Parimi Soma Sekhar Naidu, vs The State
2021 Latest Caselaw 124 AP

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

                   CRIMINAL PETITION NO.6278 OF 2020

ORDER:

This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C to

quash the proceedings in Crime No.848 of 2020 on the file of

Tadipatri Town Police Station, Anantapur District, registered for

the offences punishable under Section 153 r/w 34 of Indian Penal

Code (for short 'IPC').

It is the case of the petitioner that, on the basis of the

complaint dated 25.12.2020 lodged by the defacto

complainant/second respondent herein, the petitioner was falsely

implicated in Crime No.848 of 2020.

The brief facts of the case are that, the defacto complainant

is a police constable bearing Number PC-1967 by name

K. Peddanna. According to him, on 24.12.2020 he received

information regarding telephonic conversation which allegedly took

place between one Vali - a resident of Tadipatri Town working in

MY News, Youtube channel and one Kulasekhar Reddy - a sand

bullock-cart transporter. The verbatim of the conversation which

was recorded by Vali states as follows:

"..that Tadipatri MLA Sri Pedda Reddy wife is demanding Rs.10,000/- per one bullock cart of sand and that she assured that if any problem arises they will look after it"

It is alleged that, Vali and Somasekhar Naidu who belong to

the group of Ex.MLA Prabhakar Reddy, conspired together and

uploaded the said verbatim in social media with a view to provoke MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

two groups in Tadipatri Town. After coming to know about the

matter, the defacto complainant reported the same to police station

and a case in Crime No.848 of 2020 was registered against the

petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 153-A r/w 34

I.P.C and issued First Information Report.

The main contention of the petitioner in the present petition

is that, the police are acting as hand in glove with the political

party in power; false and frivolous case is registered against this

petitioner and on the face of the complaint no case is made out to

constitute an offence punishable under Section 153-A I.P.C, as

alleged by the police. It is contended that, the entire contents of

the First Information Report, even if accepted in toto, they does not

make out any offence punishable under Section 153-A I.P.C. The

alleged private conversation between the two individuals took place

with regard to transportation of sand by bullock-cart, wherein a

reference of wife of Sri Pedda Reddy is taken to the extent that she

was demanding Rs.10,00/- for transportation of sand on bullock

cart. It is contended that, there is no reference to any hate speech

or any intention of maligning any political leader, even if the entire

conversation is accepted in toto and as such no offence under

Section 153-A I.P.C is made out. It is also contended that, in

Ramesh v. Union of India1 the Apex Court observed that, "the

effect of the words must be judged from the standards of

reasonable, strong- minded, firm and courageous men, and not

those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger

in every hostile point of view." Reliance was also placed on the

judgment of the Supreme Court in Bilaal Ahmed Kaloo v. State

AIR 1988 SC 775 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

of Andhra Pradesh2 to contend that, the allegations made in the

complaint do not constitute an offence punishable under Section

153-A r/w 34 I.P.C and requested to quash the proceedings in

Crime No.848 of 2020 on the file of Tadipatri Town Police Station,

Anantapur District.

During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated

the contentions urged in the petition, whereas, the learned Special

Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that, at this stage, the

proceedings against the petitioner cannot be quashed, since he is

the person who uploaded recorded conversation in the youtube

along with Vali. As such, the petitioner and Vali are liable to be

prosecuted for the offence. Therefore, there is absolutely no ground

to quash the proceedings at this stage and requested to dismiss

the criminal petition.

Considering rival contentions, perusing the material

available on record, the point that arises for consideration is"

"Whether the allegations made in the complaint constitutes an offence punishable under Section 153-A r/w 34 I.P.C, if the allegations in the complaint are accepted on its face value. If so, whether the proceedings against this petitioner are liable to be quashed at this stage by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C?"

P O I N T:

The petitioner and the second respondent are the residents

of Tadipatri Town. A telephonic conversation which allegedly took

place between one Basha - a resident of Tadipatri Town and

bullock cart owner was uploaded to social media by Vali and

AIR 1997 SC 3483 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

Somasekhar Naidu with a view to provoke two groups in Tadipatri

Town. After coming to know about the matter, the defacto

complainant/second respondent reported the same to police and a

case in Crime No.848 of 2020 was registered against the petitioner

for the offence punishable under Section 153-A r/w 34 I.P.C and

issued First Information Report.

The main grievance of this petitioner before this Court is

that, this Court by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C can

quash the proceedings irrespective of the Stage of the proceedings

including the proceedings at the stage of F.I.R.

In view of the contentions, it is appropriate to decide the

scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The

power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C is inherent and

notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of Cr.P.C be

deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to

make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order

under Cr.P.C, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal3 the Apex Court

considered in detail the provisions of Section 482 and the power of

the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex

Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following

guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their

inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint:

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in

1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

In (Mrs.) Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and

others4, the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of Section 482 of

Cr.P.C and it reads as under:

"Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the

AIR 1990 SC 494 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court.

Similarly, in Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh5,

the Supreme Court held that law does not prohibit entertaining the

petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge sheet

even before the charges are framed or before the application of

discharge is filed or even during its pendency of such application

before the Court concerned. The High Court cannot reject the

application merely on the ground that the accused can argue legal

and factual issues at the time of the framing of the charge. Thus,

the judgment of the Apex Court is clear that even if a petition for

discharge is filed and pending, the High Court cannot reject the

petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. While discussing the facts

of the above judgment, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 12 as

follows:

"Once criminal law is put in motion and after investigation the charge sheet is filed, it requires scrutiny in the court of law. However, before the charges could be framed, Umesh Kumar, appellant, approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the charge sheet. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well defined and inherent powers could be exercised by the High Court to give effect to an order under the Cr.P.C.; to prevent abuse of the process of court; and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This extraordinary power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae. However, in exercise of such powers, it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused and the court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. Any document filed alongwith the petition labelled as evidence without being tested and proved, cannot be examined. Law does not prohibit entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge sheet even before the charges are framed or before the application of discharge is filed or even during its pendency of such application before the court concerned. The High Court cannot reject the application merely on the ground that the accused can argue legal and factual issues at the time of the framing of the charge. However, the inherent power of the court should not be MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution but can be exercised to save the accused to undergo the agony of a criminal trial."

In view of the judgments referred supra, this Court cannot

appreciate the evidence at this stage while deciding an application

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At best, this Court can evaluate the

evidence, but it is not competent to record a finding that the facts

on hand, as they did not constitute an offence under given

circumstance.

Keeping the law declared by the Apex Court in the various

judgments referred supra, I would like to examine the present case

as to whether the allegations made in the complaint along with the

conversation between the two persons Vali and Kulasekhar Reddy,

if accepted on its face value constitutes an offence. The complaint

lodged by the police constable/second respondent/defacto

complaint runs as follows:

"I am working as PC-1967 in Tadipatri P.S. and I am working as ward police officer to the wards of 5 to 8 of Krishnapuram. Yesterday i.e., on 24.12.2021 I was taking rounds in my ward as per the directions of C.I, Tadipatri Town P.S, I come across an audio tape took place between one Vali, who belongs to my news, Youtube channel, resident of Krishnapuram 5th road and Kulasekar Reddy, vali called Kulasekhar Reddy, who used to transport sand by Bullock cart, during conversation they talked about Tadipatri MLA Sri Pedda Reddy wife is taking Rs.10,000/- pr bullock cart sand and that they will look after the problems, if any arises and the said words of conversation was recorded by the Vali, and that Vali and Somasekhar Naidu, who belongs to Ex.MLA Prabhakara Reddy, has uploaded the said tapes in social media. It was brought to my notice that they conspired to provoke two groups in the Tadipatri Town and to create disputes between two groups and that I heard that tapes and to take action against the abovesaid persons, I am presenting the special report."

The basis for lodging the report is the exact verbatim of the

telephonic conversation with regard to bullock cart sand and it

reads as follows:

MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

"Bullock cart sand: translation Basha: I don't undersand Cart owner: Rs.10000/ has to be given to wife of Pedda Reddy, for one bullock cart Rs.10000/- was demanded by wife of Pedda Reddy and that sand can be transported Basha: How much, Rs.10000/- per cart Cart owner: yes, Appa, it is learned that Rs.10000/- has to be given Basha: Ohh, Ok, how many trips of sand you have unloaded for me so far anna Cart owner: what Basha, 6 trips were transported Basha: 6 trips Cart owner: yes Basha; what is the truth, really they are taking money Cart owner: ohh, (vehemently says) yes appa, really they are taking, that's why trips were stopped from yesterday and today Basha: is it, ok ok are you paying now and getting trips Cart owner: No, no trips, what will remain to us if we pay Rs.10000/- per bullock cart, then how can we live and survive, as such no trips Basha: ok Cart owner: you do the levelling of sand work, you ight have entrusted a man already to that work, today itself Basha: I will do the levelling, you complete the trips of sand as required Cart owner: I will transport the required sand till the road joins Basha: transport the required sand till road joins, ok, tomorrow you transport it Cart owner: ok basha, right right Basha: ok brother (anna)"

The conversation is allegedly posted in social media platform

i.e. MyNews Youtube channel. On close examination of the content

of the social media posting, it is evident that the cart owner says

that Rs.10,000/- has to be given to wife of Mr.Peddareddy for

transportation of sand by one bullock cart and she was demanding

Rs.10,000/- for transportation of one bullock cart of sand. The

telephonic conversation between the two persons would disclose

that wife of Mr.Peddareddy, sitting M.L.A of Tadipatri Constituency

demanded Rs.10,000/- for transporting one bullock cart sand and

the same is allegedly posted in the youtube channel of social media

platform. Except referring that wife of Mr. Peddareddy has

demanded Rs.10,000/- for transporting one bullock cart of sand,

nothing was elicited. But the contention of the respondents is that,

such postings in the social media would create enemity between MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

two groups of Tadipatri Town and it would constitute an offence

punishable under Section 153-A r/w 34 of I.P.C.

Section 153-A I.P.C deals with punishment for promoting

enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place

of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to

maintenance of harmony.

According to Section 153-A I.P.C, (1) Whoever

(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or;

(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, (or)

(c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

To constitute an offence, there should be the words either

spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or

otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of

religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or

community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or

feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious,

racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. But,

here, in this case, the allegation in the complaint would show that

one Vali and Somasekhar Naidu, supporter of Ex.MLA Prabhakara MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

Reddy who uploaded the said verbatim to social media. But, the

complaint is silent as to who are the persons of the other group of

the town being provoked due to the postings of the content in the

social media, except making an allegation that the content of the

postings provoked the other group to create disharmony in the

town. In the absence of disclosure of the details of the other group,

question of constituting an offence under Section 153-A I.P.C does

not arise.

Any act which promotes enmity between the groups on

grounds of religion and race etc. or which are prejudicial to

national integration is punishable. The purpose of enactment of

such a provision was to "check fissiparous communal and

separatist tendencies and secure fraternity so as to ensure the

dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation" (vide Pravasi

Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India and others5).

The essence of the offence under Section 153-A of IPC is

promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion,

race, place of birth, residence etc. and doing acts prejudicial to

maintenance of harmony. To ascertain whether an offence as

defined under Section 153-A IPC has been committed or not, it is

for the court to examine the words either spoken or written or by

signs or by visible representations and come to a conclusion

whether they have a tendency to promote or attempts to promote

on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,

caste or community or any other group etc. disharmony or feelings

of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial,

language or regional groups or castes or communities . In the

AIR 2014 SC 1591 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

absence of any material as to the actual words uttered by the

accused or the acts committed by the accused, the allegations

must be held to be extremely vague. (vide Mohd. Khalid Hussain

v. State through SHO P.S. Asifnagar6)

If the principle laid down in Mohd. Khalid Hussain v. State

through SHO P.S. Asifnagar (referred supra) is applied to the

present facts of the case, the contents of the complaint regarding

identify of the other group of Tadipatri Town is too vague. In such

case, mere posting of contents in social media do not constitute an

offence punishable under Section 153-A I.P.C. Even on close

examination of the contents of the conversation allegedly posted in

youtube do not constitute any offence punishable under Section

153-A r/w 34 I.P.C, for the reason that this was a conversation

between Basha and owner of the bullock cart regarding alleged

payment of Rs.10,000/- to the wife of Mr. Pedda Reddy for

transporting one cart of sand. But, they are not arrayed as

accused. However, Vali, Kulasekhara Reddy and Parimi

Somasekhar Naidu (the petitioner herein) were alone arrayed as

accused, since they allegedly posting the material in youtube

channel.

Similar issue came up before the Apex Court in Manzar

Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra7 wherein, the Apex Court

held as follows:

"16. Section 153-A IPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the maintenance

2000 Cri.L.J. 2949 7 (2007) 5 SCC 1 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning."

In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh8, the

Apex Court observed as under:

"15. The common feature in both sections being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will "between different" religious or racial or language or regional groups or castes and communities it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections."

Following the principles laid down in the above judgments,

the Karnataka High Court in Mohammed Shariff v. The State of

Karnataka9 declined to quash the proceedings in the said case, as

the allegations made in the compliant are reflective only to further

evaluate the matter.

In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab10, the Apex Court held

as follows:

"In so far as the offence under Section 153A IPC is concerned, it provides for punishment for promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever or brings about disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. In our opinion only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or effect public tranquility, that the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and circumstances of this case unmistakably show that there was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law and order or of public order or peace and

8 AIR 1997 SC 3483 9 Crl.P.No.3786 of 2020 dated 01.10.2020 (unreported) 10 (1995) 1 SCR 411 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

tranquility in the area from where the appellants were apprehended while raising slogans on account of the activities of the appellants. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153 A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the provisions of Section 153A IPC, by their raising causally the three slogans a couple of times. The offence under Section 153A IPC is, therefore, not made out.

It appears to us that the raising some slogan only a couple of times by the two lonesome appellants, which neither evoked any response nor any reaction from any one in the public can neither attract the provisions of Section 124A or Section 153A IPC Some more overt act was required to bring home the charge to the two appellants, who are Government servants. The police officials exhibited lack of maturity and more of sensitivity in arresting the appellants for raising the slogans - which arrest -and act the casual raising of one or two slogans - could have created a law and order situation, keeping in view the tense situation prevailing on the date of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi. In situations like that, over sensitiveness some times is counter productive and can result is inviting trouble. Raising of some lonesome slogans, a couple of times by two individuals, without anything more, did not constitute any threat to the Government of India as by law established not could the same give rise to feelings of enmity or hatred among different communities or religious or other groups."

From a reading of the principle laid down in the above

judgment, mere raising slogans by two persons is not sufficient to

constitute an offence and there must be some overt acts to bring

home the charge. If, the same principle is applied to the present

facts of the case, there was not overt act, except uploading the

verbatim conversation in the youtube social media platform.

In Khushboo v. Kanniammal and another11, a similar

issue came up for consideration with regard to commission of

offence punishable under Section 153-A I.P.C along with the other

offences, wherein, the Apex Court observed as under:

"15. Perusal of the complaints reveals that most of the allegations have pertained to offences such as defamation (Sections 499, 501 and 502 IPC), obscenity (Section 292 IPC), indecent representation of women and incitement among others.

At the outset, we are of the view that there is absolutely no basis for proceeding against the appellant in respect of some of the alleged offences. For example, the Act, 1986 was enacted to

11 (2010) 5 SCC 600 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

punish publishers and advertisers who knowingly disseminate materials that portray women in an indecent manner. However, this statute cannot be used in the present case where the appellant has merely referred to the incidence of pre-marital sex in her statement which was published by a news magazine and subsequently reported in another periodical. It would defy logic to invoke the offences mentioned in this statute to proceed against the appellant, who cannot be described as an `advertiser' or `publisher' by any means. Similarly, Section 509 IPC criminalises a `word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman' and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act. Clearly this offence cannot be made out when the complainants' grievance is with the publication of what the appellant had stated in a written form. Likewise, some of the complaints have mentioned offences such as those contemplated by Section 153A IPC (`Promoting enmity between different groups etc.,') which have no application to the present case since the appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not directed against any particular group either."

(Emphasis supplied)

In the present case also, the content of social media posting

is not against any group, but it is the discussion between two

individuals i.e Basha and cart owner. Even if such conversation is

posted in the youtube social media platform, it may at best defame

the wife of Mr. Peddareddy, the sitting MLA of Tadipatri

Constituency. But, that would not promote hatredness or ill-feeling

between two groups. In fact, there is nothing in the complaint to

show that there is another group in Tadipatri Town, except making

a vague allegation that the content may permit hatredness between

two groups in the town. Therefore, the vague allegation in the

complaint is not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable

under Section 153-A I.P.C.

In view of the principles lad down in the above judgments, in

the absence of any material, that the two groups in Tadipatri Town

are promoting enmity between each other on grounds of religion,

race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts

prejudicial to maintenance of harmony and also that, a vague MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

allegation is not sufficient to constitute an offence, since

registration of crime, investigation and consequences of

investigation will have serious impact on the esteem of a person. If,

the investigating agency took the petitioner into custody based on

such vague allegations, it would substantially damage the

reputation of that person i.e. the petitioner herein. In such case, it

is difficult to accept the contention of the prosecution that the act

of the respondents would constitute an offence punishable under

Section 153-A r/w 34 I.P.C, prima facie.

Meghalaya High Court in Smt. Patricia Mukhim v. State of

Meghalaya12 had an occasion to deal with similar situation, where

the accused allegedly posted an incident that occurred at

basketball court. In the said post there is a distinct portrayal of an

alleged skirmish between two groups, one, group allegedly

consisting of tribal youths and the other group consisting of non-

tribal youths. While deciding the same, Meghalaya High Court

placed reliance on judgment of Apex Court in Babu Rao v. State13

concluded that, the said facebook post sought to create a divide to

a cordial relationship between tribal and non-tribal living in the

State of Meghalaya, even alluding to the rule of the State

machinery as being biased in this regard. Prima facie it appears

that the case under Section 156 Cr.P.C is made out.

As discussed above in the earlier paragraphs regarding scope

of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C, this Court

can quash the proceedings at any stage of the proceedings, but,

subject to certain limitations.

Unreported Crl.P.No.9 of dated 10.11.2020 (2020 SCC Online Megh 167)

1980 (2) SCC 402 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

The power of this Court to quash at the stage of F.I.R. is

limited and this Court can verify the F.I.R. and other material, if

any, produced before the Court and decide whether such

allegations would constitute any offence, but this Court cannot

appreciate the evidence and cannot record whether the allegations

would constitute any specific offence or not.

Undisputedly, investigation in the present case is at the

fetus stage, in such case, it is difficult to quash the proceedings as

held in "State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo14", wherein the

Apex Court held that the inherent powers under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C. should not be exercised by the High Court to stifle a

legitimate prosecution. The High Court, being the highest Court of

a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision

in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so

when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the

Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of

magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without

sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid

down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its

extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.

While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is

not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial court. Even

when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima

facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the

(2005) 13 SCC 540 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

Court can evaluate material and documents on record but it

cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate

evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient

or not for convicting the accused.

In "Kurukshetra University v. State Of Haryana15", the

Supreme Court took a serious view about quashing the

proceedings by the High Court while exercising power under

Section 482 Cr.P.C and observed as follows:

"It surprises, us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, it could quash a First Information Report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the F.I.R. It ought to be realized that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases."

In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in "State of

Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo" and "Kurukshetra University v.

State Of Haryana" (referred supra) when the investigation is at

fetus stage, this Court cannot interfere with the process of

investigation and quash the proceedings by exercising power under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

In a recent judgment "Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private

Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Special Leave Petition

(Criminal) No.4931 of 2020", the Apex Court relied on the decision

of the Privy Council in "King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir

Ahmed16", held that the law is well settled that Courts would not

AIR 1977 SC 2229

AIR 1945 PC 18 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

thwart any investigation. It is only in cases where no cognizable

offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information

report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.

In "S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat17", the Apex Court

cautioned that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the

initial stage. Quashing of a complaint should rather be an

exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. In S.M. Datta v. State

of Gujarat (referred supra), the Apex Court held that if a perusal of

the first information report leads to disclosure of an offence even

broadly, law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the

police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific

spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other

sphere.

Applying the above principles to the present facts of the case,

this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings at this stage, more particularly

when the investigation is not yet commenced and facts are

incomplete and hazy. Thus, the Apex Court in all the above

judgments summed up the principle and held that when the

investigation is at fetus stage, the Court cannot quash the

proceedings.

Turning to the facts of the present case, except registration

of crime, investigation is not yet commenced and there is a

reference that the petitioner belongs to the group of Ex.MLA

Mr. Prabhakar Reddy of Tadipatri Town and their acts provokes

the other group in the town and promotes hatredness between the

(2001) 7 SCC 659 MSM,J CrlP.No.6278 of 2020

two groups, as such, there is a vague reference about existence of

two groups in Tadipatri Town.

First Information Report is only information about

commission of a cognizable offence to the police and it need not

contain minute details. Therefore, when the complaint discloses

commission of a cognizable offence punishable under

Section 153-A r/w 34 I.P.C, taking into consideration of the

allegations in the complaint on its face value, prima facie, it

constitutes an offence and the truth or otherwise about the

existence of the other group in the town has to be decided only

after conclusion after investigation. But, existence of two groups is

clear from the complaint lodged by the second respondent. Hence,

at this stage, without expressing any opinion, whether the

allegations made in the complaint constitutes an offence

punishable under Section 153-A r/w 34 I.P.C, I find that it is not

appropriate to quash the proceedings at this stage, since

investigation is not yet commenced.

In the result, criminal petition is dismissed.

Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any,

shall also stand dismissed. No costs.

_________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY Date:18.01.2021

SP