P.Rajeswari vs P.Jeeyangar Mutt Tirupatiothers
2022 Latest Caselaw 7795 AP

                                                                    BSS,J
                                                      S.A.No.636 of 2001

                                   1

          HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER

                         S.A.No.636 of 2001
JUDGMENT:

The fifth defendant in O.S.No.286 of 1982 on the file of I

Additional District Munsif, Tirupati, is the appellant. The first

respondent is the sole plaintiff instituted the suit against

respondents 2 to 6 and against the appellant seeking relief of

permanent injunction restraining the respondents 2 to 6 and the

appellant from converting the plaint „C‟ schedule land to an extent

of Ac.0.06 cents in T.S.No.11 in Tirupati Town into house plots and

making any constructions thereon changing the physical features of

the said land. The first respondent/plaintiff mutt has shown three

schedules in the plaint, which reads as under:

'A' Schedule Chittoor District, Tirupati Sub District, Chandragiri Taluk - Tirupati town - T.S.No.11 of dry land of an extent of Ac.29.59 cents towards the western side of the way leading to the Alwar Theertham.

'B' Schedule Chittoor District, Tirupati Sub District, Chandragiri Taluk - Tirupati town - T.S.No.11 land of an extent of Ac.7.72 cents within the following boundaries:

East: NGO‟s Colony, West: lands of the plaintiff in the occupation of its tenant T.T.Devasthanams, North: lands of the BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

plaintiff in the occupation of its tenant Chittoor Chengaiah and others; South: Municipal Road leading to T.T.D.quarters.

'C' Schedule Chittoor District - Tirupati sub District, Chandragiri Taluk - Tirupati town - T.S.No.11 land of an extent of Ac.0.06 cents within the following boundaries:

East: land unlawfully sold to S.Bhagyalakshmi, West: land unlawfully sold to P.Ramasubba Reddy, North: land in possession of Sakamuri Veeraswami Naidu, lessee of P.J.Mutt, South: Siripuram Colony."

2. The first respondent and appellant herein will be referred to

as plaintiff-mutt and D5, as arrayed before trial Court for the sake

of brevity and convenience.

3. The suit is filed by the plaintiff-mutt in respect of above

referred plaint „C‟ schedule property only, which is said to be part

and parcel of „A‟ schedule and „B‟ schedule property.

4. The plaintiff-mutt filed suit against D5 and others stating

that the plaint „A‟ schedule property in old Sy.No.507 and present

town survey No.11 of Tirupati Town to an extent of Ac.29.59 cents

belongs to them. The plaintiff submits that the head of mutt

entered into a registered agreement of lease in respect of entire

plaint „A‟ schedule property with one Mandaram Munikanaiah on BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

11.03.1931. It is the contention of plaintiff mutt that the said

permanent registered lease deed contains following terms:

"(a) that the lessee has to pay Rs.25/- towards rent annually to the plaintiff mutt from 1340 fasli onwards every year(bill maktha)

(b) that in the event of any transfer of the lease hold right, interest, the fact be intimated to the lessor and the deeds of transfer be got executed with the express consent of the lessor.

(c) if the lessee fails to pay rent for a period of three years, there will be a forfeiture of the lease.

(d) the lessee or its successors should make improvements to the land and use for agricultural purpose and kept the land in good condition; and

(e) the transferees of the lease hold rights are also bound by the terms of the lease."

5. They also pleaded that D1 purchased leasehold rights in

respect of plaint „B‟ schedule property, which is part and parcel of

plaint „A‟ schedule property from one Papaiah and others under

registered sale deed dated 26.10.1959, who derives leasehold

rights from Mandaram Munikanaiah, original lessee. They also

pleaded that purchaser also bound by terms of original lease deed

dated 11.03.1931 and liable to pay rent of Rs.6.87 per annum in BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

respect of „B‟ schedule property, which D1 failed to pay from 1372

fasli year onwards, thereby committed default and then they filed

suit O.S.No.59 of 1964 against D1 on the file of Subordinate Judge,

Chittoor, for declaration of their title and for possession, which

suit was transferred to Senior Civil Judge Court, Tirupati and

renumbered as O.S.No.7 of 1971 and the said suit was decreed.

Then, D1 preferred A.S.No.242 of 1973 before this Court title of

the plaintiff said to be confirmed, but relief of possession was

negatived on the ground that the parties are governed by

provisions of A.P.Tenancy Act, 1956 and 1974 and it is left open to

the plaintiff to take appropriate steps to evict D1 under the said

Act. The plaintiff also filed A.T.C.No.34 of 1980 before Principal

District Munsif - cum - Special Officer, Tirupati, against D1 seeking

relief of eviction under A.P.Tenancy Act, 1956 and 1974 which was

said to be pending. The plaintiff also alleged that D1 through D2,

who is his son, sold portion of „B‟ schedule land, which is described

as „C‟ schedule in the plaint, to D3, who in turn sold the same to

D4 and who in turn sold the same to D5 in violation of the terms of

the lease and then now D5 has been making preparation to convert

the plaint „C‟ schedule property into house plots and change the

very nature of the land and put the same to use for non-

BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

agricultural purpose in violation of terms of the lease. Then

plaintiff filed suit for injunction simplicitor after issuing legal

notice to the defendants. During pendency of the suit, D1 died on

21.10.1983 and thereafter, D6 and D7, who are his daughters, were

added as legal representatives and his son already on record as D2.

6. The first defendant filed written statement before trial

Court denying the averments made in the plaint though admitted

that originally plaint „A‟ schedule land belongs to plaintiff mutt

and Mr.M.Munikanaiah who occupied the land and in recognition of

his rights, the then pedda jeeyamgar granted permanent patta for

the entire land shown in plaint „A‟ schedule under a registered

deed dated 11.03.1931, which is not a lease deed but it is a

permanent patta and thereafter M.Munikanaiah sold Ac.7.76 cents

of land to one Mr.Adenna under registered sale deed dated

24.03.1939 and in-turn legal heirs of Mr.Adenna sold the land to

Mr.A.Venkatarayulu under a registered sale deed dated 11.12.1939

and thereafter, he purchased land under registered sale deed

dated 26.10.1959 from one Mr.Papaiah and others and since then

he has been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of plaint „A‟

schedule property and „B‟ schedule property and he never paid any BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

rent to the plaintiff-mutt as he has exercising absolute rights of

ownership over the „B‟ schedule land, which was aware of by the

plaintiff-mutt. D1 admitted about plaintiff filed suit in O.S.No.59

of 1964 which transferred to Tirupati and renumbered as O.S.No.7

of 1971 wherein it is observed that plaintiff lost possession of „A‟

schedule land as early as in 1900 and rights of the plaintiff if any

are barred by limitation and pleaded adverse possession of alienees

as successive jeeyangars never questioned possession and the right

of alienees and they are estopped by conduct questioning the

possession and rights of alienees.

7. The 5th defendant, who is appellant herein, filed separate

written statement stating that suit is barred by limitation and she

issued reply notice to the legal notice issued by the plaintiff. She

also stated that D1 is the father of D2, who got plaint „C‟ schedule

property by virtue of partition with D1, who was exercising

absolute rights over the property and sold the same to D3, who in

turn sold the same to D4 and then she purchased „C‟ schedule

property from D4 for valid consideration of Rs.1200/- under

a registered sale deed dated 09.07.1981 and took possession of the

property, and since then she has been in possession and enjoyment BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

of the property with absolute rights. She further stated that she

dug foundation pits to raise pucca construction in plaint „C‟

schedule property for which plaintiff has no right, title, interest or

possession to object the same. She also pleaded that D1 had been

in possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule property more than

statutory period, who in turn sold the property.

She prays to dismiss the suit.

8. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the

following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get permanent injunction as prayed for?

2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation as contended in para - 10 at page 4 of the written statement?

3. To what relief?

9. The parties went to trial. The learned trial Judge clubbed

O.S.No.260 of 1982 similar suit filed by the plaintiff and after

recording evidence, decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff by

observing that registered document executed by plaintiff-mutt in

favour of Mr.M.Munikanaiah in respect of plaint „A‟ schedule

property is not a permanent patta as contended by defendants,

which is only a leasedeed and even lease exceeding the period of BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

five years as per provisions of Section 76 of Madras Hindu Religious

and Endowments Act, 1931 is not valid unless it is for the benefit of

the mutt.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by trial Court,

D5 who is appellant herein, preferred A.S.No.147 of 1987 on the

file of III Additional District Judge, Tirupati. The learned appellate

Judge after hearing both sides, pronounced common judgment in

A.S.No.146 of 1987 preferred by one of the defendants in

O.S.No.260 of 1982 and A.S.No.147 of 1987 preferred by appellant

herein, dismissed both appeals by observing that tenants have no

right of conversion of the plaint schedule properties into house

sites, which is contra to the conditions of the leasedeed.

11. Aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by appellate

Court, D5 preferred present appeal stating that judgment and

decree of appellate Court confirming the judgment of trial Court is

not sustainable as this Court in A.S.No.130 and 243 of 1973 held

that plea of recovery of possession by the plaintiff is barred by

limitation. The appellant/D5 also raised question of jurisdiction of

civil Court to entertain the suit.

BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

She prays to allow this appeal and dismiss the suit filed by

the plaintiff.

12. This Court admitted the second appeal on 29.10.2001 basing

on substantial question of law as shown in ground Nos.2 to 4, which

are:

1. "1. Having regard to the judgment of Hon‟ble High Court passed in A.S.No.130 and 243 of 1973 wherein it is clearly held that plea of recovery of possession is barred by limitation, where the Court below acted legally decreeing the suit for injunction?

2. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit restraining the tenant from making construction especially when the provisions of A.P.Tenancy Act bars jurisdiction of Civil Court?

3. Whether reasoning of the Courts below for decreeing the suit for restraining the appellant from converting the plaint „C‟ schedule property into house site contrary to the terms of the lease is sustainable?"

13. Though this appeal is dismissed against R2 to R6 for default,

who are defendants in the suit filed by plaintiff who is R1 herein

and main relief sought by the plaintiff is against the appellant

herein only in respect of „C‟ schedule property, due to that this

Court proceeded to dispose of this appeal.

BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

14. I have heard learned counsel Mr.T.Vinod Kumar, representing

on behalf of learned Senior Counsel Mr.O.Manohar Reddy, for the

appellant. None represented for first respondent/plaintiff.

15. The learned counsel for appellant would submit that as per

observation of Courts below, appellant who said to be purchaser of

„C‟ schedule property is also a tenant, due to that A.P. Tenancy

Act is applicable and thereby civil Court jurisdiction is barred to

entertain any dispute between landlord and tenant. He would

further submit that when R1/plaintiff barred from recovery of

possession as per the judgment of this Court, they are not entitled

to seek equitable relief of permanent injunction which failed to

consider by the Courts below.

He prays to allow the second appeal and dismiss the suit

filed by first respondent/plaintiff.

16. Discussions and findings:-

It is not in dispute that originally plaint „A‟ schedule property

to an extent of Ac.29.59 cents in T.S.No.11 of Tirupati Town

belongs to first respondent Mutt, who in turn said to be executed

permanent registered lease deed in favour of Mr.M.Munikanaiah on

11.03.1931. The learned appellate Judge also extracted main BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

terms of lease deed dated 11.03.1931 at para - 17 of the Judgment

and held that one of the condition is that the tenant shall improve

the land and cultivate by raising garden, but tenant cannot convert

the same into house sites. It is categorical finding of learned

appellate Judge that plaintiff is landlord and defendants are the

cultivating tenants within the meaning of Andhra Tenancy Act.

Though inherent jurisdiction of civil Court to entertain the suit is

not raised by defendants in both Courts, which is substantial

question of law, it can be decided by this Court while dealing

second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The scope of Section 100

CPC explained by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Narayan Sitaramji

Badwaik (dead) through LRs - Appellants Vs. Bisaram and

Others, in Civil Appeal No.6124 of 2011 dated 17.02.2021 wherein

it is held that High Court while deciding the second appeal can also

consider the question of fact, provided, when an issue necessary

for the disposal of the appeal has not been determined by the

lower appellate Court or by both the Courts and when an issue of

fact has been wrongly determined by the Courts below by virtue of

the decision on the question of law under Section 100 of Civil

Procedure Code.

BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

17. In Chandrabhan (Deceased) Thorugh LRs. And Others -

Appellant Vs. Saraswati and Others - Respondent(s) in Civil

Appeal No.NIL of 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8736 of 2016)

Judgment dated 22.09.2022 held at para 33 of Judgment, which

reads as under:-

"33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrongapplication of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.(iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth ofevidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."

18. In the present case, there is concurrent finding of the fact that

plaintiff is the landlord and defendants including the appellant herein

are tenants to the plaint schedule property. It is also not in dispute

that plaintiff filed A.T.C.No.34 of 1980 before Special Officer - cum -

Principal District Munsif, Tirupati against D1 seeking relief of

eviction, who admittedly sold property through D2 which is plaint „C‟

schedule property and finally appellant herein has purchased Ac.0.06

cents of land, which is part of land leased out to Mr.M.Munikanaiah,

out of which, plaint „B‟ schedule is purchased by D1. When plaintiff

is landlord and defendants are tenants, which finding of fact attained BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

finality and not questioned by either of the parties and any dispute

between landlord and tenant is governed by A.P.(Andhra Area)

Tenancy Act, 1956. Now, it would be beneficial to quote Section 16

and 17 of the A.P.(Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956, which reads as

under:

"16. Adjudication of disputes and appeal(Subs. By Section 13 of Act No.39 of 1974):- - (1) Any dispute arising under this Act, between a landlord and a cultivating tenant in relation to a matter not otherwise decide by the Special Officer under the provisions of this Act, shall, on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided by the Special Officer after making an enquiry in the manner prescribed:

(2) Against any order passed by the Special Officer under this Act an appeal shall lie to the District Judge having jurisdiction, within thirty days of the passing of the order; and the decision of the District Judge on such appeal shall be final.

17. Act to override Contract and other laws:- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court."

BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

19. In Kotu Pichayya Vs. Kandalla Satyanarayana Charyulu 1

when there is a dispute between landlord and tenant and the dispute

is pending in the civil Court, the Division Bench of this Court held at

paras 6 and 7, which reads as under:

"Indeed Section 16 clearly lays down that any dispute arising under the Act between a landlord and a cultivating tenant including any question relating to determination of fair rent or eviction if a cultivating tenant shall be decided by the Tahsildar on the application of the landlord or the cultivating tenant and after making inquiry in the manner prescribed. The opening words "any dispute" cover disputes of all kinds arising under the Act. Questions relating to determination of fair rent or the eviction of cultivating tenant referred to in the provision do not exhaust all the categories of dispute. Their inclusive description is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. Disputes contemplated are various and manifold. Whatever they be, Section 16 is categorical that they have to be decided by the Tahsildar in the manner prescribed. It gives right of appeal, fixes the forum and attaches finality to the orders. What is more, Section 17 gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Act.

7. It follows therefore that whatever disputes that may properly arise under the provisions of the Act between a landlord and a cultivating tenant cannot be brought for decision before any other tribunal or court but only before the Tahsildar. In this way there is a clear embargo on the

Air 1968 AP 311 BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide such matters as are within the cognizance of the Tahsildar under the provisions of the Act. Obvious as the provision in Section 5 is that the agreed rent shall be the rent payable subject to the provisions of Section 6, the Civil Court has no power to vary that rent as such a power is expressly conferred on the Tahsildar.

It is true as argued by the learned council that exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction over matters of civil nature is not a matter of ready inference unless it is expressly explicit or necessarily implied. But what better context could there be of exclusion when Sections 16 and 17 are so categorical of exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction? Where certain rights are created by the Statute and disputes in relation thereto are brought in this cognizance of a special forum and a right of appeal is given and further the Statute gives overriding effect to its provisions, it is idle to contend that the civil court has still jurisdiction to decide such disputes as have arisen under the Act between the landlord and the cultivating tenant."

20. In Nimmagadda Venkaiah and Others Vs. Sri Sangameswara

Swamy Temple 2 when tenant filed a suit for injunction invoking

jurisdiction of civil Court in interim injunction petition carried to this

Court wherein it is held at paras 14 and 15, which reads as follows:

"14. The learned counsel for the defendants argued that under Section 16 (1) of the Act and Rule 13 of the A.P.

1993(2) ALT 283 BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

Tenancy Rules, a civil suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs are tenants and for an injunction against the defendant landlord is not maintainable, and under the Act the proper forum is the revenue court which alone is competent to grant injunction. He further argued that Rule 13 read with Section 16 of the Act would enable the revenue court to grant not merely a declaration but also an order which is called injunction or not can hardly make a difference. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision in Viswanadham v.

Sri L.N.S. Temple, 1981 (1) ALT 457. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the Tahsildar has got jurisdiction only where the dispute is between the landlord and the tenant. The Tribunal under the Tenancy Act decides the disputes between the landlord and tenant and he relied upon Venkata Reddy v. Bushi Reddy, 1970 (2) ALT 237 (F.B.).

15. In the present case the plaintiffs are the tenants of the first-defendant temple. The plaintiffs filed the suit for permanent injunction against the temple and other defendants. They also filed I.A.734/92 for issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession of the schedule lands. According to the plaintiffs they are the tenants of the first defendant temple and they took on lease 60 acres of the temple lands and they have been in possession of the land as cultivating tenants. According to the first defendant he gave notices to the plaintiffs on 22-10-91 under Exs.A-1 to A-8. Exs.A-21 to A-26 are the notices informing that the Paripalanakartha was removed and the Maktha was to be paid to him only, and also claiming arrears of the Maktha for the BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

previous years. No reply was given by the plaintiffs to the notices. It is also the contention of the plaintiffs that they are the tenants of the schedule lands and they have taken the land on lease by virtue of the order of the Commissioner of Endowments. The above contentions clearly show that the plaintiffs are the cultivating tenants of the temple land. According to defendants 2 to 23, they have taken the schedule lands on lease in March, 1992 in the auction held by the temple-authorities. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the suit is between the landlord and tenants and not between the tenants and some other strangers. Hence by relying upon the decision in Visiuanadham v. Sri LN.S. Temple, 1981(1) ALT 457 I hold that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and only the tenancy court has jurisdiction to decide the dispute in question. As per the report of the Commissioner appointed by the trial court, the crops raised in the suit lands are plantations and black gram and they do not come under the definition of "plantation crops" mentioned in Section 2 (h) of the Act. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the Act applies to the facts of the case on hand, that the competent authority to decide the dispute between the landlord and tenant is only the Special Officer under the Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the Civil Court as the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant interim injunction to the plaintiffs against the defendants. The same view was also expressed in K. Kasulu v. The Commissioner, Endowments Department and Ors., 1986 BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

(2) ALT (S.N.) 44 and also in Viswanadham v. Sri L.N.S. Temple (2 supra)."

21. In Koneti Ramachandra and Others Vs. G.Anjappa (Died) by

Lrs3 this Court held at paras 9 to 11, which reads as under:

"9. Under the A.P. Tenancy Act, relevant provisions are made, defining the rights and obligations of the tenants and landlords, in respect of agricultural lands, and Special Tribunals are constituted. Some doubt existed as to whether the Tribunal constituted under the Act had the jurisdiction to grant the relief of declaration and injunction. In Boppudi Viswanadham v. Sri Lakshminarasimha Swamivari Temple 1981 (1) APLJ 357, this Court reviewed the case-law on the subject and held that in view of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in R. Raghava Rao v. Tenancy Tahsildar, Tanuku (1976) 1 APLJ 156, the Tribunal under the Act had the power to grant such reliefs. In that case, the suit filed by a tenant was for the relief of perpetual injunction. The trial Court and the lower appellate Court took the view that they do not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, having regard to the relief claimed in it. The second appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by this Court. In Nimmagadda Venkaiah v. Sri Sangameswara Swamy Temple, an identical view was taken by this Court.

10. It is no doubt true that a Full Bench of this Court in D.

Venkata Reddy v. B. Bhushireddy , held that, where serious dispute exists, as to the very relationship of landlord and

2007(3) ALD 40 BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

tenant, the question must be decided by civil Court, and not by tenancy Tribunal. The same is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi. Had the complaint of the plaintiff in the instant case been that there existed a dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant, and any declaratory relief was south, there would have been some possibility for applying the ratio laid down in the two judgments referred to above. The only relief claimed in the present suit is the one, for perpetual injunction against the defendants. As observed earlier, through a catena of decisions, this Court held that it is the Tenancy Tribunal alone, that is conferred with the jurisdiction to grant the relief of perpetual injunction.

11. An effort is made by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff to convince the Court, that the 3rd defendant does not answer the description of landlord, and the suit filed for the relief of injunction against a stranger can certainly be maintained. Here again, the submissions do not receive any support in the pleadings. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that the 3rd defendant purchased the suit schedule property from Defendants 1 and 2. He made a reference to the agreement of sale, and sale deeds, though not with reference to the debts. The record discloses that much before the suit was filed, the property stood transferred in favour of the 3rd defendant. Therefore, there is no basis for the contention that the 3rd defendant does not answer the description of the landlord. Even otherwise, once the 3rd defendant is found to be claiming his rights through the 1st defendant, the owner of the land, he fits into the definition of landlord under BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

subsection (f) of Section 2 of the Act. The expression used in the definition is "person deriving rights" in contradistinction to "person deriving title". To answer the description of landlord, one does not have to be a person, holding title over the land, and it would be sufficient, if he derives the right from the recognized owner. At any rate, the 3rd defendant had derived title also."

22. In the present case also the plaintiff himself contended that

defendants are tenants and appellant herein is also purchaser of „C‟

schedule property which is portion of „B‟ schedule property, which is

said to be purchased by D1 from vendee of lessee, due to that they

invoked jurisdiction of Tenancy Act for eviction of D1, but surprisingly

filed civil suit for permanent injunction instead of seeking relief in

tenancy case filed before Special Officer - cum - Principal District

Munsif, Tirupati. The said aspect is not considered by the Courts

below and when civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain

the dispute and when Special Officer alone has got jurisdiction to

entertain any dispute between landlord and tenant, learned trial

Judge ought not to have entertained suit filed by the plaintiff seeking

injunction simplicitor. It is also peculiar to note that both parties

have not filed copy of said permanent registered lease deed dated

11.03.1931 executed by the then pedda jiyamgar in favour of BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

Mr.M.Munikanaiah, however both the Courts below have discussed the

contents of lease deed, but it is not known from where they

extracted as Ex.A1 to Ex.A11 marked before trial Court not contains

the copy of said leasedeed. When the civil Court has no inherent

jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the civil Court entertaining the

suit is a substantial question of law, which can be decided by this

Court while considering the appeal under section 100 CPC. In view of

ratio laid down by this Court and also as per the provisions Section 16

& 17 of A.P.(Andhra area) Tenancy Act, 1956, the civil Court has no

jurisdiction to entertain the suit, due to that the plaintiff is not

entitled to seek any relief against defendants in the suit filed before

the civil Court.

23. Therefore, in the above circumstances, accepting the

contentions of the appellant with regard to lack of jurisdiction of the

civil Court to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff/R1, the second

appeal has to be allowed setting aside the decree and judgment of

the appellate Court as well as trail Court.

24. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed. Consequently,

the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.266 of

1982 confirmed by appellate Court in A.S.No.147 of 1987 is hereby BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

set aside. The suit filed by first respondent/plaintiff in O.S.No.266

of 1982 is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties are

directed to bear their own costs throughout.

25. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions if any, stand

closed. Interim orders granted if any, stand vacated.

______________________ BANDARU SYAMSUNDER, J Dt:13.10.2022.

Rns BSS,J S.A.No.636 of 2001

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER

S.A.No.636 of 2001

Date: 13.10.2022

Rns