Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 2593 AP
Judgement Date : 25 July, 2021
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
SECOND APPEAL No.301 of 2020
JUDGMENT:
This second appeal is filed under Section 100 of Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC") by the plaintiff assailing
the decree and judgment dated 09.11.2020 in A.S.No.76 of 2018
on the file of V Additional District Judge, Allagadda, whereby
while allowing the appeal, the lower appellate Court has set
aside the decree and judgment dated 09.08.2017 in O.S.No.243
of 2007 on the file of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Allagadda.
2. The parties in this second appeal are referred to as they
are arrayed in the original suit for the sake of convenience.
3. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the plaintiffs
filed the suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the
defendant and his men from dispossessing the plaintiffs from
the plaint schedule property.
4. Plaint schedule property originally belongs to one Bekkam
Pedda Venkata Reddy @ Thota Pedda Venkata Reddy, who is the
father of the defendant. The said Pedda Venkata Reddy gifted
the schedule property to the plaintiffs under a registered gift
deed dated 14.05.2007. By virtue of said gift deed, the plaintiffs
came into possession of the schedule property. But the
defendant, who is junior paternal uncle of the plaintiff, without
any manner of right, trying to interfere with their possession.
On 21.08.2007 when the defendant tried to dispossess the
plaintiffs from the schedule property, the plaintiffs with the help
of elders resisted the same. Hence, the suit.
5. The defendant filed written statement denying the material
allegations in the plaint. It is stated that the defendant is not
aware of the gift deed and the plaintiffs intentionally mentioned
the wrong boundaries with an intention to grab the property of
the defendant. In the gift deed dated 14.05.2007 Bekkem Pedda
Venkata Reddy i.e. father of defendant put his left thumb mark,
instead of signature, but he is educated and able to sign and
prayed to dismiss the suit.
6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the
following issues:
1) Whether the boundaries in the suit schedule are correct?
2) Whether the Gift Deed dated 14.05.2007 executed by Bekkem Pedda Venkata Reddy @ Thota Venkata Reddy in favour of plaintiff is true, valid and binding on defendant?
3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of suit claim?
4) To what relief?
7. On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and
got marked Ex.A-1. On behalf of defendant D.W.1 was examined
and got marked Ex.B-1.
8. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court
decreed the suit. Aggrieved thereof, the defendant preferred
appeal and the 1st appellate Court has allowed the appeal by
setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court.
Assailing the same, the present second appeal is preferred by
the plaintiff.
9. Heard Sri Challa Siva Sankar, learned counsel for the
appellants/plaintiffs and Sri P.Nagendra Reddy, learned counsel
for respondent/defendant.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the
first appellate Court committed manifest error in allowing the
appeal without considering the reasoned judgment of the trial
Court. He submits that the first appellate Court erred in
allowing the appeal without framing a point on Ex.A-1, which is
the core issue and goes to the root of the matter, as such the
decree and judgment of the first appellate Court is liable to be
set aside. Learned counsel while pointing out the judgment in
appeal suit, submits that it was mentioned that R1 and R2
remained exparte. In this regard, clarification was sought from
the learned V Additional District Judge, Allagadda, who
submitted that it was purely a typographical mistake and the
appeal was disposed of on merits.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
following questions of law fall for consideration before this
Court:
1) Whether the first appellate Court is right in passing the impugned judgment by placing reliance on exparte decree and judgment in O.S.No.361 of 2006, ignoring the scope of Section 11 of CPC?
2) Whether the first appellate Court is right in reversing the decree and judgment of the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court finding on issue No.2 with regard to validity of Ex.A-1 is beyond the scope of suit ignoring the settled law as envisaged in Section 38 of Specific Relief Act, that the Court while deciding the injunction suit has to look into title also?
3) Whether the first appellate Court is right in disbelieving the plaintiffs case that the plaintiffs have not mutated their names in revenue records from 10 years from the date of Ex.A-1 till the pronouncement of judgment ignoring the settled law that even plaintiffs names are mutated after filing the suit, the same cannot be considered and also explained offered by the plaintiff because of the pendency of suit the revenue authorities did not consider for mutation of plaintiffs names?
4) Whether the first appellate Court is right in reversing the well considered judgment of trial Court without appreciating the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, which is contrary to the scope of Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC and non-consideration of crucial evidence is fatal to the impugned judgment?
12. Learned counsel for the respondent/defendant submits
that the first appellate Court has rightly appreciated the entire
evidence on record on proper perspective and rightly set aside
the judgment of the trial Court. He submits that the judgment
of the trial Court is not within the parameters of settled
principles of law and the same is passed without application of
mind. He submits that though the plaintiffs did not file any
single scrap of paper to prove their possession over the plaint
schedule property, the trial Court by relying on Ex.A-1 gift deed
has granted decree holding that the plaintiffs are in possession
and enjoyment of the schedule property, which is not valid.
13. Heard the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and learned
counsel for defendant and perused the material on record. This
Court before entertaining a second appeal has to examine
whether any substantial question of law arises in the case which
warrants interference of this Court. It is settled law that the
Courts will entertain the second appeal only if it is satisfied that
the appeal involved a substantial question of law.
14. Before dealing with the merits of this case it is appropriate
to have a look at the catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex
Court wherein it was held that even the concurrent findings can
be interfered with when an important piece of evidence is
overlooked by the Court below.
15. Admittedly, Section 100 of CPC has introduced a definite
restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal
so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that
the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 introduced
such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are
not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing
out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second
appeal a finding of fact even if erroneous will generally not be
disturbed but where it is found that the findings stands vitiated
on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures
and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved
therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction
to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a
fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the
judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity
vis-à-vis the Concept of justice. Needless to say however, that
perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication
what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High
Court as to perversity.
(Emphasis supplied) in Kulwant Kaur and Ors Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors. Appeal (Civil) 1287 of 1990.
16. From the discussions in the judgment, it is clear that the
High Court has based its findings on the documentary evidence
placed on record and statements made by some witnesses which
can be construed as admissions or conclusions. The position is
well settled that when the judgment of the final Court of fact is
based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on
consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material
evidence, the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere
with the judgment. The position is also well settled that
admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of
evidence and should be given due weightage by Courts. A
finding of fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is
vitiated in law and can be interfered with by the High Court in
second appeal. Since the parties have been in litigating terms for
several decades the records are voluminous. The High Court as
it appears from the judgment has discussed the documentary
evidence threadbare in the light of law relating to their
admissibility and relevance.
(Emphasis supplied) in Yadavarao Dajiba Shrawane Vs. Ma&niolrasl 2002 (6) SCC 404.
17. It will be apt to refer to Section 103 of C.P.C. which
enables the High Court to determine the issues of fact:
"103. Power of High Court to determine issue of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,
(a) which has not been determined by the Lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the Lower Appellate Court, or
(b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100."
The section, noted above, authorizes the High Court to determine any issue which is necessary for the disposal of the second appeal provided the evidence on record is sufficient, in any of the following two situations : (1) when that issue has not been determined both by the trial court as well as the Lower Appellate Court or by the Lower Appellate Court; or (2) when both the trial court as well as the Appellate Court or the Lower Appellate Court has wrongly determined any issue on a substantial question of law which can properly be the subject matter of second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C."
(Emphasis supplied) in Leela Soni vs. Rajesh Goyal 2001 (7) SCC 494.
18. It is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial
question of law under section 100 of CPC, after the 1976
amendment and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of
the first appellate Court without doing so.
(Emphasis supplied) in Ishwasdas Jain Vs. Sohan lal 2000 (1) SCC 434.
19. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court
on the scope of interference of by the High Court in second
appeal, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section
100 of CPC has to confine to the substantial question of law
involved in the appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the
evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court
below where the Courts below have exercised the discretion
judicially. Further the existence of substantial question of law is
the sine quo non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court
cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the
Court are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on
record.
20. Coming back to the facts of this case, the trial Court held
that on one hand except Ex.A-1 there is no other document filed
by the plaintiffs. On the other hand though defendant filed
Ex.B-1, the trial Court holding that it is inadmissible in
evidence has ignored the same. The trial Court further held that
though there is no document in favour of the plaintiffs, it is
unreasonable to say that they are not at all in possession of the
property. The learned Junior Civil Judge went to the extent of
observing that in some cases always the unfair litigants who are
vigilant enough may secure documents and the fair innocent
litigants may not get the documents and in such a case, it does
not mean that the person who has the document can take
advantage of it. Here is the case that P.W.1 expressed her
inability in getting No.3 adangal, which seems to be
unreasonable. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit.
However, the first appellate Court has set aside the decree and
judgment of the trial Court.
21. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the
respondent and also as rightly observed by the first appellate
Court the judgment passed by the learned Junior Civil Judge is
purely basing on surmises and conjunctures. The trial Court
observed that Exs.B-2 and B-3 are judgment and decree in
O.S.No.361 of 2006 on the file of Junior Civil Judge's Court,
Allagadda, but the same is an exparte decree, it is not sufficient
to substantiate the contention of defendant and not sufficient to
rebut Ex.A-1. The said finding of the trial Court is perverse,
since whether the decree is passed exparte or on contest, it
holds good, unless it is set aside by the competent appellate
Court. Moreover it is not the case of the plaintiffs that the decree
in O.S.No.361 of 2006 is not with regard to the plaint schedule
property.
22. In a suit for permanent injunction, the burden always lies
on the plaintiffs to prove that they are in actual possession and
enjoyment of the property as on the date of the suit. But except
filing Ex.A-1 gift deed, the plaintiffs failed to file any piece of
document to prove that they are in possession of the schedule
property as on the date of filing of suit. The defendant filed
Ex.B-1 true copy of adangal, which clinchingly proves that the
defendant is in possession of the plaint schedule property. The
first appellate Court rightly observed that Ex.A-1 gift deed is not
a genuine document and there is no explanation from the
plaintiffs what prevented them from mutating their names in the
revenue records from the date of Ex.A-1 to till the date of
pronouncement of judgment i.e. for about 10 years. Thus,
absolutely there is no document filed by the plaintiffs to prove
their possession over the plaint schedule property as on the date
of filing of the suit. However, the possession of defendant over
the schedule property is evident from Ex.B-1 adangal and
decree and judgment in O.S.No.361 of 2006. Therefore, the
decree and judgment passed by trial Court is erroneous and the
first appellate Court has rightly set aside the same.
23. As observed earlier, the first appellate Court disposed of
the appeal suit on merits and mentioning about the R1 and R2
remained exparte is only typographical mistake, as clarified by
the learned V Additional District Judge, Allagadda. Therefore,
the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the
appeal suit was disposed of exparte has no legs to stand.
24. The judgment of the trial Court is also bad on the ground
that even though the plaintiffs became majors by the time of
pronouncement of judgment, they did not take any steps to
discharge the guardian and allowed the Court to pass judgment
though they became majors. Therefore, the contention of
learned counsel for the plaintiffs that it is a curable defect and
that cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit, is not sustainable.
25. Though the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has pointed
out the grounds which are extracted in the earlier paragraphs as
substantial questions of law, this Court is of the view that there
are no questions of law much less the substantial questions of
law involved in this appeal.
26. In view of the aforesaid reasons and having given earnest
consideration to the facts and submissions, this Court finds
that there is no error or illegality in the findings of the first
appellate Court warranting interference by this Court.
27. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs
throughout.
As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications
are closed.
___________________________ LALITHA KANNEGANTI, J 25th June, 2021
PVD
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
Dismissed
SECOND APPEAL No.301 of 2020
25th June, 2021
PVD
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