Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
L. Ramesh vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 4 August, 2021
Bench: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
WRIT PETITION No.8883 of 2020
ORDER:
L.Ramesh and 15 others filed this petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India questioning the action of respondent No.1
in issuing Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020,
whereby the memo issued by the Government bearing No.26086-
A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 was withdrawn without
giving any notice to the petitioners as illegal, arbitrary, against the
principles of natural justice and violative of Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India.
The case of the petitioners is that they are title holder/owners
and possessors of land in different extents in different survey
numbers situated at Erragunta and Karakambadi villages, Renigunta
Mandal, Chittoor District, which are as under.
Sl. Petitioner Village Survey No. Extent 1-B Form/
No. Ac.Cts Doc.
1 L.Ramesh Erragunta 167, 168 and 4-06 1-B Form
1st Petitioner Karakambadi its 5-46 (ROR)
sub-divisions
340,341,342
and its sub-
divisions
2 L.Mahesh Erragunta 168 and its 0-78 1-B Form
2nd petitioner Karakambadi sub- 2-86 (ROR)
divisions,
341 and its
sub-divisions
3 S.Babu Karakambadi 340 and its 2-49 1-B Form
3rd Petitioner sub-divisions (ROR)
4 M.Damodar Reddy Erragunta 168 and its 0-41 Regd.
4th Petitioner sub-divisions Document
5 P.Vijayalakshmi Erragunta 168/9D 0-26 1-B Form
5th Petitioner (ROR)
6 C.Satish Erragunta 168/9 0-04 Regd.
6th Petitioner Karakambadi 340/2 0-30 Document
7 P.Yugandar Erragunta 168 and its 0-27 1-B Form
7th Petitioner sub-divisions (ROR)
8 A.Narasimhulu Erragunta 167, 168 and 1-37 1-B Form
Naidu Karakambadi its 1-17 (ROR)
8th Petitioner sub-divisions
341,342
and its sub-
divisions
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9 A.Sujatha Erragunta 167 and its 0.06 Regd.
9th petitioner sub-divisions Document
10 A.Varalakshmi Erragunta 168 and its 1-16 1-B Form
Karakambadi sub-divisions 1-10 (ROR)
341 and its
sub-divisions
11 K.Vijayalakshmi Erragunta 167 and its 0.21 1-B Form
11th petitioner sub-divisions (ROR)
12 T.Jayaraman Erragunta 167 and its 0.33 1-B Form
12th petitioner sub-divisions (ROR)
13 A.Krishna Murthy Erragunta 167 and its 0-45 1-B Form
13th Petitioner Karakambadi sub-divisions 1-45 (ROR)
342 and its
sub-divisions
14 Y.Kanakadurgamba Erragunta 167 and its 0.25 1-B Form
14th petitioner sub-divisions (ROR)
15 T.Jhansi Erragunta 168 and its 0.49 Regd.
15th petitioner sub-divisions Document
16 M.Saikrishna Erragunta 168 and its 0.79 Regd.
16th petitioner sub-divisions Document
The names of the petitioners have been mutated in the revenue
records and 1-B Form (ROR).
Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased an extent of Ac.25-05 cents
of dry land situated in Sy.Nos.167, its sub-divisions, 168, its sub-
divisions of Erragunta Village and Sy. Nos.170, its sub-divisions,
Sy.No.341, its sub-divisions and Sy.No.342, its sub-divisions of
Karakambadi Village of Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor District from
the lawful title holders and possessors under various sale deeds
during the years 2003 to 2005. Thereafter, pattadar passbooks and
title deed were issued in their favour.
Erragunta and Karakambadi villages of Renigunta Mandal
were declared as Inam Estates under the provisions of A.P. (Andhra
Area) Estates Land Act, 1908 and taken over by the Government
under the provisions of A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1960 (for short "the Estates
Abolition Act").
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The revenue authorities, in discharge of their statutory
obligation under Section 3 (d) of the Estates Abolition Act not to
dispossess any person from any land in the Estate in respect of
which they consider that he prima facie entitled to Ryotwari patta.
Equally, a statutory obligation is imposed on the Settlement Officer
after determining the Inam Estate, issue pattas to the Ryots under
Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act and as per the aforesaid
statutory provision, every Ryot in the Estate shall with effect on and
from the notified date be entitled to a Ryotwari patta in respect of all
ryoti lands. By virtue of this statutory obligation, the Settlement
Officer conducted an enquiry and issued rough pattas for the land
in Sy.Nos.167 and 168 of Erragunta village and Sy. Nos.170, 341
and 342 of Karakambadi village to the vendors‟ of the petitioner
Nos.1 to 3 herein in the year 1963. The vendors of the petitioners 1
to 3 were in possession and enjoyment of the said land till petitioner
Nos.1 to 3 purchased the said land under various sale deeds from
2003 to 2005, obtained pattadar passbooks and got mutated their
names in the revenue records.
Having satisfied with the title and possession of the vendors,
petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased the property under various sale
deeds in the year 2003, 2004 and 2005 and the names of the
petitioner Nos.1 to 3 were mutated in the revenue records and also
issued pattadar passbooks. Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 applied for NOC to
convert the land from agricultural to non-agriculture
purpose. Accordingly, respondent No.6 issued NOC 05.10.2004 in
their favour. Tirupathi Urban Development Authority (TUDA)
granted layout permissions on 20.09.2005 based on the
proceedings issued by respondent No.6.
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Basing on the news item in Eenadu, respondent No.3
issued an endorsement directing respondent No.6 to correct the
village account duly making the entries in the prohibition order
book and to take possession of the land and called upon to submit
compliance report within a week. Aggrieved by the said
endorsement, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 preferred W.P.No.11327 of 2010
and the said writ petition was allowed by orders dated
16.12.2010, whereunder this Court directed respondent No.3 to
initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. In
pursuance of the direction, respondent No.3 passed order on
19.12.2011 declaring the land as communal (Government Land) and
the petitioners cannot claim title over the land and consequently,
cancelled the pattadar pass books and title deeds as well as
NOC issued in favour of petitioner Nos.1 to 3. Thereupon,
petitioner Nos.1 to 3 preferred an appeal against the order passed by
respondent No.3 before the Commissioner of Appeals, Office of the
CCLA, Hyderabad. The said appeal was dismissed by the aforesaid
Authority, vide order dated 22.05.2013.
Aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner of
Appeals, Office of the CCLA, Hyderabad, the petitioners filed
Revision Petition bearing No.26086/EA and AR/A1/2013. The
said revision was allowed by respondent No.1 by order dated
25.04.2016. The operative portion of the order dated 25.04.2016 is
as follows:
"8. I have carefully examined the points raised by the Counsel
for the Petitioners and the grounds taken up the Joint Collector, I
have also gone through the record. My findings are as follows:-
(i) The Joint Collector has treated the lands as 'Tank bed land'
whereas the lands are shown as "Karakambadi Neet imumpu'
(Submergible in tank). There is a clear distinction between the lands
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which are part of the tank and the lands which may come under
submergence on certain occasions. The lands which come under
submergence cannot be treated as Tank bed land automatically. The
Joint Collector has quoted the various orders of Hon'ble High Court out
of context as these cases are applicable to tank bed lands only.
ii) The validity of the rough patta which is a part of the procedure under
the E.A. Act and Rules cannot be denied simply because the final
enquiry was not done. It is very much the duty of the authorities to
finalize the enquiry. Till that time the rough patta has to be
treated as a valid document giving valuable rights. Further, the record
does not show that there was any objection from any side.
(iii) Since beginning the land has been treated as private land and there
was no objection from any officer of the department till the adverse news
item appeared in the local papers. The action of the authorities appears to
be a panic reaction to the adverse report.
9. Overall, I do not find any substance in the two main arguments of the
Joint Collector i.e.,
(i). To treat the land as part of tank bed though it was not true.
ii) To deny the validity to the rough pattas given as per the procedure of
the Act / Rules.
10. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed and the orders of
the Commissioner of Appeals Dt.22-05-2013 and orders of the Joint
Collector, Chittoor District dt.19-12-2001 are set aside."
The order passed by respondent No.1 became final, as the
same was not challenged by any party. In spite of the orders passed
by the respondent No.1, respondent Nos.2 to 6 failed to implement
the said orders. Instead of implementing the said orders, respondent
No.3 sent a letter to respondent No.1 to review the orders
dated 25.4.2016. On that, respondent No.1 issued a Memo
dated 08.06.2017 directing respondent No.3 to implement the order
of the Government dated 26.4.2016 passed in Revision Petition
No.26086/EA and AR/A1/2013.
As respondent No.3 did not implement the order passed by
respondent No.1 dated 25.4.2016 in the Revision Petition, petitioner
Nos.1 to 3 sent a representation to the Government for
implementing its orders. On that, respondent No.1 again issued a
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Memo dated 04.10.2017 under which the respondent No.1
directed respondent No.3 to implement the order dated 25.4.2016
and further requested to furnish the compliance report to the
Government.
Further, respondent No.3 sought some clarifications for
implementing the Government orders dated 25.4.2016, on that
respondent No.1 again issued a Memo dated 16.11.2017
whereunder suitable directions were given to respondent No.3 to
restore the position prior to the date of orders of respondent No.4
dated 19.12.2011 in all aspects by quoting the orders of
Government dated 25.04.2016. Respondent No.1 directed
respondent No.3 as follows:
"a. Restore the entries in revenue records.
b. issue fresh Pass Books and Title Deeds to the petitioners and
c. Restore all the permissions that were cancelled in pursuance to the
orders of the Joint Collector issued in R.Dis. F116587/2005, dated
19.12.2011, with respect to the lands to an extent of Ac.25.05 in
Sy.No.167P, 168P of Erragunta village and 170P, 340P, 341 P of
Karakambadi village, Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor District as the order of
the Joint Collector, Chittoor District, dated 19.12.2011 have been set aside".
Though the respondent No.1 passed an order and issued
direction on 16.11.2017, respondent No.3 did not implement the
order and due to the said reason, respondent No.1 again
issued a Memo dated 04.06.2018 whereunder respondent
No.1 passed the following order:
"Therefore, the District Collector, Chittoor District is instructed to issue
orders to the concerned for incorporation of the names of the petitioners
i.e., Sri L. Ramesh and others in revenue records by putting them in online
Adangal duly correcting entries in respect of the lands to an extent of Ac.
25-05 cents in Sy.No.167P, 168P of Yerragunta village and 170P, 340P,
341P, 342P of Karakambadi Village, Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor
District and also for deletion from the list of prohibited properties
notified under Section 22-A of Registration Act, 1908 to facilitate for issue
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of fresh Pattadar Pass Books & Title Deeds in favour of them for the
subject lands within a week and send compliance report to Government
immediately. "
Finally, respondent No.3 issued proceedings dated 07.01.2018
directing respondent No.6 to implement the order of respondent
No.1. In pursuance of the order issued by respondent No.3,
respondent No.6 issued proceedings dated 19.02.2018 implementing
the order passed by respondent No.1. Respondent No.3 also issued
proceedings to the District Registrar, Tirupati dated 16.10.2018
whereunder the District Registrar was directed to delete the property
from prohibition list, accordingly, the property was deleted from
prohibited list of properties.
It is further contended that Executive Engineer, Irrigation
Department, Tirupati on the request of respondent No.5 inspected
the subject land and submitted his report dated 29.04.2006
wherein he stated that Karakambadi Tank situated in Sy.No.339
and it is rain-fed III Class Minor Irrigation source with an Ayacut
of Ac.347-11 Cents and further stated that petitioner Nos.1 to 3
raised the land level about one meter height by filling earth and
constructed stone wall with cut stone masonry to a length of about
850 mtrs. with a height of 6 feet to divide the patta dry land
from the Fore shore of the tank and he further stated that there is
no encroachment of tank bed in Sy.No.339, there are three Irrigation
wells in the subject land and the report further reveals that TUDA
accorded permission to develop layout in the land in question
subject to the condition of leaving buffer zone of 9 mtrs all along
from the northern boundary of tank as per the Zonal development
plan (Master plan) approved by the Government.
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Respondent No.5 issued proceedings converting part of the
subject land i.e. Ac.0.33 cents belonging to petitioner No.12. The
TUDA issued Master plan which was duly notified and approved
by the Government. In the said master plan, the Sy.Nos.340, 341,
342,167,168 were shown in yellow colour which indicates that it
is a Residential zone. Further, a Buffer zone was drawn
alongside of the tank which was shown in green colour. The FLR
pertaining to Karakambadi village demonstrates that the
subject land is not part of tank and tank bund which is situated in
Sy.No.339.
The survey map which was published in the Andhra
Pradesh Gazette dated 27.10.1960 indicates that the subject
land which was shown in Sy.Nos.340, 341, 342 of Karakambadi
village is not part of Karakambadi tank and there is a gap
between the tank bund and subject land. After implementing the
orders of the respondent No.1 and after deleting the subject lands
from prohibition list, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 alienated part of the
subject land approximately an extent of Ac.12-00 cents to the
petitioners 3 to 17 under various sale deeds in the year 2019. In
pursuance of the alienations made by the petitioner Nos.1 to 3, the
names of the petitioner Nos.4 to 17 have been mutated in the
Revenue records and their names have been updated both in 1-
B and Pahanies, despite clarity about land classification etc. the
impugned memo was issued.
The impugned Memo dated 16.3.2020 issued by respondent
No.1 vide Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020, is unsustainable under
the law and the same is liable to be set aside for the following
reasons/grounds:-
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a) That the respondent No.1 being a statutory Authority
having passed orders in Revision Petition dated
25.4.2016 cannot pass the impugned orders and
respondent No.1 being a quasi-judicial authority has no
such power of review its own orders passed in review
petition unless the statute confers such power.
b) That, the respondent No.1 having passed several
orders cannot legally withdraw one of the orders by re-
examining the issue which is beyond its powers.
c) That, respondent No.1 by virtue of the impugned
orders withdrawn the Memo No.26086-A /EA and
AR/A1/2013, dated 16.11.2017 which is a consequential
Memo only wherein and where under respondent No.1
directed the respondent No.3 to implement the order passed
in Revision Petition No.26086/EA&AR/A1/2013, dated
25.04.2016 and as such withdrawing the consequential
orders dated 16.11.2017 in no way effects the rights of the
petitioners secured by order in Revision dated 25.04.2016
and as such the impugned proceedings are non-est in
law and as such liable to be set aside.
d) That the impugned proceedings cannot be
sustained as no notice was served upon the petitioners
who are affected parties and as such the impugned
proceedings are liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
e) That, the rough pattas were granted to the vendors of
the petitioners 1 to 3 way back in the year 1963 on the
premise that they are entitled for pattas under Section 11
of the Estate Abolition Act and thereafter the names were
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mutated in the Revenue records and pattadar pass books
and title deeds were also were also issued in their favour
and the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased the subject land
during the years 2003 to 2005 under various sale deeds
having satisfied that their vendors have got alienable
rights over the subject land and as such the petitioner Nos.1
to 3 are bonafide purchasers for a valuable consideration.
f) That the names of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have been
mutated in the revenue records after purchase of subject
land and they were issued pattadar pass books and title
deeds without there being any objections from the Revenue
authorities.
g) That it is a settled proposition of law that a rough patta,
prima facie recognizes the rights of an individual to be
granted Ryotwari patta and the rough patta cannot be
ignored and in the instant case, respondent No.4 by virtue
of proceedings dated 19.12.2001 only cancelled the NOC and
Pattadar Pass books issued by respondent No.6, which was
in turn set aside by the respondent No.1 in its Revisional
jurisdiction.
h) That, it is an admitted fact that rough pattas were
granted to the vendors of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 way
back in the year 1963 and moreover the respondent
No.1 by virtue of Revisional orders dated 25.4.2016
accepted the entitlement of the petitioners 1 to 3 herein
and it amounts to acceptance of the pattas granted
under Section 11 of the Estate Abolition Act and such an
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Act cannot be unsettled 57 years thereafter by issuing the
impugned proceedings.
i) By virtue of Section 64 of the Estate Abolition Act, any
lawful transferee of the right to the possession or occupation
of such land, continue to have the same rights against
its transferor as he had immediately before the notified
date and further the lawful transferee of the title shall be
entitled to all the rights of his transferor and in the light of
aforesaid statutory provision, the rights of the petitioners
herein are to be equated with that of the persons who were
issued pattas and as such the petitioners are the lawful
title holders and possessors of the subject land and their
rights cannot be unsettled by issuing impugned proceedings.
j) That, issuing patta is a statutory act under Section 11 of
the Estate Abolition Act by the Settlement Officer and any
person aggrieved by the said act of issuing patta has to
prefer a statutory Appeal and in the instant case, no
appeal was preferred against the said issuance of patta and
as such it becomes final and such statutory right cannot be
defeated by issuing impugned proceedings.
k) That the secured rights of the petitioners cannot be
unsettled after the gap of 57 years by issuing impugned
proceedings. The Division Bench of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh held in a case reported in "Koya Veeraju
v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Gollaprolu, East Godavari
District.1" as follows:
1998 (1) ALT 25
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"Rough patta granted by the revenue department cannot be
reopened after lapse of long time except when there is a proof of fraud
or misrepresentation while obtaining pattas, proceedings initiated
out of pressure without application of mind - invalid. "
l) That, the Constitutional Courts only passed orders to
safeguard water tanks and tank bunds and the land
which was referred as "Mumpu" (in vernacular) cannot
be treated as part of tank and as such impugned
proceedings are liable to be set aside.
m) It is the well settled proposition of law that quasi
judicial authority has no power of review its own orders
unless the statute conferred such power (Vide: "State
Bank of India v. S.N.Goyal2")
On the basis of the above grounds, the petitioners sought to
declare the impugned memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated
16.03.2020 as illegal, arbitrary, consequently set aside the same.
Respondent No.1 filed counter along with vacate stay petition
denying material allegations inter alia contending that the
Government of Andhra Prdesh has rightly withdrawn the
Government Memo 26086/EA&AR/A1-2013, dated 16.11.2017 as
the subject land is submergible land and highly objectionable land.
The subject land is not private property, it is water spread area of
Karakambadi Pedda Cheruvu. It is a water Body.
The respondents admitted purchase of the land by the
petitioners, passing of various orders, inspection of the land by
Executive Engineer, issue of technical opinion by Executive
Engineer. The respondents noticed that the petitioners have raised
the land level about 1 Meter height by filling earth in the land in the
AIR2008SC2594
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said Survey Nos. of Karakambadi village and constructed a wall with
cut stone masonry to a length of about 850 Mts and with a height of
6 feet to divide the land said to have purchased. As such the land in
Sy.Nos. 168, 170, 340, 341, 342 of Karakambadi village total extent
of developed area comes to 26.265 acres. Out of the total area, the
area fall in the foreshore of (FTL) Full Tank Level condition has been
noted and accordingly the reduction in the capacity of the tank has
been worked out, which comes to 1.60 Mcft, thus the ayacut affected
land would be 12.84 acres say 13 acres. It is observed that about
20.00 acres in the ayacut land has been converted for non-
agricultural purpose. The surplus arrangements proved for the tank
are not disturbed. Hence, it is opined that the development made in
the said Survey unlikely to pose any threat to the safety of the Tank/
Railway Track, unless or otherwise any natural disasters occurs,
beyond the control the human thinking/power. Thus, the Chief
Engineer clearly stated that there is a threat to the development
activities whenever natural disaster happens. Thus layout proposals
were approved in the water conservation Zone. The Joint Collector
after inspection came to the same conclusion as expressed by the
Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Tirupati.
It is further contended that a news item was published in
"Eenadu Telugu Daily, Chittoor District Edition dated 17.07.2005
under the caption "Real Mosam". Consequent to this news item, a
report was called for from the Revenue Divisional Officer(RDO),
Tirupati. The RDO, Tirupati has reported that the land in Sy.No.339
measuring an extent of 128.64 acres is classified as "Karakambadi
Pedda Cheruvu" as per the village Accounts of Karakambadi village
accounts and it is third class irrigation source with a registered
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ayacut of 346-96 acres. Further he has reported that an extent of
Ac.26.09 cents of the land in Sy.No.340/2,3,4,5, 6,7,
341/1A,B,C,3,4, 5A,56,6,7,8,9, 10A,106,11,12A,126, 13, 14 of
Karakambadi village and in Sy.No.167/9, 10, 156, 17B, 19B, 14, 15,
20, 168/1, 16, 1C, 168/3, 3131/6, 362, 364,168/5,6,7,9,169/2 of
Yerramitta village, said to have purchased by Sri Babu, L. Ramesh
are classified as patta Dry/Wet as per the Fair Adangal of
Karakarnbadi village and in the remarks column of the Fair Adangal
it was recorded as " Karakambadi Neeti -mumpu (Submergible due to
water in tank)."
Respondents admitted that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
in W.P.No11327 of 2010 dated 16.12.2010 has opined that the
"impugned endorsement reflects the anxiety of respondent No.2 to
protect the environment and the water bodies further directed him to
initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with the law, after
informing the petitioners of the grounds and the relevant provisions
of the Acts, under which, he is seeking to proceed against them, and
after giving full opportunity of being heard to them."
Accordingly, the then Joint Collector has issued notices to the
petitioners, meanwhile, the petitioners have filed another
W.P.No.10801 of 2011 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in
the said writ petition, the Court directed the Joint collector " not to
pass any orders", after that necessary parawise remarks were
submitted by the District Collector and the writ petition was
dismissed on 08.09.2011 as withdrawn. Again Notices were issued to
hear the case and passed order vide F1/6587/2005, dated
19.12.2011 under section 9 and 12 of ROR Act 1971, duly observing
that the petitioners cannot claim title over neeti -mumpu land.
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Appeal preferred against the order of the Joint Collector ended in
favour of the State, but in revision, order was set aside. Thereafter,
several directions were issued as narrated in the writ petition.
The respondents contended that as per village Map of
Karakambadi supplied by the M.R.O. the land purchased by the
petitioners is submergible land. The railway line is separating the
land on the western side of village, following water course poramboke
are existing.
1. Naidu Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.137
3. Erragunta (Kunta) is in S.No.157
4. The karakambadi Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.339
5. The Eguva Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.368
6. The Diguva Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.384
7. Gunta (Kunta) is in S.No.394
8. Vagu (Stream) is in S.no. 391, 401, 402, 403, 406
10.Kunta (Tank) in S.No.411
Thus, the submergible land including the subject land is in
Sy.No. 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 350, 354, 355, 356, 359, 141,
154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166,
167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, adjacent to the Sy.No. 339
in an extent of Ac. 128.64 cents which is classified as Karakambadi
Cheruvu, and the said adjacent Survey numbers are even though
classified as Patta Dry/Wet, but noted as submergible land in
Remarks column of Fair Adangal. The submergible land in the
foreshore of any tank which is noted as submergible in water shall
become part of the tank only, until the contrary is proved with
specific evidence, which is lacking in this particular case as per BSO
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15 and 16. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to claim any
relief on this ground.
Similarly, fair adangal supplied by the Mandal Revenue Officer
disclosed that the Sy.No.167 is subdivided into 167/1 to 167/20
(Total extent 7.46 acres), Sy.No.168 is subdivided into 168/1 to
168/9 (Total extent 7.49 acres), Sy.No.169 - Total extent 0.99 acres
is classified as Road, Sy.No.340 is subdivided into 340/1 to 340/8
(Total extent 5.45 acres), Sy.No.341 is Subdivided into 341/1 to
341/14 (Total extent 8.07 acres), Sy.No.342 is subdivided into
342/1 to 342/6 (Total extent 7.89 acres). In the remarks column of
the above Survey numbers, it is clearly noted that Karakambadi
Cheruvu Neeti Mumpu (in English submergible lands of
karakambadi tank).
It is contended that after verifying the records the lands are
confirmed as submergible lands. The petitioner failed to produce the
ryotwari pattas granted by the Settlement Authorities appointed
under section 5(2) of E.A.Act. The Rough pattas filed by the
petitioners are not final, Settlement authorities are not competent to
issue ryotwari patta for the communal lands which attracts section
3(b) of E.A.Act. The G.O.MS.No.148, MA, Municipal Administration
and Urban Development authority dated 21.03.2007 clearly
mentioned that approval of master plan in Rural area shall be
permitted within a radius of 500 Meters from the existing
Settlements (except in Special development zone, conservation zone
and industrial zone) for their natural expansion. The present lands
are located in conservation zone i.e., water conservation namely
"Karakambadi Cheruvu Neeti Mumpu." Therefore the permission
accorded by the TUDA in favour of the petitioners for laying layouts
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in the suit land is not in accordance with the condition laid down in
para 3(1) of the G.O.Ms.No.148, MA, dated 21.03.2005.
It is contended that according to BSO-16 (1) "no land
belonging to Government shall be sold, under this standing order, to
any person other than a citizen of India, except with the sanction of
the Collector or the Board and with the previous permission of the
Government. Every sale under this Standing Order shall be subject
to the condition that, if the land is placed at the disposal of a
company, association, society, institution or a local body or
transferred to any person other than a citizen of India, without the
sanction of the Government, the sale shall thereupon become null
and void.
The land liable to submersion when a tank is full, should
remain registered as "tank poramboke" as long as the tank is
maintained. The actual extent of water spread of each tank at full
tank level should be shown in color wash in the copies of village
maps. Whether it is occupied or not, the entry "Water Speared of
Tank" should be made in the Settlement Register and Adangal.
Against every unoccupied field or Sub- division so registered, the
further entry " Tank Poramboke" should be made if the field is not
already shown as such; and in the case of occupied fields, the actual
extent of the water spread of each tank at full tank should be
separately sub divided and the entry " waterspread" should be made
in the register against such sub-division in view to their being
transferred to tank poramboke as soon as reverted to Government at
a revenue sale or by relinquishment or otherwise. Whenever in
consequence of improvements or repairs to a tank its waterspread
area increases, the records mentioned above should be revised
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accordingly. It is the duty of the Revenue Officials to see that the
maps and registers mentioned above are kept up- to- date and that
no water spread land be transferred to "tank poramboke" and the
same cannot be assigned.
It is also contended that when it is the duty of the State to
protect water bodies, the earlier order issued by the State in favour
of the petitioners cannot be sustained under law. The law is well
settled in "Hyderabad Urban Development Authority v.
S.B.Kirloskar3", "Intellectuals forum, Tirupati v. State of
Andhra Pradesh4" "Hinchlal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi5", and in
"Sarevapalli Ramaiah (Died) as per LRS v. The Collector,
Chittoor District6" the Supreme Court candidly held that "water
bodies cannot be assigned or converted into house sites and it is the
duty of the Sate to protect the water bodies. In view of Article 51-A (g)
of the Constitution of India, it is the duty of every citizen of India to
protect and improve the natural environment including forests,
lakes, rivers and wild life and to have compassion for living
creatures. As per Article 48-A of the Constitution of India, the State
shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country and in case the
earlier order passed by the State is not withdrawn, it amount to
disowning directions issued by the Supreme Court. Finally, prayed to
dismiss the writ petition.
Sri S.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of
Sri Sudhakar Rao Ambati, learned counsel for the petitioners, mainly
contended that the memo impugned in the writ petition is nothing
2018 (10) SCJ 609
AIR 2006 SC 1350
AIR 2001 SC 3215
AIR 2019 SC 1706
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but reviewing the order passed by the State Government, which is
impermissible under law, except when there is a specific ground that
it was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, but no specific
pleadings with details of fraud/misrepresentation are available in the
impugned memo for withdrawing earlier memo issued by the
Government. In the absence of any ground of fraud,
misrepresentation with details, for withdrawing the orders passed by
the State by issuing impugned memo, the memo impugned in the
writ petition is unsustainable and placed reliance on the judgment of
Privy Council in "A.L.N.Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee
of the High Court, Rangoon7".
Sri S.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, further contended that
unless power of revision is conferred on the authorities, the
respondents cannot exercise such power of revision. The memo
under challenge is only quasi judicial order, no power of review is
conferred on the authorities specifically under any enactment,
thereby exercise of power by the respondents - authorities is in
excess of the power conferred on the authorities. In support of this
view, he placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad in "Dasari Satyanarayana v. Dasari
Bapayya8" "Pydah Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra
Pradesh9", "Koyya Veerraju v. Mandal Revenue Officer,
Gollaprolu, East Godavari District10" and judgments of the
Supreme Court "Dr.Smt.Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu
Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (UP)11" "Patel Narshi Thakershi
AIR 1941 PC 93
AIR 1963 AP 148
Laws (APH) 1968 7 43
1998 (6) ALD 594 (DB)
AIR 1987 SC 2186
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v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji12" "State Bank of India v.
S.N.Goyal13" and "Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. State of
Tamilnadu14"
On the strength of the principles laid down in the above
judgments, learned senior counsel contended that the respondents
have no authority to review the order passed by the State as no such
power is conferred on the respondents. On this ground, the
impugned memo is liable to be set aside.
As regards the plea of the respondents that the subject land is
"submergible land", the learned senior counsel contended that in the
revision order dated 25.04.2016, the Government categorically
drawn distinction between "submergible land (Mumpu land)" and
"tank-bed land", held that the submergible land, which may get
submerged on some occasions cannot be treated as "tank-bed land".
The said order of the Government has become final. Therefore, this
aspect of the matter cannot be re-agitated or re-opened.
According to the respondents, rough patta does not fall under
Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. However, it is
admitted at the end of paragraph 8 of the Counter affidavit that
rough pattas were issued to the petitioners and they were not
cancelled. These pattas were issued in 1963. The revisional
authority, the Government, held in its order dated 25.04.2016 that
rough patta is a valid document and that it is the responsibility of
the authorities to conduct final survey. Therefore, on this ground,
the order passed by respondent No.1 cannot be reopened.
AIR 1970 SC 1273
(2008) 8 SCC 92
(2014) 5 SCC 75
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Learned senior counsel contended that the inspection of the
land by executive engineer or the inspection report of the Joint
Collector or any other document being relied on by the respondents
have already been considered by the Government in its order dated
25.04.2016, on the basis of those order, the matter cannot be
reopened by exercising power of review. Therefore, the impugned
memo is illegal and unsustainable under law.
One of the contentions urged by the respondents is that the
Government "cannot close its eyes to the fraudulent act" and if any
order was issued basing on fraud or mis-representation by the
beneficiary, the same can be reopened. Refuting the said contention,
learned senior counsel would submit that till now in any of the
proceedings or in any of the reports of the Revenue Officials or the
Joint Collector or the Government, such plea of fraud or
misrepresentation was neither pleaded nor raised. In fact, the
impugned memo is not on the basis of any fraud or
misrepresentation. Therefore, there is no basis for reopening the
matter by issuing impugned memo. In addition to the above grounds,
it is also contended that no notice was issued and no opportunity
was afforded to the petitioners before withdrawing the earlier order
by issuing impugned memo, as such it is violative of principles of
natural justice, thereby the impugned memo is illegal and arbitrary.
On behalf of Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned
Additional Advocate General, Sri P.Yugandhar Reddy, learned
Assistant Government Pleader attached to the office of learned
Additional Advocate General, contended that when there is fraud in
obtaining order, the State can reopen the order passed by
respondent No.1 to exercise power of review, thereby the impugned
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memo is in accordance with law. Apart from that, the land is
submergible as per the material available on record, though it is
recorded as private patta/dry/wet in the revenue records. When it is
submergible land due to water flow from Karakambadi tank, it is
deemed to be communal land, as such pattas cannot be granted
either under the Estates Abolition Act or under the provisions of any
other enactment, as such patta granted in favour of the vendors of
the petitioners is not sufficient to claim right by the petitioners. On
the other hand, it is the duty of the respondents to protect water
bodies in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in the
judgments (referred supra) and the impugned memo is an attempt
made by the State to protect water bodies i.e. Karakambadi tank and
other tanks. When the Government intended to protect water bodies
and passed order, the Court cannot interfere with such order passed
by the Government. Thereby, the Court cannot declare the impugned
memo as illegal and arbitrary, requested to dismiss the writ petition
and vacate the interim earlier passed by this Court.
Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available
on record, the points need to be answered by this Court are as
follows:
(1) Whether the impugned memo No.26086/Lands-
VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 issued by respondent No.1
withdrawing Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013
dated 16.11.2017 based on any of the grounds
mentioned in the impugned memo, without prior
notice to the petitioners, is sustainable?
(2) Whether the State can exercise power of review in its
quasi judicial orders in the absence of conferment of
such power of review under the provisions of any law
or enactment? If not, whether the memo impugned in
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the writ petition be declared as illegal and arbitrary;
consequently liable to be set aside?
P O I N T No.1:
As there is no dispute regarding various orders passed by the
authorities, finally by the State vide memo No.26086-A/EA and
AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017. But the reason for withdrawal of the
said memo by issuing impugned memo is specific that after
dismissal of the appeal by the Commissioner, Appeals, the applicant
therein approached the Government by filing revision petition
requesting to set aside the orders of the Commissioner, Appeals. The
Government vide Memo No.26086-A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated
16.11.2017 observed that the matter was not examined on merits,
accordingly set aside the order passed by the Commissioner,
Appeals dated 22.05.2013 and order passed by the Joint Collector
on 19.12.2011, directed the District Collector to restore entries in
revenue records and issue fresh pattadar passbooks.
The 2nd ground raised in the impugned memo is that the
Government did not decide the matter in proper perspective as to
the issue of classification of the land as "Neeti Mumpu", which is
nothing but "Water Body"
The 3rd ground raised in the impugned memo is that the
Government has re-examined the whole issue and withdrawn the
Government Memo No.26086-A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated
16.11.2017. Therefore, the respondents have to limit their counter to
the grounds covered by the memo, but the respondents raised
different contentions in the counter for the first time, which were not
raised in the impugned memo.
Final order in revision was passed by respondent No.1 on
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25.04.2016 in revision petition No.26086/EA&AR/A1/2013 dated
25.04.2016 and answered the contentions raised by the revenue
authorities, finally in paragraph No.8 the Government i.e. Principal
Secretary to Government concluded that the subject property cannot
be treated as "Tank bed", and validity of the rough patta cannot be
questioned as they were issued as per the procedure prescribed
under the Estates Abolition Act.
Aggrieved by the said order, the District Collector filed a review
petition to review the order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the
Principal Secretary to Government, but the same was dismissed by
Memo No.26086/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 08.06.2017. Surprisingly,
the impugned memo was issued withdrawing the order in review
petition dated 16.11.2017 on various grounds, which I referred in
earlier paragraphs. But the respondents, in the counter, made
serious improvements in the plea raised before the Principal
Secretary to the Government in the review petition, so also in the
memo impugned in the writ petition. The contentions raised in the
counter, which are beyond the contentions raised in the impugned
memo, cannot be taken into consideration to adjudicate the real
controversy between the parties since the parties cannot improve
their pleas by filing counter affidavit.
It is a settled proposition of law that, by filing affidavit
reasons cannot be supplemented to a ground in an administrative
order and this view is fortified by the judgment of the Constitutional
Bench in "Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election
Commissioner, New Delhi15", wherein it was held that when a
statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its
(1978) 1 SCC 405
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validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned therein and
cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit
or otherwise; otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, gets validated by
additional reasons/grounds later brought in. In the said judgment,
the Constitution Bench referred to earlier judgment in
"Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji16",
wherein the Apex Court observed as follows:
"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority
cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently
given by the officer making the order of what he meant or of what
was in his mind, or what he intended to do. As such orders are
meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting
and conduct of those to whom they are addressed' they must be
construed objectively with reference to the language used in the
order itself."
By applying the above principles to the facts of the present
case, respondents cannot improve the grounds by filing a counter
affidavit, and this Court is not required to examine the contentions
raised in the counter which are supplemented, as they were not
raised in the impugned memo.
Applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in
"Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New
Delhi" (referred supra), I would like to confine the decision on the
basis of grounds raised in the impugned memo while ignoring the
other contentions raised in the counter.
From the beginning and before this Court in the counter, it is
stated that the land in dispute in different survey numbers (stated
above) is private patta land and not vested on the Government
consequent upon the abolition of estates under the Estates Abolition
Act. Thus, rough patta was granted in favour of the original
AIR 1952 SC 16
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landholders i.e. vendors of the petitioners‟ predecessors, but the
question of validity of rough patta cannot be decided in the present
proceedings. Even in the fair adangal, the disputed land is shown as
private patta land, but the contention of the respondents is that it is
submergible land during rainy season.
The Principal Secretary to Government decided the issue on
25.04.2016 in Revision petition No.26086/EA&AR/A1/2013.
Specific contentions urged by the petitioners were recorded in
paragraph No.3 (ii) (iii) and paragraph No.6, recorded a specific
finding in paragraph No.8 of the order dated 25.04.2016. In
paragraph No.3 (i) of the said order, one of the contentions raised by
the District Collector was that vendors of the petitioners were
granted rough pattas under the provisions of the Estates Abolition
Act, necessary entries were made in the fair adangal in favour of the
vendors of the petitioners. This fact is not in controversy since it was
admitted before the authorities including the Principal Secretary to
the Government and even before this Court also. Pattadar Passbooks
and title deeds were also issued to the vendors of the petitioners.
Therefore, the pattas granted in favour of the petitioners under
Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act cannot be examined in the
present proceedings. However, the Government contended that such
pattas will not create any title and they are only rough pattas. But in
paragraph No.7 (iv) the revisional authority referred several
judgments of the High Court and one such judgment is "Bollineni
Pedayogaiah v. Joint Collector/Settlement Officer17", wherein
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held that once the
pattas were granted long back, conducting of denovo enquiry after
2004 (5) ALT 806
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lapse of nearly 24 years on the alleged report of Tahsildar about the
irregularities in granting pattas is not legal and further held that suo
moto enquiry by the authorities should be conducted within the
reasonable time.
In the instant case on hand, pattas were granted in 1963
under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, but the Joint
Collector suo motu initiated proceedings prior to 2011 and passed
an order on 19.12.2011 and the same was confirmed by the
Commissioner of Appeals by order dated 22.05.2012 though pattas
were granted long ago. In fact, initiation of suo motu enquiry into
the irregularities in granting pattas under Section 11 (a) of the
Estates Abolition Act and recorded a finding is a serious illegality for
the reason that against the order of Settlement Officer passed under
Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, an appeal lies to the
competent authority under the provisions of the Estates Abolition
Act. Therefore, the Joint Collector has no jurisdiction to record any
finding. However, this Court in the present petition cannot examine
the validity of the pattas issued under Section 11 (a) of the Estates
Abolition Act, in view of the limited question involved in the petition.
In any view of the matter, the Principal Secretary to the Government
being revisional authority based on the judgments (referred above)
concluded that legality of rough patta granted in favour of the
vendor of the petitioners cannot be examined at this stage, after long
lapse of time.
In the present case, in the counter, respondents invented
fraud, misrepresentation etc., for initiation of the proceedings,
nowhere such ground was raised throughout the proceedings even
before the revisional authority. However, fraud or misrepresentation
MSM,J
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must be pleaded with full details so as to enable the
adversary/opposite party to meet such plea. Order 6 Rule IV of the
Civil Procedure Code (for short "C.P.C.") mandates that "in all cases
in which the party pleading relief on any misrepresentation, fraud,
breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other
cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are
exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items
if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading." Though the rules
under C.P.C. are not applicable to the writ petition, more details are
required to decide the writ petition since the Courts are deciding
those contentions based on the affidavit filed by the parties in the
writ petitions, but not by conducting any process of trial or enquiry
like suits. In the present facts, the respondents did not furnish any
details of fraud or misrepresentation etc., but pleaded, for the first
time, in the counter filed by them or even if, it is pleaded before the
Joint Collector, appellate authority or in the revision, in the absence
of details the Court cannot consider such plea of fraud or
misrepresentation.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioners in support of his
contentions, placed reliance on the judgment of Privy Council in
"A.L.N.Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee of the High
Court, Rangoon" (referred supra), wherein it is held that fraud of
this nature, like any other charge of a criminal offence whether made
in civil or criminal proceedings, must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, the plea
of fraud or misrepresentation raised for the first time before this
Court by the respondents in the counter cannot be entertained in the
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absence of sufficient details in the pleadings as mandated under law.
On this ground, the plea or fraud or misrepresentation raised by the
respondents is hereby rejected. Apart from that, such plea was not
raised in the impugned memo.
The Principal Secretary to Government also referred to a
judgment of Division Bench in "the Mandal Revenue Officer v.
Kanchubriki Parvathamma18", wherein it is held that rough pattas
are valid documents for seeking mutation of their names in the
revenue records and the said pattas shall be proof of title as long as
they are not set aside as per the procedure established by law.
In view of the principle laid down in the judgment (referred
supra), rough patta granted in favour of the petitioners‟ vendors‟
predecessors is sufficient to mutate the name of the petitioners in
the revenue records as patta was issued in their favour under
Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act. At this stage, either this
Court or the authorities or the Commissioner of Appeals or
Revisional authority cannot examine validity of such pattas obtained
under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act after long lapse of
more than 50 years. Therefore, issue regarding validity of rough
pattas cannot be decided at this stage, on this ground withdrawal of
memo issued by the Government bearing No.26086-A/EA &
AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 by impugned memo is a serious
illegality.
The 2nd ground urged by the respondents is that the subject
land is a submergible land (Neeti Mumpu). At best, the land is
subject to „inundation‟ during rainy season, but that cannot be said
to be a „tank bed‟ or „tank poramboke‟. As admitted by the
2008 (6) ALD 788 (DB)
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respondents, it is only submergible land and it is a private
zeroyati land as per fair adangal. Therefore, it is a private land.
Though it is a submergible land, it cannot be treated as „government
land‟ and it will not vest on the government consequent upon the
abolition of estates more particularly, when patta was granted in
favour of the original landholders. Even otherwise, the Principal
Secretary to the Government discussed about this issue in the order
dated 25.04.2016 in paragraph No.6 in detail and recorded that it
was only submergible land. It is recorded as „private patta land‟ in
the fair adangal, but in the remarks column, it is mentioned as
„submergible land‟ and not part of karakambadi tank. The Principal
Secretary to the Government dealt with the matter in detail and
recorded a finding that the subject land is a patta land, but not a
river poramboke or tank proamboke by placing reliance on the
judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad "Pydah
Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh" (referred
above), wherein it is held that the payment of cist and acceptance
thereof by the Government was a positive indication that the owner
of the land was determined to retain his possession notwithstanding
submersion of the land. In the same judgment, it was clarified that
once right or title to the particular land is established, even in course
of time by flow of water the land gets eroded, the title to the land
does not pass from the private person to the Government and patta
land does not become Government land or river proamboke.
In the facts of the case also, though it is recorded as private
patta land in the fair adangal and in remarks column, it is
mentioned as „submergible land‟. Hence, it is an undisputed fact that
it is purely private patta land, though the land is subject to
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inundation during rainy season, the title will not divest from private
parties, vest on the Government and the same cannot be treated as
"river poramboke". Therefore, on the ground that the land is
submergible land, withdrawal of Memo No. 26086-A/EA &
AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 by impugned memo is illegal.
The 3rd ground urged by the respondents for withdrawing
Memo No. 26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is that the
land is „water body‟ and it is the duty of the State to protect water
bodies in view of Article 48A and 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India
and taking cue from the principle laid down in "Hyderabad Urban
Development Authority v. S.B.Kirloskar", "Intellectuals forum,
Tirupati v. State of Andhra Pradesh" and "Hinchlal Tiwari v.
Kamala Devi" (referred supra) the Memo No. 26086-A/EA &
AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is recalled by impugned memo.
It is an undisputed fact that the subject land is not a part of
tank bed or tank poramboke, it is only submergible land when watter
filled in the tank in full. Merely because, it is a submergible land, it
cannot be treated as a water body. The word „water bodies‟ are not
defined anywhere.
Water body can be said to be a part of earth‟s surface covered
with water, such as a river or lake or ocean.
Learned Assistant Government Pleader contended that when
the land is a water body or tank poramboke, patta cannot be granted
under the Estates Abolition Act or under Andhra Pradesh Revenue
Board Standing Order 15.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners strongly refuting
the contentions of the State, placed reliance on "Pydah Chalmaiah
v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh" (referred supra), where
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the Court held that merely because the lands are "mumpu lands
(submergible lands), grant of patta cannot be denied.
In paragraph No.9 the Division Bench of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad placed reliance on "Tarakdas
Acharjee Choudhury v. Secretary of State19", concluded that
merely because the land is submergible, a patta under the provisions
of the Estates Abolition Act cannot be denied. In "Tarakdas
Acharjee Choudhury v. Secretary of State" (referred supra), it was
observed that if a person was owner of certain land before
submersion, be would on reappearance of it be entitled to resume
possession thereof, only that he has to prove his title in relation to
that land on reformation. To put it differently, the right of the owner
to the land by reason of its submersion would not be lost and he
would be at liberty to enforce his right on proving that the land that
has reappeared is the same it was in his ownership prior to
submersion.
In "Pydah Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra
Pradesh" (referred supra), while dealing with the writ petition filed
against the order passed by the Board of Revenue, the Court
formulated a question whether a patta can be granted under Section
11 (b) of the Estates Abolition Act when the land is Mumpu land. The
Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
observed as follows:
"It is a common ground that the name of the petitioner‟s predecessor-in-
interest was found in 10 (1) account in relation to these lands and all that
was required to be ascertained by them under Section 11 (d) was whether the
petitioner satisfied the conditions laid in that provision. The continuous
occupation from 01.07.1939 up to 07.09.1950 was the only matter about
which the authorities had to be satisfied with. The Revenue Board, while
AIR 1935 P.C. 125
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admitting that in case of submerged lands such occupation could as well be
proved by means of payment of cist had erred in holding that this payment
should be proved only by producing cist receipts. In our opinion, non-
production of cist receipts was not fatal if payment could be proved even
otherwise. The Revenue Board could in this behalf take into consideration
the other documents which were in their Department and on which the
petitioner had relied, It would appear from the counter filed in this
proceeding by the respondents, which curiously enough does not fully accord
with the text of the order of the Revenue Board, that continuous payment of
cist from 1939 up to 1956 is an admitted feet. Para 5(a) of the counter is
specific that there was no balance of assessment due an these lands up to
the end of fasli 1865. It is alto admitted in the counter that the petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest was in possession of the land on the first day of July
1939. The counter indubitably is based on the documents available in the
department. Section 11 (b), as already noticed, refers to the occupation
between the first day of July, 1939, and the notified date only. This does not
go beyond that, for conferring the right of patta on a ryot. It is common
ground that proviso to section 11 (b) is not applicable to this case. The orders
of the Revenue authorities also, in fact, proceeded on that basis. In these
circumstances, it is clear that the Revenue Board had failed to take into
consideration the facts admitted by the department in deciding the revision
petition. Further, it was in error when it was inclined to think that the only
way of proof of payment of cist was production of original receipts. Thus the
decision of the Revenue Board is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of
the record. It is, therefore, liable to be quashed."
In view of the law laid down in the above judgment, the
contention urged by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on
behalf of learned Additional Advocate General is unsustainable
under law and the same is hereby rejected.
The Principal Secretary to the Government considered the
issue in detail and recorded a finding merely because it is subject to
inundation occasionally during rainy season, the same cannot be
treated as „tank bed‟ or „tank poramboke‟ automatically and did not
agree with the findings of the Joint Collector based on the law quoted
by the Joint Collector since such principles are applicable only to
tank beds, not to submergible lands. Even if, the contention of the
respondents is accepted that the subject land is subject to
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inundation occasionally during rainy season, as the subject land is
classified as „private land‟ in fair adangal of Karakambadi village, the
same cannot be termed as „water body‟ for the purpose of deciding
the present issue. Hence, on this ground also, the Memo No. 26086-
A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 cannot be recalled by
issuing impugned memo.
The other ground raised by the respondents is that the
Government has re-examined the whole issue. No doubt, the
Government can re-examine the whole issue, but it must be within a
reasonable time. The petitioners purchased the property from their
vendors, who obtained ryotwari patta under Section 11 (a) of the
Estates Abolition Act. The rights of the landholder or Ryots were
crystallised on the day when the rough patta was granted, but at this
stage i.e. after more than 50 years the whole issue cannot be
reopened and re-examined. In addition to that, the subject land is
not a tank bed or water body as admitted by the respondents.
However, it is a submergible land, but in view of the endorsement in
the „remarks column‟ of fair adanga that submergible land cannot be
treated as „tank poromboke‟ or „water body‟. Even if, it is submergible
land, water may struck for few days and water level in the tank is
receded, it will reappear after some days. Therefore, the ground
raised by the authorities that the State is under obligation to protect
such submergible land treating it as „tank poramboke‟ or „water body‟
is a serious illegality.
In any view of the matter, the State is competent to settle the
issue, but it must be within a reasonable time. When rough patta
was granted to the landholders or Ryots, who sold the property to the
vendors of the petitioners, thereafter to these petitioners, their title is
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crystallised and became owners of the property by purchase. In such
case, the principle of proprietary estoppel can be invoked by the
petitioners.
The Delhi High Court in "Raj Kishan Dass v. Mrs. Kusum
Singh20" considered the Scope of Proprietary Estoppel, wherein it
was observed that, Proprietary estoppel operates in a variety of cases
to disparate that it has been described as "an amalgam of doubtful
utility". The cases can be divided broadly into two categories. In the
first, one person acts under a mistake as to the existence or as to the
extent of his rights in or over another's land. Even though the
mistake was in no way induced by the landowner, he might be
prevented from taking advantage of it. Particularly if he "stood by"
knowing of the mistake, or actively encouraged the mistaken party to
act in reliance on his mistaken belief. These cases of so-called
"acquiescence" do not raise any questions as to the enforceability of
promises and therefore do not call for further discussion. In the
Second situation, there is not merely "acquiescence" by the
landowner, but "encouragement". The other party acts in reliance on
the landowner's promise (or on conduct or a representation from
which a promise can be inferred) that the promise has a legally
recognized interest in the land or that one will be created in his
favor. The question then arises, to what extent such a promise can
be enforced, even though it may not be supported by consideration,
or fail to satisfy the other requirements (such as certainty) of a
binding contract.
93 (2000) DLT 359
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The present facts would attract the second situation as
reliance was placed on patta granted under Section 11 (a) of the
Estates Abolition Act. The property was sold by original landholder
or Ryhot to several persons including the petitioners. Therefore, the
petitioners are entitled to insist the State to mutate their names in
the revenue records and the State is under obligation to comply with
such legitimate demand to mute the names of the petitioners.
Therefore, to avoid uncertainty of the title to the property, principle
of proprietary estoppel can be invoked.
As there is duty cast upon the Government to avoid litigation,
the State shall not protract the litigation without any reasons. While
this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate consequence of making
the law unclear, citizens have been the victims. Representations by
public authorities need to be held to scrupulous standards, since
citizens continue to live their lives based on the trust they repose in
the State. In the commercial world also, certainty and consistency
are essential to planning the affairs of business. When public
authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing
an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the
trust reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business
friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith
which can be reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which
it generates. Professors Jain and Deshpande characterize the
consequences of this doctrinal confusion in the following terms:
"Thus, in India, the characterization of legitimate
expectations is on a weaker footing, than in jurisdictions
like UK where the courts are now willing to recognize the
capacity of public law to absorb the moral values
underlying the notion of estoppels in the light of the
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evolution of doctrines like LE [Legitimate Expectations] and
abuse of power. If the Supreme Court of India has shown
its creativity in transforming the notion of promissory
estoppel from the limitations of private law, then it does not
stand to reason as to why it should also not articulate and
evolve the doctrine of LE for judicial review of resilement of
administrative authorities from policies and longstanding
practices. If such a notion of LE is adopted, then not only
would the Court be able to do away with the artificial
hierarchy between promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation, but, it would also be able to hold the
administrative authorities to account on the footing of
public law outside the zone of promises on a stronger and
principled anvil. Presently, in the absence of a like doctrine
to that of promissory estoppel outside the promissory zone,
the administrative law adjudication of resilement of policies
stands on a shaky public law foundation."
The need for this doctrine to have an independent existence
was articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the United State Supreme
Court in Vitarelli v. Seton21 as follows:
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by
which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if
dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even
though generous beyond the requirements that bind such
agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This
judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly
established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the
procedural sword shall perish with the sword."
In view of the said principle, when an order was passed by the
State exercising revisional power, the State cannot seek review of its
order and again withdraw the order passed by the Government by
issuing impugned memo as it creates confusion and uncertainty of
title to the property of the petitioners. Therefore, by applying the
principle of proprietary estoppel, the shortcut method adopted by the
Government to recall the Memo No.26086-A/EA&AR/A1/2013 dated
16.11.2017 is an illegality for the reason that the Principal Secretary
to the Government passed order in revision in 2016, dealt with each
and every issue raised by the Government. Review was also
dismissed, but a different method was invented by the respondents
359 US 535 (1959)
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to recall its own order, which creates any amount of confusion and
uncertainty as to the rights of the petitioners. Right of the party in
immovable property cannot be undetermined for indefinite period by
issuing different orders by the Government. Such conduct of the
Government, respondents herein creates any amount of confusion
and the Citizens of the State will lose trust on the Government.
One of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for
the petitioners before this Court is that the impugned memo was
issued withdrawing the order in review petition on various grounds.
However, no notice was issued and prior opportunity was afforded to
the petitioners before issuing impugned memo withdrawing the
earlier order. The impugned memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated
16.03.2020 issued by respondent No.1 withdrawing the earlier order
vide Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017, is a
quasi judicial order though on administrative side. Such order
cannot be passed without affording any prior opportunity to the
petitioners since they are immediate affected parties to such
proceedings. When an order is passed without issuing any prior
notice and without affording any opportunity, it is in violation of
principles of natural justice.
In "Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India22" the
Apex Court held that it is obvious that in passing the impugned
order of cancellation, the respondents were acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity and also they were acting in exercise of their statutory
powers. Indisputably, the third respondent while purporting to
cancel the registration certificate was acting in exercise of his power
(2010) 13 SCC 427
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under Rule 43 of the MPEDA Rules. The show cause notice dated
23.01.2008 was issued by the third respondent in exercise of this
power. Finally concluded that "a reasonable opportunity of making
objection" or "a reasonable opportunity of defence" is to be afforded
to the licensees and a similar question was considered by the
Constitutional Bench in "Khem Chand v. Union of India23",
wherein Constitutional Bench unanimously expressed its opinion
that concept of `reasonable opportunity' includes various safeguards
and one of them, in the words of the learned Chief Justice, is:
"(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which
he can only do if he is told what the charges leveled against him are and the
allegations on which such charges are based"
The Apex Court further held that it is no doubt true that at
the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told
the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove
his innocence. However, show-cause notice cannot be read
hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably.
The entire exercise of the Apex Court in the said judgment is to
the effect that a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded before
passing any order.
In "A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak24", Supreme Court held that
violation of natural justice would render the order void. In
"Anisminic Limited v. Foreign Compensation Commission25" the
House of Lords held that breach of natural justice nullifies the order.
Thus, respondent No.1 violated principles of natural justice. In
those circumstances, this Court while exercising power under
AIR 1958 SC 300
[1984] S.C.R. 495
[1969] 2 AC 147
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the quasi
judicial order passed by respondent No.1 and set aside the same on
this ground alone. Hence, the impugned memo is liable to be set
aside. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioners
and against the respondents.
P O I N T No.2:
The main contention of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioners is that when a revision petition is filed, no further revision
is maintainable against such order. Here, the Joint Collector passed
an order, and the Commissioner of Appeals confirmed the order of
the Joint Collector, but in revision the Principal Secretary to the
Government set aside the order of both the Joint Collector and
Commissioner of Appeals and decided in favour of the petitioners.
Thereafter, several directions were issued for implementation of the
order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the Principal Secretary to the
Government. For one reason or the other, the order was not
implemented. Finally, the District Collector filed a petition for review
of the order passed in Memo No.26086/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated
25.04.2016 and the same was dismissed by Memo No.26086-A/EA &
AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017, while issuing directions for
implementation of the said order dated 25.04.2016. However, the
said Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is
withdrawn by the Government by issuing impugned Memo
No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020
Learned Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of learned
Additional Advocate General-I would contend that the Government
can pass any number of orders and review its own orders, but this
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contention is fallacious and contrary to law. The law is well settled
that against a review, no further review is maintainable and this view
is fortified by the judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in
"Dasari Satyanarayana v. Dasari Bapayya" (referred supra),
wherein the Court held that against a review, no further review is
maintainable, and the Court specifically held as follows:
"The orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, and the
Settlement Officer under Section 11 (a) are subject to revision by the Director of
Settlements under Section 5 (2) of the Act The orders of the Director of
Settlements including those made in revision under Section 5 (2) are subject to
revision by the Board of Revenue under Section 7 (d). Under the Act, there is
however no provision for any further revision to the Government, the Board of
Revenue being the final revisional authority in matters arising under Section
11 (a) of the Act. In the absence of an express provision, there is no warrant for
the assumption that by implication there is some residuary power in the
Government to revise the orders of the Board of Revenue. In "Nagarathnammal
v. Ibrahim Saheb (AIR 1955 Mad 305 (FB)" a Full Bench of the Madras High
Court held that under Section 10 (5) of the Madras Hereditary Village Officers
Act, the Collector is the final authority, and neither the Board of Revenue nor
the Government has any right to interfere. That decision is an authority for the
proposition that where the statute does not expressly provide for a revisional
jurisdiction, the Government cannot claim to exercise such a jurisdiction under
an assumed residuary power. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of
Balakrishna Ayyar, J., who spoke for the Full Bench. I hold, therefore, that in
this case the Board of Revenue is the final revising authority against the
orders of the Directors of Settlements, and no further revision to the
Government lies. That being so, the proceedings now pending before the
Government as a result of the revision petition filed by the 1st respondent are
wholly lacking in jurisdiction."
In the present case, the Government did not take this matter
in further revision, but filed a review petition, which ended in
dismissal. For one reason or the other, the order in review was
withdrawn to unsettle the title of the petitioners by their acts at their
whims and fancies of the authorities. The order passed in the review
petition filed by the Collector cannot be withdrawn as it attained
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finality long back. Even as per the provisions of C.P.C., review
against review is not maintainable. Therefore, when once review
petition is filed, though not permissible under law, withdrawal of the
order passed in review would amount to reviewing the order of review
on the pretext to examine the issue in detail by the Government. No
such power is conferred on the State authorities to keep the issue
unsettled ad infinitum or indefinitely. If such power is conferred on
the Government, whenever Government changes, by adopting
different policies of their own may reopen the issue again to unsettle
the title to the immovable property. Therefore, such bar is created
only to put an end to the litigation attaching finality to such orders.
Withdrawing order in review by issuing impugned memo is a serious
illegality. Further, Order XLVII Rule 9 of C.P.C. says that no
application to review an order made on an application for a review or
a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained.
Though, the provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable to the writ
proceedings, the purport of the said provision can be applied to the
present facts of the case to put an end to the litigation. Hence, the
contention of the learned Assistant Government Pleader is rejected.
Yet, another contention urged before this Court by the learned
Senior counsel is that a power of review cannot be exercised by the
quasi judicial authorities except on conferment by Statute. In
support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the Judgment of
Apex Court in "Dr.Smt.Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu
Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (UP)" (referred supra), wherein it is
held as follows:
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"It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its
own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the
statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in
considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal,
acts as a quasi judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the
U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not
confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. "In the circumstances, it
must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in
reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7,
1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a
nullity.
The next question that falls for our consideration is whether the High
Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the
ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an
alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the
question to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. It
is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the
maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without
jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative
remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and
the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction.
Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity; such
an order could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the High Court was not
justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative
remedy was available to the appellant under Section 68 of the U.P. State
Universities Act."
In the present facts of the case, no review is provided by any
statute either under the Estates Abolition Act or under the Andhra
Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 to review
the orders passed by the authorities. But for one reason or the other,
the District Collector after lapse of long period from the date of
passing order by respondent No.1, filed petition for review of the
order passed by the State Government, and the same was ended
against the State, again the State issued impugned memo to
withdraw the order to multiply the issue and unsettle the title of the
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petitioners indefinitely. Such course is not open to the Government.
Moreover, very entertaining of review by the Principal Secretary to
the Government is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court
in "Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji"
(referred supra). In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that the
power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law
either specifically or by necessary implication.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioners further contended
that suo motu power can be exercised only within a reasonable time
to interfere with grant of pattas. But, in the present case, the issue
was settled long back, but the State intended to interfere with such
order and exercised inherent power with a view to review the issue
again, which is already decided by the Principal Secretary to the
Government, such course is not open to the Government in view of
the law declared by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in "Koya Veeraju v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Gollaprolu, East
Godavari District." (referred supra), wherein it is held as follows:
"The above discussion including the legal position makes it clear that
the powers which the authorities sought to exercise are neither just nor
reasonable. By the present proceedings, they started to unsettle the things
which were settled long ago. Keeping silent for several decades and then to
come up with an explanation that lands in question (were) prohibited for
alienation and the alienators (sic alienees) are not entitled for mutation is not
tenable. The powers to revise are quasi-judicial in nature. The same shall be
exercised within a reasonable period and while exercising shall give valid and
acceptable reasons. The power exercised clearly establishes that the
authorities acted under dictation influenced more by extraneous
consideration; the proceedings are not only arbitrary and unreasonable, but
they exercise powers with mala fide intention.
The submission of the Government Pleader is that the authorities to
exercise suo motu powers as they came to know that alienations were made
due to fraud and misrepresentation. But in none of the orders referred to
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earlier, mere was a finding as to fraud or misrepresentation. The facts
narrated by the petitioners disclose that after purchase of the land they were
put in possession of the land they improved it and they have been enjoying
the same. If the authority felt that the land in question was required for some
public purpose then they had to resort to invoke the provisions contained in
some other law to take over the land and not by unsettling the things. In our
view exercise of suo motu revisional powers is unwarranted, mala fide,
unreasonable and illegal. When the Court comes to know that manifest
illegality has been crept in or proceedings without jurisdiction, to render
justice and avoid multiplicity of proceedings, this Court can exercise powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India instead of driving the parties to
exhaust alternative remedy. After all alternative remedy is not a rule of law,
but it is a matter of convenience for Judges to dispose of the cases. The duty
of the Court is to see justice is not only done but seemed to be done."
One of the contentions raised by the learned Assistant
Government Pleader on behalf of learned Additional Advocate
General is that the Joint Collector passed orders in R.Dis.F-
1/6587/2005 dated 19.12.2011 and Commissioner, Appeals passed
orders No.P1/1012/2006 dated 22.05.2013, and based on the said
orders, and memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated
16.11.2017, it is contended that respondent Nos.2 and 3 recorded
categorical findings regarding nature of the land in different
paragraphs, but the same was not taken care of by the Principal
Secretary to the Government. Therefore, the order of respondent No.1
is required to be reviewed again.
No doubt, if the revisional authority ignores certain aspects,
the person aggrieved by the findings recorded by the revisional
authority may prefer a review. Accordingly, respondent No.3 filed
review petition for review of the order passed by the Principal
Secretary to the Government, but the said review was dismissed
again recording reasons having found no ground to review the order
passed by respondent No.1. When once the review is dismissed no
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further review is permitted under law as discussed in the earlier
paragraphs. Therefore, on this ground also, impugned memo
proposing to review the entire proceedings is liable to the set aside as
it is contrary to the law laid by the Apex Court and other Courts
(referred supra). Hence, the documents produced along with the
counter are of no assistance to the respondents.
In the present case, pattas were granted in favour of the
petitioners‟ vendors‟ vendor or petitioners‟ vendor in 1963, later the
Joint Collector passed order on 19.12.2011 and the same was
confirmed by the Commissioner of Appeals on 22.05.2013, but both
the orders were set aside by the Principal Secretary to the
Government by order dated 25.04.2016. Thus, the order became
final in the 2016 itself, but a review petition was filed, in the said
review petition, an order dated 16.11.2017 was passed vide Memo
No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 directing to implement the order
dated 25.04.2016. Late, the said Memo No.26086-A/EA &
AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 was withdrawn by issuing impugned
Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020. As such, there
is any amount of substantial delay and at such belated stage, the
order cannot be reopened by issuing memo without notice to the
petitioners. Therefore, on the ground of delay also, exercise of power
by the Government to withdraw the order dated 16.11.2017 by
issuing impugned memo is nothing but arbitrary and illegal exercise
of power by the State and its authorities.
Sri S.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel would contend that
when once final order is passed by the quasi judicial authorities, the
quasi judicial authority will become functus officio only when its
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order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated to the
party concerned and it cannot reopen the matter and take up
proceedings further. In support of his contentions, learned senior
counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in "State
Bank of India v. S.N.Goyal" (referred supra), wherein it is held that
a quasi judicial authority will become functus officio only when its
order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated (put in
the course of transmission) to the party concerned. Thus, once the
order is published or notified or communicated by the authority, the
quasi judicial authority has no power to reopen the issue once again
as it becomes functus officio. Here, respondent No.2, 3 and 4 are
quasi judicial authorities, who decided the rights of the parties in the
land under different enactments i.e. the Estates Abolition Act and
Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971,
where no such power to reopen is conferred on the State and the
final orders passed in the revision by respondent No.1 attained
finality in the year 2016 itself. Thereafter, several memos were issued
for implementation of the order, but for one reason or the other, the
authorities did not take steps, ultimately the Collector filed revision,
obviously for the reasons best known, at belated stage, which ended
in dismissal. However, not satisfied with the order of dismissal in
review, the State invoked an indirect method of withdrawing the
order, which is impermissible under law. Such withdrawal by quasi
judicial authority after it becomes functus officio is a serious
illegality and such exercise of power is arbitrary in nature.
Learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex
Court in "Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamilnadu"
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(referred supra), wherein the Apex Court held that when once a
decision is taken on question of law, on which the judgment of the
court is based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of
a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the
review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot
be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and
foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the
order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on
the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality
attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. In the present
case, the State reopened the issue and reviewed the order by issuing
impugned memo on three grounds, which I discussed in the earlier
paragraphs. Change of law subsequent to the decision taken by the
quasi judicial authority is not a ground to reopen the issue and
review the order, which was already reviewed by the State in revision
petition in 2017 itself.
In view of the law declared by the Courts in catena of
perspective pronouncements (referred supra), exercise of power to
review the order passed in review earlier, by issuing impugned memo
and withdrawing the order in Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013
dated 16.11.2017 is without jurisdiction and not based on any
irregularity in the order earlier passed by the State. Therefore, the
impugned memo is illegal as the same was issued in arbitrary
exercise of power.
Merely because, the State is the authority having control over
all the departments in the State, it cannot exercise its power at its
whims and fancies targeting few citizens in the State. Such exercise
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of power may lead to chaos by unsettling the settled rights of the
parties in the immovable property. If exercise of such power is
permitted, it will lead to multiplicity of litigation in the State and the
never ending litigation seriously affects the economy of the State
itself and such unsettling the title to the immovable property may
mar the industrial growth having its serious consequences on the
public life. Therefore, such exercise of power by the State by issuing
impugned Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is
illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India. Consequently, the Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated
16.03.2020 is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the issue is
answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed declaring the Memo
No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is illegal, arbitrary and
the said Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is
hereby set aside. No costs.
Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall
also stand dismissed.
_________________________________________
JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
04.08.2021
Ksp
