Anantha Satya Udaya Bhaskara Rao ... vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh
2022 Latest Caselaw 7354 AP

       THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI

                   I.A.No.1 of 2022 in /&
             CRIMINAL PETITION No.6954 of 2022

COMMON ORDER:-


      This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 167(2) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( for short, 'Cr.P.C.'), seeking

default bail, by the petitioner/accused in Cr.No.195 of 2022 of

Sarpavaram Police Station, Kakinada District, registered for the

offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with 34 of

Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(v) of

S.Cs.&S.Ts.(PoA) Act, 1989 as amended by Act No.1 of 2016.


      2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that, he is shown

as accused in Crime No.195 of 2022. He was arrested on

23.05.2022 and was remanded to judicial custody on the same

day. Since the case was registered under Section 302 IPC among

other offences, the police have to complete the investigation and

file charge sheet on or before the 90th day of his arrest as per the

provisions of Section 167(2) (a) (i) of CrPC, i.e. on or before

20.08.2022. As the police did not file charge sheet within the

statutory period of 90 days, he got filed an application in

Crl.M.P.No.1508 of 2022 seeking default bail under Section
                                  2


167(2) of CrPC. The prosecution opposed the said petition

contending that charge sheet was filed on 88 th day itself i.e. on

18.08.2022 and the same was returned for complying with

certain omissions and later it was resubmitted and thus, charge

sheet having been filed within the statutory period, the petitioner

is not entitled for default bail. The learned Special Judge for Trial

of Cases under S.Cs. & S.Ts. (PoA) Act-cum-X Additional District

& Sessions Judge, Rajamahendravaram, on perusal of the

material and after hearing both sides, dismissed the said

application on the ground that the police have filed charge sheet

in conformity with section 173(2) of CrPC within the statutory

period prescribed and simply because it was returned for not

filing the scientific experts' opinion, the same does not confer any

right on the petitioner to seek default bail under Section 167(2)

of CrPC. As the petitioner is entitled for default bail under Section

167(2) of Cr.P.C., the petitioner filed the instant petition for the

relief mentioned supra.

      3. Smt. Veedi Nooka Ratnam, mother of the deceased got

filed I.A.No.1 of 2022 under Section 482 of CrPC to implead her

as a party to the petition contending that she being a victim as

per Section 2(ec) and 2(ed) of the S.Cs. & S.Ts. (PoA) Act has a
                                   3


right of being heard under Section 15A(5) of the Act in any

proceedings in respect of bail . The said application is also taken

up and being heard along with the main application.

         4. Heard Sri K.Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, for

Ms.P.Anitha, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Posani

Venkateswarlu, learned senior counsel, for Sri P.Sai Surya Teja,

learned counsel for the victim/L.W.1, and Sri S. Dhushyanth

Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-

State.

5. Section 15A(5) of the Scs. & S.Ts. (PoA) Act provides a

right to the victim of being heard and contest any proceedings in

respect of bail. Hence, the petitioner in I.A.No.1 of 2022, who is

mother of the deceased, is a proper and necessary party to this

petition. Accordingly, she is permitted to come on record as 2nd

respondent/victim in Criminal Petition No.6954 of 2022.

Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2022 is allowed.

6. Sri K.Chidambaram, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner, would submit that the charge sheet said to have been

filed on 18.08.2022 was returned for compliance of certain

objections and later it was resubmitted on 22.08.2022 and again

it was returned and was resubmitted on 26.08.2022 and thus it is

clear that the charge sheet filed on 18.08.2022 is not complete in

all respects and it suffers from certain omissions. Moreover, in

the memo dated 26.08.2022 filed by the Investigating Officer

before the Court below seeking extension of remand of the

accused, it is clearly mentioned that investigation in this case was

not yet completed. The cumulative effect of the above events

makes the things very clear that despite pendency of

investigation, a defective or incomplete charge sheet has been

filed by the prosecution. Thus, the charge sheet filed on

18.08.2022 cannot be reckoned as a charge sheet as envisaged

under Section 173(2) CrPC and hence the petitioner is entitled for

grant of default bail. In support of his contentions, he relied on

Achpal and others vs. State of Rajasthan 1, C.Parthasarthy

vs. Director or Enforcement2, M.Ravindran vs. The

Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence3

and Akula Ravi Teja @ Bulli vs. The State of Andhra

Pradesh4.

The learned senior counsel would further submit that

though all these pleas have been raised before the learned

.AIR 2018 sc 4647

. 2022(2) Crimes 594

. AIR2020SC 5245

. 2021(1) ALT (Crl.) 291

Sessions Judge in the application filed under Section 167(2)

Cr.P.C., the learned Sessions Judge, without appreciation of the

facts in proper perspective and without assigning proper and

justifiable reasons, dismissed the said petition.

The learned senior counsel would further submit that since

no charge sheet is filed and as no charge sheet remained on

record as on the 90th day, the Court below is not empowered to

remand the accused beyond 90 days and thus the petitioner's

judicial custody is not valid and the same amounts to illegal

detention.

The learned senior counsel has further contended that the

contents of the charge sheet itself show that investigation was

not completed and has drawn attention of this Court to the

relevant portion of the charge sheet.

On the above contentions, he prayed to allow the Criminal

Petition and grant default bail to the petitioner under Section

167(2) CrPC.

7. Per contra, Sri S.Dhushyanth Reddy, learned Additional

Public Prosecutor, would submit that the endorsements contained

on the overleaf of the charge sheet regarding return and

resubmission of charge sheet would go to show that charge sheet

has already been filed on 88th day itself i.e. on 18.08.2022 and it

was returned only for complying with certain omissions and thus

the charge sheet filed at the first instance has contained all the

necessary particulars as per section 173(2) CrPC and it cannot at

all be termed as either incomplete or defective charge sheet.

Thus, mere return of charge sheet will not confer any right to the

accused to seek default bail. In support of his contention, he

relied on the decision in Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa

Raghavendra Buvanahalli Muniyappa Nagesh Babu vs.

The State of Andhra Pradesh5.

He would further submit that the charge sheet filed on the

88th day i.e. on 18.08.2022 was returned for non-submission of

scientific reports and the same was resubmitted on 22.08.2022

and again it was returned on 27.08.2022 and the same was again

resubmitted on 30.08.2022 and that the Investigating Officer has

filed all the documents available with him and simply because

scientific documents are not filed, the same cannot be said to be

either incomplete or defective charge sheet.

. 2009(2) APLJ 268 (DB)

He would further submit that the memo filed by the

investigating officer only suggests pendency of investigation

regarding involvement of any other accused in the crime but not

in relation to the investigation regarding the petitioner/accused

and since the entire investigation having been completed against

the petitioner/accused and a charge sheet has been laid, the

petitioner/accused is not entitled for grant of default bail.

The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would further

submit that since charge sheet has been filed on 88th day itself,

Magistrate or Special Court constituted to deal with special Acts,

is empowered to extend the remand beyond 90 days under

Section 309 of CrPC and thus the extension of remand by the

Special Court is valid and there is no force in the contention

raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He placed on

record the copy of the docket proceedings of the Special Court,

whereby the remand of the accused is extended.

8. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned senior counsel for the

victim would submit that, the order passed by the lower Court

rejecting to grant default bail being final orders deciding the

rights of the accused finally at that stage, if at all the petitioner/

accused is aggrieved, he has to file a revision questioning the

said orders and thus, the instant petition filed under Section

167(2) CrPC is not maintainable and the same is liable to be

dismissed. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on

Raja Bhaiya Singh vs. State of M.P.6 and Ratan Mandal vs.

State of Jharkhand7

The learned senior counsel would further submit that the

charge sheet having been filed on 88th day itself i.e. on

18.08.2022, there is sufficient compliance of completion of

investigation as required under Section 167(2) of CrPC. Merely

because the charge sheet was returned for compliance of certain

omissions such as non filing of certain scientific reports, it cannot

be termed as either defective or incomplete charge sheet and the

petitioner cannot get any advantage out of it to say that

investigating was not completed within the statutory period. He

would further submit that the contents of the charge sheet and

the material placed before the Court below are sufficient to take

cognizance of the offence against the accused. As such the

petitioner is not entitled to get default bail as per Section 167(2)

CrPC.

. 2021 SCC OnLine MP 27

.2006 CriLJ 781

The learned senior counsel would further submit that even

if it is assumed for sake of arguments that charge sheet filed on

18.08.2022 is defective, since the petitioner has not filed petition

for grant of default bail till it was resubmitted on 22.08.2022,

the indefeasible right, if any, accrued, stood extinguished on

resubmission of the charge sheet on 22.08.2022.

9. In reply to the contention advanced by the learned

senior counsel for victim regarding maintainability, Sri

K.Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, would submit that, the

orders impugned having been passed in a bail application, being

interlocutory in nature, is not amenable for any revision under

Section 397(2) of CrPC and the instant petition filed under

Section 167(2) of CrPC is maintainable. For his contention, he

placed reliance on Honnaiah T.H. vs. State of Karnataka and

others8.

The learned senior counsel would further submit that

since the instant petition having been filed to invoke the

indefeasible right of an accused to get default bail, which is the

cherished object enshrined in the Constitution, technicalities, if

any, should not be given much importance and an oral

. 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 672

submission made would suffice. In this regard, reliance is placed

on Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam9,

10. Perused the material available on record. The

undisputed facts in this case are as follows:

(i) The petitioner was shown an accused in a crime registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC along with other allied offences.

(ii) He was arrested on 23.05.2022 and was remanded to judicial custody.

(iii) A charge sheet has been filed on 18.08.2022 and the same was returned for complying with certain omissions and later it was resubmitted on 22.08.2022, later it was returned on 27.08.2022 and it was again resubmitted on 30.08.2022 and the latest resubmission was on 16.09.2022.

(iv) The default bail application filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Court below.

11. In view of the nature of this petition and the relief

sought, it is relevant to extract section 167(2) (a)(i) of Cr.P.C.

"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty four hours.

(1) xxxxxx

. AIR 2017 SC 3948

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that-

(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,-

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;"

12. In Honnaiah T.H. (supra 1) relied on by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed

that the orders, which do not decide or touch upon the important

rights or liabilities of the parties, are interlocutory orders. The

observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para-12 of

the judgment read as follows:

"12...... In the decision in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, ((1977)4 SCC 137) this Court explained the meaning of the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) CrPC. This Court held that the expression "interlocutory order" denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch upon the important rights or liabilities of parties. Hence, any order which substantially affects the right of the parties cannot be said to be an "interlocutory order". Speaking for a two-Judge Bench, Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali observed:

"6. [...] It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes

orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."

13. The observations made by his Lordship in Amar Nath

referred to in the above decision make it clear that 'passing

orders for bail' is an interlocutory order and thus the same is not

amenable for being revised by revisional Courts as per sedtion

397(2) of CrPC.

14. In Raja Bhaiya Singh (supra 6) relied on by the

learned senior counsel for the victim, learned judge of Madhya

Pradesh High Court held at paras-12 & 13 as follows:

"12. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 1 SCR 749: ((1977)4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 sc 47), a three Judge Bench of Apex Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In V.C.Shukla v. State (1980) 2 SCR 380 : (1980 Supp SCC 92 : AIR 1980 SC 962), this Court has held that the term 'interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the

revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final.

13. Therefore, as per aforesaid law, the order upon the application filed for default bail under section 167(2) of CrPC is not an interlocutory order because it decided the valuable right of default bail finally at that stage. Hence, the revision is tenable against the aforesaid order."

15. In Ratan Mandal (supra 7) his Lordship of Jharkhand

High Court held at para-15 as thus:

"Section 167(2), Criminal Procedure Code gives an indefeasible right to the accused to be released on bail on certain conditions and if that indefeasible right of the accused is taken away by any order then in my view it substantially affects the rights of the accused and it also decides right of the accused to be released on bail and, therefore, in my view an order refusing to release the accused on bail under the provisions of Section 167(2), Criminal Procedure Code is a final order and not an interlocutory order as has been held by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order."

16. The decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel

for the victim having been delivered by High Courts of Madhya

Pradesh and Jharkhand, though not binding on this Court, have

some persuasive value and deals with the similar question

involved in this case. The observations made therein would go to

show that the order refusing to grant default bail under Section

167(2) CrPC since substantially affects the rights of the accused,

is a final order and hence revision petition is maintainable.

17. It is relevant here to note that the decision relied on

by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners simply denotes

'passing orders for bail', it nowhere states in specific terms that

the orders passed refusing or granting default bail, stand on the

same pedestal and thus would fall under that category. Since the

case on hand is in relation to default bail under Section 167(2)

CrPC, the decision relied on by the learned senior counsel for the

petitioners is not applicable to the facts of the instant case.

18. In support of his contention that an oral request would

sufficient for grant of default bail, the learned counsel for the

petitioners has relied on Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra 9), the

observations made therein are to the effect that though

entitlement for grant of default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC is

not specifically pleaded as a ground in an application filed for

grant of bail, an oral argument for default bail made by the

learned counsel for the accused before the High Court would

suffice in lieu of a written application.

19. Their Lordships further observed:

"The law laid down as above shows that the requirement of an application claiming the statutory right under Section 167(2) of the Code is a prerequisite for the grant of bail on default., In my opinion, such application has to be made before the Magistrate for enforcement of the statutory right. In the cases under the

Prevention of Corruption Act or other Acts where special Courts are constituted by excluding the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it has to be made before such Special Court. In present case, for the reasons discussed, since the appellant never sought default bail before the court concerned, as such not entitled to the same."

20. The observations made by their Lordships in the above

decision would go to show that, the petition for enforcement of

the statutory right under Section 167(2) of CrPC has to be moved

either before the committal Court or before the Special Courts, if

any, constituted. In the case on hand, the petitioner has to move

such an application before the Special Court constituted for S.Cs.

& S.Ts. (PoA) Act. However, non filing of charge sheet within the

stipulated time can be brought to the notice of the High Court in

an application filed for grant of regular bail. Thus, the

observations made in the said decision do not fit into the facts

and circumstances of the present case, since it is nowhere stated

that a petition seeking enforcement of right of default bail can be

filed before the High Court.

21. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition

before this Court under Section 167(2) CrPC and such a remedy

is available only before the Magistrate Court/Special Court. If he

feels aggrieved by the orders passed by the Court below

dismissing his application filed for grant of default bail, he ought

to have filed a revision petition questioning the correctness of the

orders so passed, since his indefeasible right of getting default

bail was decided finally at that stage. Thus, the petition filed in its

present form is not maintainable.

22. However, in view of the strenuous argument advanced

by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that in view of the

relief sought for, technicalities cannot be given much weight in

deciding the application and also keeping in view the fact that the

indefeasible right of the petitioner to get default bail is said to

have been denied, this Court deems it proper to proceed on to

decide the petition on merits also.

23. The learned counsel for the petitioner referring to

certain portions of the charge sheet and placing reliance on the

requisition filed by the investigating officer into Court below on

26.08.2022 has strenuously contended that investigation is not

yet completed for examination of some more witnesses and thus

the charge sheet filed into Court without actually completing

investigation is not in strict compliance of section 167(2) CrPC.

24. The portions of charge sheet and the requisition relied

on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are extracted

hereunder:

Charge sheet:

" ....Due to pendency of the revision the investigation charged to unearth the whole truth is not yet completed. It is further submitted that if the complicity of any other person comes to light during the analysis of CFR's, electronic evidence in further investigation, such persons will be arrested as accused....."

"The important CC Footage at the house of the accused after committing the offence and the other CC Footage near the scene of offence prior to committing the offence are to be examined to ascertain the presence and involvement of other accused if any."

Requisition:

"I submit that the accused noted above was remanded upto 26.08.2022 as per the request of Investigating Officer. In this case investigation is not yet completed for examination of some more witnesses and FSL & RFSL reported are pending and to elicit the involvement of any other persons in this case."

25. The above extracted portions would show that

pendency of investigation in this case is only to unearth the

complicity or involvement of any other person in this case. The

charge sheet makes is clear that investigation in respect of the

petitioner/accused has been completed in all respects and the

contents of it are sufficient to take cognizance of the offence by

the concerned Court. Thus, the charge sheet filed in the first

instance cannot at all be termed either as 'incomplete' or as

'defective' as sought to be contended by the learned counsel for

the petitioner.

26. In Achpal, relied on by the learned counsel for the

petitioner, wherein the charge sheet was returned by

investigating agency below the rank of police officer as per orders

passed by the High Court, their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme

Court held at para-18 as follows:

"18. In the present case, as on the 90th day, there were no papers or the charge-sheet in terms of Section 173 of the Code for the Magistrate concerned to assess the situation whether on merits the accused was required to be remanded to further custody. Though the charge-sheet in terms of Section 173 came to be filed on 5-7-2018, such filing not being in terms of the order passed by the High Court on 3-7-2018 [Mahaveer v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 1] , the papers were returned to the investigating officer. Perhaps it would have been better if the Public Prosecutor had informed the High Court on 3-7-2018 itself that the period for completing the investigation was coming to a close. He could also have submitted that the papers relating to investigation be filed within the time prescribed and a call could thereafter be taken by the Superior Gazetted Officer whether the matter required further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code or not. That would have been an ideal situation. But we have to consider the actual effect of the circumstances that got unfolded. The fact of the matter is that as on completion of 90 days of prescribed period under Section 167 of the Code there were no papers of investigation before the Magistrate concerned. The accused were thus denied of protection established by law. The issue of their custody had to be considered on merits by the Magistrate concerned and they could not be simply remanded to custody dehors such consideration. In our considered view the submission advanced by Mr Dave, learned advocate therefore has to be accepted.

27. The facts of the case on hand completely differ with

the facts of the case decided in the above referred decision and

thus the said decision is not at all applicable to the facts of the

present case.

28. In C.Parthasarthy relied on by the learned counsel for

the petitioner, a learned Judge of Telangana High Court held at

paras-21 and 22 as thus:

"21. The Supreme Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar5 discussing Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. has held that a charge sheet can be filed only after the completion of investigation. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:

9. Section 173(2)(1) provides that on completion of the investigation the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report in the form prescribed by the State Government and stating therein (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. Sub-section (5) of Section 173 makes it obligatory upon the police officer to forward along with the report all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely and the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as witnesses at the trial.

22. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)6 has held that the object behind Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is to complete the investigation and file the charge sheet. The idea is to ensure that cognizance is taken without any delay. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:

206. Section 173 commands the investigating agency to complete the investigation expeditiously without unnecessary delay and when such an investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance

of offence on a police report the details in the form as may be prescribed by the State Government and provide the information required under this section.

29. In Akula Ravi Teja relied on by the learned counsel

for the petitioner, it was held:

20) It is significant to note that a plain reading of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. makes it manifest that what is required to claim for default bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is failure on the part of the Investigating Agency to complete the investigation within the stipulated period of time.' In other words, it is the default committed by the Investigating Agency to complete the entire investigation within the stipulated time that confers right on the accused to claim for default bail. So, filing of charge-sheet is not the criteria or the actual test to be applied to decide whether the accused is entitled to default bail or not. It is relevant to note that the charge-sheet after completion of investigation will be filed to enable the Court to take cognizance of the offence. So, the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence on the basis of a preliminary charge-sheet filed without completing the entire investigation. Therefore, the crucial aspect that needs to be ascertained to consider the claim of the accused for default bail is whether the investigation is completed within the stipulated time of 90 days or not. So, when the Investigating Agency files only preliminary charge-sheet within the said stipulated time keeping the investigation pending or without completing the investigation, it will not under any circumstances defeat the right conferred on the accused to claim for default bail."

.....

23) The very contents of the charge-sheet, which are extracted above, clinchingly establishes that the investigation is not completed and many crucial witnesses are yet to be examined to prove the overt acts of the accused in this crime and some other evidence as stated by the investigating officer is still to be Cx, P.No.4276 2 2020 secured. Therefore, on account of default committed by the prosecuting agency in completing the investigation within the stipulated period of time, the petitioner acquired an indefeasible right to claim default bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

30. The observations made in the above referred decisions

in clear and unambiguous terms clarify that, what all required is

completion of investigation and not mere filing of charge sheet

and thus charge sheets filed without completion of actual

investigation cannot be said to be proper compliance of

requirement under section 167(2) of CrPC and that preliminary

charge sheets filed without completing the investigation cannot

defeat the right of getting default bail.

31. In Velinedipuram relied on by the learned senior

counsel for victim, a Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of

Andhra Pradesh held at para-4 as follows:

"4. So, what has to be looked into at this stage by the Magistrate is only to see whether any offence was disclosed in the police report and whether the names of the accused, witnesses etc., are furnished. If the names of the accused and the nature of the offence is not disclosed, or cannot be culled out on a reading of the police report, then perhaps it may be a case of non-compliance of the provisions of S. 173(2) of the Code. But, where it is fairly made clear about the names of the accused, the offence involved in the case together with similar other necessary details, even if there are some omissions in some minor particulars like the age of the accused, father's name etc., it cannot be said that there is failure of compliance with S. 173(2). For this view of ours, reliance can be placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Satya Narain v. State of Bihar, (1980) 3 SCC 152 : AIR 1980 SC 506 : 1980 Cri LJ 227, wherein the Supreme Court observing that if the report with sufficient particularity and clarity specifies the contravention of the law which is the alleged offence it would be sufficient compliance, stated as follows--

"Turning now to the charge-sheet submitted in this case it sets out all the details as required by S. 173(2) of the Code. The name of the accused is mentioned. The nature of the offence is mentioned. It is further stated that the information of the offence was given by Mahesh

Kant Jha. It is also stated that there was sufficient evidence to proceed against Satya Narain Musadi appellant herein under S. 7 of the Act. May be that the charge-sheet could have been more informative or the information set out in the charge-sheet could be styled as scanty. Some more details may have been helpful. It, however, could not be said that it did not disclose an offence of which the Magistrate could take cognizance under Sec. 190(1)(b). Ultimately when a Magistrate looks at police report also styled as charge-sheet under S. 190(1)(b) he takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and prima facie he does so of the offence or offences set out in the report (Vide Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 1 SCR 571 at p. 574 : 1971 Cri LJ 1697. And the report under discussion does disclose an offence under S. 7 of the Act"."

32. The Division Bench has further held at para No.5 that

non-filing of all the enclosures under Section 173(5) along with

the report filed under S. 173(2) is not a ground to release the

accused on the premise that full charge sheet is not filed within

the stipulated time.

33. In Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa Raghavendra

Buvanahalli Muniyappa Nagesh Babu relied on by the

learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the Division Bench of High

Court of Composite state of Andhra Pradesh this Court while

answering reference made to it whether the charge sheet, which

was filed within 90 days, but was returned for compliance of

certain technical objections of not filing the scientific expert's

opinion, is a proper compliance under section 173 Cr.P.C.and

whether the same confer any right on the accused to seek bail as

a matter of right, as required under Section 167 Cr.P.C., at para-

22 held as follows:

"22. We accordingly answer the question referred as under:

Once the charge is filed within 90 days, but was returned for compliance of certain technical objections of not filing the scientific expert's opinion, is a proper compliance under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. and the same will not confer any right on the accused to seek bail, as a matter of right. Even in a case where the charge sheet is filed after 90 days, but before accused seeks bail availing the benefit under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, his indefeasible right will be extinguished on filing such charge sheet."

34. From the observations made in the aforementioned

citations, it is evident that the charge sheet must contain the

particulars so as to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance

under Section under Sec. 190(1)(b) and charge sheet should be

filed after concluding the investigation in all respects and it is

further evident that mere return of charge sheet for compliance

of certain technical objections of not filing the scientific expert's

opinion, is a proper compliance under section 173 Cr.P.C.

35. With the above legal pronouncements, now the facts of

the case are to be scanned to verify whether the charge sheet

filed on 18.08.2022 is in conformity with the requirement under

Section 173(3) CrPC and does it contain all the necessary and

relevant particulars so as to enable the Magistrate to take

cognizance of the offences alleged against the accused or it was

filed keeping the investigation pending or without completing the

investigation.

36. The overleaf of the charge sheet containing the

endorsements of return made by the Court and the resubmissions

made by the Investigating officer is placed on record by the

learned Additional Public Prosecutor. The endorsements made

therein make it clear that the charge sheet filed on 18.08.2022

was returned for complying the following objections:

"1. List of documents to be filed correctly

2. Provision of law to be noted correctly

3. Rough sketches of scene of offence to be filed

4. Scene of offence photos with CD to be filed

5. Form 60 to be filed

6. Accused copy and P.P. charge sheet copies to be filed."

The said charge sheet was resubmitted on 22.08.2022 by

the Investigating Officer making the following endorsement:

"Sir, Re-submitted after carried out the remarks No. 1 to 6"

The same was again returned on 27.08.2022 with the

following:

"1. Objection No.1 dated 18.08.2022 is not completed properly

2. Case property to be produced

3. RFSL and SFSL reports to be filed

4. Final opinion of the doctor to be filed. "

Thereafter, the charge sheet was resubmitted on

30.08.2022 with the following endorsement.

"Sir, Resubmitted after compliance of remarks Nos. 1 to 4.

1. Objection (1) is complied with.

2. Objections (2), (3) and (4) are complied."

37. The endorsements extracted above in clear terms say

that the charge sheet was returned for non enclosure of scientific

documents and for non production of case property. In

Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa Raghavendra Buvanahalli

Muniyappa Nagesh Babu relied on by the learned Additional

Public Prosecutor and Velinedipuram relied on by the learned

senior counsel for victim, it is clearly held that once charge is filed

within 90 days, but was returned for compliance of certain

technical objections of not filing the scientific expert's opinion, is

a proper compliance under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. and the same

will not confer any right on the accused to seek bail, as a matter

of right. The above decision squarely applicable to the facts of

the present case.

38. To conclude, the charge sheet filed on 18.08.2022 i.e.

on 88th day of arrest of the petitioner/accused contains all the

necessary particulars as per section 173(2) & (5) of CrPC so as to

enable the concerned Court to take cognizance of the offence

and whatever investigation said to be pending is only in respect

of unearthing the involvement and complicity of other accused

but not in respect of the accused and thus there is sufficient

compliance of the requirement of completion of investigation

within the statutory period as per Section 167(2) CrPC and thus

the petitioner/accused is not entitled to get default bail.

39. Upon summation of the observations, this petition filed

under section 167(2) CrPC does not survive either technically or

on merits and the same deserves dismissal.

40. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. This

order will not preclude the petitioner from availing other remedies

available to him.

Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.

___________________________ JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI Date : 26.09.2022 RR

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI

DISMISSED

I.A.No.1 of 2022 in/& CRIMINAL PETITION No.6954 of 2022

Date : 26.09.2022

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