Allahabad High Court
Nanhu And Others vs Raksha Ram And Others on 12 November, 2025
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:71743
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 1002672 of 2001
Nanhu And Others
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
Raksha Ram And Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
S.K. Mehrotra, I.D.Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
C.S.C., Alka Verma, Deepak Chandra Jain, Q M Haque, Tanay Hazari, Vijai Bahadur Verma
A.F.R. Judgment Reserved on 27.10.2025 Judgment Delivered on 12.11.2025
Court No. - 6
HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.
1. Under challenge is the order dated 27.08.2001, passed by the District Registrar, Gonda in exercise of powers under Section 73 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short, 'the Act of 1908'), whereby it has directed the registration of sale-deed to be executed in favour of the private-respondents.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the instant petition, it will be relevant to notice certain facts giving rise to the instant petition.
3. The original-petitioner No.4, namely, Matai, was the recorded tenure-holder of Bhumidhari Plots No.64, 203, 157 and 163, situate in Village Pakri Kaishwar, Post Bishnupur Bairiya, Pargana, Tehsil and District Gonda. The case set up by the petitioners No.1 to 3 was that Matai was living with them as a family. However, Matai was finding it difficult to manage his property, hence, he executed a sale-deed dated 03.08.1996, in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3, relating to Plots No.64 and 203. On the very same date, Matai also executed a registered Will in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 in respect of Plots No.157 and 163.
4. On the other hand, the private-respondents set up a case that Matai had executed a sale-deed in their favour in respect of all the four plots i.e. Plots No.64, 203, 157 and 163 on 01.08.1996. The private-respondents along with Matai had reached the office of Sub-Registrar for completing all the formalities regarding execution and registration of the sale-deed, but on some pretext, Matai made himself scarce and he fled from the Sub-Registrar's Office.
5. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the private-respondents made an application to the office of Sub-Registrar bringing on record the aforesaid facts including that the sale consideration has been paid to Matai and though he came to execute and register the sale-deed, but he fled from the site, hence, though the sale-deed was executed, but could not be registered, hence, an order for registering the sale-deed in terms of Section 73 of the Act of 1908 may be passed.
6. The said proceedings were registered by the Sub-Registrar and the petitioners No.1 to 3 were also issued notices including Matai, who came forward and denied the execution of the sale-deed said to have been executed in favour of the private-respondents before the Sub-Registrar and it was also informed that Matai had already informed the police about the illegal attempt of the private-respondents for getting the sale-deed executed forcibly including putting the signatures on blank stamp papers and he informed the Sub-Registrar that he had not executed any sale-deed in favour of the private-respondents. The Sub-Registrar considering the facts and circumstances including noticing the statement of Matai given to him, refused to register the said document.
7. The private-respondents, being aggrieved, preferred an application before the Registrar under Section 73 of the Act of 1908. The matter was heard by the Registrar and by means of the order dated 27.08.2001, it allowed the application of the private-respondents and directed the registration of the sale-deed in favour of the private-respondents.
8. Being aggrieved, the petitioners approached this Court by means of the instant petition and by means of interim order dated 07.09.2001, the execution of the sale-deed in favour of the private-respondents was stayed.
9. Shri I.D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the entire sequence of events, which have unfolded would indicate that the petitioner No.4 Matai, who was the recorded tenure-holder did not intend to execute the sale-deed in favour of the private-respondents and he had already informed to the Sub-Registrar of the same, rather the petitioner No.4 executed a registered sale-deed in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 and in furtherance thereof, the name of the petitioners No.1 to 3 was also duly mutated in the revenue records and it continues to do so. Moreover, a FIR/NCR report was also furnished to the police and in the given circumstances, it was clear that the alleged sale-deed and the claim of the private-respondents could not be treated to be duly executed, hence, the order impugned passed by the Registrar is patently erroneous.
10. Shri Shukla has further urged that the reasoning upon which the impugned order has been passed is two fold. The Registrar found that there were discrepancies in the statement given by Matai regarding the version and the sequence of events which occurred, which clearly indicated that there was discrepancy and the statement of Matai could not be accepted as it was full of contradiction. The other ground which was taken by the Registrar in the impugned order was the fact that the statement of the witnesses of the sale-deed executed in favour of the private-respondents clearly indicated that Matai had executed the sale-deed after taking the full sale consideration and in the aforesaid circumstances, if the facts and the material placed on record are seen, it will reveal that the impugned order suffers from vice of being arbitrary inasmuch as the reasons as recorded above are based on surmises and conjectures and not on the basis of the material available on record.
11. It is submitted that the order just refers to the statement of the witnesses, as a matter of fact, but it does not disclose that what the said witnesses stated which was instrumental for the Registrar to arrive at a conclusion that the sale-deed was executed by Matai. In the impugned order, merely making a reference that the witnesses examined clearly proved the execution of the sale-deed is per se bad, apart from the fact that the chronology of events have not been appropriately noticed including the fact that the private-respondents had already instituted a suit seeking cancellation of the sale-deed executed and registered in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 and the said suit of the plaintiffs/respondents had also been dismissed.
12. It has further been urged that despite knowing the fact that Matai had executed a sale-deed in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 relating to Plots No.64 and 203 and a registered Will executed in favour of the petitioners No.1 and 2 relating to Plots No.157 and 163, but the said Will was not challenged. Thus, the conduct of the private-respondents is also contrary to their alleged case which has not been appropriately considered while passing the order and in such circumstances, the petitioners, who are in possession of the property cannot be made to suffer at the behest of the private-respondents that too in a summary proceedings especially when they attempted to assail the rights of the petitioners by filing a civil suit, wherein they failed as the suit was dismissed. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, it is urged that the impugned order be set aside after allowing the petition.
13. Mrs. Alka Verma along with Shri Tanay Hazari and Shri Vijai Bahadur Verma, learned counsel for the private-respondents have opposed the aforesaid submissions and have urged that the Registrar while passing the impugned order dated 27.08.2001 has categorically stated that the sale-deed was executed in favour of the private-respondents after taking the sale consideration and since there were clear discrepancies in the version of Matai relating to execution of the sale-deed in favour of the private-respondents, which is an indicator, that at different places, different versions have been given to delay and to harass the private-respondents and to avoid the registration of the sale-deed.
14. It is further urged that where the Registrar had satisfied himself that the sale-deed was executed by Matai in favour of the private-respondents, which was also supported with evidence and considered, hence, such findings of fact based on material on record cannot be assailed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
15. It was further urged that the word 'duly execution' has been taken note of in several decisions which clearly indicates that once the sale-deed had been executed which was not denied and it was not stated that it was executed under suspicious circumstances, hence, by taking a contrary stand, at a subsequent point of time, the same would not aid an unscrupulous person.
16. Taking note of the aforesaid, the Registrar has passed the order, which cannot be said to be bad and the alleged grounds or discrepancies sought to be projected by the petitioners relating to the stamp papers also could not be substantiated, hence, the findings of fact cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be dismissed and if there is any grievance, the petitioners can seek their remedy before the regular Courts. Thus, for this reason also, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
17. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record.
18. It is undisputed that Matai was the owner of four bhumidhari Plots No.64, 203, 157 and 163. It is also undisputed fact that the petitioners No.1 to 3 have a registered sale-deed dated 03.08.1996 in their favour executed by Matai in respect of Plots No.64 and 203. It is also an undisputed fact that the petitioners No.1 to 3 also have a registered Will in their favour executed by Matai relating to other two Plots No.157 and 163. It is also an undisputed fact that Matai in his lifetime had informed the Sub-Registrar after executing the sale-deed in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 regarding the alleged claim of the private-respondents, who stated that Matai had executed a sale-deed in their favour in respect of all the four plots. It is also not disputed by the private-respondents that they claimed their sale-deed to be executed on 01.08.1996, but not registered.
19. Thus, the issue arises that in case if the sale-deed of the private-respondents is said to have been executed validly on 01.08.1996 and even if registered later then it would relate back to the date of execution i.e. 01.08.1996 and that would be prior in point of time than the registered sale-deed of the petitioners No.1 to 3 which is dated 03.08.1996.
20. In order to resolve the conflicting claims, it will be appropriate to notice what is the width of jurisdiction of the Registrar under Sections 71 and 73 of the Act of 1908. The relevant provisions of Sections 71, 73 and 75 of the Act of 1908 are being reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:-
"71. Reasons for refusal to register to be recorded.-(l) Every Sub-Registrar refusing to register a document, except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situate within his sub-district, shall make an order of refusal and record his reasons for such order in his Book No.2, and endorse the words "registration refused" on the document; and, on application made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, without payment and unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded.
(2) No registering officer shall accept for registration a document so endorsed unless and until, under the provisions hereinafter contained, the document is directed to be registered.
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73. Application to Registrar where Sub-Registrar refuses to register on ground of denial of execution.-(l) When a Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground that any person by whom it purports to be executed, or his representative or assign, denies its execution, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent authorized as aforesaid, may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate in order to establish his right to have the document registered.
(2) Such application shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by a copy of the reasons recorded under section 71, and the statements in the application shall be verified by the applicant in manner required by law for the verification of plaints.
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75. Order by Registrar to register and procedure thereon.-(l) If the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been complied with, he shall order the document to be registered.
(2) If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order, the registering officer shall obey the same and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in sections 58, 59 and 60.
(3) Such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration.
(4) The Registrar may, for the purpose of any enquiry under section 74, summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give evidence as if he were a civil Court, and he may also direct by whom the whole or any part of the costs of any such enquiry shall be paid, and such costs shall be recoverable as if they had been awarded in a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
21. In order to invoke the jurisdiction in terms of Section 73 of the Act of 1908, the private-respondents had to establish that the document had been validly executed and the requirement of law have also been complied with.
22. It is in this context that the learned counsel for the private-respondents have urged that once the sale-deed had been presented indicating the signatures had been appended by the petitioner No.4, namely, Matai would indicate that the document was validly executed and since the request for getting the said document registered was made within a period of four months from the date of its execution with proper stamp duty, the legal requirement also stood complied with. Hence, the order of registration could not be faulted.
23. If the aforesaid aspect of the matter is examined, it would reveal that so far as Matai was concerned, he did not accept the execution of the sale-deed in favour of the private-respondents. It was specifically put to the learned counsel for the private-respondents regarding the suit for cancellation filed by the private-respondents and in response, it was admitted that though the suit had been filed by the private-respondents bearing No.981 of 1998, but it stood dismissed for want of prosecution. It is stated that a restoration application is still pending.
24. It has also been informed by the leaned counsel for the petitioners that while the aforesaid writ petition was pending before this Court, consolidation operations in the village intervened wherein the private-respondents had raised objections under Section 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act of 1953') which have also been dismissed for want of prosecution and an application for restoration is pending there, too.
25. It was also put to the learned counsel for the private-respondents that admittedly they had filed a suit for cancellation only in respect of two plots to which it was stated that since Matai had executed a sale-deed in their favour relating to all the four plots and only two plots i.e. Plots No.64 and 203 were the subject matter of the sale-deed executed and registered by Matai in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3. Hence, the plea was confined to Plots No.64 and 203.
26. In the aforesaid backdrop, another undisputed fact that emerges that till date there is no suit assailing the cancellation of the registered Will executed by Matai in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 relating to Plots No.157 and 163.
27. Before proceeding further, it will be appropriate to notice the dictum of the Apex Court in Veena Singh v. District Registrar/Additional Collector (F/R) and another, (2022) 7 SCC 1, where the Apex Court has considered the scheme of Section 73 of the Act of 1908 including the remedies available in cases where there is a dispute and how Section 73 is different to Section 74 of the Act of 1908. For ease of reference, certain relevant paragraphs of the said report are being reproduced hereinafter:-
"31. Section 71 requires the Sub-Registrar who refuses to register a document, except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situated within his sub-district, to make an order of refusal and record his reasons, and endorse the refusal of registration on the document. Further, the Sub-Registrar is required to furnish a copy of the reasons recorded, to any person executing or claiming under the document.
32. Section 72 provides for an appeal to the Registrar from an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing registration on a ground other than the denial of execution. Section 72 is in the following terms:
?72. Appeal to Registrar from orders of Sub-Registrar refusing registration on ground other than denial of execution.?(1) Except where the refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against an order of a Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whether the registration of such document is compulsory or optional) to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate, if presented to such Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order; and the Registrar may reverse or alter such order.
(2) If the order of the Registrar directs the document to be registered and the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order, the Sub-Registrar shall obey the same, and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59 and 60; and such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration.?
In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 72, an appeal lies to the Registrar against an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration, except where the refusal is made on the ground of a denial of execution.
33. Section 73 provides for an application to the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground of a denial of execution. Section 73 provides thus:
?73. Application to Registrar where Sub-Registrar refuses to register on ground of denial of execution.?(1) When a Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground that any person by whom it purports to be executed, or his representative or assign, denies its execution, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent authorised as aforesaid, may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate in order to establish his right to have the document registered.
(2) Such application shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by a copy of the reasons recorded under Section 71, and the statements in the application shall be verified by the applicant in manner required by law for the verification of plaints.?
34. In terms of Section 73, where a Sub-Registrar refuses registration on the ground that the person by whom it purports to be executed (or their representative or assign) denies execution, any person who claims under the document (or a representative assign or authorised agent) may apply to the Registrar within thirty days ?in order to establish [their] rights to have the document registered?. Such an application has to be in writing, accompanied by the reasons recorded under Section 71. The statements in the application have to be verified in the manner required by law for the verification of plaints.
35. On such an application being preferred, the Registrar has to follow the procedure which is spelt out in Section 74. Section 74 stipulates as follows:
?74. Procedure of Registrar on such application.?In such case, and also where such denial as aforesaid is made before a Registrar in respect of a document presented for registration to him, the Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire?
(a) whether the document has been executed;
(b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presenting the document for registration, as the case may be, so as to entitle the document to registration.?
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38. Section 76 provides for that the order of refusal by the Registrar under Sections 72 or 75 has to be reasoned, and the Registrar is required to furnish a copy of the reasons recorded to any person executing or claiming under the document. It further provides that no appeal shall lie against such an order of refusal.
39. In the event of a refusal by the Registrar, a suit can be filed by a party in terms of the provisions of Section 77 before a civil court, praying for a decree directing the document to be registered. On the other hand, an order of the Registrar directing the registration of a document is amenable to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. While seeking a writ of certiorari, the person moving the petition before the High Court would be entitled to establish whether the registration has been ordered in breach of the statutory provisions and is contrary to law. The mere existence of the remedy available before a civil court, under Section 9CPC to avoid the document or to seek a declaration in regard to its invalidity, will not divest a person, who complains that the order passed by Registrar for the registration of the document was contrary to statutory provisions, of the remedy which is available in the exercise of a Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, whether a writ should be entertained lies at the discretion of the Court and in a given case, the High Court may decline to do so on the ground that disputed questions of fact arise. However, it needs to be emphasised that in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction, it would be open to the High Court to determine as to whether the statutory provisions which guide the power of the Sub-Registrar or, as the case may be, the Registrar to order the registration of the document have been duly fulfilled.
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73. The ?execution? of a document does not stand admitted merely because a person admits to having signed the document. Such an interpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when an individual is made to sign a document without fully understanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation would unfairly put the burden upon the person denying execution to challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court, since registration will have to be allowed once the signature has been admitted.
74. In giving meaning to the expression ?execute? in the provisions of the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopt a purposive construction to protect, facilitate and achieve the object of registration. In Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 363 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 126] , R.V. Raveendran, J., speaking for a two-Judge Bench of this Court, highlighted the purpose of registration : (SCC pp. 367-68, para 18)
?18. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s) presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified.?
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76. The Registration Act exists so that information about documents can be put into the public domain, where it can be accessed by anyone in order to prevent forgeries and fraud, and so that individuals can be aware of the status of properties. If the interpretation conflating signing with execution is adopted, it would ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars will continuously end up registering documents whose validity will inevitably be then disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suit or writ proceedings continue, the document would remain on the public records as a registered instrument, which has the potential to cause more disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should not be adopted by this Court.
77. However, while adopting the current interpretation ? that the admission of one's signature on a document is not equivalent to admission of its execution ? it is important to consider the power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their procedures under the Registration Act.
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81. Sub-section (4) of Section 75 stipulates that for the purpose of the enquiry under Section 74, the Registrar may summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give evidence as if he is a civil court. The Registrar is also empowered to impose the obligation of paying the costs of the enquiry on a party, and such costs are to be recovered as if they have been charged in a suit under the CPC. Thus, sub-section (4) of Section 75 incorporates a deeming fiction from two perspectives ? first, in empowering the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and for compelling them to give evidence ?as if he were a civil court?; and second, in awarding costs which become recoverable ?as if they have been awarded in a suit? under the CPC.
82. The process which is conducted by the Registrar for the purpose of an enquiry under Section 74 cannot be equated to the powers of the civil court, though certain powers which are entrusted to a civil court are vested with the Registrar by the provisions of Section 75(4). A quasi-judicial function is entrusted to the Registrar for the purpose of conducting an enquiry under Section 74. Where the Registrar refuses to register a document under Sections 72 or 76, no appeal lies against such an order. Section 77, however, provides that when the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered, any person claiming under such document or its representative, assign or agents may institute a suit before the civil court within the stipulated time for a decree directing that the document shall be registered. It is thus clear that the Registrar, when he conducts an enquiry under Section 74, does not stand constituted as a civil court. The enquiry before the Registrar is summary in nature. The decision of the Registrar in ordering document to be registered, or for that matter in refusing to register a document, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review.
83. Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits their signature on a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar is bound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filed under Section 73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power of conducting an enquiry of a quasi-judicial nature under Section 74. If the Registrar passes an order refusing registration under Section 76, the party presenting the document for registration has the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act, where a competent civil court will be able to adjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively.
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93. The Registrar purported to exercise the powers conferred under Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the sale deed had been duly signed by the appellant and was therefore liable to be registered. However, the objections of the appellant raised serious issues of a triable nature which could only have been addressed before and adjudicated upon by a court of competent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, during the course of the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that in respect of the remaining area of 1000 sq m in the front portion of the land, a suit for specific performance [ Original Suit No. 568 of 2014.] has been instituted by the second respondent, resulting in a decree for specific performance dated 16-11-2018. As regards the subject-matter of the sale deed, the second respondent has instituted a suit for possession before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Fast Track Court [ Suit No. 264 of 2016.] , where certain proceedings are pending. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that the Registrar in the present case acted contrary to law by directing the sale deed to be registered.
94. In the impugned judgment [Veena Singh v. Collector, 2018 SCC OnLine All 6299] , the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has observed that registration does not depend upon the consent of the executant but on the Registrar's finding that the executant had actually signed the document. The High Court held that having found in the course of the enquiry that the sale deed was duly prepared by a scribe, that the attesting witness had stated that the sale deed was signed by the appellant and she also placed her fingerprints in their presence, it was open to the Registrar to direct registration in spite of a denial of its execution by the appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the High Court has, with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed with its execution. For the reasons mentioned earlier in this judgment, such an approach is completely erroneous and cannot be upheld."
28. From a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, it would be clear that where a person denies the execution and the Sub-Registrar in such cases is bound to refuse the registration, however, the powers under Sections 73 and 74 is not as the appellate powers and in such cases where the execution itself is disputed, there cannot be a direction for registering the sale-deed. Any person so aggrieved has right of approaching the Civil Court for getting their rights adjudicated.
29. In light of the law as laid down by the Apex Court in Veena Singh (supra) and applying the said dictum to the facts of the instant case, it would reveal that the private-respondents had already taken recourse to get the sale-deed executed in favour of the petitioners No.1 to 3 cancelled, however, the said suit remains dismissed for want of prosecution till date. It is also not disputed that the private-respondents did not assail the registered Will despite knowing the fact that their claim was of all the four plots but they only challenged the sale-deed relating to two plots and the registered Will which relates to the other two plots has not been challenged.
30. It is also relevant to notice that upon the commencement of the consolidation operations as informed by learned counsel for both the parties, the private-respondents though had initiated their objections under Section 9-A(2) of the Act of 1953, but even that could not be decided on merit and was dismissed for want of prosecution.
31. In the aforesaid backdrop where the private-respondents having taken recourse to regular proceedings for getting their rights adjudicated and having left them unattended, which resulted in its dismissal for want of prosecution and till date they have not been restored (as per the statements of learned counsel for the parties), this Court cannot permit the private-respondents to achieve something indirectly which they have failed to achieve directly as they had already instituted proceedings, before the Civil Court as well as the Consolidation Court, which are of substantive nature having binding effect on the title of the parties.
32. This Court is satisfied that in the given facts and circumstances which have been noticed hereinabove including the law laid down by the Apex Court in Veena Singh (supra), the Registrar had exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the impugned order directing registration of the sale-deed vide order dated 27.08.2001, apart from the fact that the order is also not sufficiently supported by reasons and is bereft of sound reasoning. Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 27.08.2001.
33. This Court further notices the fact that since there are proceedings pending before the District Court as well as before the Consolidation authorities are on the nature of [even though the substantive proceedings have been dismissed for want of prosecution] miscellaneous application seeking restoration, but the fact remains that if the said proceedings are revived then any observations made by this Court while setting aside the order dated 27.08.2001 may not be treated as an expression of opinion on merits of the matter which needless to say would be decided as per evidence led by the parties and as per the governing law. 34. Subject to the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 27.08.2001, passed by the Registrar, Gonda. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Jaspreet Singh,J.)
November 12, 2025
Rakesh/-
