India Ashok Reddy vs The Principal Secretary Home
2021 Latest Caselaw 3697 AP

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI


 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CHIEF JUSTICE
                                        &
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA

                      WRIT APPEAL No.270 of 2021
                           (Through Video-Conferencing)

Indla Ashok Reddy, S/o late I. Subba Reddy,
Aged about 34 years, Occ: nil,
R/o H.No.8/1, VM 6, Near Chandamama
Apartments, Raghavendra Nagar, Markapuram,
Prakasam District, PIN.523 316.
                                                              ..Appellant

             Versus

The Principal Secretary (HOME),
Home Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh,
Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Guntur District
and others.
                                                             ... Respondents


Counsel for the Appellant              : Mr. M. Naga Raghu

Counsel for the respondents            : Mr. N. Aswartha Narayana
                                         GP for Services I



Date of hearing                        : 02.09.2021.

Date of Judgment                       : 23.09.2021


                                 JUDGMENT

(Arup Kumar Goswami, CJ)

Heard Mr. M. Naga Raghu, learned counsel for the appellant. Also

heard Mr. N. Aswartha Narayana, learned Government Pleader for

Services I appearing for the respondents.

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2. This writ appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated

26.03.2021 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing W.P.No.25211

of 2020 filed by the appellant.

3. Pursuant to a notification dated 06.06.2008 issued by respondent

No.2-Chairman, State Level Police Recruitment Board, Andhra Pradesh,

Mangalagiri, inviting applications from the eligible candidates for selection

and appointment to the post of Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Sub-Inspectors,

the appellant/writ petitioner had submitted an application and participated

in the selection process. He was provisionally selected for the post of

Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police (Men) under

OC category on 10.07.2011. Later on, respondent No.2 in the writ petition

issued a Memorandum dated 18.02.2012 cancelling the provisional

selection of the petitioner by invoking Rule 3(G)(vi) of A.P. Police

(Stipendiary Cadet Trainee) Rules, 1999 as amended vide G.O.Ms.No.97

Home (Legal) Department, dated 01.05.2006, on the ground that the

petitioner was involved in Crime No.132 of 2007 of Markapuram Town

Police Station for the offence under Section 419 IPC and Section 3 of the

Public Examinations (Prevention of Malpractices and Unfair Means) Act,

1997, which is an offence involving moral turpitude.

4. Assailing such cancellation, the petitioner had approached the A.P.

Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad by filing O.A.No.2553 of 2012. By

order dated 12.08.2013, the Tribunal set aside the order of cancellation

dated 18.02.2012 and directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner

as Stipendiary Cadet Training RSI (AR) (Men) and send him for training.

The aforesaid order of the Tribunal was challenged by respondent Nos.1

to 4 by filing W.P.No.3639 of 2014. The said writ petition was disposed of

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by order dated 27.01.2020, following the order of this Court in

W.P.No.34535 of 2014, dated 23.01.2020, enabling the appellant to

submit a representation within a period of one month from the date of

receipt of a copy of the order and providing that if any such

representation is made, the authorities are to consider the same and pass

appropriate orders in terms of the guidelines laid down in the judgments

of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and

others, reported in 2016 (8) SCC 471 and H. Abdul Sajid Vs. State

Level Police Recruitment Board and others in Special Leave to

Appeal (C) No.7758 of 2018, dated 02.04.2018, without reference to the

order impugned in the O.A. It was observed that the appellant would

enclose copies of the aforesaid judgments and also the judgment of the

Full Bench of this Court rendered in B. Rama Krishna Yadav and

others Vs. The Superintendent of Police and others, reported in

2016 (2) ALD 340.

5. In terms of the order in W.P.No.3639 of 2014, a representation

was submitted and the same was disposed of by memorandum dated

02.07.2020, holding that the trial court vide judgment in C.C.No.454 of

2007 had acquitted the petitioner extending benefit of doubt and it is not

a case of clean acquittal and therefore, the candidature of the writ

petitioner is rejected. Assailing the said order, W.P.No.25211 of 2020

came to be filed and by the order under challenge, the said writ petition

was dismissed.

6. The learned single Judge on the basis of the materials on record

had formulated the following point for consideration:

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"Whether the petitioner suppressed the material

information in Column No.16 of the application form and

whether the offences allegedly committed by this

petitioner in C.C.No.454 of 2007 are an involvement in

moral turpitude. If not, whether acquittal of this

petitioner is honourable acquittal. If so, whether

rejection of the representation of this petitioner by the

second respondent by impugned order is in accordance

with law. If not, liable to be set aside and issue a

direction to appoint this petitioner as Reserve Sub-

Inspector?"

7. The learned single Judge held that as the petitioner had

suppressed the material information in the application form, though

disclosed his involvement and acquittal in the attestation form, it is

sufficient to conclude that the petitioner intentionally suppressed a

material fact and that if such disclosure was made at the time of scrutiny

of his application, the competent authority would have taken a decision at

that stage itself. However, because of suppression of material facts, the

petitioner was allowed to participate in the examination and in further

process of recruitment. In such circumstances, the petitioner is disentitled

to claim any relief in the writ petition. It was also held that acquittal of the

petitioner, having regard to the judgment pronounced, cannot be said to

be an honourable acquittal as the acquittal was granted on benefit of

doubt.

8. Mr. M. Naga Raghu, learned counsel for the appellant/writ

petitioner, submits that though due to lack of knowledge, the petitioner

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had not mentioned the criminal case filed against him in Column No.16 of

the application form, he had subsequently mentioned about the aforesaid

fact in the attestation form supplied to him after he was provisionally

selected and therefore, Clause No.22 of the notification dated 06.06.2008,

which indicates that suppression of material facts or withholding any

factual information either in the application or in the attestation form

(which would be supplied to the candidates who will be provisionally

selected) will disqualify the candidate from being considered for

appointment, would not be applicable to the petitioner. It is submitted

that the petitioner was acquitted after a full-fledged trial as the

prosecution failed to establish its case against the petitioner for the

charges levelled against him and that the learned single Judge failed to

consider this aspect of the matter in its correct perspective in the light of

the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Dy. Inspector

General of Police & Another Vs. S. Samuthiram, reported in

(2013) 1 SCC 598 and Commissioner of Police Vs. Sandeep

Kumar, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 644. Mr. M. Naga Raghu also relied

upon the judgment in the case of State Bank of India & Others Vs. P.

Soupramaniane, reported in 2019 Law Suit (SC) 1125. It is

submitted that the judgments relied upon by the learned single Judge for

dismissal of the writ petition have no application in the facts and

circumstances of this case.

9. Mr. N. Aswartha Narayana, learned Government Pleader for

Services I, appearing for the respondents, while supporting the judgment

under appeal, placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Love Kush

Meena, reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 252.

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10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the

parties and have perused the materials on record.

11. When the petitioner had submitted his application in pursuance of

the notification dated 06.06.2008, the above C.C. was pending disposal.

The petitioner was acquitted in the above C.C. on 26.04.2009. The

petitioner had attended for preliminary selection on 10.08.2009.

12. Rule 3(G) of the Andhra Pradesh (Stipendiary Cadet Trainee) Rules,

1999, as amended, reads as follows:

"(G). Disqualification for appointment: The candidates

falling under the following categories shall be disqualified

for appointment, under these rules.

(i) Suppression of material facts (either in the

application form or in the attestation form).

(ii) If the candidate himself or through his

relatives or friends or any other has canvassed

or endeavoured to enlist extraneous support

whether from official or non-official sources for

his candidature.

(iii) A person (a) who has entered into or

contracted a marriage with a person having a

spouse living, or (b) who, having a spouse

living, has entered into or contracted a

marriage with any other person. Provided that

the State Government may, if satisfied that

such marriage is permissible under the

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personal law applicable to such person,

exempt any person from the operation of this

rule.

(iv) A person who has been dismissed from the

services of a State or Central Government or

from the service of any Central or State

Government undertaking or local body or

other authority.

(v) A person who has been convicted for any

offence in any court of law.

(vi) A person who is involved in an offence

involving moral turpitude."

13. Clause 22 of the notification, which was highlighted, reads as

follows:

"Suppression of material facts or withholding any factual

information either in the application or in the attestation

form (which would be supplied to the candidates who will

be provisionally selected) will disqualify the candidate

from being considered for appointment. In the event of

any information being found false or incorrect or

ineligibility being detected at any time even after

appointment, he/she will be discharged from service

forthwith by the appointing authority without giving any

notice."

14. It is an admitted position that the petitioner had not disclosed

about the criminal case pending against him in the application form. In

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the attestation form, which was made available to the petitioner, on his

being provisionally selected, against column 16 (f), which was printed as

"Whether you were prosecuted by the police in a court of law? If so,

indicate the present stage of this case: 1) under trial 2) convicted 3)

compounded 4) acquitted", the petitioner had put '√' mark at "4)

acquitted".

15. Mr. M. Naga Raghu submits that since the petitioner had made

disclosure in the attestation form, the consequences for not providing

such details in the application form will not flow as information could be

given either in the application form or in the attestation form.

Accordingly, he submits that the petitioner could not have been

disqualified taking recourse to Clause 22 of the notification.

16. Clause 22 provides, in essence, that suppression of material facts

or withholding any factual information either in the application or in the

attestation form will disqualify the candidate from being considered for

appointment. In other words, the candidates are required to disclose all

the material facts both in the application form and the attestation form.

Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Raghu that it

would suffice if information relating to involvement in a criminal case is

given either in the application form or in the attestation form. It is also

relevant to note that in the event of any information being found false or

incorrect or ineligibility being detected at any time even after

appointment, such a candidate could be discharged from service forthwith

by the appointing authority without giving any notice.

17. In Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others (supra), the

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the whole idea of verification of

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character and antecedents is that the person suitable for the post in

question is appointed. It is one of the important criteria which is

necessary to be fulfilled before appointment is made. An incumbent

should not have antecedents of such a nature which may adjudge him

unsuitable for the post. In paragraph 35, it was observed as follows:

"35. Suppression of 'material' information presupposes

that what is suppressed that 'matters' not every technical

or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due

consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in exercise of

powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating

the services of employee. Though a person who has

suppressed the material information cannot claim

unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service

but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and

exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with

objectivity having due regard to facts of cases."

18. In H.Abdul Sajid (supra), in the light of the decision in Avtar

Singh (supra), liberty was granted to the petitioner therein to make a

representation.

19. In the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra), the applicant who had

applied for the post of Head Constable had answered "No" against the

column, which was printed as "whether he had ever been arrested,

prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a

court of law for any offence, debarred/disqualified by any Public Service

Commission from appearing at its examination/selection or debarred from

any examination, rusticated by any university or any other education

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authority/institution." The same was apparently a false statement as he

and some of his family members were involved in a criminal case being

FIR No.362 for the offence under Sections 325/34 IPC. However, before

responding to the notification issued in January, 1999 inviting applications

for the post of Head Constables, the applicant was acquitted on

18.01.1998. Subsequently, in the attestation form, he had disclosed that

he had been involved in a criminal case and had been acquitted. On such

disclosure being made, his candidature was cancelled. Such cancellation

being assailed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, the application

was dismissed and on a writ petition being filed before the Delhi High

Court, the same was allowed. Being aggrieved, the employer-

Commissioner of Police approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court while upholding the order of the Delhi High Court,

observed as follows:

"We respectfully agree with the Delhi High Court that the

cancellation of his candidature was illegal, but we wish to

give our own opinion in the matter. When the incident

happened the respondent must have been about 20 years

of age. At that age young people often commit

indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often be

condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not

expected to behave in as mature a manner as older

people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor

indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand

them as criminals for the rest of their lives."

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20. In T.S. Vasudavan Nair v. Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre,

reported in (1988) Supp. SCC 795, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

observed that the appellant should not have been denied the employment

on the sole ground that he had not disclosed the fact that during

emergency he had been convicted in a case registered under the Defence

of India Rules for having shouted slogans on one occasion.

21. In Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar reported in (1996)

11 SCC 605, appointment was denied to an incumbent who was duly

selected for the post of Constable in Police Service subject to verification

of character and antecedents, as it was found that he was involved in a

criminal case under Sections 304, 324/34 and 324 IPC. It was held by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court that mere acquittal in the criminal case was not

enough once it was found that it was not desirable to appoint such a

person as a constable in the disciplined force. It was further held that the

view taken by the employer in the background of the case cannot be said

to be unwarranted, though he was discharged or acquitted. Antecedents

of the incumbents could not be said to be proper. The aforesaid decision

does not deal with the effect of suppression but the case has turned on

the background of the facts of the case in which the incumbent was

involved.

22. In B.Ramakrishna Yadav (supra) the question that had fallen for

consideration of the Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a

reference was as to whether suppression of information by the candidate,

applying for an employment, regarding his involvement in a criminal case,

would be a ground for either rejecting his candidature or cancelling his

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selection or terminating the service, if he has already been selected as

appointed? The Full Bench answered the reference as follows:

"13. Verification of character and antecedents is one of

the important features in service jurisprudence so as to

find out whether a selected candidate is suitable to the

post. Having regard to the antecedents of a candidate, if

appointing authority finds that it is not desirable to

appoint such person, in particular to a disciplined force, it

can deny employment or even terminate such person, if

appointed, within the shortest possible time from the date

of verification of character and antecedents. This has to

be scrupulously followed in case of recruitment in police

force, it being a disciplined force. As observed by the

Supreme Court in Mehar Singh (supra), people repose

great faith and confidence in the police force, and

therefore, the selected candidate must be of confidence,

impeccable character and integrity. A person having

criminal antecedents is, undoubtedly, not fit in this

category, more particularly when he has suppressed the

information about his involvement in criminal case(s)

irrespective of the fact whether the case was pending or

he was acquitted.

14. It is common practice that in the application form, a

specific information relating to involvement in a criminal

case, conviction or detention, irrespective of acquittal, is

sought for and if a candidate keeps relevant columns

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blank or answer the columns in negative, when in fact he

was involved in criminal case, that would undoubtedly

amount to suppression of information relating to his

involvement in criminal case. In a given case, if such a

candidate was acquitted long back, for instance, more

than 5 to 10 years before, and that too of a petty

offence, it may be for the employer to decide whether to

appoint him or to terminate his service having regard to

his performance and other relevant factors. However,

such a decision should be fair. In other words, such a

decision should not be arbitrary and mala fide. As

observed by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar (supra),

if the conviction or involvement was in traffic, municipal

and other petty offences under the Penal Code, 1860

committed at an young age, such conviction or

involvement could, in a given case, be ignored by an

employer. The candidate, however, is expected to

disclose all such information leaving it open to the

appointing authority to decide whether to appoint such

person having regard to gravity of the offence allegedly

committed and proximity of time having regard to the

nature of job for which he is being considered or to be

appointed. While considering such candidate, who in all

fairness has disclosed such information, the employer

should not act mechanically to deny employment or reject

application of such a candidate at threshold. In any case,

a candidate having suppressed the information and/or

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giving false information in respect of his character and

antecedents, cannot, as of right, seek an order of

appointment contending that he has been acquitted of

the case. If such a candidate is selected and appointed

and if at the stage of verification of antecedents, any

information is gathered or surfaced, which would amount

to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer or

suppression of information, it would not create equity in

his favour or any estoppel against the employer while

resorting to his termination. Such candidate cannot claim

any right to continue in service and the employer, having

regard to the nature of employment as well as other

relevant factors, has a discretion to either reject his

candidature or not to appoint such candidate or to

terminate his services, if he was appointed, on the basis

of the information received at that stage (i.e. verification

of character and antecedents). In short, the candidate,

who suppressed material information and/or given false

information regarding his antecedents and character,

cannot have any right of appointment or continuity in

service. It is, however, always open to the

employer/appointing authority to exercise its discretion in

the facts and circumstances of each case keeping in view

the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

15. The judgment of this Court in A. Sagar (supra), in our

opinion, does not state the correct position of law. Thus,

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the question framed by us stands answered in terms of

this judgment."

23. The prosecution case in C.C.No.454 of 2007 on the file of the

Additional Junior Civil Judge, Markapuram, arising out of Crime No.132 of

2007, in a nutshell, was that on 02.08.2007 at 9 a.m., the 3rd year

Mathematics-III Paper examination had started and when the process of

verification of hall tickets of the students was being undertaken, the

petitioner started running away from the examination hall leaving the

answer sheet behind. The petitioner was caught and on verification, it

was found that the petitioner, impersonating himself as one Srikanth, was

writing the examination for him.

24. The learned trial Court, by judgment and order dated 26.04.2009,

observed that there is a reasonable doubt on the evidence of the

prosecution and, therefore, the accused (the appellant and another) are

entitled for benefit of doubt and, accordingly, acquitted them.

25. In the context of acquittal in a criminal case qua appointment in

public service, an expression "honourable acquittal" has come to be

acknowledged by virtue of judicial pronouncements.

26. The meaning of expression "honourable acquittal" came up for

consideration in S. Samuthiram (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, at paragraphs 21 and 22, observed as follows:

"21. The meaning of the expression 'honourable

acquittal' came up for consideration before this Court in

Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal

Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court

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has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with

honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary

proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere

acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in

service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable.

The expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame',

'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal

Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial

pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is

meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. When the

accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution

evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to

prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can

possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

22. In R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787,

it was held even in the case of acquittal, departmental

proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than

honourable. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava

Rajgopalachari reported in 1972 SLR 45, this Court quoted

with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in

(1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168 which is as follows:

"The expression "honourably acquitted" is one which is

unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order

used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We

said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation

given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered

that it ought to have been accepted by the Government

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authorities and by the magistrate. Further, we decided that

the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred

to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our

judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and

completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted.

Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government

authorities term 'honourably acquitted"."

27. In State of Rajasthan (supra), at paragraphs 15 and 27, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

"15. It is pointed out that various nuances arising in

this judgment has been considered even in the subsequent

judgments. In Union territory, Chandigarh Administration

v. Pradeep Kumar, a two Judge Bench of this Court dealt

with the expression "honourable acquittal". It was opined

that acquittal in a criminal case was not conclusive for

suitability of the candidate concerned and it could not

always be inferred from an acquittal or discharge that the

person was falsely involved or has no criminal

antecedents. Thus, unless it is an honourable acquittal, the

candidate cannot claim the benefit of the case. No doubt,

it was mentioned by relying on the earlier judgment of this

Court in Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram that

while it was difficult to define precisely what is meant by

the expression "honourable acquittal", an accused who is

acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution

evidence and prosecution has miserably failed to prove the

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charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be

said that the accused was honourably acquitted. In this

context, it has been specifically noticed by this Court that

entry into the police service required a candidate to be of

good character, integrity and clean antecedents. Finally, it

was opined that the acquittal in a criminal case does not

automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the

post, as a person having criminal antecedents will not fit in

this category.

27. We may note here that the circular dated

28.03.2017 is undoubtedly very wide in its application. It

seeks to give the benefit to candidates including those

acquitted by the Court by giving benefit of doubt. However,

such circular has to be read in the context of the judicial

pronouncements and when this Court has repeatedly

opined that giving benefit of doubt would not entitle

candidate for appointment, despite the circular, the

impugned decision of the competent authority dated

23.05.2017 cannot be said to suffer from infirmity as being

in violation of the circular when it is in conformity with the

law laid down by this Court."

28. A perusal of the above judgments would go to show that while it is

difficult to give a precise definition of the expression "honourable

acquittal", it can possibly be said that when the accused is acquitted after

full consideration of prosecution evidence and the prosecution had

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miserably failed to prove the charges, it can possibly be said that the

accused was honourably acquitted.

29. Acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive for suitability of a

candidate. It cannot always be inferred from an acquittal or discharge that

the person was falsely implicated or has no criminal antecedents. Unless it

is a case of honourable acquittal, the candidate cannot claim the benefit

of the case.

30. Having regard to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

elucidating on the expression "honourable acquittal", we are of the

considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, when

the petitioner was acquitted on benefit of doubt, it would not come within

the category of "honourable acquittal", as rightly observed by the learned

single Judge.

31. In the context of the order which came to be challenged in the writ

petition by which provisional selection of the petitioner was cancelled

taking recourse to Rule 3(G)(vi) of the Rules of 1999, dealing with offence

involving moral turpitude, it will also be necessary to go into the question

as to whether the petitioner was involved in an offence involving moral

turpitude.

32. In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another reported in

(1996) 4 SCC 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "moral

turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance

to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any

connection showing depravity.

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33. In State Bank of India v. P. Soupramaniane, at paragraphs 8

and 9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

"8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the

Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an

employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for

an offence involving moral turpitude. Though every offence

is a crime against the society, discontinuance from service

according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only for

committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which

disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be

categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether

an offence involves moral turpitude or not depends upon

the facts and the circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, the

tests that can be applied for judging an offence involving

moral turpitude are:

a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as

could shock the moral conscience of society in general;

b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one,

and

c) Whether on account of the act having been committed

the perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved

character or a person who was to be looked down upon by

the society.

The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to

conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are :- the

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person who commits the offence; the person against whom

it is committed; the manner and circumstances in which it is

alleged to have been committed; and the values of the

society.

According to the National Incident - Based Reporting

System (NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the

United States of America, each offence belongs to one of

the three categories which are: crimes against persons,

crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes

against persons include murder, rape, and assault where

the victims are always individuals. The object of crimes

against property, for example, robbery and burglary is to

obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes

against society for example gambling, prostitution, and

drug violations, represent society's prohibition against

engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any

alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for

deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States

of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude

for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible conduct

and scienter, whether with specific intent, deliberateness,

willfulness or recklessness.

9. There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences

which can straightaway be termed as involving moral

turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption

Act, NDPS Act etc. The question that arises for our

HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.270 of 2021

consideration in this case is whether an offence involving

bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral

turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It

is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence

involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from

an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt

cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude.

On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which

can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence

involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no

motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the

victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries

caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall

consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion

that the crime committed by the Respondent does not

involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of

an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be

discharged from service."

34. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments goes to show that all offences

do not come in the category of moral turpitude. It was observed that acts

which disclose depravity and wickedness of character, motive which lead

to the act is a base one, acts which can shock the moral conscience of

society in general and upon committing which the society considers a

person committing the offence to be of a depraved character, can be said

to come within the meaning of moral turpitude.

HCJ & NJS,J W.A.No.270 of 2021

35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while a simple assault cannot

be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude, the use of a

dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in

an offence involving moral turpitude.

36. In the instant case, the allegation against the petitioner, as noted

earlier, is that he had impersonated himself as one Srikanth and was

writing the Mathematics-III paper examination for him. Impersonating a

person for writing an examination for someone else cannot be said to be

an act done on the spur of the moment but with deliberate planning and it

shows lack of character. It is another matter that the petitioner was

acquitted on benefit of doubt.

37. Moral turpitude has to be understood to mean something which is

contrary to honesty and morality. We have no hesitation to hold that the

offence in which the petitioner was involved is an offence which comes

within the purview of moral turpitude. A person aspiring for appointment

in police force has to possess good character, integrity and good

antecedents. It goes without saying that members of the police force

have to be of good moral character in order to inspire confidence in the

people.

38. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that no

interference is called for with the judgment under challenge and

accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. All pending

miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.

ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CJ                           NINALA JAYASURYA, J
                                                                           Nn