Smt Geeta Yadav And Another vs State Of U.P. And Another
2025 Latest Caselaw 7039 ALL

Allahabad High Court

Smt Geeta Yadav And Another vs State Of U.P. And Another on 21 May, 2025

Author: Raj Beer Singh

Bench: Raj Beer Singh

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:85576
 
Court No. - 71
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 44264 of 2024
 

 
Applicant :- Smt Geeta Yadav And Another
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Dinkar Lal
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh,J.
 

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material brought on record.

2. This application u/s 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as BNSS) has been preferred for quashing of the entire proceedings, including summoning order dated 18.05.2023, of Complaint Case No. 4439 of 2021 (Suresh Kumar Yadav Vs. Manish Yadav and Another), under Section - 323, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station - Kankar Khera, District - Meerut, pending before the court of Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No.4, Meerut. The order dated 25.09.204, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge / Fast Track Court No.1, Meerut in Criminal Revision No. 496 of 2023 (Smt. Geeta Yadav and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another), is also being impugned.

3. It is submitted by learned counsel for applicants that impugned complaint has been lodged making false and baseless allegations. The injuries shown to the complainant are wholly false and manufactured. It was stated that when the applicants were summoned, by that time a first information report was already registered by applicant no.1 against opposite party no.2 and others but that fact was taken into consideration. Learned counsel has referred case of Mohammad Wajid and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 and submitted that there are no allegations so as to constitute the offence under Section - 504, 506 I.P.C.. Both the parties are members of one and same family. Learned counsel has referred statement of complainant and of witnesses and submitted that no prima facie case is made out against applicants and the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed. It was also stated that applicants have preferred a criminal revision against summoning order but that has also been dismissed without considering facts and law.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that in view of allegations made in the impugned complaint and statements of complainant recorded under Section - 200 Cr.P.C. and statements of witnesses recorded under Section - 202 Cr.P.C., a prima-facie case is made out against applicants. It was pointed out that opposite party no.2 has lodged the impugned complaint on 18.12.2020 and after that the applicant no.1 has lodged first information report against opposite party no.2. It is further stated that revision against summoning order has already been dismissed.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and material on record even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In well celebrated judgment of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 605, Hon'ble Supreme Court has carved out certain guidelines, wherein FIR or proceedings may be quashed but cautioned that the power to quash F.I.R. or proceedings should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

7. In the case of Mohammad Wajid (supra), in paragraph no.28 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under :-

"28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant."

8. At this stage, it would be pertinent to mention that revision against summoning order dated 18.05.2023 has already been dismissed by the Session Court. It is correct that availing of the remedy of the revision before the Sessions Judge under Section - 399 CrPC does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section - 482 Cr.P.C. but it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter.

9. In Deepti alias Arati Rai v. Akhil Rai & Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 751, the Apex Court held that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by sessions court is not maintainable and that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. In case of Laxmi Bai Patel Vs. Shyam Kumar Patel; 2002 0 Supreme (SC) 283, the Court held:

"3. Before taking up the merits of the case, it would be proper to consider the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a case where the sessions court exercising revisional power under Section 397(3)Cr.P.C. has dismissed the revision petition by the aggrieved party, a second revision petition about acceptance of the same party is barred. The position is well- settled that in such a case power under Section 482Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court in rare cases and in exceptional circumstances where the court finds that permitting the impugned order to remain undisturbed will amount to abuse of process of the court and will result in failure of justice."

10. Similarly in the case of Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri; 1993 (1) SCC 435, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that-

" .... Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well-settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence, the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of Respondent 1. On this short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside."

11. In the case of Rajathi Vs. C.Ganesan; 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118, the Court held as follows:-

"In Krishnan v. Krishnaveni(1997 (4) SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 544), this Court explained the scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The question before the Court was if in view of the bar of second revision under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code was prohibited, whether inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings.''

12. Thus, once the revision against summoning order is dismissed, the High Court in power under Section - 482 Cr.P.C. would interfere only where it is shown that if the complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of the process of Court or that interest of justice otherwise call for quashing of the complaint. The provisions of Section - 482 Cr.P.C. have reincarnated in Section - 528 of BNSS. Hence, similar analogy would be applicable in respect of application under Section - 528 BNSS.

13. In the instant matter, the opposite party no.2 has stated in his statement under Section - 200 Cr.P.C. that on 12.12.2020 about 08:30 AM the applicants have abused him and assaulted him with 'lathi' and sticks and resultantly he has sustained injuries. It was further alleged that when his sister-in-law Ritu Yadav came to save him, she was also assaulted. The applicant was medically examined at Government Hospital. The version of complainant is supported by the witnesses examined under Section - 202 Cr.P.C.. It would be relevant to mention here that the first information report was lodged by the applicant no.1 after this complaint was lodged by the opposite party no.2. The version of complainant is supported by his medical examination report, wherein four injuries have been shown on his person. Whether the offence under Section - 504 and 506 I.P.C. are made out or not, that can be considered at the stage of charge but in view of material on record, it cannot be said that a case for quashing of entire impugned proceedings is made out. As stated above, the revision against summoning order has already been dismissed and in such situation the interference under Section - 528 BNSS can only be made in case when there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice. In the instant matter no such contingency is made out. Applying the principles set out in the judgments referred above to the case on hand, no case for quashing of impugned proceedings is made out. Hence, the prayer of quashing of impugned proceedings is refused.

14. However, in view of facts of the matter and the contention that no case under Section - 504 and 506 I.P.C. is made out, it is directed that in case applicants move an application for discharge before the Trial court concerned within a period of three weeks from today, the same shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with law by the court concerned. It is further directed that for a period of three weeks from today and in case such an application for discharge is filed within the aforesaid period, till the disposal of discharge application, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants, provided the applicants cooperate in early disposal of discharge application.

15. The application under Section - 528 BNSS is disposed of in above terms.

Order Date :- 21.5.2025

S Rawat