.08.2012 holding that
the claimants failed to establish their respective claims over the
acquired lands in respect of which the reference was made and
therefore till the claimants establish their claims in a civil Court,
they cannot be declared as persons entitled to receive
compensation. It is further stated that on the request of some of the
owners, the LAO referred the matter U/s 18 of the Act and learned
III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi registered the case as
LAOP No.44/1999 and after enquiry disposed of the said LAOP by
confirming the award No.1 of 1998.
(h) The entire extent under award No.1/1998 was taken
physical possession under the cover of "panchanama" dated
15.03.1998 by LAO and handed over to 3rd respondent. The lands
were mutated in favour of the Vice-Chairman, Tirupathi Urban
Development Authority (TUDA), Tirupathi in the revenue records
of Vedanthapuram Village. The lands were reclaimed, layout was
approved for an extent of Ac.25-22 cents and house plots were sold
to the general public by way of public auction and the plots
covered under remaining extent were kept pending in view of the
Court litigation. The said extent was fenced with barbed wire and
name plate was also erected indicating that the land belongs to
TUDA. Hence the contention of the petitioners that they are still in
possession and compensation was not paid is not correct. As such
the question of lapse of earlier acquisition proceedings in terms of
Section 24(2) of REFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not arise. The writ
petitions are not maintainable and they may be dismissed.
5. The 3rd respondent also filed separate counter in both the
writ petitions with averments similar to the counter filed by
respondents 2 and 4.
6. Petitioners in W.P.No.390/2020 filed additional affidavit
with the following main averments.
(a) Section 4(1) notification was issued by the Special
Deputy Collector, (Land Acquisition) in the name of dead persons
(i.e., pattadar and enjoyer). However, in the noties U/s 5(A) of the
Act, 1894 calling for objections, surprisingly the signatures of the
dead persons were mentioned. Except C. Shankar Reddy, no one
was alive as on the date of 4(1) notification or at the stage of
notices U/s 5(A). Hence the acquisition proceedings are vitiated.
(b) It is submitted that at the request of aggrieved parties, the
Government stayed the land acquisition proceedings. Upon the
representation of small farmers, Hon‟ble Minister took up the
matter on 19.11.1997 in proceedings No.1819/M/MA&UD/97 and
thereafter respondent Principal Secretary stayed the proceedings in
question on 25.11.1997 pending further orders vide letter
No.27263/12/97-IMA. The said stay order is in operation till
10.03.1998. Hence as per Section 11(A) of the Act, 1894, the
entire land acquisition proceedings were lapsed on 25.03.1998.
These facts were suppressed by the respondents.
(c) Land acquisition proceedings were contrary to
G.O.Ms.No.911 MA issued by the Housing, Municipal
Administration and Urban Development (I-2) Department, dated
09.11.1987 and on that ground the writ petitions deserve to be
allowed.
(d) In Roc.No.307/G/92 it is evident that till 19.03.1998 the
draft letter to the LAO was not approved and the said letter reached
the LAO on 20.03.1998. Further on 15.03.1998 (Sunday)
panchanama was conducted which shows that the panchanama was
prepared later.
(e) According to respondents 11-A proceedings were issued
on 12.03.1998. However letter in Roc.No.307/G/92, dated
19.03.1998 the draft award was not finalized and hence issuance of
notice dated 12.03.1998 would not arise. The said notice was
received by C. Shankar Reddy on 25.03.1998 and hence it is clear
that the respondents put an anti date in the said notice. The
signatures of the individuals were forged. Hence the acquisition
proceedings may be quashed.
7. Heard Sri K. A. Narasimham, learned counsel representing
Sri V. Sai Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned
Government Pleader for Revenue representing respondents 1 & 2
and Sri I. Koti Reddy, counsel representing Sri P.Muni Reddy,
Standing Counsel for TUDA.
8. Severely fulminating the award No.1/1998 dated 12.03.1998
learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K.A. Narasimham would
strenuously argue that the said award, since inception was fraught
with many incorrigible procedural violations and therefore the
same is liable to be set aside. He would expatiate that there was no
involvement of public purpose whatsoever in the instant
acquisition proceedings which should be the corner stone for land
acquisition proceedings. Referring to the Notification dated
09.11.1992 issued U/s Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 he would
argue that the notification does not depict that proposal or request
for acquisition was mooted by 3rd respondent. Further, the alleged
public purpose mentioned therein as "for sites and services
programmes" is as dubious and indiscernible as it could be.
Neither the above patent and cryptic phraseology nor the latent
intendment of the authorities spelled out that the acquisition was
for a true public purpose, because the so-called sites and services
were not even insinuatingly meant for poor and homeless weaker
sections of the society but the acquisition like any other private
commercial venture, was intended to provide housing sites to the
rich and opulent section. Hence the acquisition did not pass the
test of „public purpose‟ U/s 3(f) of the Act, 1894. When the very
object of the acquisition is divested of the spirit of public purpose,
he would argue, the notification should fall to ground at the
inception itself. He placed reliance on
(i) Srinivasa Cooperative House Building Society Ltd.
v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry1
(ii) Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi2
(iii) Radhy Shyam (Dead) through LRs v. State of Uttar
Pradesh3
(iv) Gajjela Narasimha Reddy v. Collector, Ranga
Reddy District4
(v) Common Order dated 14.07.2016 in
W.P.Nos.24580 & 24756 of 2007 passed by Hon'ble
Sri Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao
(a) Nextly, learned counsel would argue that Section 4(1)
Notification was vitiated also for the reason that in the said
notification the names of some of the deceased owners were
1994 (4) SCC 675
(1992) 2 SCC 168 = MANU/SC/0484/1992
2011 (5) SCC 553
2008 (5) ALT 233 = 2008(5) Andh LD 302
shown. However, curiously, the signatures of such deceased
persons were found in the objections statements, recorded U/s 5(a)
of the Act, 1894. Therefore, both Section 4(1) Notification as well
as the meaningful enquiry contemplated U/s 5(a) lost their
significance. He relied on Ramji Veerji Patel v. Revenue
Divisional Officer5 to project the avowed object of Section 5(a).
(b) Nextly learned counsel argued that as per Section 11(A)
of the Land Acquisition Act, the award should be passed within a
period of two years from the date of publication of declaration,
failing which the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. In the
instant case declaration U/s 6 of the Act, 1894 was made on
20.04.1993. However, award was passed only on 12.03.1998. In
the interregnum except the stay granted by the Government vide
the letter No.27263/12/1997-1MA, dated 25.11.1997 issued by the
Principal Secretary, no Court stay was in vogue. Therefore, the
entire acquisition proceedings including the award are hit by
Section 11(A).
(c) Finally learned counsel argued that on the representation
of the writ petitioners and some others, stay of acquisition was
MANU/SC/1288/2011
granted by the Government and thereafter, though stay was said to
be vacated as alleged by the respondents, no vacate order copy was
served on the petitioners and the petitioners and others are still in
effective possession of the subject lands and further, compensation
has not been paid to the petitioners and in that view, the award
No.1/1998 dated 12.03.1998 is hit by Section 24 of the
REFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the acquisition is unsustainable in
the eye of law. Therefore, if the respondents want, they have to
initiate land acquisition proceedings afresh in accordance with the
provisions of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013. He relied upon
D.Mahesh Kumar v. State of Telangana, Department of
Revenue, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Hyderabad6.
Thus he prayed to allow the writ petitions.
9. Per contra, Sri I. Koti Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for
3rd respondent and Sri Muni Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for
4th respondent vehemently argued that the writ petitions are liable
to be dismissed in limini for the reason that on the same grounds
now raised by the petitioners, their predecessors have filed writ
2017 (1) ALT 400 (D.B)
petitions in the earlier round of litigation by challenging Section
4(1) notification dated 09.11.1992 and those batch of writ petitions
after thorough hearing were dismissed by the Common High Court
of Andhra Pradesh and the resultant appeals were also dismissed
holding that there was no vagueness or ambiguity in the
terminology „sites and services‟ employed in Section 4(1)
notification and the same is meant for public purpose.
(a) After dismissal of the appeals, the 4th respondent passed
Award No.1/1998 in respect of litigated lands in an extent of
Ac.11.96 cents and when the predecessors in title of the present
writ petitioners and some others did not attend enquiry, referred the
award to learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi U/s 30 and
31 of the Act, 1894 and deposited the award amount in the Court.
They would further argue that learned III Additional District Judge,
Tirupathi conducted enquiry in L.A.O.P.No.341 of 1998 and
disposed of the case vide order dated 28.08.2012 holding that the
claimants before him could not establish their respective claims.
Similarly, on the request of some of the claimants who challenged
quantum of compensation, Land Acquisition Officer (LAO)
referred the matter U/s 18 of the Act, 1894 to III Additional
District Judge, Tirupathi and learned Judge disposed of the LAOP
No.44/1999 by confirming the award No.1 of 1998. Learned
counsel would strenuously argue that the present writ petitions are
not maintainable in view of the earlier round of litigation which
was decided against their predecessors and also for the reason that
their predecessors failed to succeed in the corresponding LAOPs
referred U/s 18 and 30 of the Act, 1894. Learned counsel would
thus contend that the writ petitions are hit by the principle of res
judicata.
(b) Learned counsel nextly argued that writ petitions shall
fail also due to the enormous indolence of the petitioners who
woke up from slumber and re-agitated the cause already decided
more than 20 years ago. No plausible explanation for delay was
offered by the petitioners. Therefore, for the inexplicable and
inordinate delay the writ petitions deserve dismissal. They placed
reliance on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal7.
(c) Thirdly, they argued that the common order dated
14.07.2016 in W.P.Nos.24580 and 24756 of 2007 passed by
(2020) 8 SCC 129
learned single judge of Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh
has no relevancy with the notification under issue in the instant
case. But for the fact that the lands in both the set of matters
situate in Vedanthapuram, the acquisition proceedings are quite
different. The judgments in the writ petitions filed by the
predecessors of the petitioners were not placed before learned
single judge in W.P.No.24580/2007 and batch. In that view
probably learned judge came to conclusion that the wording „sites
and services‟ in the notification under challenge was vague and
accordingly allowed the batch of writ petitions. However, the said
judgment will not have any bearing on the present writ petitions.
(d) Nextly while refuting the contentions of the petitioners
that they are still in possession of the subject lands, learned counsel
for respondents argued that soon after passing the award, the LAO
took possession of the lands and handed over to TUDA wherein the
development activities have been conducted and some plots were
also sold. Learned counsel thus vehemently argued that since
possession was taken and compensation was deposited in the Court
by following due process of law, the question of award No.1/1998
hit by Section 24 of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not arise.
Thus they prayed to dismiss the writ petitions.
10. As a reply, Sri K.A.Narasimham argued that the Act 1894
being an expropriatory legislation, the LAO shall meticulously
follow the procedure contemplated under the law. However, in the
instant case, as there were numerous violations, such as vagueness
in the purpose; non-disclosure of proposal by the 3rd respondent;
non-holding of meaningful enquiry under Section 5A; non-passing
of the award within the time stipulated under Section 11A of the
Act, 1894; non-payment of compensation to the petitioners and not
taking of possession, the award is vitiated and the previous orders
which dealt with only some of the procedural violations will not
operate as res judicata as the present writ petitions are filed
projecting all the lapses in acquisition. He relied upon Mathura
Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B.Jeejeebhoy8
11. The points for consideration are:
(i) Whether the writ petitions are hit by principles of
res judicata?
MANU/SC/0420/1970 = AIR 1971 SC 2355
(ii) Whether objections-enquiry under Section 5A of
the Act 1894 was hit by fraud?
(iii) Whether the award 1/1998 was not passed within
the time stipulated U/s 11(A) of the Act, 1894 and thereby
it was lapsed?
(iv) Whether award No.1/1998 is hit by Sec. 24 of the
REFCTLARR Act, 2013?
12. Point No.1 : The petitioners are questioning the award
No.1/1998 on the following main contentions:
(i) In Section 4(1) notification, there was no mention about
the proposal initiated by 3rd respondent requiring the land for
TUDA. Hence acquisition was sought to be made without any
requisition by a particular agency.
(ii) The requirement for sites and services programme by
TUDA is vague and misleading and does not disclose any public
purpose, de horse of which, acquisition cannot be undertaken.
(iii) No meaningful enquiry as contemplated under Section
5A of the Act 1894 was conducted as some of the owners of the
lands died long prior to Section 4(1) notification, but curiously
their signatures were found on the statement of objections recorded
during the enquiry. Hence, the acquisition is hit by fraud.
13. In the light of above contentions, I perused the record
produced by the respondents 3 and 4 in two volumes. The volume
with the name "D-DIS-G1/307/92", contains at page 15 the letter in
D.O.ROC.No.307/G1/92, dated 12.02.1992 addressed by the 3rd
respondent to the 1st respondent wherein he clearly mentioned the
need for acquisition of the lands, He stated that to promote land
growth centres around the town, the TUDA has identified Ac.25.22
cents of land in Vedanthapuram village. He further mentioned that
vide G.O.Ms.No.25 MA, dt;21.01.1987 the Government have
permitted to initiate land acquisition proposals in the larger interest
of planned and integrated development of urban areas. As there is
demand for plots on the southern side of the town and as it was
economically viable project, he requested the 1st respondent to
forward his requisition to screening committee for approval.
(a) Then the letter No.460/12/92-2, MA, dated 15.07.1992
addressed by the Joint Secretary, MA & UD Department to the 3 rd
respondent shows that the screening committee in its meeting held
on 04.05.1992 cleared the above acquisition proposal of the 3rd
respondent.
(b) Thereafter, U/s 3(c) of the Act, 1894, the Governor of
A.P. appointed Special Deputy Collector (LA) (TUDA), Tirupathi
to perform the functions of Collector U/s 5(a) of the Act, 1894 and
the said officer submitted draft notification U/s 4(1) of the Act,
1894 to the 2nd respondent for approval and vide proceedings No.
B6/17412/92, dt: 09.11.1992, the 2nd respondent while approving
the draft notification sent it for publication in the A.P. Gazette -
issue No.CTR 192, dated 10.11.1992.
(c) Thereafter, the Special Deputy Collector issued Section
4(1) notification. Then Section 5(A) enquiry was conducted on
09.03.1993 by serving notices on the interested persons and giving
them opportunity to put forth their objections. Thereafter, the draft
declaration proposal u/s 6 of the LA Act was submitted to the
District Collector, Chittoor by LAO, TUDA on 31.03.1993 and
same was approved by the Collector vide proceedings
No.B10/17412/92, dated 15.04.1993 and was published in the A.P.
Gazette Extraordinary, Issue No.217, dated 20.04.1993 and also
published in local papers.
14. While so, out of the proposed extent of Ac.25.22 cents, since
there was no dispute with regard to Ac.13.26 cents, the LAO
passed award No.1/1993, dated 16.06.1993 (vide page No.217 of
the file) and allowed the compensation of Rs.19,14,779/-.
15. So far as remaining extent of Ac.11.96 cents is concerned,
challenging the Section 4(1) notification some of the land owners
filed batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh. Thota Subbamma, the mother of the petitioner in
W.P.No.350/2020 filed W.P.No.5539/1993. Whereas C. Shankar
Reddy, the 1st petitioner in W.P.No.390/2020 and E. Pulla Reddy,
the husband of 3rd petitioner in W.P.No.390/2020 filed
W.P.No.6653/1993. Inter alia, the contention of the petitioners
was that the purpose of acquisition mentioned as „sites and services
programme‟ was very vague and there was no public purpose
involved. After hearing, the writ petitions were dismissed by a
learned single Judge vide common order dated 13.06.1994 with the
following observations:
"Public purpose is defined under
Section 3(f) of the Act 1894. The land
required under any scheme of development
by any local authorities with the approval of
appropriate Government is also for public
purpose. Under Section 18 of the Andhra
Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act,
1975, it is open to the Government to acquire
any land required for the purpose of
development or for any other purpose under
this Act and the Government can acquire
such land under the provisions of the Act
1894. This is exactly what is done in this
case." (emphasis supplied).
(a) Disagreeing with the argument of the petitioners that the
expression "sites and services programme" was vague and the
persons interested cannot understand the purpose for which it was
sought to be acquired and that the TUDA was aiming at deriving
profit by dividing the land into sites and distributing the same to
the public at higher costs which cannot be said to be for a public
purpose, learned Judge observed thus:
"I cannot accept this contention. The expression "sites
and services programme" is clear enough to indicate division of
land into sites and service by sale. I am of the view that it is
not fatal in view of the authority of the Supreme Court cited in
H.D.Vora v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 866 =
MANU/SC/0309/1984], wherein it was held:
"It is not necessary that the order of requisition
must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is
made. The only requirement of the law is that the
requisitioning must be made for a public purpose and so
long as there is a public purpose for which an order of
requisition is made, it would be valid irrespective of
whether such public purpose is recited in the order of
requisition or not"
(b) Aggrieved, one of the petitioners filed Writ Appeal
No.1071/1994. The said writ appeal and the remaining writ
petitions were heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of the
High Court of A.P. vide order dated 25.03.1996 with the following
observations:
7. The learned counsel for the appellants sought to
rely on a decision of the Supreme Court in MADHYA
PRADESH HOUSING BOARD v. MOHD. SHAFI [1992 (2)
SCC 168] for the proposition that the expression used in the
notification should not be vague. The facts of the said case are
different from the facts of the present case. In the present case
Section 5-A enquiry was conducted and all the persons
concerned including the appellants and petitioners herein, filed
their objections and the same were considered and disposed of.
None of the appellants / petitioners raised the objection that the
purpose mentioned in the notification (ie) „Sites and Services
Programme‟ is vague. Only for the first time in the writ
petitions that they raised such an objection. It is manifest that
under the scheme, the TUDA has to prepare a master plan and
the lands shown in the master plan should be acquired after
identifying the rightful owners. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the notification is vague or untenable (emphasis supplied).
It is well settled principle of law that in the Section 4(1)
notification the entire purpose for which the land has to be
acquired need not be mentioned. It is sufficient if the purpose
for which the land is to be acquired is mentioned and it cannot
be said that the same is vague or untenable".
16. While so, the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 and some other
land owners submitted a representation to the Government to
delink their lands from acquisition (vide page No.285 of the file).
In that view, the Principal Secretary MA & UD Department vide
his letter No.27263/MA, dated 25.11.1997 called for the report of
the 3rd respondent while staying the acquisition of the lands
pending further orders. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent submitted
his report vide D.O. ROC No.307/G1, dated 16.12.1997 and
requested to vacate the stay granted to complete the land
acquisition process. Thereupon, the Principal Secretary, vide his
letter No.27263/12/1997/2/MA, dt: 10.03.1998 communicated to
the 3rd respondent that the stay order issued was vacated and the
request of the small farmers of Vedanthapuram village was
rejected. Consequently, Award No.1/1998 came to be passed by
the LAO on 12.03.1998.
17. After passing of the award also, some writ petitions were
filed. For instance, the petitioners in present writ petition
Nos.350/2020 and 390/2020 and some others filed
W.P.No.3131/2012 seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the
action of the Government in not considering their representation
for deletion of their lands from acquisition as illegal and to direct
the respondents to delete their lands. In the said writ petition also
they questioned the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act as
vague and ambiguous. A learned single Judge of the common
High Court of A.P. considering the submission of learned Standing
Counsel for TUDA that the award was already passed and the land
was divided into plots and substantial number of plots were already
sold, dismissed the writ petition on 15.02.2012.
18. Be that as it may, challenging the award No.1/1998, batch of
writ petition Nos.17076, 17077, 17078, 17108, 17109 & 17110 of
2000 were filed. Thota Subbamma, mother of the petitioner in
W.P.No.350/2020 filed W.P.No.17077/2000, whereas the 1st
petitioner and husband of 3rd petitioner in W.P.No.390/2020 have
filed WP No.17110/2000. In those writ petitions, the petitioners
mainly contended that award No.1/1998 dated 12.03.1998 was
passed after expiry of a period of two years from the date of
publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 and
hence, the award was violative of Section 11(A) of the said Act.
The said W.P.Nos.17076/2000 & batch (C.Munikrishnaiah v.
District Collector9) was dismissed by a learned single Judge with
the following observation:
"18. It is no doubt true that the lands belonging to all
the petitioners herein were proposed for acquisition under the
same notification and the same declaration was given. The
petitioners individually challenged the proceedings in various
writ petitions as noticed hereinabove. E. Pulla Reddy and
others, the petitioners in W.P. No.17110 of 2000 filed W.P. No.
6653 of 1993 and obtained interim order on 19-5-1993. The
interim order was in force till 26-3-1996 and, therefore, no
award should have been passed in respect of the lands of those
persons. Similar is the case in respect of other writ petitioners.
The award passed on 12-3-1998 insofar as the same extent is
concerned, cannot be said to be beyond two years. Further, as
rightly contended, in relation to Acs.13.26 cents, an award
being Award No.1 of 1993 was already passed on 16-6-1993
and the same, in my considered opinion, does not render the
award dated 12-3-1998 passed in relation to other lands
illegal."
(a) Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner filed the
batch of writ appeal Nos.317, 320, 321, 322, 323 and 325 of 2023
and those writ appeals were also dismissed by the Division Bench
by its order dated 22.12.2006 while observing thus:
"The aforementioned two judgments substantially
support the view we have taken that the orders of status quo
passed in different writ petitions and writ appeals filed by the
appellants, which remained effective till 25.3.1996 i.e., the date
on which Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 was dismissed,
effectively prevented respondent No.2 from passing award in
respect of land measuring Ac.11-96 cts. and, therefore, the
MANU/AP/0060/2003
award passed on 12-3-1998 was within the period of two years
specified in Section 11A."
(b) Aggrieved, the petitioners filed Special Leave Petition
No.3972/2007 which was dismissed in limini by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court vide its order dated 09.03.2007.
19. After passing award No.1/1998, the LAO referred the award
to the Court of learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati under
Section 30 of the Act 1894 since some of the owners of the
acquired lands did not appear for conducting enquiry to establish
their title to be eligible for compensation. T.Subbamma, the
mother of petitioner in WP No.350/2020 and the 1 st petitioner in
WP No.390/2020 were shown as respondents therein. Learned III
Additional District Judge, Tirupati conducted enquiry in LAOP
340/1998. Except filing counters, the respondents did not place
any evidence to establish their case. Hence, learned III ADJ
observed that till the claimants establish their claims in a Civil
Court, they cannot be declared as persons entitled to receive
compensation in respect of their respective lands and answered the
reference accordingly vide order dated 28.08.2012.
(a) Be that it may, on the representation of the petitioners in
WP No.390/2020 and some others, the LAO also made a reference
of award No.1/1998 under Section 18 of the Act 1894 to the III
ADJ, Tirupati. Learned Judge after conducting enquiry dismissed
the LAOP No.44/1999 by confirming the award on the ground that
the claimants have not produced any evidence to seek enhanced
compensation for the acquired lands.
20. The above is the past history of long drawn legal battle
against award No.1/1998 as is depicted by the record produced by
the respondents 3 & 4 and the relevant judgments. In the above
backdrop, the contentions now raised by the present petitioners
once again against award No.1/1998 have to be scrutinized.
21. The first contention raised by the petitioners is that Section
4(1) notification is vague, ambiguous and indiscernible by the
owners of the respective lands to put forth their objections and
there is no public purpose involved in the "sites and services
programme" projected in the notification. I find absolutely no
teeth or venom in this contention, for, the said contention was
already raised in W.P.No.5539/1993 & batch by the present
petitioners and learned single Judge in his common order dated
13.06.1994 has rejected the said claim and his observation was
noted in Para 15 of my judgment. So also, in the resultant appeal
No.1071/1994 and other batch of writ petitions, the Division Bench
in its order dated 25.03.1996 while confirming the order of learned
single Judge, dismissed the aforesaid writ appeal and other writ
petitions, categorically observed that it cannot be said that the
notification is vague or untenable. Its observations are extracted in
Para 15(b) of my judgment. Again in W.P.No.3131/2012, the
present writ petitioners raised the issue of vagueness in Section
4(1) notification, but the said contention was negative by the
learned single Judge. Thus, at the outset, the challenge made
against section 4(1) notification on the ground of the alleged
dubiousness or nebulousness was rejected by the Courts in
successive cases. Hence, said contention is of no avail once again
to the petitioners now.
22. The next contention is that section 4(1) notification does not
reflect any proposal initiated by 3rd respondent requiring the land
for TUDA and hence, there is no requisition for acquisition. This
argument in my view does not hold water in the light of my
succintive narration of the background history commencing from
the proposal made by the 3rd respondent to the 1st respondent vide
his letter in D.O.ROC.No.307/G1/92 dated 12.02.1992, and
requesting him to forward his requisition for Ac.25.22 cents of land
in Vedanthapuram Village to the Screening Committee for
approval till issuance of Section 4(1) notification by the Special
Deputy Collector (LA), TUDA. The aforesaid correspondence
would clearly show that the sites and services programme was
mooted by the 3rd respondent. Further, a perusal of Section 4(1)
notification would depict that Government was satisfied that the
lands mentioned in the schedule were needed for public purpose
i.e., for sites and services programme to be undertaken by 3rd
respondent. The aforesaid aspects were vividly discussed in the
orders concerning the earlier round of litigation. Therefore, the
repetitive contention of the petitioners can be heard only to be
rejected.
23. Thus, the writ petitions on the above contentions are not
sustainable and hit by doctrine of res juidicata, as those
contentions were already heard and decided in earlier writ petitions
and writ appeals. Plethora of decisions would demonstrate that the
principle of res judicata applies to writ jurisdiction also. In
P.Bandopadhya v. Union of India10, the Apex Court observed
thus:
"Reference can be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench
in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. [MANU/SC/0291/1990 : (1990) 2 SCC 715 : AIR
1990 SC 1607 wherein Sharma, J., on behalf of the five-judge bench,
held:
"35...It is well established that the principles of res judicata are
applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of the
petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have, in the
event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition before the
High Court. The petitioner in reply contended that since the
special leave petition before this Court was dismissed in limine
without giving any reason, the order cannot be relied upon for a
plea of res judicata. The answer is that it is not the order of this
Court dismissing the special leave petition which is being relied
upon; the plea of res judicata has been pressed on the basis of the
High Court‟s judgment which became final after the dismissal of
the special leave petition. In similar situation a Constitution Bench
of this Court in Daryao v. State of UP [MANU/SC/0012/1961 :
(1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457] held that where the High
Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent
petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts
and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will be barred by
the general principle of res judicata. The binding character of
MANU/SC/0378/2019 = (2019) 13 SCC 42
judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part
of the Rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much
emphasised by the Constitution, is founded and a judgment of the
High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits
must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the
Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a
petition under Article 32..."
24. Learned counsel for petitioners cited following decision to
contend that in the present case the principle of res judicata has no
application. It should be noted that the said decision can be
distinguished on facts and hence, it will not fortify petitioners‟
case.
In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal‟s case (8 supra), with
regard to the applicability or non-applicability of principles of res
judicata, the Apex Court has observed that when the matter in
issue between the parties is one purely of fact or a mixed question
of law and fact decided in the earlier proceedings by a competent
Court, it cannot be reopened and questioned in a subsequent
proceedings. However, where the decision is on a question of law
i.e., the interpretation of statute it will be res judicata in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties, where the cause of action is
the same because the expression "the matter in issue in Section 11
CPC means the right litigated i.e., the facts on which right is
claimed or denied and the law applicable to it for determination of
the issue. However, where the question is one purely of law and it
relates to the jurisdiction of a Court or a decision of the Court
sanctioning something which is illegal, then resorting to the rule of
res judicata is not permissible as the rule of res judicata is a rule of
procedure which cannot supersede the law of the land.
In the instant case, in the earlier two rounds of litigation,
Section 4(1) notification was challenged on the ground that the
terminology "sites and services programme" was vague and
dubious and not disclosing any public purpose. The said contention
involves mixed question of facts and law because in the earlier writ
petitions the common High Court of A.P. considered the law i.e.,
Section 4(1) and Section 3(f)(vii) on one hand and relevant facts
i.e., TUDA has the responsibility to implement its master plan for
growth of the town and held there was no ambiguity in the words
"sites and services programme" and it was intended for public
purpose. The said decision was rendered in all the earlier rounds of
litigation. Therefore, the said concluded mixed question of fact
and law cannot be resuscitated once again in the present cases.
25. That being so, the following decisions relied upon by the
petitioners to contend that there was no public purpose involved, in
my view, will not advance their cause.
(a) In Srinivasa Cooperative House Building Society Ltd.
(1 supra), in the matter of providing house sites to the members of
the appellant Cooperative Society, the Government under an
agreement contributed nominal amount of Rs.200/-. The appellant
argued that since the Government‟s contribution was there from
public exchequer, the public purpose envisage under Section 3(f)
of the Act 1894 was satisfied and the requirements under chapter
VII of the Act need not be followed. The Apex Court held that the
act done by the State was a colourable exercise of power and there
was no public purpose involved.
However, in the instant case, as already stated supra, in WP
No.5320/1993 & batch, a learned single Judge referring to Section
3(f)(vii) of the Act, 1894 held that the land acquired under any
scheme of development by any local authority (3rd respondent)
with the approval of appropriate Government will amount to public
purpose.
(b) The Madhya Pradesh Housing Board‟s case (2 supra)
is concerned, the said decision was distinguished on facts by the
Division Bench of the High Court in W.A.No.1071/1994 & batch.
(c) In Radhy Shyam‟s case (3 supra), the Apex Court on
facts of the case held that there was no real or substantive urgency
to justify invoking urgency provision under Section 17(1) and to
exclude the enquiry under Section 5A. It should be noted that in
the present case neither the urgency button under Section 17 was
pressed nor the enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with. On
the other hand, in the orders relating to the earlier writ petitions, it
was clearly observed that Section 5A enquiry was conducted and
the said fact attained finality.
(d) In Gajjela Narasimha Reddy‟s case (4 supra), a learned
single Judge of the High Court of A.P. having regard to the fact
that the acquisition of land was for a private cooperative housing
society for development and allotment of sites to its members who
were advocates, chartered accounts and businessmen, held that no
public purpose was involved. The instant case is not of that nature.
The requisition was made by a statutory Urban Development
Authority i.e., TUDA to implement its master plan for providing
sites and services to the general public.
(e) The common order in W.P.No.24580 of 2007 & batch
dated 14.07.2016 relied upon by the petitioners, wherein a learned
single Judge in respect of a different acquisition proceedings held
that sites and services programme was vague, cannot be considered
since the earlier judgments including the judgment of Division
Bench holding that there was no obscurity in the said terminology
was not placed before the learned Judge.
Thus, this point is answered in favour of the respondents and
against the petitioners.
26. Point No.2: It is argued that some of the land owners died
long prior to section 4(1) notification, but their names were
mentioned in the notification and their signatures were found in the
objection statements recorded under Section 5A enquiry and hence,
no meaningful enquiry was conducted and the so-called enquiry
was vitiated by fraud.
(a) This argument is not tenable for two main reasons.
Firstly, while challenging the award No.1/1998 in WP
Nos.17076/2000 & batch, the petitioners who had an opportunity to
question the validity of Section 5A enquiry did not do so, but for
the first time they raised this objection. Hence, the said contention
is hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. With regard to
the applicability of doctrine of constructive res judicata, the Apex
Court has observed thus:
(i) Sharadchandra Ganesh Muley v. State of
Maharashtra11
"5. It is seen that the bar under Section 11A (Land Acquisition Act,
1894) was available to the appellant when the first writ petition was
filed, since the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on
September 24, 1984 during the pendency of the writ petition. He did not
raise the point. Therefore, the doctrine of „might and ought‟ engrafted in
Explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC would come into play and the
appellant is precluded to raise the controversy once over. Therefore, the
doctrine of constructive res judicata puts an embargo on his right to raise
the plea of bar of limitation under Section 11A."
(b) Secondly, in the present writ petitions, the petitioners did
not take a specific plea that particular persons who were mentioned
in Section 4(1) notification expired long back and their signatures
were found in the objection statements recorded under Section 5A.
No particulars of such persons and the dates of their death are
MANU/SC/0004/1996 = AIR 1996 SC 61
mentioned in the pleadings. It is trite law that a party who seeks an
order to be set aside on the ground of fraud, must specifically plead
and prove the details of the fraud perpetrated by the concerned.
Lest, the sterile argument dehors of pleadings should be rejected by
the Courts.
(i) In A.C.Ananthaswamy v. Boraiah (Dead) by LRs12, the
Apex Court emphasized the need for requisite plea and proof of
allegation of fraud. It observed thus:
"5. We do not find any merit in this appeal. Firstly, in the
present case, Patel Chikkahanumaiah had moved an application
under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree on
the ground of non service of summons in which fraud was not
alleged. As stated above, Patel Chikkahanumaiah had moved R.A.
No.54 of 1977 in which there was no such allegation. Secondly,
the present suit has been instituted to set aside the ex-parte
decree on the ground that the decree was obtained by fraud
and misrepresentation. Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. To
prove fraud, it must be proved that representation made was
false to the knowledge of the party making such representation
or that the party could have no reasonable belief that it was
true. The level of proof required in such cases is extremely
higher. An ambiguous statement cannot per se make the
representation guilty of fraud. To prove a case of fraud, it
must be proved that the representation made was false to the
knowledge of the party making such representation. [See:
Pollock & Mulla on Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts --
(2001) 12th Edition page 489]." (emphasis supplied)
(ii) In Afsar Sheikh v. Soleman Bibi13. the Apex Court
observed thus:
MANU/SC/0655/2004 = (2004) 8 SCC 588
"15. While it is true that `undue influence', `fraud', `misrepresentation'
are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law
distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule
2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with
specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that
the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence
in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue
influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no
issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in
the trial court, or, in the first round, even before the first appellate court."
(iii) In Gayatri Devi v. Shashi Pal Singh14. the Apex Court
observed thus:
"16. In our view these observations aptly apply to the case
before us. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the
judgment of this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v
Jagannath [MANU/SC/0192/1994 : AIR 1994 SC 853] and
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Rajendra Singh and others
[MANU/SC/0180/2000 : (2000) 2 SCR 264] to contend that there
was a fraud played upon the court and the fraud unravels
everything. As a general proposition, the proposition is right. But
fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. In the entire
history of litigation nothing was pleaded, much less proved, as
fraud. We cannot countenance the plea of fraud without any
basis." (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, this point is answered against the petitioners.
27. Point No.3: The question of law raised in this point is no
more res integra since a learned single Judge of the High Court of
MANU/SC/0001/1975 = AIR 1976 SC 163
MANU/SC/0188/2005 = AIR 2005 SC 2342
A.P. in W.P.No.17076/2000 & batch has elaborately discussed the
said question and held that the award No.1/1998 was passed within
the stipulated period of two years. In the corresponding Writ
Appeal No.317/2023 & batch, the Division Bench has upheld the
common order passed by the learned single Judge. Further, SLP
No.3972/2007 filed before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was
dismissed. Therefore, the petitioners cannot re-agitate the same
issue now.
This point is accordingly answered against the petitioners.
28. Point No.4: Regarding this point, the contention of the
petitioners is that even though award No.1/1998 was passed,
physical possession of the property was not taken and
compensation was not paid to the petitioners and hence, the award
is hit by Section 24(2) of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013. The
respondents staunchly denied the said contention. In view of the
background history pertaining to this case narrated earlier, I find no
force in the contention of the petitioners.
Payment of compensation is concerned, since the petitioners
did not turn up for enquiry, the LAO referred the matter to the
Court of III ADJ, Tirupati, under Section 30 of the Act 1894 and
deposited the award amount of Rs.19,01,607/- vide bankers cheque
No.264237, dated 13.07.1998. The 3rd ADJ conducted enquiry in
LAOP No.341/1998 and passed orders dated 28.08.2012 and held
that till the claimants establish their claims in Civil Court, they
cannot be declared as persons entitled to receive compensation.
So far as possession is concerned, the LAO has taken
possession of Ac.11.96 cents vide Panchanama dated 15.03.1998
and handed over to the 3rd respondent vide certificate of handing
over of possession of lands dated 16.03.1998. It should be noted
that on the representation of the Standing Counsel for 3 rd
respondent that the possession was taken over and some of the
plots were also sold, W.P.No.3131/2012 was dismissed. No appeal
seems to be carried and hence, the said order became final. In that
view, the petitioners now cannot contend that the award was hit by
Section 24(2) of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013.
29. Thus, on a conspectus, the writ petitions are not maintainable
either on law or in facts. Further, due to inordinate delay in
challenging the award No.1/1998 also, the writ petitions deserve
dismissal. In Indore Development Authority‟s case (7 supra), the
Apex Court observed thus:
"366.9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action
to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24
applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e.,
1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen
concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury
instead of court to invalidate acquisition."
30. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
_________________________
U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J
10.03.2023
KRK/NNN/MVA
