Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3700 AP
Judgement Date : 23 September, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
WRIT APPEAL No.203 of 2020
(Through Video-Conferencing)
B. Kalimulla, S/o. late B. Nabi Sab, age 58 years,
Dy. Executive Engineer, O/o. Chief Engineer
(Projects) Kadapa ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its
Principal Secretary, Irrigation and Command Area
Development (Ser.VI) Department, Secretariat
Building, Hyderabad, now at Velagapudi, Guntur
District, and another ... Respondents
Counsel for the appellant : Mr. K. Rathanga Pani Reddy
Counsel for respondent No.2 : Mr. S.M. Subhani
Date of hearing : 07.09.2021
Date of judgment : 23.09.2021
JUDGMENT
(Arup Kumar Goswami, CJ)
This appeal is directed against an order dated 20.02.2020 passed by
the learned single Judge in W.P.No.16176 of 2014, whereby the writ petition
challenging G.O.Ms.No.30, Irrigation & Command Area Development
(IW: Services VI 1) Department dated 29.05.2014, ordering for prosecution
of the petitioner (appellant herein) was dismissed.
2. Heard Mr. K. Rathanga Pani Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. S.M. Subhani, learned standing counsel for Anti Corruption Bureau,
appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Appellant in the present appeal shall be referred to as the petitioner.
2 HCJ & NJS,J
W.A.No.203 of 2020
4. The case of the petitioner, in short, as presented in the writ affidavit
is that the petitioner joined as Assistant Executive Engineer on 10.11.1987
and was subsequently promoted as Deputy Executive Engineer in HLC
Localization Sub-Division, Garladinne, Anantapur Division on 08.12.2007.
While serving as such, respondent No.2, i.e. the Director General, Anti
Corruption Bureau, registered a case in Cr.No.3/RCA-ATP/2010 under
Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for
short, "the Act of 1988") alleging that petitioner is in possession of assets
disproportionate to the known sources of income. Respondent No.2 had
served a notice dated 21.01.2011 calling for explanation. The petitioner had
submitted explanation controverting the alleged assessment of
disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs.73,09,792/- and contending that
value of assets possessed by him and his family members are to the tune of
Rs.46,88,762/-, which is well within the income from legitimate/licit and
declared sources against the likely savings i.e. Rs.69,74,538/- and,
accordingly, prayed for dropping further action.
5. Respondent No.2, by letter dated 20.03.2013, recommended
prosecuting the petitioner under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Act
of 1988. However, the Principal Secretary to Government, Irrigation and
Command Area Development (Ser.VI) Department, i.e. respondent No.1
issued memo dated 07.12.2013, stating that it was decided to conduct a
departmental enquiry into the charges instead of prosecution. Subsequently,
on that very date, by G.O.Rt.No.1171 dated 07.12.2013, it was proposed to
hold an enquiry against the petitioner in terms of Rule 20 of Andhra Pradesh
Civil Services (CC&A) Rules, 1991 (for short, "the Rules"). A copy of the
articles of charges, statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour
in support of each article of charge, list of witnesses by whom the articles of 3 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
charges are proposed to be proved and a list of documents in support of
charges proposed to be sustained, were enclosed at Annexures I, II, II & IV
respectively.
6. The two charges framed are as follows:
"Charge-I: He neither obtained prior permission from
the competent authority nor intimated to the
competent authority in respect of the purchase of the
Movable and Immovable assets purchased in his name
and in the name of his family members as mentioned in
Annexure - I.
Charge-II: He did not submit Annual Property Returns
to the competent authority during his service i.e., from
10.11.1987 to 09.04.2010."
7. It is stated that by the above-mentioned acts, the petitioner exhibited
lack of integrity, devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of a Government
servant and thereby contravened Rules 3 (1), (2) and 9(1), (2) & (7) of
A.P.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
8. Subsequently, respondent No.1, by G.O.Ms.No.30 Irrigation &
Command Area Development (IW: Services VI 1) Department dated
29.05.2014, in exercise of powers conferred under clause (b) of sub-section
1 of Section 19 of the Act of 1988, accorded sanction for the prosecution of
the petitioner for the offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(e) of the Act of 1988 and for any other cognate offences
punishable under any other provisions of law. Challenging the aforesaid
G.O., the writ petition came to be filed.
4 HCJ & NJS,J
W.A.No.203 of 2020
9. The learned single Judge recorded a finding that the decision in the
case of Sri K. Srinivasulu v. the Government of A.P., rep. by its
Principal Secretary, Home (SC.A) Dept., reported in 2010 (3) ALD
452, squarely applies to the facts of the case. Reliance was also placed on
the decisions in K. Rama Krishna Raju v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh, reported in 2012 (2) ALD 425, State of Maharashtra
through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mahesh G. Jain, reported
in (2013) 8 SCC 119 and Sri Bhavana Rishi Co-op. House Building
Society, R.R. District v. Information Commission, Hyderabad,
reported in 2010 (3) ALD 465. It was held that merely because a memo
was issued earlier recommending disciplinary action, it cannot lead to an
inescapable conclusion that the sanction of prosecution cannot be granted
later and that even if there was no sufficient material firstly, the law permits
the State to re-look into the issue of sanction of prosecution. Holding as
aforesaid, the writ petition was dismissed.
10. Mr. K. Rathanga Pani Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that being satisfied with the stand taken by the petitioner, decision
was taken not to prosecute the petitioner, but to conduct only disciplinary
enquiry and, therefore, in the absence of there being any fresh material to
come to a conclusion that prosecution should be commenced, the
subsequent order dated 29.05.2014 recommending prosecution cannot be
countenanced in law. It is submitted that the learned single Judge failed to
consider the matter in its correct perspective and the learned single Judge
wrongly placed reliance on the judgments as noticed, in coming to the
eventual conclusion. He has also submitted that while passing the order
dated 29.05.2014, decision taken earlier by memo dated 07.12.2013 to
conduct only departmental enquiry instead of prosecution was overlooked 5 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
and, therefore, the same, ex facie, demonstrates non-application of mind.
He relies on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab
and another v. Mohammed Iqbal Bhattii, reported in (2009) 17 SCC
92 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen, reported in
(2010) 14 SCC 527.
11. Mr. S.M. Subhani, learned standing counsel for respondent No.2, relies
on the reasonings assigned by the learned single Judge and submits that no
case is made out for interference with the order of the learned single Judge.
12. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the materials on record.
13. At the very outset, it will be appropriate to extract the memo dated
07.12.2013, which reads as under:
"The attention of the Director General, Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Hyderabad is invited to the reference cited,
wherein he has recommended for prosecuting the
Accused Officer Sri B. Kalimullah, Deputy Executive
Engineer in a competent Court of Law under Sections 13
(2) read with 13 (1) (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988.
After careful examination of the matter, and after duly
considering the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the matter, it has been decided to conduct a
Departmental Enquiry into the charges instead of
Prosecution.
6 HCJ & NJS,J
W.A.No.203 of 2020
The Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Hyderabad is, therefore, requested to furnish the draft
Articles of Charges on the allegation of acquisition of
disproportionate assets against Sri B. Kalimullah,
formerly Deputy Executive Engineer, H.L.C. Localization
Sub-Division, Garladinne, Anantapur District urgently for
initiating departmental action against Sri B. Kalimullah,
Deputy Executive Engineer in disproportionate assets
case."
14. It will also be appropriate to extract relevant portion of G.O.Ms.No.30
dated 29.05.2014, which reads as under:
"3. And whereas, for the purpose of investigation, the
check period of the Government Servant was taken
from 10.11.1987 i.e. the date on which the Accused
Officer joined into Government service till 09.04.2010
i.e. the date on which searches were conducted;
4. And whereas, it is alleged that the said Sri B.
Kalimullah, Incharge Deputy Executive Engineer, HLC
Localization Sub-Division, Garladinne, Anantapur
District, during the above said check period, acquired
Assets in his name and in the names of his family
members to the extent of Rs.87,26,357-00. The income
of the said Sri B. Kalimullah from all the known sources
during the above check period is estimated to be
Rs.47,44,935-00. The total expenditure of Sri B.
Kalimullah during the above check period is worked out
to Rs.33,28,370-00. The likely savings of Sri B.
7 HCJ & NJS,J
W.A.No.203 of 2020
Kalimullah during the check period of was Rs.14,16,565-
00 (i.e., Total income of Rs.47,44,935-00 Minus Total
expenditure of Rs.33,28,370-00. As such, Sri B.
Kalimullah is found to be in possession of
Disproportionate) Assets worth Rs.73,09,793/- (Total
Assets of Rs.87,26,357-00) minus likely savings of
Rs.14,16,565-00 which he acquired by corrupt and
dubious methods;
5. And whereas, the aforesaid acts of Sri B. Kalimullah,
Incharge Deputy Executive Engineer, HLC Localization
Sub-Division, Garladinne, Anantapur District constitute
the offences punishable under Section 13(2) r/w section
13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(Central Act 49 of 1988);
6. And whereas, the Government of Andhra Pradesh
being the competent authority to remove him from
service after fully and carefully examining the material
viz., copy of F.I.R., copies of statements of witnesses,
copies of documents and other placed before them in
respect of the above said allegation and having regard
to the facts and circumstances of the case, consider
that the said Sri B. Kalimullah, Incharge Deputy
Executive Engineer, HLC Localization Sub-Division,
Garladinne, Anantapur District should be prosecuted in a
court of law for the said offence;
"7. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the 8 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of
1988), the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby
accord sanction for the prosecution of the said Sri B.
Kalimullah, Incharge Deputy Executive Engineer, HLC
Localization Sub-Division, Garladinne, Anantapur District
for the said offences punishable under Section 13(2)
read with section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988) and for any other
cognate offences punishable under any other provisions
of law for the time being in force in respect of the
aforesaid acts and for taking cognizance of the said
offence by the court of competent jurisdiction."
15. A perusal of the memo dated 07.12.2013 goes to show that though it
is stated therein that after careful examination of the matter and after duly
considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the matter, it was
decided to conduct a departmental enquiry into the charges instead of
prosecution, no reasoning was assigned as to why it was decided to conduct
only a departmental enquiry instead of prosecution.
16. In Mohd. Iqbal Bhattii (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an
occasion to consider the question whether the State has any power to review
in the matter of grant of sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was observed at paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:
"6. Although the State in the matter of grant or refusal
to grant sanction exercises statutory jurisdiction, the
same, however, would not mean that power once
exercised cannot be exercised once again. For
exercising its jurisdiction at a subsequent stage, express 9 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
power of review in the State may not be necessary as
even such a power is administrative in character. It is,
however, beyond any cavil that while passing an order
for grant of sanction, serious application of mind on the
part of the authority concerned is imperative. The
legality and/or validity of the order granting sanction
would be subject to review by the criminal courts. An
order refusing to grant sanction may attract judicial
review by the superior courts.
7. Validity of an order of sanction would depend upon
application of mind on the part of the authority
concerned and the material placed before it. All such
material facts and material evidence must be considered
by it. The sanctioning authority must apply its mind on
such material facts and evidence collected during the
investigation. Even such application of mind does not
appear from the order of sanction, extrinsic evidence
may be placed before the court in that behalf. While
granting sanction, the authority cannot take into
consideration an irrelevant fact nor can it pass an order
on extraneous consideration not germane for passing a
statutory order. It is also well settled that the superior
courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority either to
grant sanction or not to do so. The source of power of
an authority passing an order of sanction must also be
considered. (See Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State
of Gujarat [(1997) 7 SCC 622 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1784 :
10 HCJ & NJS,J
W.A.No.203 of 2020
1997 SCC (Cri) 1120] .) The authority concerned cannot
also pass an order of sanction subject to ratification of a
higher authority. [See State v. Dr. R.C. Anand [(2004) 4
SCC 615 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1380] .]"
17. A perusal of the above would go to show that although the State in
the matter of grant of or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory
jurisdiction, the same, however, would not mean that power once exercised
cannot be exercised once again. It is also manifest that while passing an
order for grant of sanction, serious application of mind on the part of the
authority concerned is imperative. The sanctioning authority must apply its
mind on all material facts and material evidence collected during the
investigation.
18. In paragraph 12 of Nishant Sareen (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed as follows:
"It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or
refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that
would not mean that power once exercised cannot be
exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of
express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The
power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It
seems to us a sound principle to follow that once the statutory
power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the
Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent
authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the
sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the
same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of
review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change 11 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
of the Government or change of the person authorised to
exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction
may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best
known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion
on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there
may not be any end to such statutory exercise."
19. In Nishant Sareen (supra), it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court that the Government in the matter of grant of or refusal to grant
sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once
exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence
of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. It was, however,
held that the power of review is not unbridled. It is further held that once
statutory power under Section 19 of the Act of 1988 or Section 197 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is exercised by the Government or by the
competent authority, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to
review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again, as unrestricted
power of review may not bring finalty to such exercise and on change of the
Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of
sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority
for the reasons best known to him and a different order may be passed. It
was accordingly observed that a change of opinion, per se, on the same
materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order
refusing to grant sanction. However, in case where fresh materials have
been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order
and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is
reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in the light of the fresh 12 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant
may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course.
20. In Romesh Lal Jain v. Naginder Singh Rana and others,
reported in (2006) 1 SCC 294, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
as follows:
"14... an order granting or refusing sanction must be
preceded by application of mind on the part of the
appropriate authority. If the complainant or the accused
can demonstrate such an order granting or refusing
sanction to be suffering from non-application of mind, the
same may be called in question before a competent court
of law."
21. In Sri K. Srinivasulu (supra), a Division Bench of this Court had
held that the order of sanction must, ex facie, disclose that the sanctioning
authority had considered the evidence and other materials placed before it.
While the order of sanction need not contain detailed reasons, basic facts
that constitute the offence must be apparent on the order. In the said case,
G.O.Ms.No.25 dated 15.01.2009 did not even state that sanction was being
refused and all that the G.O. recorded is that the Government had decided
to initiate a departmental enquiry against the 4th respondent. The
contention advanced on behalf of the State that as Central Government had
directed disciplinary proceedings to be initiated against the officer, it must
be inferred that the Government had rejected the request of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau for grant of sanction, was repelled by holding that there
must be a clear recital in the order that sanction for prosecution under the
Act of 1988 is being accorded or refused. It was also held that in the 13 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
absence of any explicit statement of refusal, the impugned order suffered
from non-application of mind.
22. In K. Rama Krishna Raju (supra), a learned single Judge of this
Court had observed that according or refusing to accord sanction for
prosecution is not an empty formality and requires application of mind. In
that case, it was held that the mere fact that the matter had been referred to
the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings does not, by itself, necessitate the
inference that the competent authority had, impliedly, refused to accord
sanction for prosecuting the petitioner before the competent Criminal Court
and that in the absence of any order being passed earlier refusing to accord
sanction for prosecution, it cannot be said that the order according sanction
under the impugned G.O., amounted to a review.
23. In Mahesh G. Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed
that the sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority
has perused the material placed before him and after consideration of the
circumstance, has granted sanction of prosecution and that the prosecution
may also prove by adducing evidence that the material was placed before
the sanctioning authority and a satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of
the materials before him.
24. The memo dated 07.12.2013 is a cryptic order and abruptly a
conclusion was drawn to conduct departmental enquiry into the charges
instead of prosecution. It will be a futile exercise if an order granting
sanction or refusing sanction is passed in a routine manner. The order
granting sanction must be demonstrative of the fact that there was proper
application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. That the
competent authority did not apply its mind is evident from the fact that the
aforesaid order did not state that sanction was refused. The memo dated 14 HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.203 of 2020
07.12.2013 does not indicate what materials have been examined and it
merely records that totality of the facts and circumstances were considered.
It cannot be construed that by memo dated 07.12.2013 sanction was
refused. On the other hand, the order dated 29.05.2014, as noticed earlier,
demonstrates that there is application of mind to the relevant facts and
materials on record and on being satisfied, it was decided to exercise powers
under clause (b) of sub-section 1 of Section 19 of the Act of 1988 to accord
sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences punishable
under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act of 1988. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that
the order dated 29.05.2014 is not an order passed reviewing the memo
dated 07.12.2013.
25. In view of the above discussions, we are of the opinion that no case is
made out to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge and,
accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending
miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CJ NINALA JAYASURYA, J MRR
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