Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Kankipati Kalyan Babu Kalyan vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 24 December, 2021
*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
+I.A.No.2 OF 2021
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1299 OF 2017
%24.12.2021
# Rentapalli Anand Mary, D/o. Lajaru,
aged about 38 years, R/o.D.No.8-102,
Guntupalli,
Krishna District. ....Petitioner/2nd respondent.
And:
$ Kankipati Kalyan Babu @ Kalyan,
S/o. Ranga Rao, aged about 31
years, H.No.7-60, Ambedkar Nagar,
Gunupalli, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal,
Krishna District and others.
....Respondents/Respondents.
! Counsel for the petitioner/2nd respondent: Sri A. Rama Krishna
^ Counsel for the respondents 1 & 2 : Sri K. Suresh Reddy
Counsel for the 3rd respondent : Sri S. Venkata Sainath
Special Assistant P.P.
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834
2 2016 CRI.L.J.243
3 (2012) 10 SCC 303
4 (2017) 9 SCC 641
5 2019 (5) SCC 688
6 (2013) 7 SCC 77
7 (2015) 7 SCC 681
8(2014) 13 SCC 318
2
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
*****
I.A.No.2 OF 2021
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1299 OF 2017
Between:
Rentapalli Anand Mary, D/o. Lajaru,
aged about 38 years, R/o.D.No.8-102,
Guntupalli,
Krishna District. ....Petitioner/2nd respondent.
And:
1. Kankipati Kalyan Babu @
Kalyan, S/o. Ranga Rao, aged
about 31 years, H.No.7-60,
Ambedkar Nagar, Gunupalli,
Ibrahimpatnam Mandal,
Krishna District.
2. Kankipati Vijayakumari,
W/o. Rajesh, aged about 38
years, R/o. 5th Line,
Ambedkar Nagar, Guntupalli,
Krishna District,
Andhra Pradesh.
3. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High court of Andhra Pradesh
at Amaravati.
....Respondents/Respondents.
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 24.12.2021.
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may Yes/No
be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
Copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
________________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
3
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
I.A.No.2 OF 2021
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1299 OF 2017
JUDGMENT:
1. Heard Sri K. Suresh Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants,
Sri S. Venkata Sainath, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the 1st
respondent/State and Sri A. Rama Krishna, learned counsel for the 2nd
respondent.
2. The appellant No.1 herein was found guilty for the offence
punishable under Sections 376, 342, 417 and 420 IPC. The appellant
No.2 was found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 109 r/w
Sections 376 and 342 read with 34 IPC. They were convicted and
sentenced vide judgment dated 23.10.2017 in Session Case No.217 of
2013 by the learned Court of Sessions Judge, Mahila Court,
Vijayawada.
3. The application I.A.No.2 of 2021 is filed with the following prayer:
"Hon'ble Court may be pleased to permit the petitioner/2nd
respondent to compromise the matter with the petitioners/accused
Nos.1 and 2 in S.C.No.217 of 2013 on the file of the Court of
Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Vijayawada and pass such other
order or orders in the interest of justice."
4. The joint memo has been filed by both the parties i.e., by the
petitioners 1 & 2 and the 2nd respondent, stating in paragraph No.2
thereof as under:-
"2. It is further humbly submitted that, the 2nd respondent
and petitioner No.2 are close friends having studied together while
we are prosecuting BeD. The 2nd respondent and petitioner No.1
fell in love and they decided to marry, but due to obvious reasons
it was not materialized. Due to some misunderstandings
respondent No.2 gave a report to the police which resulted in
punishing the petitioners. While the matter stood thus, the well-
wishers, elders from both sides including community people
convened a meeting and reprimanded both to put an end to the
unnecessary ill feelings in the minds of both parties in order to
lead peaceful life in the locality. The 2nd appellant was a close
friend of 2nd respondent, as such she realized to end the agony met
by both families, as such coming forward to compound the case on
her own will and accord. There is no threat or coercion in filing
this petition to compound the offence. The 2nd respondent has no
objection to allow the appeal filed by the appellants by recording
compromise by setting aside the conviction and sentence."
5. Sri K. Suresh Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants submits
that the appeal can be decided setting aside the conviction and
sentence order and the convicts can be acquitted in view of the
compromise. His submission is that the offence under Section 376 IPC
is purely personal in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated
in the joint memo/application/I.A.No.2 of 2021 which cannot be termed
as heinous offence considering that the 2nd respondent and the
petitioner No.2 were close friends; had studied together and while
pursuing B.Ed., they fell in love and decided to marry but it could not
be materialized and due to that reason and misunderstanding, the
report was lodged by the 2nd respondent. He has placed reliance on
the judgment in the case of Ramgopal and another vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh1 and Parvpal Rajivpal Singh vs. State of Gujarat2.
6. Sri A. Rama Krishna, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent has
adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants.
7. Sri S. Venkata Sainath, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
appearing for the State, however, opposes the application and submits
that the appellants have been convicted of the offences including under
Section 376 IPC which is a heinous offence and cannot be termed as a
personal offence. It has its impact on the society and as such the
1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834
2 2016 CRI.L.J.243
I.A.No.2 of 2021 cannot be allowed. He has placed reliance on the
judgment in the case of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another3.
8. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned
counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
9. The following point arises for consideration
"whether on the basis of the joint memo/compromise the appeal
can be allowed, setting aside the judgment dated 23.10.2017 and
acquitting the appellants for the offences which includes the offence
of Rape punishable under Section 376 IPC?
10. The law on the point as involved herein is not res integra. The
Court proceeds to consider some cases on the subject.
11. In Gian Singh (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has summed up the position in para no. 61, as under:-
"61.The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but
it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and
the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though
3 (2012) 10 SCC 303
the victim or victim's family and the offender have
settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
any compromise between the victim and the offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.;
cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of
the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise between
the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the
ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is
put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is
in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
12. In Narinder Singh (supra), the Ho'nble Supreme Court discussed
in detail as to under what circumstances the High Court should accept
the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and
under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. This
judgment laid down certain principles for guidance of the High Court in
giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and in
exercising its inherent powers under section 482 of the Code. Paragraph
no. 29 of the judgment reads as under:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would
be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement
between the parties and exercising its power under Section
482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing
the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in
those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties
have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on
that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is
filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged
to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the
victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes
should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire
disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote
and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to
be generally treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone. However, the High Court would
not rest its decision merely because there is a mention
of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine
as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the
sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to proving the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,
whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of
the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in
respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the
High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept
the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in
the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to
accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete
settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can
also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement
play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived
at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at
this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-
sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the
charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the
evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after
prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the
High Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and
to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by
the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage
before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been
convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved
under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of
sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
13. In Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and
others Vs. State of Gujrat and another4 the Hon'ble Apex Court again
summarised and laid down principles which emerged from the
precedents on the subject, in paragraph no.16 of the judgment, which
are as follows:-
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarised in the following
propositions :
16.1 Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court;
16.2 The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section
482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3 In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether
the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power;
16.4 While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court;
4 (2017) 9 SCC 641
16.5 The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that
the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and
no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6 In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving
mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim
or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a
serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with
the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element
of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7 As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in
so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned;
16.8 Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute;
16.9 In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause
oppression and prejudice; and
16.10 There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8 and 16.9, above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic well-being of the state
have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved
in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance."
14. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others5,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, again held that the power to quash the
criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code
is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Paragraph 15 of Laxmi Narayan (Supra) is being
reproduced as under:-
"15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions
of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is
observed and held as under:-
15.1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised
having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
15.2) Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society;
5 2019 (5) SCC 688
15.3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the
offences under the special statutes like Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
15.4) Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or
the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society
cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of
the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their
entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention
of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine
as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the
sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to framing the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,
whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of
the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise
is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and
29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder
Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as
a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5) While exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-
compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there
is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the
offender, the High Court is required to consider the
antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused,
namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was
absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to
enter into a compromise etc."
15. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh (Supra),
Narinder Singh (supra) Parbatbhai Aahir (supra) and in Laxmi
Narayan (supra) has consistently laid down that the power to quash
the criminal proceedings in view of settlement is not to be exercised in
those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences like
murder, rape, dacoity etc., or other offences of mental depravity
under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity or Economic offences including
the financial and economic wellbeing of the State. The settlement
between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all in
such offences. Any compromise between the victim and the offender in
relation to such offences, cannot provide for any basis for quashing the
criminal proceedings. Such offences are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on the society.
16. The offence under Section 376 IPC falls in the category of serious
and heinous offences and is treated as crime against the society and not
against an individual alone. Rape is the most morally and physically
reprehensible crime in a society. It is an assault on the body, mind and
privacy of the victim. In Shyam Narain Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)6, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that rape is an assault on the
individuality and inherent dignity of a woman. A monstrous burial of
6 (2013) 7 SCC 77
her dignity in the darkness. It is a crime against the holy body of a
woman and the soul of the society. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Madan Lal7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that rape or attempt to
rape are crimes against the body of a women which is her own temple.
These are the offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the
reputation. Reputation is the richest jewel one can conecive of in life. No
one can allow it to be extinguished. When a human frame is defiled, the
"Purest Treasure" is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of her non-
perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it
in clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be
against her honour which matters the most. In Shimbhu Vs. State of
Haryana8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that rape is an offence
against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to
compromise and settle. It was further held that in the interest of justice
and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim, it would
not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at between the
parties in rape cases to be a ground for the court to exercise the
discretionary power.
17. The submission of the learned counsel for the private parties that
the offence of rape is purely personal to the parties and not an offence
affecting the society, is misconceived and is hereby rejected. Rape is an
offence against the society and it is not a matter to be left for the parties
to compromise and settle. The concept of compromise, under no
circumstances, can be thought of as there cannot be a compromise or
settlement against the honour and dignity of a woman.
7 (2015) 7 SCC 681
8 (2014) 13 SCC 318
18. In Narinder Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly
laid down that in those cases where the conviction is already recorded
by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the
High court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has
already been convicted by the trial court. In Narinder Singh (Supra)
the charge was proved under Section 307 IPC and the conviction was
recorded for that heinous crime, it was held that there was no question
of sparing a convict found guilty for such a crime.
19. In Ramgopal (supra)upon which much reliance has been placed
by the learned counsel for the appellants what the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held is with respect to non heinous offences or where the
offences are predominantly of a private nature, which can be annulled
irrespective of the fact that the trial had been concluded or appeal
stands dismissed against conviction, if compromise is struck post
conviction and even in those cases the exercise of such discretion is to
be with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the
incident, the fashion in which the compromise had been arrived at and
with due regard to the nature of the incident; but that is not with
respect to heinous offences. It has been clearly laid down that in cases
where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such
benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed in Narinder Singh
(supra) and Laxmi Narayana (supra). It is apt to reproduce paragraph
No.13 of Ramgopal (supra) as follows:
"13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving
nonheinous offences or where the offences are pre-
dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective
of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal
stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out
punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice.
Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to
lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases
where compromise is struck post conviction, the High Court
ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in
view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the
fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and
with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the
offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and
after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extra-
ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to
secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast
line constricting the power of the High Court to do
substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or
specious justice, which in the given facts and
circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice.
On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences
have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit
ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this
Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab &
Ors.3 and Laxmi Narayan (Supra)".
20. In Ramgopal (supra), the conviction was not for the offence under
Section 376 IPC which is a heinous offence. The appellants, therefore
cannot derive any benefit from the judgment in Ramgopal (Supra).
21. In the present case the appellants have been convicted of a
heinous offence u/s.376 IPC by the trial Court and therefore any
question of sparing them on mere compromise does not arise.
22. In Parvpal Rajivpal Singh (supra), the judgment on which
reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the appellants is
distinguishable as in that case there was no conviction by the time, the
compromise was filed. That case was at the stage of after filing of the
charge sheet, whereas in the present case there is order of conviction
and the compromise/settlement has been filed at the appellate stage.
Further, in view of the clear pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the cases discussed above, I am not inclined to take the view as has
been taken by the High Court of Gujarat in Parvpal Rajivpal Singh
(supra).
23. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that it
was a case of love affair and there was promise to marry and therefore it
is not a case of rape cannot be accepted at this stage of considering the
point in issue to set aside the conviction on mere settlement between
the parties, in view of the clear finding of guilt and conviction for the
offences u/s 376 IPC recorded by the learned trial Court. Such a
plea would require consideration of the evidence on record and the
circumstances to arrive at a conclusion if there was promise to marry at
all, if such promise was false since its inception or it was a true promise
but due to certain reasons could not be fulfilled or physical relationship
was on such promise and it was voluntary or under some
misconception of fact, so as to constitute or not an offence of rape. This
can be done, if occasion arises, only while deciding the appeal on
merits.
24. For all the aforesaid reasons, this court is of the considered view
that on the basis of the compromise/settlement between the appellants
herein and the respondent No.2, the order of conviction cannot be set
aside nor the appellants can be acquitted of the offences for which there
is conviction, by allowing the appeal on any settlement. The point
framed in paragraph 9 above is answered accordingly.
25. I.A.No.2 of 2021 therefore deserves to be rejected and is
accordingly rejected.
26. It is clarified that any observations made in this order is only for
the purpose of deciding the I.A.No.2 of 2021 and shall have no bearing
on the decision of the appeal on merits.
________________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
Date:24.12.2021,
Note:
L.R copy to be marked.
B/o.
Gk
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
I.A.No.2 OF 2021
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1299 OF 2017
Date:24.12.2021
Gk
