Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Sri N. Prateep Kumar vs M.Jagadeesh Chandra Prasad, on 28 February, 2022
1
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CONTEMPT APPEAL No.13 OF 2021
Between:
Sri N. Prateep Kumar, IFS,
S/o. N. Kondala Rao, Aged about 58 years,
Occ: Prl. Chief Conservator of Forests
and Head of Forest Force,
Aranya Bhavan, K. M. Munshi Road,
Nagarampalem, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh. --- Appellant
Versus
M. Jagadeesh Chandra Prasad,
S/o. M. Reddy Satyanarayana,
Aged about 32 years,
Occ: Forest Range Officer,
Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh. --- Respondent
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 28.02.2022
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH
AND
HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether Their Lordships wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
______________________________
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J
________________________
B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J
2
* HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH
AND
* HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
+ CONTEMPT APPEAL No.13 OF 2021
% 28.02.2022
# Between:
Sri N. Prateep Kumar, IFS,
S/o. N. Kondala Rao,
Aged about 58 years,
Occ: Prl. Chief Conservator of Forests
and Head of Forest Force,
Aranya Bhavan, K. M. Munshi Road,
Nagarampalem, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh. --- Appellant
Versus
M. Jagadeesh Chandra Prasad,
S/o. M. Reddy Satyanarayana,
Aged about 32 years,
Occ: Forest Range Officer,
Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh. --- Respondent
! Counsel for the Appellant : Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy,
Senior Advocate, assisted by
Mr. C. Sumon, Advocate
^ Counsel for the Respondent : Mr. Parthasaradhy Achuta,
Advocate
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (1981) 2 SCC 277
2. (1994) 6 SCC 332
3. (2003) 11 SCC 1
4. (2010) 12 SCC 770
5. (2014) 3 SCC 373
6. (2014) 16 SCC 204
7. 2015 SCC OnLine Can SC 30
8. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 29
9. (2021) 7 SCC 613
10. (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL)
11. (2010) 3 SCC 705
12. AIR 1969 SC 189
13. (1970) 3 SCC 98
14. (1981) 2 SCC 277
15. 1987 Supp SCC 394
16. (1994) 6 SCC 332
17. (1995) 3 SCC 559
18. (2001) 3 SCC 739
19. (2022) 1 SCC 101
This Court made the following:
3
THE HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH
AND
THE HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
CONTEMPT APPEAL No. 13 of 2021
Sri N.Prateep Kumar, IFS,
S/o. N.Kondala Rao,
Aged about 58 years,
Occ:Prl. Chief Conservator of Forests
and Head of Forest Force,
Aranya Bhavan, K. M. Munshi Road,
Nagarampalem, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh.
.... Appellant
Versus
M. Jagadeesh Chandra Prasad,
S/o. M. Reddy Satyanarayana,
Aged about 32 years,
Occ: Forest Range Officer,
Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh.
.... Respondent
Counsel for the Appellant : Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy,
Senior Advocate assisted by
Mr. C. Sumon, Advocate
Counsel for the Respondent : Mr. Parthasaradhy Achuta,
Advocate
JUDGMENT
Date: 28.02.2022
(Per Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah)
Heard Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Mr. C. Sumon, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Parthasaradhy
Achuta, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner.
2. The instant appeal is preferred under Section 19(1) of The
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), by way of
which the appellant impugns the Judgement and Order dated 21.10.2021
penned by the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case No.722 of 2021.
3. The learned Single Judge, upon analysis, was pleased to hold:
'4. In the circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding
that the respondent has committed a clear and unequivocal
violation of the orders of this Court amounting to deliberate
disobedience of the orders of this Court. Accordingly, the
respondent has committed contempt of the orders of this Court.
5. In view of this clear contempt, the respondent is sentenced to
simple imprisonment for a period of four weeks and a fine of
Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) payable within two
weeks from the date of this order. Failing which, the respondent
shall be liable for further simple imprisonment of two weeks.
6. This order is suspended for a period of four weeks to enable
the respondent to file an appeal against this order if he so
chooses.'
4. On 19.11.2021, we directed that the sentence imposed on the
appellant be kept in abeyance till 30.11.2021. On 30.11.2021, in view of
our order dated 19.11.2021, the learned Division Bench-I, before whom the
matter was listed directed to post the case before us in the post-lunch
session. Thereupon, we heard arguments in part and continued the interim
order till 07.12.2021.
5. Our order dated 07.12.2021 is reproduced herein below:
"Heard Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Mr. C. Sumon, learned counsel for the appellant, and
Mr. Parthasaradhy Achuta, learned counsel for the
respondent/writ petitioner.
2. The present appeal is directed against Judgement and Order
passed by the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case No.722 of
2021, whereby the appellant, upon his conviction for having
committed contempt of Court, has been sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of four weeks and subjected to
a fine of INR 2,000/- payable within two weeks from the date of
the order, failing which he would be liable for further simple
imprisonment of two weeks.
3. The respondent had preferred Writ Petition No.8724 of 2020 to
declare that the proceedings initiated against him dated
30.12.2019 placing him under suspension be quashed and
therein, vide I.A.No.1 of 2020, a prayer was made that the order
dated 30.12.2019 be suspended. The learned Single Judge by
order dated 13.08.2020 had passed interim direction in terms of
the prayer made in the said I.A.No.1 of 2020. On account of non-
compliance of the order dated 13.08.2020, the respondent
instituted Contempt Case No.722 of 2021. After hearing the
appellant, final order convicting him and sentencing him to
imprisonment and imposing fine came to be passed, which is
under appeal herein.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
judgement and order is disproportionate and unfair, in light of
the facts and circumstances of the present case and prayed for
this Court's interference. It was submitted that the learned
Single Judge misconstrued the stand of the appellant in his
counter-affidavit and the additional counter-affidavit and treated
the same as an admission of guilt by him. It was submitted that
in the first counter-affidavit, paragraph no.3, which has been
quoted by the learned Single Judge, is with reference to
communication received by the appellant dated 25.09.2020 from
the Government and the action taken by him on the same.
Thereafter, submitted learned Senior Counsel, the learned Single
Judge has referred to the additional counter-affidavit filed by
him affirmed on 22.09.2021 in which the learned Single Judge
has noted that the appellant's stand was that he was unware of
the interim order dated 13.08.2020 and further, that he became
aware of the said fact only upon receipt of notice in the contempt
case. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the averments
made in the two counter-affidavits have been read out of context,
and drew the attention of the Court to the first counter-affidavit
of which paragraph no.3 which has been quoted by the learned
Single Judge to contend that the order of the Court dated
13.08.2020 was received by the appellant in his office on
25.09.2020 and the statement made in the additional counter-
affidavit at paragraph no.2 wherein he had stated that the order
passed by the Court was not brought to his knowledge.
5. It was contended that the two statements in the two counter-
affidavits are to be read in continuity. Learned Senior Counsel
further submitted that the affidavit also states that because the
interim order of the Court was not brought to the knowledge of
the appellant, for the lapse(s) committed by his subordinates,
action had been initiated against all the concerned staff in
Proceedings no.1931/2020/Vig-1(i) dated 17.09.2021. Learned
counsel submitted that in the same counter-affidavit, it has also
been stated that the respondent-writ petitioner never submitted
any representation post-13.08.2020 as mentioned in the said
affidavit. It was further submitted that the respondent had been
reinstated at the very first instance on 14.06.2021 after notice
dated 12.05.2021 was received.
6. Thus, it was submitted that the appellant having implemented
the order at the very first instance on being made aware of the
position i.e, the order of which contempt was urged, deserves to
be exonerated of having committed contempt as the omission on
his part was neither deliberate nor wilful. Further, learned
counsel submitted that there were genuine reasons for even the
delay caused in implementing the order of the Court, which was
due to a communication gap between the appellant and the
learned Government Pleader, who represented the appellant by
virtue of his official position, before the learned Single Judge in
the writ petition, and there was a lack of clarity with regard to
there being any interim order passed on 13.08.2020. Learned
Senior Counsel submitted that due to the afore-stated
communication gap between the appellant and the learned
Government Pleader, it would transpire that even the learned
Government Pleader was not very categorical with regard to any
interim order passed on 13.08.2020 as also the nature of such
order.
7. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant has
enjoyed an unblemished career record of almost thirty-five years
and has never conducted himself in a manner which would
show that he was casual towards the order of the Court, much
less violate the order of the Court. Learned counsel drew the
attention of the Court to Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to contend that the
Court shall not impose a sentence under the Act for contempt of
Court, unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature
that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere,
with the due course of justice. Learned Senior Counsel submitted
that in the present case when the appellant has complied with
the order, although belatedly, for which there is explanation, it
cannot be held that there was deliberate or wilful violation of the
order, so as to interfere substantially with the due course of
justice.
8. It was next contended that the appellant by initiating action
against the subordinates concerned who had failed to bring to
his notice the interim order of this Court dated 13.08.2020 also
indicates that he is conscious of his responsibility to ensure that
the order(s) of the Court are duly complied. Learned Senior
Counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge has proceeded
on the assumption that by extending the suspension of the
respondent/writ petitioner, even after the passing of the interim
order dated 13.08.2020, it was clearly established that the
appellant had committed wilful contempt, which was in clear
disobedience of the order.
9. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the same was
misplaced for the reason that the appellant in the additional
counter-affidavit had categorically stated that at the time when
the matter was placed before him to review the suspension order
of the respondent/writ petitioner, the interim order dated
13.08.2020 was not on the record put up before him and thus,
he was unaware of the same and had extended the period of
suspension due to various other factors.
10. Concluding his arguments, learned Senior Counsel submitted
that the appellant at the very first instance had tendered
unconditional apology and had also purged the alleged contempt
by revoking the suspension on 14.06.2021 in terms of the order
of the Court dated 13.08.2020. He highlighted that the sentence
was disproportionate in the nature of the case.
11. Learned counsel produced the records available with the
appellant before this Court. We have also been handed over a
compilation. There is a clear averment by the appellant that not
even one of the representations, mentioned in the affidavit filed
by the respondent/writ petitioner in the Contempt Case, is on
record with the authorities and thus, there was no occasion for
the appellant to be aware of the same. Learned counsel further
submitted that there are only two representations before the
Enquiry Officer and therein lies a reference to an interim
direction of the Court, but dehors any elaboration on such
direction. It is urged that, most importantly, no copy of the order
dated 13.08.2020 was forwarded to the appellant, by the
respondent/writ petitioner, for him to be aware of the actual
order. Lastly, it was submitted that even after revocation of the
suspension of the respondent on 14.06.2021, which was duly
served on him, till date, the respondent has not resumed his
duties. We note, at this juncture itself, that the event of the
respondent/writ petitioner having joined or not joined back after
14.06.2021 is an issue which is immaterial in the instant
appeal.
12. This Court, with the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel
has examined the pleadings. However, no explanation was
forthcoming as to why even after revoking the suspension order
on 14.06.2021, there was a gap of over three months for
initiating disciplinary action against the subordinates who had
not brought the interim order dated 13.08.2020 to the notice of
the appellant except that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there
was some delay. Purely to better appreciate the appellant's
contentions, we queried as to what was the stage of the
proceedings as initiated on 17.09.2021. Upon verification from
the record available in Court, it was submitted that 15 days'
time had been granted to the concerned staff to submit their
explanation(s) but after that no further steps appears to have
been taken. Again, having regard to the jurisdiction we are
concerned with herein, this is an aspect which need not detain
us, but was tangentially touched upon to see as to whether the
appellant followed up on such proceedings.
13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner
submitted that despite his repeated efforts to get the order dated
13.08.2020 implemented and complied with, the officers
concerned had totally ignored the same. It was submitted that
the respondent/writ petitioner personally met the Additional
Principal Chief Conservator, who though not a party in the writ
petition, had accepted the representations. On a query of the
Court as to why the respondent served a copy of the order dated
13.08.2020 and representation to another person/officer, who is
not even arrayed as a party in the writ petition, rather than the
appellant, learned counsel submitted that the Additional
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests is the competent authority
and so representation was submitted to him and further that he
tried to meet the appellant, but was not given an appointment.
Learned counsel submitted that the respondent/writ petitioner
has submitted a representation seeking transfer which has not
yet been decided by the authorities even after the order of a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court so directing. Be that as it may, this
again is not our lookout.
14. In response to the submissions of learned counsel for the
respondent, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted
that the stand taken with regard to the respondent having
personally met the Additional Principal Chief Conservator is only
a verbal submission in Court, which is neither documented nor
was there any proof of the respondent/writ petitioner having met
the said officer. It was submitted that interestingly, such stand
had been taken belatedly and that too, for the first time before
this Court, at the appellate stage, and was never advanced
before the learned Single Judge.
14. The instant order has been dictated in open Court, so that no
submission on behalf of either side is missed/mis-stated.
Learned counsel submit that the aforesaid submissions are all
they wish to canvass. Upon the Court again calling upon learned
counsel if they wished to supplement the arguments recorded
supra, it was stated at the Bar that nothing further was to be
added.
15. Accordingly, arguments having been concluded, judgement
stands reserved.
16. Till pronouncement of judgement, the interim order passed
by us shall operate. Personal appearance of the appellant is
dispensed with."
6. The arguments canvassed by learned senior counsel and learned
counsel for the parties are encapsulated in detail above. We note that 2
typographical errors have crept into our order dated 07.12.2021 (supra) as
two paragraphs have been numbered '14.', and 'unaware' has been mis-
spelt as 'unware' in paragraph no.4 thereof.
7. Section 2(b) of the Act defines 'civil contempt' in the terms below:
'(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful
breach of an undertaking given to a court;'
8. In Capt. Dushyant Somal v Smt. Sushma Somal, (1981) 2 SCC
277, it was observed:
'3. ... Nor is a person to be punished for contempt of court for
disobeying an order of court except when the disobedience is
established beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof
being similar, even if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding.
Where the person alleged to be in contempt is able to place
before the court sufficient material to conclude that it is
impossible to obey the order, the court will not be justified in
punishing the alleged contemner. ...'
(emphasis supplied)
9. In Niaz Mohammad v State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332, it
was held:
'9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') defines "civil contempt" to mean "wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or
other process of a court ...". Where the contempt consists in
failure to comply with or carry out an order of a court made in
favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in
whose favour such order or direction has been made can move
the court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the
alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from
the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not
like an execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The
party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to
the benefit of such order. The court while considering the issue
as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not
having complied with and carried out the direction of the court,
has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a
particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining
civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to
any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the
direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied about the
disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but
should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and
intentional. The civil court while executing a decree against the
judgment-debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the
disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a
decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the
decree whatever may be consequence thereof. But while
examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the
jurisdiction of the court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for
disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held
guilty and punished, the court has to record a finding that such
disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the
circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the
court, the court is satisfied that although there has been a
disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some
compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the
contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish
the alleged contemner.'
(emphasis supplied)
10. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v Dharam Godha, (2003) 11
SCC 1, it was noted:
'17. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act defines "civil
contempt" and it means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful
breach of undertaking given to a court. "Wilful" means an act or
omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally and with
the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the
specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done,
that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard
the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or
with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to constitute
contempt the order of the court must be of such a nature which is
capable of execution by the person charged in normal
circumstances. It should not require any extraordinary effort nor
should be dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or
omission of a third party for its compliance. This has to be
judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each
case. The facts mentioned above show that none of the
respondents to the petition can be held to be directly responsible
if the Scheme which had been formulated by the Government of
India on 28-6-1996 and had been approved by this Court by the
order dated 8-7-1996 could not be implemented in letter and
spirit as many factors have contributed to the same. The reasons
given for non-inclusion of Shri Umadhar Prasad Singh in signing
of the agreement appear to be quite plausible. NCFL has
undoubtedly not discharged its liability of making payment of its
entire liability of Rs 6 crores. However, it has come out with a
case that some additional expenditure has been incurred in
running the unit. It is not possible to get the complete financial
picture only on the basis of the affidavits filed in the present
petition. On the material on record, therefore, it is not possible to
hold that the charge of having committed contempt of court on
account of alleged non-compliance with the orders passed by
this Court on 8-7-1996, 1-5-1997 [Under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India] and 31-7-2000 [Ashok Paper Mills Kamgar
Union v. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC at p. 16, below] has been
established against any one of the respondents.'
(emphasis supplied)
11. In Dinesh Kumar Gupta v United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
(2010) 12 SCC 770, it was held:
'15. ...The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 clearly postulates the
existence of only the following preconditions before a person can
be held to have committed civil contempt:
(i) There must be a judgment or order or decree or direction or
writ or other process of a court; or
An undertaking given to a court;
(ii) The judgment, etc. must be of the court and undertaking must
have been given to a court;
(iii) There must be a disobedience to such judgment, etc. or
breach of such undertaking;
(iv) The disobedience or breach, as the case may be, must be
wilful.
xxx
17. This now leads us to the next question and a more relevant
one, as to whether a proceeding for contempt initiated against
the appellant can be held to be sustainable merely on
speculation, assumption and inference drawn from facts and
circumstances of the instant case. In our considered opinion, the
answer clearly has to be in the negative in view of the well-
settled legal position reflected in a catena of decisions of this
Court that contempt of a civil nature can be held to have
been made out only if there has been a wilful disobedience
of the order and even though there may be disobedience,
yet if the same does not reflect that it has been a
conscious and wilful disobedience, a case for contempt
cannot be held to have been made out. In fact, if an order
is capable of more than one interpretation giving rise to
variety of consequences, non-compliance with the same
cannot be held to be wilful disobedience of the order so as
to make out a case of contempt entailing the serious
consequence including imposition of punishment.
However, when the courts are confronted with a question
as to whether a given situation could be treated to be a
case of wilful disobedience, or a case of a lame excuse, in
order to subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it
may be, will obviously depend on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case; but while deciding so,
it would not be legally correct to be too speculative based
on assumption as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
clearly postulates and emphasises that the ingredient of
wilful disobedience must be there before anyone can be
hauled up for the charge of contempt of a civil nature.
xxx
23. Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook or ignore
an important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature
given out under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to
satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience to the order.
Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a
proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged to
have been disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable or
rational interpretation of an order or circumstance which is the
factual position in the instant matter. It would equally not be
correct to infer that a party although acting due to
misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith
without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court,
should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a
contempt proceeding.
24. To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it would be
relevant and appropriate to take into consideration the settled
legal position as reflected in the judgment and order delivered
in Ahmed Ali v. Supdt., District Jail [1987 Cri LJ 1845 (Gau)] as
also in B.K. Kar v. High Court of Orissa [AIR 1961 SC 1367 :
(1961) 2 Cri LJ 438] that mere unintentional disobedience is not
enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt and although
disobedience might have been established, absence of wilful
disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him
guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or
misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is
not sufficient to justify for holding one guilty of contempt. It is
further relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of
contempt that casual or accidental or unintentional acts of
disobedience under the circumstances which negate any
suggestion of contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory
only and does not render the contemnor liable to punishment
and this was the view expressed also in State of Bihar v. Rani
Sonabati Kumari [AIR 1954 Pat 513] and N. Baksi v. O.K.
Ghosh [AIR 1957 Pat 528].'
(original emphasis in bold; emphasis supplied by underlining)
12. It is not disputed that the power to punish for contempt is
special and rare; it is a drastic power, casting upon the Court a sacred duty
to exercise the same with great care and caution. A misdirection in such
exercise could result in curbing the liberty of the charged individual. We are
conscious of this position, as succinctly exposited by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Sudhir Vasudeva v M George Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC
373, more specifically at Paragraph 19 thereof.
13. In Ram Kishan v Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204, it was
observed:
'11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts
power to punish an offender for his wilful
disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority
commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to
an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the
entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the
respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the
contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the
courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution
and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt,
it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to
exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-
criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in
these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would
rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere
probabilities. (Vide V.G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta [V.G.
Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1992) 4 SCC 697 : 1993 SCC (L&S)
202 : (1993) 23 ATC 400] , Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi
Gulati [Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC 530 : 2001
SCC (L&S) 1196] , Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh [Anil Ratan
Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21] , Bank of
Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya [Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin
Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC 360] , Sahdeo v. State of
U.P. [Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 705 : (2010) 2 SCC
(Cri) 451] and National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay
Alankus [National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9
SCC 600 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 481 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 172] .)
12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be
established that disobedience of the order is "wilful". The word
"wilful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking
into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions,
which is an indication of one's state of mind. "Wilful" means
knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with
full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes
casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine
inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or
negligent actions. The act has to be done with a "bad purpose or
without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or
perversely". Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not
include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate
conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and
intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated
action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a
disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of
some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible
for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot
be punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered
unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct."
(Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram
Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591] , Rakapalli Raja
Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao [Rakapalli
Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4
SCC 255 : AIR 1989 SC 2185] , Niaz Mohammad v. State of
Haryana [Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC
332 : AIR 1995 SC 308] , Chordia Automobiles v. S.
Moosa [Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC
282], Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha [Ashok
Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1] , State
of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas [State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006)
1 SCC 275: 2006 SCC (L&S) 122 : AIR 2006 SC 258]
and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE [Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE,
(2013) 9 SCC 753].)'
(emphasis supplied)
14. We also approvingly note an instructive passage from Peter W.
G. Carey v Judith Laiken, 2015 SCC OnLine Can SC 30, where the
Supreme Court of Canada observed:
'[30] Contempt of court "rest[s] on the power of the court to
uphold its dignity and process. ... The rule of law is directly
dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process
and maintain their dignity and respect": United Nurses of
Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901, at p.
931. It is well established that the purpose of a contempt order is
"first and foremost a declaration that a party has acted in
defiance of a court order": Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006
SCC 52 : [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, at para. 35, cited in Bell
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Torroni, 2009 ONCA 85 : 94
O.R. (3d) 614, at para. 20.
[31] The common law has developed to recognize two forms of
contempt of court: criminal contempt and civil contempt. The
distinction, which the parties to this appeal accept, rests on the
element of public defiance accompanying criminal contempt: see,
e.g., United Nurses, at p. 931; Poje v. Attorney General for
British Columbia, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 516, at p. 522. With civil
contempt, where there is no element of public defiance, the
matter is generally seen "primarily as coercive rather than
punitive": R.J. Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance (2nd
ed. (loose-leaf)), at ¶ 6.100. However, one purpose of sentencing
for civil contempt is punishment for breaching a court order:
Chiang (Trustee of) v. Chiang, 2009 ONCA 3 : 305 D.L.R. (4th)
655, at para. 117. Courts sometimes impose substantial fines to
match the gravity of the contempt, to deter the contemnor's
continuing conduct and to deter others from comparable conduct:
Sharpe, at ¶ 6.100.
[32] Civil contempt has three elements which must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt: Prescott-Russell
Services for Children and Adults v. G. (N.), (2006) 82 O.R. (3d)
686 (C.A.), at para. 27; College of Optometrists, at para. 71;
Bhatnager v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 217, at pp. 224 -25; Jackson v. Honey, 2009
BCCA 112 : 267 B.C.A.C. 210, at paras. 12-13; TG Industries
Ltd. v. Williams, 2001 NSCA 105 : 196 N.S.R. (2d) 35, at paras.
17 and 32; Godin v. Godin, 2012 NSCA 54 : 317 N.S.R. (2d) 204,
at para. 47; Soper v. Gaudet, 2011 NSCA 11 : 298 N.S.R. (2d)
303, at para. 23. These three elements, coupled with the
heightened standard of proof, help to ensure that the potential
penal consequences of a contempt finding ensue only in
appropriate cases: Bell ExpressVu, at para. 22; Chiang, at
paras. 10-11.
[33] The first element is that the order alleged to have been
breached "must state clearly and unequivocally what should
and should not be done": Prescott-Russell, at para. 27; Bell
ExpressVu, at para. 28, citing with approval Jaskhs Enterprises
Inc. v. Indus Corp., 2004 CanLII 32262 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 40.
This requirement of clarity ensures that a party will not be found
in contempt where an order is unclear: Pro Swing, at para. 24;
Bell ExpressVu, at para. 22. An order may be found to be
unclear if, for example, it is missing an essential detail about
where, when or to whom it applies; if it incorporates overly broad
language; or if external circumstances have obscured its
meaning: Culligan Canada Ltd. v. Fettes, 2010 SKCA 151 : 326
D.L.R. (4th) 463, at para. 21.
[34] The second element is that the party alleged to have
breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it:
Bhatnager, at p. 226; College of Optometrists, at para. 71. It may
be possible to infer knowledge in the circumstances, or an
alleged contemnor may attract liability on the basis of the wilful
blindness doctrine (ibid.).
[35] Finally, the party allegedly in breach must have
intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally
failed to do the act that the order compels: Sheppard v.
Sheppard, (1976) 12 O.R. (2d) 4 (C.A.), at p. 8. The meaning of
this element is one of the main points in contention on appeal
and I will turn to consider it in more detail momentarily.'
(emphasis supplied)
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rama Narang v Ramesh
Narang, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 29, opined that 'for bringing an action
under the ambit of civil contempt, there has to be a wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful
breach of an undertaking given to the court.'
(emphasis supplied)
16. Recently, in Abhishek Kumar Singh v G Pattanaik, (2021) 7
SCC 613, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated thus:
'65. It is well settled that contempt action ought to proceed only
in respect of established wilful disobedience of the order of the
Court. This Court in para 12 of the decision in Ram Kishan [Ram
Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S)
311] observed thus : (SCC pp. 209-10)
"12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be
established that disobedience of the order is "wilful". The word
"wilful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires
looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging
his actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind.
"Wilful" means knowingly intentional, conscious,
calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of
consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual,
accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability.
Wilful acts does not encompass involuntary or negligent
actions. The act has to be done with a 'bad purpose or
without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or
perversely'. Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not
include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The
deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what
he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there
has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part.
Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such
disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances
under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with
the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. 'Committal or
sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a
degree of default or misconduct.' (Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R.
Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1
SCC 591], Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopalav. Naragani Govinda
Sehararao [Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani
Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255], Niaz
Mohammad v. State of Haryana [Niaz Mohammad v. State of
Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332], Chordia Automobiles v. S.
Moosa [Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC 282]
, Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha [Ashok Paper
Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1] , State of
Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas [State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1
SCC 275 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 122] and Uniworth Textiles
Ltd. v. CCE [Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, (2013) 9 SCC 753] .)"
(emphasis supplied)
66. It is useful to recall the exposition in Director of
Education [Director of Education v. Ved Prakash Joshi, (2005) 6
SCC 98 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1357 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 812] and also
in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India [K.G. Derasari v. Union of
India, (2001) 10 SCC 496 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 756] ; wherein this
Court observed that in exercising contempt jurisdiction, the
primary concern must be whether the acts of commission or
omission can be said to be contumacious conduct of the party
who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the
directions given in the judgment and order of the Court. Further,
the Court ought not to take upon itself power to decide the
original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court
passing the judgment and order. It is also not open to go into the
correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions
or delete any direction, which course could be adopted only in
review jurisdiction and not contempt proceedings.'
(original emphasis in bold; emphasis supplied by underlining)
17. Broadly stated, a conspectus of the aforesaid makes it clear that
whilst circumspection ought to guide us, inasmuch as the contempt alleged
must be deliberate and intentional and not on account of mere oversight or
without contumacious intent, when the situation so warrants, appropriate
punishment must, necessarily, ensue.
18. Having surveyed the legal principles supra, we apply the same to
the instant factual matrix. Shorn of unnecessary detail, the facts are thus.
The respondent (writ petitioner) filed WP No.8724 of 2020 for quashing and
setting aside the impugned proceedings Rc.No.10057/2019/Vig-1, dated
30.12.2019 placing the petitioner under suspension in exercise of power
under Rule 8(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 [hereinafter referred to as the 'APCS (CCA)
Rules'] terming the same, inter alia, as illegal, arbitrary, vindictive and
violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
19. In WP No. 8724 of 2020, IA No.1 of 2020 was filed for suspending
the operation of the order impugned therein, on which the Court by order
dated 13.08.2020 granted interim direction till further orders. The
suspension of the respondent having not been vacated, he filed CC No.722
of 2021 alleging disobedience of the order dated 13.08.2020 passed in WP
No.8724 of 2020. The petitioner alleges to have filed a representation
thereafter before the authority concerned but his suspension was not
vacated and, on the contrary, was extended by the appellant, who is the
competent authority, after reviewing the same on 31.12.2020 vide
Rc.No.1931/2020/Vig-1, dated 01.02.2021. After filing of the contempt
case, the appellant revoked the suspension of the respondent vide order
dated 14.06.2021.
20. As per the stand of the appellant, noted in detail in order dated
17.12.2021 (supra), he was unaware of the interim order of the Court dated
13.08.2020 when the matter was brought before him for review on
31.12.2020, due to which suspension of the petitioner was continued.
Further, the contention is that the moment the appellant received the
notice in the contempt case, without losing time, he revoked the suspension
on 14.06.2021.
21. The learned Single Judge considered the matter and held that the
defence of the appellant that he was unaware of the interim order dated
13.08.2020 and became aware of the same only upon receipt of notice in
the contempt case could not be accepted. The learned Single Judge was of
the clear view that it was a case of blatant disobedience of the order of the
Court.
22. The following sequence of events is beyond cavil:
a) The respondent was placed under suspension on 30.12.2019;
b) Assailing the same, he filed WP No.8724 of 2020;
c) In IA No.1 of 2020 in WP No.8724 of 2020, on 13.08.2020, an
interim order was passed (of which disobedience was claimed in
the contempt case);
d) The respondent's suspension was further extended by the
appellant under proceedings dated 01.02.2021, and;
e) On 14.06.2021, the appellant revoked the respondent's
suspension.
23. It is also admitted by the appellant that the order of the Court
was received in his office on 25.09.2020 as also a communication from the
State Government, Environment, Forests, Science & Technology (Sec.IV)
Department, under Memo No.1663/Sec.IV/AI/2020, dated 25.09.2020 on
29.09.2020. However, on a bare perusal of the aforesaid Government
Memo, it is clear that actually, there was reference to the interim order of
the Court in WP No.8724 of 2020 and copy of the same was also enclosed
therewith. The said letter was seen by the appellant and in fact, in his
affidavit, he has stated that he issued instructions on 08.10.2020 pursuant
to the said letter. This, by itself, is sufficient to indicate that there had been
deliberate and wilful violation of the interim order of the learned Single
Judge dated 13.08.2020. Later on, in his affidavit itself, it has been stated
that 'on receipt of the Contempt Affidavit on 16.04.2021 followed by receipt
of Contempt Notice on 12.05.2021, the action to implement the interim orders
was expedited and in compliance to the orders of the Hon'ble Court, the
suspension orders of the petitioner were revoked on 14.06.2021'. It would be
relevant to note, at this juncture, that upon perusal of the case record, the
averment about receipt of 'Contempt Affidavit' on 16.04.2021 appears to
refer to the date on which copy of the Memorandum of the Contempt
Petition was served on the learned State Counsel; whereas 'Contempt Notice'
refers to the formal intimation termed 'Show Cause Notice Before Admission'
issued by the Deputy Registrar, High Court in terms of the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 03.05.2021 in Contempt Case No.722 of 2021.
24. Pausing, though only briefly, the Court would note that even
then, the suspension order was not revoked forthwith or with promptitude,
but only on 14.06.2021. Not only this, in the order dated 14.06.2021, it has
been stated that the appellant in exercise of powers conferred under Rule
8(5)(c) of the APCS (CCA) Rules, had revoked the order of suspension with
immediate effect. Thus, in the considered opinion of the Court, this also
indicates that the revocation was not in light of the order dated 13.08.2020,
which mandated so, but rather by the appellant in exercise of power
conferred upon him by the APCS (CCA) Rules, whereas in compliance of the
order dated 13.08.2020, only a follow-up action by way of revocation of
suspension citing the said High Court order had to be issued. Thus,
unfortunately, even the order dated 14.06.2021 indicates a certain
disregard of the order dated 13.08.2020.
25. Another contention of the appellant is that he had tendered an
unconditional apology at the first instance, but this cannot be accepted for
the simple reason that such apology was not tendered immediately on
receipt of the memorandum of the contempt petition on 16.04.2021, but
only after receipt of show cause notice in the contempt case on 12.05.2021,
and thereafter also the suspension was not vacated immediately; rather it
was revoked only on 14.06.2021.
26. Another plea taken by the appellant was that communication
from his counsel viz. the government counsel concerned, was not clear due
to which he even sought a clarification. The appellant urged that in the
letter of the government dated 25.09.2020, the direction was to file a
counter-affidavit in the writ petition, due to which he had marked it to the
Chief Conservator of Forests, WLM Circle, Tirupati, on 08.10.2020 itself.
We are unable to accept this submission. A casual and mechanical
approach ought to have been eschewed by the appellant, instead he had to
be vigilant. Such conduct is nothing short of callousness towards the order
of the Court. It was incumbent upon the appellant to have gone through
the order of the learned Single Judge, which was referred to and placed
with the letter dated 25.09.2020, carefully and ensured it was complied
with, in letter and spirit. We say no more.
27. In the aforesaid background, it is difficult for this Court to accept
that the violation of the order dated 13.08.2020 was not deliberate and
unintentional. We note again that receipt of copy of the learned Single
Judge's order dated 13.08.2020 in the office of the appellant on 25.09.2020
and the Government Memo dated 25.09.2020 was received in the
appellant's office on 29.09.2020; receipt of the contempt petition on
16.04.2021; receipt of show cause notice in the contempt case on
12.05.2021 and the order revoking suspension being passed by the
appellant on 14.06.2021 are not in dispute - rather, these events and the
dates mentioned stand admitted by the appellant himself in his affidavits.
Having given the matter our most anxious consideration, there is no scope
of ambiguity or doubt that the non-compliance of the learned Single
Judge's order dated 13.08.2020 was wilful and deliberate.
28. The orders of the Court cannot be taken lightly. We recall the
observation of Lord Diplock in Attorney General v Times Newspapers
Ltd., (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL) that there exists 'an element of public policy
in punishing civil contempt, since administration of justice would be
undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded with
impunity'. Although it has not been so contended by the appellant, we may
observe that arguendo, if the appellant was aggrieved by the learned Single
Judge's order dated 13.08.2020, the appropriate course was to prefer an
appeal or to file an appropriate application for recall or modification thereof.
Having regard to the extant legal principles, the Court does not find any
merit in the instant appeal inasmuch as recording of the conviction of the
appellant under the Act is concerned. The same is affirmed and stands
maintained.
29. However, with regard to the quantum, we have deemed it fit to
consider certain factors. The appellant has a hitherto unblemished record
of long service with no similar instance(s) of non-compliance of Court
orders in his career. He has also tendered an unconditional apology, albeit
belatedly. Again, the order of the learned Single Judge, yet after an
unconvincing delay, was finally complied with. We are, thus, inclined to
interfere with the sentence awarded by the learned Single Judge, keeping in
mind that justice ought to be tempered with mercy.
30. Hence, the ends of justice would be served by modifying the
impugned order by increasing the fine to Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten
Thousand) and reducing the imprisonment awarded to one week. The fine
shall be paid by the appellant within 3 weeks from today, failing which the
same shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Keeping in mind that
our order visits the appellant with grave consequences, the present order
shall be suspended for a period of three weeks from today, to pursue
remedy(ies) as may be available in law and if he so desires.
31. Accordingly, the present contempt appeal stands disposed of in
the aforementioned terms. Any pending applications do not subsist for
consideration and are hereby closed.
________________________________
(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J)
Mjl/Dsh
JUDGMENT
(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Krishna Mohan)
32. Having gone through the judgment of my learned brother
Hon'ble Sri Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, as I am unable to concur with
the view taken by my learned brother, with due respect I differ and render a
separate judgment as follows:
33. This contempt appeal arises against the order of the learned
single Judge in Contempt Case No.722 of 2021 dated 21.10.2021.
34. The appellant is the respondent in the contempt case and the
respondent No.2 in the pending Writ Petition No.8724 of 2020 before the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The respondent is the petitioner in the
contempt case and the petitioner in the above said pending writ petition.
35. Heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the
learned counsel for the respondent.
36. The order of the learned single Judge in Contempt Case No.722
of 2021, dated 21.10.2021, assailed in this appeal is as follows:
"The petitioner, who was working as a Forest Range Officer,
was suspended by the respondent by way of proceedings in
Rc.No.10057/2019/Vig-1, Dated 30.12.2019. This order of
suspension was suspended by this Court by an order dated
13.08.2020. The petitioner has now approached this Court by way
of the present contempt case on the ground that despite the orders
of this Court, the respondent by proceedings dated 01.02.2021 in
R.C.No.1931/2020/vig-1, had reviewed the suspension of the
petitioner on 31.12.2020 and continued to the petitioner under
suspension despite the orders of this Court dated 13.08.2020 and
the same would amount to disobedience of the orders of this Court
and that the respondent was in gross contempt of this Court.
The respondent, after receiving notice, filed a counter affidavit
signed on 16.07.2021. In this counter affidavit, the respondent at
paragraph No.3 stated as follows:
"3. It is further submitted that, the orders of the Hon'ble
Court dated 13.08.2020 were received in this office on
25.09.2020 and the Government in Memo
No.1663/Sec.IV/A1/2020, EFS&T Dept., dated 15.09.2020
(received in this Office on 29.09.2020), requested to take
necessary action for filing Counter Affidavit in
W.P.No.8724/2020 filed by the petitioner on behalf of
Government also. Immediately, the respondent herein has
issued instructions on 08.10.2020 to the Chief Conservator of
Forests, WLM Circle, Tirupati to file Counter Affidavit in
W.P.No.8724/2020 and to furnish action taken report, so as to
submit the same to the Government. The respondent herein
has appointed the Chief Conservator of Forests, Wildlife
Division, Chittoor as Common Inquiry Officer and Common
Presenting Officer respectively on 08.10.2020."
2. He also stated that after receipt of the notice of the present
contempt case, the suspension orders passed against the petitioner
were revoked on 14.06.2021. However, no explanation was given as
to why the orders of this Court were disobeyed by extending the
suspension of the petitioner by proceedings Rc.No.1931/2020/Vig-
1, Dated 01.02.2021. Subsequently, the respondent filed an
additional reply affidavit said to have been signed on 22.09.2021. In
this affidavit, the respondent took the stand that he was unaware of
the interim orders passed by this Court and became aware of the
said fact only upon the receipt of the notice in the contempt case.
The respondent took the stand that the counter in the writ petition
had been filed on 10.08.2020 itself and the factum of the Court
passing an interim order on 13.08.2020 was not known to the
respondent. He further states that the petitioner did not report to
duty even after the orders of reinstatement had been issued and he
is still in unauthorized absence.
3. The suspension of the petitioner was suspended by this
Court on 13.08.2020. The respondent however, continued the
suspension of the petitioner by an order of continuation of
suspension dated 01.02.2021. The issue which arises in the present
contempt case is whether the order of this Court dated 13.08.2020
was within the knowledge of the respondent when he extended the
suspension of the petitioner on 01.02.2021. In the first counter
affidavit signed on 16.07.2021, the respondent unequivocally states
that he had received a Memo from the Government on 25.09.2020
along with the orders of this Court dated 13.08.2020 calling upon
the respondent to take necessary action. In the light of the said
admission on the part of the respondent, there can be no further
doubt that the order of this Court was received by the respondent
on 25.09.2020. The stand taken by the respondent in the
subsequent affidavit on 22.09.2021 cannot be accepted and appears
to be an attempt to defend himself in view of the blatant and clear
disobedience of the orders of this Court.
4. In the circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in
holding that the respondent has committed a clear and unequivocal
violation of the orders of this Court amounting to deliberate
disobedience of the orders of this Court. Accordingly, the
respondent has committed contempt of the orders of this Court.
5. In view of this clear contempt, the respondent is sentenced
to simple imprisonment for a period of four weeks and a fine of
Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) payable within two weeks
from the date of this order. Failing which, the respondent shall be
liable for further simple imprisonment of two weeks.
6. This order is suspended for a period of four weeks to enable
the respondent to file an appeal against this order if he so chooses.
7. Accordingly, the contempt case is allowed. There shall be
no order as costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending, in this
Contempt Case, shall stand closed."
37. The respondent as stated above filed the above said contempt
case by filing an affidavit stating that the interim order of the learned single
Judge in W.P.No.8724 of 2020 dated 13.08.2020 was not implemented, he
filed the above said writ petition to quash and set aside the departmental
proceedings issued by the respondent No.2 therein/the appellant in
suspending the petitioner therein vide proceedings in
Rc.No.10057/2019/Vig-1, dated 30.12.2019 and filed an I.A.No.1 of 2020
in the said writ petition praying for suspension of operation of the said
impugned proceedings dated 30.12.2019, the Hon'ble Court while granting
further time to file counter passed an interim direction till further orders by
order dated 13.08.2020 and posted the matter to 07.09.2020, the
respondents therein filed their counter in the said writ petition in August,
2020 and he submitted representations to the respondent-department
therein on 31.08.2020, 30.09.2020, 24.12.2020, 09.02.2021 and
10.03.2021 with a request to implement the orders of the learned single
Judge passed in I.A.No.1 of 2020 in W.P.No.8724 of 2020 dated
13.08.2020. Instead the appellant passed orders contrary to the orders of
the learned single Judge dated 13.08.2020 while reviewing the suspension
orders of the respondent in his proceedings vide Rc.No.1931/2020/vig-1,
dated 01.02.2021 extending the suspension orders until further orders.
Thus, alleged that the appellant willfully disobeyed the orders of the High
Court dated 13.08.2020.
38. For which the appellant filed the counter affidavit denying the
said allegations by contending that the respondent has been kept under
suspension in PCCF and HOFF, AP, Guntur in Rc.No.10057/2019/Vig-1,
dated 30.12.2019 for not attending to his legitimate duties as Forest Range
Officer as per codal provisions by further not maintaining absolute integrity
being a Government employee contrary to the Andhra Pradesh Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 as reported by the Chief Conservator of
Forests, WLM Circle, Tirupati, aggrieved by the same he filed W.P.No.8724
of 2020 before the Hon'ble High Court seeking to quash and set aside the
said proceedings dated 30.12.2019, thereafter the appellant in his official
capacity has revoked the suspension orders of the respondent vide
reference No.1931/2020/Vig-1, dated 14.06.2021 by serving the same to
the respondent through the Divisional Forest Officer, Chittoor on
17.06.2021, the respondent was given posting orders in the PCCF and
HOFF AP Guntur in Ref.No.5453/2017/HR-1, dated 22.06.2021 posting
him as Forest Range Officer, Government Timber Depot Range, Bairluty,
Atmakur Wildlife Division, WLM Division, Kurnool District, the order of the
Hon'ble High Court dated 13.08.2020 was received in his office on
25.09.2020 with the Government Memo No.1663/Sec.IV/A1/2020, EFS &
T Dept., dated 25.09.2020 (received on 29.09.2020) wherein a request was
made to take necessary action for filing counter affidavit in W.P.No.8724 of
2020 on behalf of the Government also, then he has issued instructions on
08.10.2020 to the Chief Conservative of Forests, WLM Circle, Tirupati to file
counter affidavit in the said writ petition and sought for action taken report
so as to submit the same to the Government, the Chief Conservator of
Forests Wild Life Management Circle, Tirupati, in Rc.No.283/2019/M4,
dated 14.10.2020 (received in his office on 12.11.2020) stated that the
Divisional Forests Officer, Chittoor East Wildlife Division, Chittoor
submitted the approved counter affidavit along with material papers for
filing the counter affidavit on 02.08.2020 at 09:00 AM in his
Rc.No.101/2019/G2, dated 01.08.2020 but due to COVID Pandemic
situation the staff were not available to take up follow up action
immediately and on receipt of the contempt affidavit on 16.04.2021 and the
contempt notice on 12.05.2021 the action for implementation of the interim
order of the High Court dated 13.08.2020 was ex pedited and the
suspension order against the respondent was revoked as stated above on
14.06.2021 and the delay was neither willful nor wanton but due to the
administrative grounds only and tendered an unconditional apology for the
delay in implementing the orders of the Court.
39. The appellant also filed an additional counter affidavit in the
above said contempt case tendering an unconditional apology for the delay
in implementation of the interim orders of the Hon'ble High court dated
13.08.2020 and prayed for taking a lenient view by contending further that
the interim orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court was not placed before
him by the concerned while placing the suspension orders of the
respondent for review, had it been brought to his knowledge he would not
have extended the suspension period when the 2nd review was held and he
would have implemented the interim orders of the High Court without any
delay, for the lapses committed by the subordinate staff, an action has been
initiated against all the concerned staff in his proceedings
No.1931/2020/Vig-1(ii), dated 17.09.2021, the above said writ petition was
filed questioning the orders of suspension pursuant to the disciplinary
action against the respondent 10057/2019/Vig-1, dated 30.12.2019, the
writ petition was filed on 13.05.2020 and as per the office of the learned
Government Pleader the matter came up for admission on 28.05.2020, it
was adjourned to 23.07.2020, the suspension of the respondent was
reviewed on 07.07.2020 and articles of charge were issued on 03.08.2020,
the counter affidavit was handed over to the learned Government Pleader's
office on 04.08.2020, the matter was listed for admission on 04.08.2020,
and the learned Government Pleader reported that the counter was
uploaded on the same day but the same was registered on 10.08.2020,
thereafter the matter underwent adjournments on 13.08.2020, 19.09.2020,
08.10.2020, 05.11.2020, 18.11.2020, the docket notings of the learned
Government Pleader's office also did not indicate hearing or passing of
interim orders dated 13.08.2020, the respondents in the writ petition
including the appellant were under the impression that the matter was not
heard after filing the counter affidavit, the respondent/writ petitioner never
submitted any representation after 13.08.2020, had he got the knowledge
of the interim order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 13.08.2020, he would
have taken steps to file vacate stay petition, without the knowledge of the
said interim order the suspension of the respondent was reviewed for the
second time on 31.12.2020 and the same was communicated vide
proceedings dated 01.02.2021, but on coming to know as stated supra the
respondent/writ petitioner was reinstated to duty vide orders in
proceedings No.1931/2020/Vig-1, dated 14.06.2021 and in view of the
delay in implementation of the interim orders of the Hon'ble High Court he
has issued orders in proceedings No.1931/2020-Vig.1, dated 17.09.2021
treating the suspension period of the respondent/writ petitioner from
13.08.2020 to 14.06.2021 as on duty with full pay and allowances,
still, the respondent did not report to duty after his reinstatement till date
and he neither reported to duty at his place of posting nor applied for any
leave and he has been unauthorisedly absenting himself from duty even
after compliance of the interim orders of the Hon'ble High Court with
consequential benefits and sought for sincere apology for the delay in
implementation of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court.
40. Basing upon the above said averments and pleadings, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argued that there is no
willful and deliberate disobedience of the interim order passed by the
learned single judge dated 13.08.2020 and the delay in implementation of
the same is due to oversight and inadvertence only. In a career span of
35 years, the appellant has never been accused of violation of any court
order much less for any willful and deliberate act. The learned single Judge
erroneously found that "the stand taken by the appellant in the additional
counter affidavit dated 24.09.2021 is different from that of the counter
affidavit dated 23.07.2021 and thereby the appellant made an attempt to
defend himself which is a clear disobedience of the orders of the Hon'ble
High Court". He further submits that there is no contradiction in the stand
taken by the appellant between the said two counters and it is more
explanatory in nature. The appellant stated in the counter filed on
23.07.2021 that he had received a copy of the order of the learned single
Judge on 25.09.2020 with a Government Memo whereas in the additional
counter affidavit filed on 24.09.2021 it was stated that when the appellant
extended the order of suspension of the writ petitioner on 31.12.2020 the
said interim order of the learned single judge was not brought to his notice
by his office staff nor it was placed in the file. Hence it is evident that due to
administrative lapses only the appellant was not appraised of the order
dated 13.08.2020 and it slipped out of mind though the appellant had seen
the order initially as mentioned in the first counter affidavit. He further
argued that the learned single Judge ought to have seen that the appellant
had purged himself with the contempt immediately on receipt of notice in
contempt petition by issuing the orders revoking suspension of the
respondent/ writ petitioner dated 14.06.2021 and order dated 17.09.2021
wherein the suspension period of the respondent from the date of interim
orders to 14.06.2021 was treated as on duty with full pay and allowances
and the learned single Judge ought to have considered the unconditional
apology tendered by the appellant both in the counter and as well as in the
additional counter affidavit as he has got highest regard for the Hon'ble
High Court. Hence, sought for setting aside the order of the learned single
Judge in Contempt Case No.722 of 2021 dated 21.10.2021 wherein the
appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
four weeks and fine of Rs.2,000/- payable within two weeks from the date
of the order in default to undergo further simple imprisonment of two
weeks.
41. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the above said contempt case is filed before the learned
single judge due to non implementation of the interim orders of the learned
single Judge dated 13.08.2020 in spite of submitting the same along with a
representation in the office of the respondent in the writ petition. He
admitted that even after reinstatement of the respondent on
implementation of the orders of the learned single Judge dated 13.08.2020,
the respondent did not join in duty so far and the counsel submitted no
objection for exoneration of the appellant from the contempt case as the
main writ petition is pending for consideration to be decided on merits.
42. In the backdrop of the above said rival contentions and
averments and arguments advanced on both the sides, the issue would fall
for consideration before this court is that whether the delay in compliance
of the order of the learned single Judge in I.A.No.1 of 2020 in W.P.No.8724
of 2020 dated 13.08.2020 by the appellant vide proceedings dated
14.06.2021 is deliberate amounting to willful disobedience?
43. It is true that the respondent filed the above said writ petition
questioning the proceedings of the appellant vide Rc.No.10057/19/Vig-I,
dated 30.12.2019 placing him under suspension in exercise of the power
under APCCS (CCS) Rules, 1991. In the said writ petition he filed an
I.A.No.1 of 2020 seeking suspension of the operation of the impugned order
dated 30.12.2019 pending disposal of the writ petition. As stated supra the
appellant is shown as respondent No.2 in his official capacity along with
three official respondents in the main writ petition and as well as in the
above said IA.
44. The order of the learned single Judge in I.A.No.1 of 2020 in
W.P.No.8724 of 2020 dated 13.08.2020 reads as follows:
"ORDER:
Further time is granted for filing counter.
Interim direction is granted till further orders.
Post on 07.09.2020."
45. The Government of Andhra Pradesh addressed a Memo
No.1663/Sec.IV/A1/2020, dated 25.09.2020 to the appellant marking a
copy to the Government Pleader for Services, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, Amaravathi, with respect to the subject of filing counter in
W.P.No.8724 of 2020 filed by the respondent in which the reference is cited
as interim orders of Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P.No.8724
of 2020 filed by the respondent. But in the body of the letter the appellant
is requested to take necessary action for filing counter affidavit in the said
writ petition on behalf of the Government also in consultation with the
Government Pleader for Services, High Court of Andhra Pradesh and action
taken report was sought to be furnished. Further the proceedings of the
appellant in reference No.1931/2020/Vig-I/1, dated 14.06.2021 reveals the
revocation of the said order of suspension of the respondent with immediate
effect who was placed under suspension on 30.12.2019 by virtue of the
impugned proceedings of the appellant.
46. From the reading of the counter affidavit, additional counter
affidavit of the appellant and the material papers in the contempt case,
it is clear that the respondent was placed under suspension pending
disciplinary proceedings on 30.12.2019, then he filed W.P.No.8724 of 2020
challenging the said suspension on 13.05.2020 which came up for
admission on 28.05.2020 and got adjourned to 23.07.2020.
In the meanwhile, the first review of suspension of the respondent was
made by the appellant on 07.07.2020 and the articles of charge was issued
to the respondent on 03.08.2020 and the counter affidavit in the said writ
petition was given to the learned government pleader's office on
04.08.2020. Again the matter was listed on 04.08.2020 and the learned
government pleader reported to the court about the filing of the counter
affidavit through online which was registered on 10.08.2020. Thereafter the
matter underwent adjournments on 13.08.2020, 19.09.2020, 08.10.2020,
05.11.2020 and 18.11.2020 and the same was informed by the learned
government pleader also to the office of the appellant. Hence the appellant
and other official respondents in the writ petition were under the
impression that the matter was not heard after filing the counter affidavit.
As there was no knowledge of the interim direction dated 13.08.2020 in
I.A.No.1 of 2020 in W.P.No.8724 of 2020 they have not filed the vacate stay
petition. Though the appellant's office received the order of the High court
dated 13.08.2020 along with the government memo dated 25.09.2020, as it
was not placed before the appellant by the subordinate staff, he only
instructed the concerned officer to take steps for filing the counter affidavit
on 08.10.2020 and at the time of second review of suspension orders of the
respondent on 31.12.2020 the said suspension orders were extended vide
proceedings of the appellant dated 01.02.2021 without the knowledge of the
orders of the court dated 13.08.2020 as it was neither informed nor placed
in the file by the staff of the appellant. While so, the appellant suddenly
received contempt affidavit and notice in the contempt case on 12.05.2021,
then it was realized that something went wrong and taken steps
immediately. In that process the suspension order of the respondent dated
30.12.2019 was revoked by the appellant on 14.06.2021 and the posting
order was given to the respondent by the appellant on 22.06.2021 and the
period between 13.08.2020 to 14.06.2021 was treated for the respondent as
on duty with full pay and allowances vide order of the appellant dated
17.09.2021. Even the said time taken was due to lack of staff during the
COVID-19 pandemic period. In spite of reinstatement with all consequential
benefits the respondent did not join duty till date committing unauthorised
absence. Be that as it may, the appellant also vide letter dated 20.05.2021
sought for a legal opinion from the learned Government Pleader Services-I
with respect to the said contempt case with a reminder on 09.06.2021. In
reply, the learned Government Pleader Services-I gave legal opinion dated
15.06.2021 confirming that there was no interim order in favour of the
respondent dated 13.08.2020. Even the letter of the respondent dated
04.04.2021 was only addressed to the Enquiry Officer, Tirupati with
respect to the disciplinary proceedings pending against him without
marking copy of the same to the appellant.
47. Thus the totality of the above said facts and circumstances and
sequence of events would clearly infer that the delay in implementation of
the orders of the learned single Judge dated 13.08.2020 is due to oversight
and inadvertence of the appellant, his staff and the learned government
pleader. That apart the respondent also did not bring it to the notice of the
appellant about the said interim direction dated 13.08.2020 seeking for it's
implementation. It shall also be seen that the appellant initiated action also
against his subordinate staff for the lapses committed by them in his
proceedingsdated 17.09.2021. For the mistake and lapses committed by the
subordinate staff and the information furnished by the learned government
pleader's office and the legal opinion rendered by the said government
pleader, the appellant cannot be held responsible and shall not be hauled
up for contempt. But the learned single Judge erroneously observed that
the stand taken by the appellant in his affidavit and in the additional
affidavit is an attempt to defend himself and he has committed a clear
unequivocal violation of the orders of the learned single Judge amounting
to deliberate disobedience of the orders of the court. Accordingly the said
contempt case was allowed vide order dated 21.10.2021 sentencing the
appellant to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of four weeks and fine
of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer further simple
imprisonment for a period of two weeks. It can be reiterated that there is no
conflict between the counter affidavit and the additional counter affidavit of
the appellant in the stand taken by him but it is more in the nature of
giving an explanation to persuade this court how he has missed the interim
direction dated 13.08.2020 by oversight and inadvertance.
48. It is to be recollected that the appellant also appeared standing
before us with folded hands in all the effective hearings of this appeal on
19.11.2021, 30.11.2021 and 07.12.2021 and sought for an unconditional
apology with all due respects.
49. As stated supra, the pleadings, the material on record and the
arguments on both the sides would only disclose and form part of an act
done by oversight and inadvertance without any deliberate intention to
willfully disobey the orders of the court.
50. Hence, I am of the considered view that the order under
challenge is liable to be set aside. It cannot be construed that there is any
civil contempt on the part of the appellant. This court opines that while
exercising power of the contempt jurisdiction, the courts must not be
hypersensitive or swung by emotions, but must act judiciously.
The contempt proceedings are intended to ensure compliance of the orders
of the court and adherence to the rule of law. When the apology is tendered
unconditionally with bona fide intention to the satisfaction of the court,
there cannot be any impediment to accept the same.
51. In SAHDEO V. STATE OF U.P.1 it was held as follows:
(2010) 3 SCC 705
"15. The proceedings of contempt are quasi-criminal in nature. In
a case where the order passed by the court is not complied with by
mistake, inadvertence or by misunderstanding of the meaning and
purport of the order, unless it is intentional, no charge of contempt
can be brought home. There may possibly be a case were
disobedience is accidental. If that is so, there would be no
contempt."
52. Similarly, in DEBABRATA BANDOPADHYAY VS. STATE OF
W.B.2it was observed as under:
"9. A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a
serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the
accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection
as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and
difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals.
It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not
explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished.
... Punishment under the law of contempt is called for when the
lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defiance of
authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of
contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged."
53. The same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble
Apex Court reported in ALIGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD v. EKKA
TONGA MAZDOOR UNION3, CAPT. DUSHYANT SOMAL v.
SUSHMA SOMAL4; BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. STATE OF
BIHAR5; NIAZ MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA6 and
MANISH GUPTA v. GURUDAS ROY7.
54. In MRITYUNJOY DAS v. SAYED HASIBUR
RAHAMAN8, it was observed as follows:
AIR 1969 SC 189
(1970) 3 SCC 98
(1981) 2 SCC 277
1987 Supp SCC 394
(1994) 6 SCC 332
(1995) 3 SCC 559
(2001) 3 SCC 739
"The jurisdiction of contempt has been conferred on the court to
punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to
the majesty of law, but in the case of quasi-criminal in nature,
charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the allege
contemnor becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. It would be very
hazardous to impose sentence in contempt proceedings on some
probabilities."
55. In U.N.BORA vs. ASSAM ROLLER FLOUR MILLS
ASSN9, it was observed as follows:
"8. We are dealing with a civil contempt. The Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean a wilful
disobedience of a decision of the Court. Therefore, what is relevant
is the "wilful" disobedience. Knowledge acquires substantial
importance qua a contempt order. Merely because a subordinate
official acted in disregard of an order passed by the Court, a liability
cannot be fastened on a higher official in the absence of knowledge.
When two views are possible, the element of wilfulness vanishes as
it involves a mental element. It is a deliberate, conscious and
intentional act. What is required is a proof beyond reasonable doubt
since the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Similarly, when
a distinct mechanism is provided and that too, in the same
judgment alleged to have been violated, a party has to exhaust the
same before approaching the court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is well open to the said
party to contend that the benefit of the order passed has not been
actually given, through separate proceedings while seeking
appropriate relief but certainly not by way of a contempt proceeding.
While dealing with a contempt petition, the Court is not expected to
conduct a roving inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which
was allegedly violated. The said principle has to be applied with
more vigour when disputed questions of facts are involved and they
were raised earlier but consciously not dealt with by creating a
specific forum to decide the original proceedings.
9. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid settled principle
of law except by quoting the reasoned decision of this Court
(2022) 1 SCC 101
in Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal [Hukum Chand
Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, (2021) 13 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC OnLine
SC 438] wherein the celebrated judgment in Ram Kishan v. Tarun
Bajaj [Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204 : (2015) 3
SCC (L&S) 311], has been quoted. The following paragraphs would
govern the aforesaid principle: (Hukum Chand Deswal case [Hukum
Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, (2021) 13 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 438] , SCC paras 20-21 & 25-27)
"20. At the outset, we must advert to the contours delineated
by this Court for initiating civil contempt action in Ram
Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj [Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16
SCC 204 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 311] . In paras 11, 12 and 15 of
the reported decision, this Court noted thus : (SCC pp. 209-11)
'11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts
power to punish an offender for his wilful
disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority
commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to
an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the
entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the
respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the
contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the
courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution
and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt,
it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to
exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-
criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in
these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would
rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere
probabilities. (Vide V.G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath
Gupta [V.G.Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1992) 4 SCC 697 :
1993 SCC (L&S) 202], Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi
Gulati [ChhotuRam v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC 530 : 2001
SCC (L&S) 1196], Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh [Anil
Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21], Bank of
Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya [Bank of
Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC
360], Sahdeo v. State of U.P. [Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3
SCC 705 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 451] and National Fertilizers
Ltd. v. TuncayAlankus [National Fertilizers
Ltd. v. TuncayAlankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ)
481 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 172] .
12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be
established that disobedience of the order is "wilful". The word
"wilful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires
looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his
actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. "Wilful"
means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and
deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing
therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or
unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not
encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be
done with a "bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or
stubbornly, obstinately or perversely". Wilful act is to be
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done
negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person
means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the
same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil
motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order,
but such disobedience is the result of some compelling
circumstances under which it was not possible for the
contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be
punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered
unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct."
(Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram
Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591] , Rakapalli Raja
Ram Gopala Rao v. NaraganiGovindaSehararao [Rakapalli Raja
Ram Gopala Rao v. NaraganiGovindaSehararao, (1989) 4 SCC
255], Niaz Mohd. v. State of Haryana [Niaz Mohd. v. State of
Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332], Chordia Automobiles v. S.
Moosa [Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC
282], Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha [Ashok
Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC
1], State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas [State of Orissa v. Mohd.
Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 122] and Uniworth
Textiles Ltd. v. CCE [Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, (2013) 9
SCC 753] .
15. It is well-settled principle of law that if two
interpretations are possible, and if the action is not
contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be
maintainable. The effect and purport of the order is to be taken
into consideration and the same must be read in its entirety.
Therefore, the element of willingness is an indispensable
requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of
the Act. [See Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak [Sushila Raje
Holkar v. Anil Kak, (2008) 14 SCC 392 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S)
497] and Three Cheers Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC
Ltd. [Three Cheers Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd., (2008)
16 SCC 592] ]
21. Similarly, in R.N.Dey v. BhagyabatiPramanik [R.N.Dey
v. BhagyabatiPramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400], this Court expounded in
para 7 as follows : (SCC p. 404)
'7. We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to be
used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for
execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which
alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to
the court is to be exercised for maintenance of the court's
dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no
right to insist that the court should exercise such jurisdiction
as contempt is between a contemner and the court. It is true
that in the present case, the High Court has kept the matter
pending and has ordered that it should be heard along with the
first appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that
under the coercion of contempt proceeding, the appellants
cannot be directed to pay the compensation amount which they
are disputing by asserting that claimants were not the owners
of the property in question and that decree was obtained by
suppressing the material fact and by fraud. Even presuming
that the claimants are entitled to recover the amount of
compensation as awarded by the trial court as no stay order is
granted by the High Court, at the most they are entitled to
recover the same by executing the said award wherein the
State can or may contend that the award is a nullity. In such a
situation, as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of
the order, the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly
unjustified.'
25. Pertinently, the special leave petitions were filed by the
respondent against the order dated 28-1-2019 [Sagu Dreamland (P)
Ltd. v. Jingal Bell Amusement Park (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del
6720], which as aforesaid, did not deal with the question regarding
the monthly rent payable by the respondent but explicitly left the
parties to pursue the same before the executing court. The plaintiff-
petitioner having acquiesced of that observation of the High Court,
cannot be allowed to contend to the contrary. This Court
in Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly [Jhareswar Prasad
Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352: 2002 SCC (L&S)
703], in para 11, opined thus : (SCC p. 360)
'11. ... The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not
entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with
and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is
alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the
direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider
the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the
court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned
with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which
is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying
with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or
order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter
or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein
then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court
which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order
instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking
upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a
manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or
order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which
are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt
of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting
substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same
without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can
be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings
because the party which is prejudicially affected by the
judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and
granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge
that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation
arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the
majesty and image of courts.'
26. Thus understood, we find force in the explanation offered by
the respondent that as per its bona fide understanding, there was
no outstanding dues payable to the petitioner. Moreover, as
observed [Sagu Dreamland (P) Ltd. v. Jingal Bell Amusement Park
(P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6720] by the High Court, these
aspects could be answered by the executing court if the parties
pursue their claim(s) before it in that regard. Suffice it to observe
that it is not a case of intentional violation or wilful disobedience of
the order passed by this Court to initiate contempt action against
the respondent. Instead, we hold that it would be open to the parties
to pursue their claim(s) in execution proceedings or any other
proceedings, as may be permissible in law in respect of the issue(s)
under consideration. In such proceedings, all aspects can be
considered by the forum/court concerned on merits in accordance
with law. We say no more.
27. Reverting to the allegation about damage caused to the suit
property by the respondent at the time of vacating the same, in our
opinion, the respondent has made out a formidable case that it did
not cause any damage, much less permanent damage to the
structure in the suit property. Whereas, the petitioner was relying
on photographs concerning the debris on the site left behind at the
time of vacating the suit property. The debris cannot cause damage
and it is certainly not a case of defacement of the suit property. That
position is reinforced from the fact that the water park in the suit
premises was started and became fully functional within 2-3
months. Viewed thus, it is rightly urged that it can be safely
assumed that no damage was caused by the respondent to the
structure in question. Minor repairs required to be carried out by
the petitioner for making the water park functional cannot be
painted as intentional disobedience of the order of this Court. In any
case, that being a complex question of fact, need not be adjudicated
in the contempt proceedings. We leave it open to the petitioner to
pursue even that claim in execution proceedings or such other
proceedings as may be permissible in law. We may not be
understood to have expressed any final opinion in respect of
condition of the suit premises, whilst handing over possession to the
petitioner. We hold that even this issue under consideration does
not warrant initiation of contempt action against the respondent."
56. Following the principles laid down in the above said decisions,
in the present case also the appellant can be exonerated for contempt of
court giving benefit of doubt as he tendered unconditional apologies
sincerely for the delay in implementation of the order of the court with all
consequential benefits soon after receiving the notice in the contempt
petition itself without anybody's intervention.
57. In the result, the Contempt Appeal is allowed. The order of the
learned single Judge in C.C.No.722 of 2021 dated 21.10.2021 is set aside.
No costs.
58. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any,
shall stand closed.
________________________________
JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
LMV
ORDER OF THE COURT
Date: 28.02.2022
(Per Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah)
59. We have differing opinions. Clause 36 of the Letters Patent of the
Madras High Court, applicable to this Court, is attracted:
'36.Single Judge and Division Courts.--And we do hereby declare
that any function which is hereby directed to be performed by the said
High Court of Judicature at Madras, in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction, may be performed by any Judge, or by any Division
Court thereof, appointed or constituted for such purpose in pursuance of
Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and in such Division
Court is composed of two or more Judges, and the Judges are divided in
opinion as to the decision to be given on any point, such point shall be
decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges, if there
shall be a majority, but if the Judges should be equally divided they shall
state the point upon which they differ and the case shall then be heard
upon that point by one or more of the other Judges and the point shall be
decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have
heard the case including those who first heard it.'
(emphasis supplied)
60. The Registry shall place this case before Hon'ble the Chief Justice
on the administrative side. Formulation of point(s) of difference is
necessitated as the Reference Court, per Clause 36 (supra), is to adopt one
of the views expressed vide separate judgements pronounced today.
61. Accordingly, the question referred is - Whether the appeal
deserves disposal by reducing the term to one week's imprisonment and
increasing the fine to Rs.10,000/- in terms of the judgement by
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J; or whether the appeal is to be allowed as per
the judgement by B. Krishna Mohan, J?
_________________________________
(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J)
__________________________
(B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J)
Mjl/Dsh
