Jetti Rama Mohana Rao vs A.P.Teachers Federationkrishna ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 5269 AP

              HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

        SECOND APPEAL Nos. 1199, 1166 and 1201 of 2007

COMMON JUDGMENT :

       S.A.No.1199 of 2007, S.A.No.1166 of 2007 and S.A.No.1201 of

2007 are preferred by the defendants in O.S.Nos.251 to 253 of 2003 on

the file of the Court of the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge,

Vijayawada.


       2. The plaintiff in these suits is the respondent herein and is

common to all these matters.

3. Extents of Ac.1-60 cents in R.S.No.164 of Gunadala area,

a suburb of Vijayawada, are subject matters of S.A.No.1199 of 2007 and

S.A.No.1166 of 2007. The plaint schedules described these two extents, in

specific boundaries. An extent of Ac.0-98 cents in R.S.No.164 of Gunadala

area, a suburb of Vijayawada, is the subject matter in S.A.No.1201 of

2007. It is described being in specific boundaries.

4. The appellants in all these three second appeals were the

owners of these respective extents. The respondent agreed to purchase

these extents under agreements for sale dated 27.06.1985. They were

executed by the appellants upon receiving part sale consideration

thereunder and that the respondent was delivered possession of these

extents on that day itself.

5. Sale consideration under the agreements for sale concerned in

S.A.No.1199 of 2007 and S.A.No.1166 of 2007 as agreed was

Rs.1,84,000/-, each out of which advance was paid at Rs.1,22,600/- on

27.06.1985 by means of cheques. Rs.43,000/- each was paid by means of MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

cheques on 29.09.1985 to the appellants concerned to these two second

appeals. Under the agreement for sale relating to S.A.No.1201 of 2007,

the sale consideration agreed was Rs.1,12,700/-, out of which the

respondent paid Rs.75,140/- on 27.06.1985 as advance, and Rs.26,290/-

on 29.09.1985.

6. The part-payments so made later were also endorsed on the

reverse of the agreements for sale.

7. The terms of these agreements for sale provided for the

respondent to obtain necessary permission from the Government

Authorities within two months and that entire balance amount was to be

paid within an year. Further term in these agreements is in the event of

the respondent failing to obtain permission from the concerned

authorities, Rs.3,000/- each under the agreements for sale concerned to

S.A.No.1199 of 2007 and S.A.No.1166 of 2007 should be retained by the

respondent for the purpose of registration and balance sale consideration

of Rs.15,400/- should be paid. It was further agreed that in the event of

default, the respondent should pay interest at 12% p.a. for the balance

amount after two (02) months from the date of the agreement.

8. In respect of the agreement concerned to S.A.No.1201 of 2007

it was agreed that Rs.2,000/- should be retained by the respondent out of

the balance of Rs.11,270/- and Rs.9,270/- should be paid to the appellant

within two (02) months and in case of default this sum shall carry interest

at 12% p.a.

9. Specific contention of the respondent is that balance sale

consideration was tendered at Rs.20,944/- relating to the agreements MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

concerned to S.A.No.1166 and S.A.No.1199 of 2007 and Rs.12,607/-

under the agreement concerned to S.A.No.1201 of 2007 to the respective

appellants, which they refused to receive and endorse on the reverse of

these agreements for sale in acknowledgement thereof. The respondent

also contended that it has always been ready and willing to perform its

part of contract under these agreements for sale.

10. Further contention of the respondent is that in spite of

repeated demands and issuance of legal notice dated 21.02.2003, since

the appellants did not come forward to abide by the terms of the

agreements, upon executing sale deeds as well as to register, it was

constrained to lay the suits seeking relief of specific performance of these

agreements for sale against the respective appellants.

11. The appellants admitted execution of the agreements for sale

and agreed terms thereunder. However, they denied that possession of

the lands concerned were delivered to the respondent and contended that

the recitals in these agreements relating to delivery of possession were

included, to facilitate the respondent to obtain permission from the State

Government, which though was not real. Asserting that they have been in

possession and enjoyment of their respective extents, cultivating raising

paddy, sugarcane etc., they contended that balance sale consideration

was not paid. Denying that further amounts paid of Rs.20,944/- and

Rs.12,607/- allegedly under three different cheques, they contended that

the respondent created a false story in respect of these alleged payments

with an ulterior motive to cover up their failure to perform their part of

contract. Questioning ready and willingness on the part of the respondent

to abide by the terms of these agreements for sale, they further MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

contended that there is huge delay in seeking the relief of specific

performance against them and that the agreements for sale cannot be

enforced since barred by time.

12. The appellants further contended that they got issued a reply

dated 06.03.2003 to the legal notice of the respondent. Thus disputing

the claim of the respondent, they contended that the respondent is not

entitled for the relief of specific performance against them nor they are

liable to execute any sale deeds in its favour under these agreements for

sale.

13. Basing on the pleadings, the trial Court settled the following

issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 27.06.1985 as prayed for?

2. Whether the conditions made in the agreement are barred by limitation and hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground?

3. To what relief?

14. The parties lead evidence in the course of trial, both oral and

documentary.

15. On the material and evidence, the trial court rejected the

defence and decreed the suits as prayed. The respondent was called

upon to deposit the balance sale consideration with 12% p.a. from

27.08.1985 within one month from the date of the decree and thereupon

the appellants were directed to execute sale deeds in favour of the

respondent within two (02) months therefrom.

MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

16. Aggrieved, the appellants preferred appeals where the decrees

and judgments of the trial Court were confirmed, dismissing them.

17. In these circumstances these three second appeals are

presented by the appellants.

18. Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel for the

appellants and Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned senior counsel for the

respondent, addressed arguments in these second appeals.

19. Since nature of the dispute, evidence on record and facts and

circumstances are similar in all these three second appeals and common

arguments are addressed by the learned counsel, all of them are now

disposed of together by this common judgment.

20. These three second appeals are admitted on the following

substantial question of law:

"1. Whether Ex.A2 can be relied upon to save limitation?"

21. In the course of arguments, contentions are advanced not only

confining to the above substantial question of law but also with reference

to ready and willingness on the part of the respondent to perform its part

of the contract under the agreements for sale, delay in seeking the relief

referring to the conduct of the parties and circumstances relating to

exercise of discretion by the trial Court. Since these instances are also

relevant and have certain bearing in these matters, they are also

considered now.

MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

Re. READY AND WILLINGNESS

22. In a suit for specific performance, the holder of agreement,

namely the plaintiff should plead and prove that he is always ready and

willing to perform his part of the contract being the prime requirement in

terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. Depending on the mutual

obligations agreed upon and in terms of the contract under the agreement

for sale, this factor assumes importance.

23. Though the initial burden to establish this fact is on the plaintiff

in a suit of this nature, it cannot be stated that the burden so placed

remains static and in all eventualities he has to succeed on his own

strength, without depending on the nature of the defence set up by the

defendant. The reason is, there are mutual obligations between the

parties to the contract under the agreements for sale to perform and

discharge. These mutual obligations and terms are so intricately

intertwined, at times their proof cannot stand on an abstract requirement

of burden of proof.

24. However, in this context, Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy,

learned counsel for the appellants, relied on P.Leelavati v. G.Ravi and

Others1, where relying on Dhanraj and others vs. Saleh2, it is so

stated relating to burden of proof in a case of this nature, is on the

plaintiff. The evidence on behalf of the respondent through its witnesses

when considered along with the admitted situation of execution of

agreements for sale upon receiving a part of consideration and later a

part-payment evidenced by an endorsement on the reverse of these

. AIR 2018 AP 8

. 2016(2) ALT 417 MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

agreements for sale, did establish that the respondent discharged its

obligation paying a major part of the sale consideration well within time.

25. It is admitted that the respondent had agreed to obtain

necessary permission from the State Government or other Government

authorities like Vijayawada Urban Development Authority and Urban Land

Ceiling Authority. By the date of filing the suit, the respondent did not

obtain such permission from anyone. Evidence adduced on behalf of the

respondent through P.W.2 reflects the attempt they made to obtain such

permission from the Government.

26. It has to be appreciated that these chunks of land were

purchased by the respondent as a Cooperative society for providing house

sites to its members. The evidence of P.W.2 makes out that in spite of

their repeated applications to the Government, they did not receive any

response.

27. Legal notice was issued by the respondent on 21.02.2003 to

the appellants calling upon them to perform their part of the contract and

execute a sale deed upon receiving balance sale consideration in terms of

the agreements for sale. In this legal notice and also in the plaint there

are categorical averments to the effect that the respondent has always

been ready and willing to perform its part of the contract, while pointing

out the alleged default on behalf of the appellants. Replies were issued on

07.03.2003 by the appellants to the legal notice of the respondent

denying such instances.

28. In construing this situation relating to ready and willingness to

perform the part of the contract, recitals in these agreements for sale that MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

delivery of the lands concerned was given to the respondent by the

appellants assumed importance. This recital as such is not denied or

disputed by the appellants. Only contention on their behalf in this context

is that it was so recited to enable the respondent to obtain permission

from Government authorities and it was not really intended to nor acted

upon.

29. When the agreements for sale have a specific recital to that

effect, it has to be given effect to. It cannot be lightly treated, as a

nominal recital to enable the respondent to apply for a specific purpose.

30. The respondent produced cist receipts relating to these lands

in support of their contention as to possession. The appellants also

produced the cist receipts and further relied on entries in the adangals as

well as certificate issued by the Assistant Secretary (VAO) dated

15.08.2004 and the Agricultural Extension Officer dated 10.11.2004, when

seeds were supplied to the appellants. The predominant contention of the

appellants is that they have been cultivating these lands raising crops like

Sugarcane, paddy etc.

31. Cist receipts produced on behalf of both the parties cannot

lead to draw an inference of possession. The Assistant Secretary

examined at the trial on behalf of the appellants as D.W.2 deposed that

he had issued cist receipts to the respondent basing on the possessory

agreements for sale in its favour.

32. Adangal extracts relied on by the appellants though contain

entries for the years 1987-88, 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 they were issued

by the concerned VAO. They were not authenticated by the competent MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

authority of the Revenue department, namely the Tahsildar or MRO.

D.W.2- Assistant Secretary (VAO) also stated in cross-examination that

the appellants are known to him. It is an instance of possible

interestedness as suggested in the cross-examination to him on behalf of

the respondent. Possession certificate issued by him did not have any

bearing in these circumstances.

33. Another witness examined on behalf of the appellants, namely

D.W.2 in clear and categorical terms admitted possession of these lands

to rest with the respondent.

34. These circumstances were considered by the Courts below,

recording findings in favour of the respondent.

35. When both these factors are considered together, the

requirement as to readiness as well as willingness on the part of the

respondent to perform his part of the contract under these agreements for

sale cannot be suspected. They did positively establish this fact and thus

in its favour.

36. Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel for the

appellants, strenuously contended that there is no material placed by the

respondent explaining the efforts made by it to obtain permission from the

Government or the authorities concerned, since there is neither pleading

nor evidence on record. The evidence of the second witness examined on

behalf of the plaintiffs is referred to above and it is explaining the

situation. If the respondent had produced documentary proof relating to

correspondence it had entered into, it would have strengthened its

contention.

MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

37. As rightly contended by Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned senior

counsel for the respondent, the witnesses of the respondent were not

cross-examined specifically in this respect. Failure to cross-examine on a

crucial question of this nature in a suit for specific performance has its

own deleterious effect. In this context, Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned

senior counsel, relied on AEG CARAPIET V. A.Y.DERDERIAN3. In para-

10 of this ruling, Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed:

"10.....Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. It has been stated on high authority of the House of Lords that this much a counsel is bound to do when cross- examining that he must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff's account in its entirety. Such failure leads to miscarriage of justice, first by springing surprise upon the party when he has finished the evidence of his witnesses and when he has no further chance to meet the new case made which was never put and secondly, because such subsequent testimony has no chance of being tested and corroborated."

38. This ruling is considered with approval in Muddasani

Venkata Narsaiah (Dead) through L.Rs. vs. Muddasani Sarojana4

and by one of the learned Judges of this Court in G.Shashikala and

others v. G.Kalawati Bai and others5.

. AIR 1961 CAL 359

.2016(4) ALD 59 (SC)

.2018(6) ALT 427 MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

39. Further reliance is placed by Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned

senior counsel for the respondent, explaining the concept of ready and

willingness in Balwant Vithal Kadam v. Sunil Baburaoi Kadam6.

40. In the light of this backdrop, when the case of the respondent

in this context was not subjected to challenge in the course of trial, except

by means of a bare averment in the written statement, at this stage in

second appeal, contentions on this score cannot stand. Even otherwise,

the material on record is establishing this fact in favour of the respondent

meeting requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, by

pleading and proof.

41. Contentions are also advanced on behalf of both the parties

relating to effect of delay in instituting the suit which shall be considered

infra. Even on such score, the contention of the appellants cannot stand.

Therefore, this is not an instance where the respondent had willfully and

deliberately failed to perform its part of the contract and on the other

hand ready and willingness on its part stood established to go on with the

contracts under the agreements for sale.

Re.DELAY AND BAR OF LIMITATION:

42. The suits were instituted on 12.03.2003 basing on agreements

for sale dated 27.06.1985. There were also instances of intervening part-

payments which apparently within four (04) years, if the case of the

respondent is accepted.

43. The predominant contention of the appellants is that there is a

huge delay of 18 years in instituting the suit and which has not been

. 2018(2) SCC 82 MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

explained. Thus, Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel for the

appellants, contended that this huge delay remained unexplained

satisfactorily and whatever reasons set out by the respondent are clearly

unacceptable. Failure to produce documentary proof in relation to the

alleged effort of the respondent to obtain permission from the

Government or other authorities is strongly relied on by the learned

counsel in this respect, while pointing out that it is the specific defence set

out at the earliest point of time including the reply notice dated

07.03.2003.

44. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned senior counsel, contended that

efforts were being made by the respondent to get at necessary permission

from the Government and other authorities and having regard to the

nature of the respondent as an Association, when the purchase of the

lands is for specific purpose of providing residential plots to its members,

it became inevitable to obtain such permission. It is also contended that

since a greater part of the terms of the contracts under these agreements

for sale were already performed by the respondent parting with a major

portion of sale consideration and being put in possession of these

properties by the appellants in terms thereof, delay as such did not have

any bearing.

45. Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel for the

appellants, further contended that the claims in all these matters are

clearly barred by limitation, since the suits were not filed within three (03)

years from the date of the agreement or when considered from the date

of alleged part-payments. Questioning the alleged attempt of the

respondent to show that a part-payment was made on 27.08.1989 by MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

means of cheques and preparing endorsements on the reverse of these

agreements for sale which the appellants did not sign or acknowledge, as

an attempt to show as if the claim is within time, it is contended that this

instance is not only reflecting conduct on the part of the respondent but

also its failure, to bring the claim within time.

46. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned senior counsel for the

respondent, contended that except a bare denial in the written statement

that the suit claim is barred by time, this instance dated 27.08.1989, is not

specifically referred to as an occasion to point out refusal to perform their

part of the contract by the appellants when demanded by the respondent.

Learned senior counsel further contended that the entire case of the

appellants at the trial in this context was a complete denial of issuance of

cheques on 27.08.1989 towards part-payment and also the endorsements

sought to be brought out on the agreements for sale. Therefore, it is

contended by the learned senior counsel that neither it is an instance

relatable to construing the period of limitation nor to affect the claim of

the respondent, on account of the alleged conduct.

47. Article-54 of the Limitation Act reads as under:

54. For specific performance of a Three The date fixed for the contract years performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.

48. In terms thereof, a suit for specific performance of a contract

has to be filed within three (03) years from the date fixed for the

performance or when no date is fixed for its performance, within three

years when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused.

MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

49. As seen from the agreements for sale in these cases, date is

not fixed as such for performance. The appellants at the trial clearly

admitted in their depositions that they did not contemplate cancellation of

these contracts in the event of failure to perform.

50. It is true that the respondent made an attempt by the

transaction dated 27.08.1989 through one of its office bearers Sri

A.V.Reddy, to present cheques to the appellants, on behalf of the

respondent, which was later cancelled by him and endorsements were

also made to that effect on the reverse of the agreements for sale. The

appellants did not receive these cheques and did not sign any such

endorsements, according to the respondent.

51. The appellants did not admit this transaction and squarely

denied. If the appellants had come out with a different version explaining

away this alleged transaction dated 27.08.1989, as an attempt by the

respondent in furtherance of these contracts, there was a reason and

possibility for the appellants to contend that they refused to perform their

part of the contract, to the knowledge of the respondent. On account of

the nature of denial of this transaction and the defence so set up, they

lost such an opportunity. Therefore, this instance, covered by Ex.A2-

cheques cannot be the basis for the appellants to contend that the suit

claim stood barred by time, since they were not enforced within three

years therefrom in terms of Article-54 of the Limitation Act.

52. Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel for the

appellants, strenuously contended in this context, referring to application

of Article-54 of the Limitation Act and to the given facts and MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

circumstances of the case. In support of this contention, the learned

counsel for the appellants relied on Thota Rambabu @ Ramu vs.

Cherukuri Venkateswara Rao @ Pedababu and others7 and

R.K.Parvatharaj Gupta vs. K.C.Jayadeva Reddy8.

53. In R.K.Parvatharaj Gupta, Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy,

learned counsel for the appellants, relied on the observations in para-10

as well as Paras-15 and 16. These observations are with reference to

Article-54 of the Limitation Act and based on given facts and

circumstances. They are extracted hereunder:

" 10. In terms of the said article, a suit for specific performance of a contract is required to be filed within three years; in the event no date is fixed for the performance, within a period of three years from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. The notice dated 24-4-1984, thus, is required to be construed in the context of the agreement dated 13-10-1982 entered into by and between the parties.

15. The notice dated 24-4-1984 must be construed having regard to the aforementioned backdrop of facts. From a perusal of the said notice, it appears that prior thereto, the appellant had received notice from the Court of the Civil Judge, Bangalore in connection with the said loan. From 1982 to 1984, the respondent did not take any steps to make any inquiry as regards the disposal of the said litigation before the High Court. He did not pay any amount to the Bank.

16. The appellant, therefore, had good reasons to serve the aforementioned notice calling upon the respondent to deposit the entire amount to the Bank. There is nothing on record to show that despite receipt of the said notice dated 24-4-1984, the respondent took any step to deposit the said amount. He was, thus, not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He has, as noticed hereinbefore, deposited a sum of Rs 10,000 only in the year 1985 i.e. after more than one year thereafter."

54. In Thota Rambabu, relevant observations relied on by the

learned counsel for the appellants are in para-28 and para-39. They are

extracted hereunder:

.2005(5) ALT 278

.2006(2) SCC 428

MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

"28.... Though the plaintiff pleaded that he got issued a notice, requiring the 1st defendant to perform his part of the contract, he failed to establish the same. Therefore, the date of Ex.A1 deserves to be treated as the starting point.......

= ======= ========

39. In the absence of any of the circumstances referred to above, the Court cannot infer delivery of possession in favour of a transferee. Taking of possession, being one of the most important ingredients of Section 53-A, the plaintiff cannot derive the benefit of that a provision, once he failed to prove that he has taken possession of the suit schedule property."

55. The facts considered in the above instance are totally different

than being considered now in the present case. It was a case where

issuance of legal notice and factum of delivery of possession of the

property under the agreement for sale in dispute were not established.

These circumstances were considered and relied on, to hold that the claim

of the plaintiff stood barred by time.

56. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned senior counsel for the

respondent, in explaining the effect of delay and bar of limitation, relied

on S.Indira and another v. Netyam Venkataramanna and others9.

In para-7 of this ruling, it is stated as under:

"7 ....As succinctly laid down by Justice Subba Rao (as he then was). Speaking for the Bench in Satyanarayana v. Yelloji Rao (AIR 1965 SC 1405), delay in one thing and abandonment and waiver is another: the former is relevant for the purpose of exercising discretion of the Court in granting specific performance while in case of latter if abandonment or waiver is proved, no question of discretion arises and the plaintiff must fail automatically....."

.1996(3) ALD 548 (DB) MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

57. Another ruling relied on by the learned senior counsel for the

respondent in the same context is Ponnuru Krishnavenamma v.

Banks Taviteswara Rao and another10.

58. When the facts and circumstances in this case basing on the

ratio relied on in all those authorities are considered, it is manifest that

delay as such cannot hold sway. Delay as such cannot tantamount to

waiver or abandonment of contract.

59. The suits were laid within three (03) years from the date of

issuance of legal notice, namely 21.02.2003 and in terms of Article-54 of

the Limitation Act when the respondent came to know the refusal to

perform their part of the contract by the appellants. Hence, the suits so

filed are within time.

60. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneylu, learned senior counsel for the respondent,

contended that these second appeals are admitted on the question of bar

of limitation and this question cannot be treated as substantial question of

law. It is the further contention of the learned senior counsel that since

the question of limitation is based on fact and law, when the contention

sought to be raised on behalf of the appellants on such premise, neither

this question be treated as substantial question of law nor such contention

be permitted.

61. It is true that the question of limitation is not only of law but

based on facts. Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel for the

appellants, relying on M.Chellappan v. A.Meeran Pillai(Dead)

.1999(3) ALD 705 MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

through L.Rs.11 contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered

bar of limitation, as a substantial question of law for the High Court to

consider.

62. Nonetheless, in the given facts and circumstances of the case,

this question of bar of limitation has lost its effect in this matter nor can

be a ground to non-suit the plaintiff.

63. Nature of discretion exercised by the trial Court in favour of the

respondent cannot be lightly interfered with and it is in terms of Section

20 of the Specific Relief Act. Adverting to this situation, Sri

V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned senior counsel relied on Ajaib Singh v.

Gurbax Singh and others12, K.Prakash v. B.R.Sampath Kumar13

and Mrs. A.Kanthamani v. Mrs. Nasreen Ahmed14.

64. Factors to consider in exercise of such discretion, that included

application of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act when

possession is delivered to the purchaser by the seller, are also adverted to

by the learned senior counsel relying on Meruva Anji Reddy v.

Ganaparthhi Seshaiah and others15.

65. In the light of these rulings relied on for the respondent by

learned counsel, when the trial Court exercised its discretion in favour of

the respondent on proved facts directing specific performance of the

contracts under the agreements for sale rightly, when confirmed by the

.2009(2) Orissa Law Review 316

.1988(1) SCC 143

. 2014(6) ALD 196(SC)

. 2017(2) SCJ 608

.2011(5) ALD 419 MVRJ, S.A.No.1199,1166 & 1201 of 2007

appellate Court on questions of fact, in these second appeals, this Court

as such cannot lightly interfere.

66. Therefore, finding no such questions requiring consideration

and determination that invite application of Section 100 CPC in favour of

the appellants, this Court is satisfied and hold that there is no merit in

these second appeals. Consequently, they have to be dismissed.

67. In the result, all the three second appeals are dismissed. The

respondent shall pay the balance sale consideration within two (02)

months from now and in the event of refusal by the appellants to accept,

they shall deposit the same in the trial Court to the credit of the suits. The

respondent shall also apply to the State Government and the authorities

concerned for necessary permission, if required. No costs.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed.

Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.

________________________ JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

Dt: 16.12.2021 RR