M/S Shriram General Insurance Co. vs Smt. Ammunuru Munemma,
2021 Latest Caselaw 4119 AP

                              1




     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND


                M.A.C.M.A.NO.513 of 2021

O R D E R:

This appeal has been filed by the appellant/respondent

No.2 seeking to set aside the order and decree passed in

M.V.O.P.No.267 of 2013 on the file of the Motor Vehicle

Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge,

Tirupati, dated 03.10.2016.

2) Along with the appeal, the appellant filed I.A.No.1

of 2021 seeking to condone the delay of 757 days in filing the

appeal. The appellant also filed I.A.No.2 of 2021 seeking to

condone the delay of 674 days in re-presenting the above said

appeal.

3) The petitioner is the Insurance Company/Appellant

and the respondent Nos.1 to 4 are the petitioners/claimants in

M.V.O.P.No.267 of 2013. The parties hereinafter will be

referred to as arrayed in the MVOP.

4) Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

Perused the material available on record.

5) Brief facts of the case are that:

i) The claimants filed M.V.O.P.No.267 of 2013, on the file

of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-III

Additional District Judge, Tirupati, claiming compensation of

Rs.7, 50,000/- for the death of the deceased (i.e.) A. Govinda

Reddy, who died in a motor accident that took place on

27.06.2012. The 1st claimant is wife, claimants 2 and 3 are

children and 4th claimant is mother of the deceased.

ii) The Tribunal after hearing both sides and upon

appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available

on record, was pleased to allow the claim application awarding

compensation of Rs.6,68,500/- along with interest @ 7.5%

per annum from the date of petition to till the date of deposit

into Court with proportionate costs.

iii) The Tribunal held that the respondent Nos.2 and 3

therein are directed to deposit the compensation awarded in

the Court within a month from the date of the award. The

Tribunal held that on such deposit, the 1st petitioner is entitled

to a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-, the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are

entitled to a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- each and the 4th petitioner

is entitled to a sum of Rs.1,18,500/-.

iv) The Tribunal further held that on making such

deposit, the petitioners 1 to 4 are permitted to withdraw a

sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, Rs.75,000/-, Rs.75,000/- and

Rs.43,500/- respectively and rest of the amount ordered to be

deposited in State Bank of India, Main Branch, Tirupati for a

period of two years.

6) Against the decree and award, dated 03.10.2016 in

M.V.O.P.No.267 of 2013 passed by the Tribunal, the

Insurance Company/Appellant, who is the 2nd respondent

therein, filed the present appeal. Along with the appeal, the

Insurance Company/ Appellant filed I.A.No.1 of 2021 seeking

to condone the delay of 757 days in filing the appeal and also

filed I.A.No.2 of 2021 seeking to condone the delay of 674

days in re-presenting the said appeal.

7) In the affidavit filed along with I.A.No.1 of 2021,

the reasons stated by the appellant at para No.3 for the delay

occurred in filing the appeal as extracted hereunder:

Para No.3: "I submit that, the order in question was pronounced on 03.10.2016 in copy application was filed on 11.10.2016. The same was delivered on 14.09.2017. The certified copies of the subject matter of the order and decree were mixed with other records at our office. In spite of our best efforts we could not trace the same till today, thus there was a delay of

757 days in the above said appeal. Thus there is no absolutely willful latches on my part in the above matter."

8) In the affidavit filed along with I.A.No.2 of 2021,

the reasons stated by the appellant at para No.4 for the delay

occurred in re-presenting the appeal as extracted hereunder:

Para No.4: "I submit that, at the time of shifting of the office, the bundle of this case mixed with some other files at our office. Later, due to the blow out of covid- 19 pandemic situation, I could not represent the file, in time i.e., 01.12.2019. Thus, there was a delay of 674 days was occurred in re-presenting the matter. Thus, there is no absolutely willful latches on my part in the above matter."

9) Upon perusal of the certified copy of the decree

and award, dated 03.10.2016 in M.V.O.P.No.267 of 2013

issued by the Tribunal, it appears that the petitioner made

application for certified copy on 11.10.2016. The Tribunal

delivered the certified copy on 14.09.2017. The present

appeal is filed on 20.11.2019. The same was returned by the

Registry of High Court on 22.11.2019. The appeal was re-

submitted on 06.10.2021. As such, it is clear that from the

date of delivering the certified copy of the decree and award

(i.e.) on 14.09.2017, the petitioner did not choose to file

appeal till 20.11.2019 (i.e.,) for a period of more than two

years. Even after filing the appeal, when it is returned by the

Registry of High Court with certain objections on 22.11.2019,

it is re-submitted only on 06.10.2021 (i.e.) after nearly two

years from the date of return. As seen from these factual

aspects, there is a delay of 757 days in filing the appeal in the

High Court against the decree and award of the Tribunal

below and there is a delay of 674 days in re-presenting the

said appeal after complying certain objections raised by

Registry of High Court.

10) As per admitted facts of the case, the accident was

occurred on 27.06.2016 wherein the husband of the 1st

claimant, father of the claimants 2 and 3 and son of the 4th

claimant died. The deceased was aged 40 years at the time of

accident. He is the sole breadwinner of the family. The claim

application was filed before the Tribunal below in the year

2013. The Tribunal passed award on 03.10.2016. Though

the Tribunal awarded compensation on appreciation of the

entire oral and documentary evidence available on record and

after hearing both sides, the claimants could not get the

compensation amount to till date. Though the Tribunal

directed the respondent Nos.2 and 3 therein to deposit the

awarded compensation amount into the Court within a month

from the date of award, it was not deposited till date. In view

of the same, the claimants would have suffered irreparable

loss and hardships due to sudden demise of the breadwinner

of the family and they might be no support to sustain

themselves. They did not get any benefit out of the decree

and award passed by the Tribunal for all these years, due to

action of the Insurance Company in not depositing the award

amount within the time stipulated as directed by the Tribunal

below.

11) The Motor Vehicles Act enacted to provide for

expeditious relief to the victims of accident. The intention of

the Parliament to enact the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide

just and reasonable compensation for the victims and to

protect their substantive rights. The loss or damage caused

to the victims and their families has to be compensated within

a reasonable time to entitle the victims to come out of the

grief.

12) Upon perusal of the above averments, in the

considered opinion of the Court, the said affidavits are filed in

a routine manner and the reasons stated for the delay are

vague. It is clear that the appellant failed to show sufficient

cause to condone the delay of 757 days in filing the appeal

and delay of 674 days in re-presenting the said appeal. The

appellant miserably failed to submit plausible, cogent and

acceptable reasons sufficient to condone such a huge and

inordinate delay.

13) The reasons mentioned in the affidavit which were

already extracted as above, clearly establish that there was

abnormal delay in filing appeal and there is no proper

explanation, as to why such huge delay had occurred.

Though it was stated by the petitioner that the delay was

neither willful nor wanton, but due to the reasons stated in

the affidavit the fact remains that the concerned officers are

failed in taking appropriate steps to file the appeal within the

time by following due procedure as provided under law. Filing

this appeal with a delay of 757 days and re-presenting the

appeal with a delay of 674 days without showing any

sufficient cause is nothing but abusing the process of law and

it will effect the substantive rights of the claimants who are

not in a position to get single rupee from the Insurance

Company/Appellant even after 5 years after passing order in

favour of the claimants by the Tribunal on 03.10.2016.

14) In the present case, the breadwinner of the family

died in a motor vehicle accident on 27.06.2016. But, till date

even after Nine (9) years the claimants/victims did not get

any compensation from the wrongdoers, who are responsible

for the accident and who are liable to pay the compensation

as determined by the Tribunal. It is to be noted that the

Tribunal while passing the decree and award, dated

03.10.2016 directed the respondent Nos.2 and 3 therein (i.e.)

Insurance Company/appellant and another to deposit the

award amount along with interest and costs within a month.

But, till date the said amount is not deposited in the Tribunal

below.

15) For the afore mentioned reasons, in the considered

opinion of this Court, there is no sufficient cause shown by the

petitioner/appellant to condone the delay of 757 days in filing

appeal and 674 days in re-presenting the appeal and as such

I.A.No.1 of 2021 and I.A.No.2 of 2021 are liable to be

dismissed.

16) The view of this Court is fortified by the law laid

down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the following rulings:

17) In the case of Balwant Singh (died) v. Jagdish

Singh1 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held as hereunder:

"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce

(2010) 8 SCC 685: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537

the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."

18) In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal

Corporation of Brihan Mumbai2 wherein the Hon'ble Apex

Court held as hereunder:

"23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the

(2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24

judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

19) In the case of Brahampal @ Sammay and

another vs. National Insurance Company3 wherein the

Hon'ble Apex Court while considering Sec.173 of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988, interpreted the words "may" and

"sufficient cause" used in the Second proviso of Sec.173(1)

and observed at para No.18 and 22 as extracted hereunder:

18. The Court in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of "reasonableness" while giving the clause "sufficient cause" a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and

(2021) 6 Supreme Court Cases 512

negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.

22. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of "sufficient cause". Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief.

20) In the case of Office of Chief Post Master

General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and

another4 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a

petition filed for condonation of delay of 427 days after

considering various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

observed as extracted hereunder:

12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate

2012 LawSuit (SC) 124

period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings.

In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the

Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

21) In another case of The State of Madhya Pradesh

and others vs. Bherulal5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of

663 days, came down heavily, while dismissing the said

application in as extracted hereunder:

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels

2020 SCC OnLine SC 849

appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.

22) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India

Ltd. and another 6 wherein it is held as hereunder:

"28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts

1992 (3) SCC 563

and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

23) The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India while dealing

with an application to condone the delay of 916 days caused

in preferring an appeal in case of University of Delhi vs.

Union of India (UOI) and others 7 held as hereunder:

20. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear

2020(1) ALT 230

that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating "sufficient cause" to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent.

21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law.

24) By following the proposition of law of the Hon'ble

Apex Court, this High Court in Tahsildar, Mangalagiri

Mandal vs. Mangalagiri Pattana Padmasali Bahutama

Sangham, Rep. by its President, Mandru Venkateswara

Rao and another 8, dismissed the application filed seeking

condonation of delay of 1016 days holding that there is no

sufficient cause for the condonation of such a huge delay.

25) This High Court in the case of M/s. Shriram

General Insurance Company Limited vs. Gubbala Harish

and others in M.A.C.M.A.No.440 of 2021 dismissed the

application filed seeking condonation of delay of 1977 days

holding that there is no sufficient cause for the condonation of

such a huge delay.

26) This High Court in the case of M/s. Shriram

General Insurance Company Limited vs. Papaganti

Anusha and others in M.A.C.M.A.No.445 of 2021,

dismissed the application filed seeking condonation of delay of

652 days holding that there is no sufficient cause for the

condonation of such a huge delay.

27) For the above mentioned reasons, this Court holds

that there is no any "sufficient cause" for the condonation of

(2021) 2 ALD 57

delay of 757 days in filing the appeal and 674 days in re-

presenting the said appeal.

28) Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2021 and I.A.No.2 of 2021

filed for condonation of delay of 757 days in filing the MACMA

and 674 days in re-presenting the said MACMA are hereby

dismissed.

29) In view of the dismissal of I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2021,

the main MACMA No.513 of 2021 shall stand dismissed.

30) There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in

this petition shall stand closed.

______________________ JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND Dt. 21.10.2021 PGR

Note: L.R. copy be marked.

*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

+ M.A.C.M.A.No.513 of 2021

% 21.10.2021

# M/s Shriram General Insurance Co., Ltd., rep. By its Authorized Signatory, holding office at Renugunta Road, Tirupathi Post, Chittoor District.

... Appellant.

Vs.

$ Smt. Ammunuru Munemma, W/o late Govinda Reddy, Hindu, Female, age 41 years, R/o Nagampalli Village, Dhurgiperi Post, Yerpedu Mandal, Chittoor District and others.

.... Respondents.

! Counsel for the Appellant:

Sri P. Bhaskara Narasimha Murthy.

! Counsel for the Respondents: Nil.

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

(2010) 8 SCC 685: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537

(2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24

(2021) 6 Supreme Court Cases 512

2012 LawSuit (SC) 124

2020 SCC OnLine SC 849

1992 (3) SCC 563

2020(1) ALT 230

(2021) 2 ALD 57

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 21.10.2021

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No may be allowed to see the Judgments?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No Marked to Law Reporters/Journals.

3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish Yes/No to see the fair copy of the Judgment?

_______________________ JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

M.A.C.M.A.No.513 of 2021

Dt.21.10.2021

PGR