Smt.Ram Pyari Devi And Others vs State Of U.P. And Others
2023 Latest Caselaw 16921 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:121616-DB
 

 
A.F.R.
 

 
RESERVED ON 16.05.2023
 
DELIVERED ON 31.05.2023
 
Court No. - 39
 

 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 32728 of 2000
 

 
Petitioner :- Smt.Ram Pyari Devi And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- H.N.Singh,B.N. Singh,Shyamal Narayan
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A.K. Singh,G.K. Singh,Harshita Raghuvanshi,R.N. Singh,Sri Nath Dwivedi
 

 
Hon'ble Salil Kumar Rai,J.

Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J.)

Heard Sri Shyamal Narayan, the counsel for the petitioners, Sri Ravi Kant Senior Advocate along with Sri Gajendra Pratap, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Sri Nath Dwivedi, the counsel for respondent no. 4 and Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava, the Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondent.

By way of present writ petition, the writ petitioners have challenged the demand notice dated 24.7.2000 issued by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur to respondent no. 4 to initiate the proceeding of freehold land of area 43,000 sq. ft. in Nazul Plot No. 103, Mohalla Arazi Chhawani City Gorakhpur. Subsequently, during the pendency of present writ petition, Prayer no. 1A was also added for quashing the sale deed / freehold deed dated 26.7.2000 executed by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur in favour of respondent no. 4.

The factual matrix of the present case is as follows : -

The ancestor of the petitioners - late Madan Lal Tekariwal was granted lease of Bungalow No. 07, Gorakhpur (subsequently which was re-numbered as Plot No. 103) which was having total area 66,795 sq. ft. by way of two lease deeds dated 1.11.1954 and another dated 3.12.1954. As per the terms and conditions of above lease deeds, lessee Sri Madan Lal Tekariwal had to construct residential building to let out the same to government officers. The above lease deed was for a period of 30 years which could be renewed upto a maximum period of 90 days. It was further mentioned in the terms and conditions of lease that the lessee shall let out the building exclusively for the residence of gazetted officer on rent and it shall not be occupied by him. After expiry of period on 30.4.1975, the lessee - Madan Lal Tekariwal also filed an application dated 8.7.1975 before the District Magistrate for renewal of his lease which remained pending till his death. After the death of lessee - Madan Lal Tekariwal, the petitioners being his successors moved an application dated 9.8.1977 for mutation of their name as heirs of late Madan Lal Tekariwal and also prayed that lease may be renewed in their favour. The above application of the petitioners was forwarded by the District Magistrate to In-charge, Nazul Nagar Palika, Gorakhpur for taking further action. The In-charge, Nazul Nagar Palika, Gorakhpur by letter dated 25.10.1977 informed the District Magistrate that the proceeding for re-vesting the land in question has been pending against lessee - Madan Lal Tekariwal, therefore, the names of the petitioners cannot be mutated as the heirs of Madan Lal Tekariwal and notice has been issued to the petitioners for the same, therefore, the question of renewal does not arise. But subsequently, there is no order on record that any order was passed on the application dated 7.10.1977 of the petitioners by the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate allotted the building constructed over a part of the land in dispute to respondent no. 4 on 27.7.1982 under Act No. 13 of 1972 with the stipulation that respondent no. 4 will pay the rent to lessee - Banwari Lal (petitioner no. 2). It is relevant to mention here that at the time of aforesaid allotment, the respondent no. 4 was an M.L.A. Thereafter, two renewal applications submitted by the petitioners were rejected by orders dated 9.6.1985 and 7.7.1985 on the ground that the petitioners had violated the terms and conditions of lease by making construction thereon without permission and it was further directed by these two orders that the petitioners should remove the illegal constructions within a period of 30 days. In case, they failed to remove the construction, then they will be evicted from the land in dispute including the building situated over it. Thereafter, in the year 1989, proceedings under the Public Premises Act were also initiated against the petitioners for their eviction from the land in dispute which remained pending. Thereafter, the State Government issued Government Order dated 1.12.1998. As per Para 10 of the Government Order dated 1.12.1998, former lease holders (पूर्व पट्टा धारक) were also given right to apply for freehold within three months from the date of receiving the notice, and in case, they failed to freehold the nazul plot, then rent control tenants residing in the building over nazul land, would get the right to apply for freehold. In pursuance of above Government Order, the petitioners had submitted two applications, one for commercial portion of land having area 15,800 sq. ft. and another for residential portion of land having area 50,995 sq. ft. along with treasury challan of required deposit. The State has executed freehold sale deed dated 20.3.1999 in favour of petitioners regarding commercial part of Plot No. 103 having area 15,800 sq. ft. but no action was taken on the application dated 27.1.1999 of the petitioners for freehold of the residential portion of Nazul Plot No. 103. But the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur had issued impugned notice / letter dated 24.7.2000 to respondent no. 4 to deposit required amount for execution of freehold deed in his favour regarding area of 43,000 sq. ft. in Plot No. 103 which was residential portion in the above land. This demand notice was under challenge, in the present writ petition but during the pendency of present writ petition, sale deed / freehold deed dated 26.7.2000 was also executed in favour of respondent no. 4 after taking required deposit from him. Therefore, petitioners, by way of amendment, have also prayed for quashing of sale deed / freehold deed dated 26.7.2000 regarding the land of 43,000 sq. ft. in Plot No. 103.

The petitioners have contended that the Government Order dated 1.12.1998 clearly conferred right upon the lease holder whose lease expired to apply and get the freehold deed executed in their favour within three months from the date of receiving the demand notice and his tenant (respondent no. 4) will get right only after the petitioners failed to get the freehold deed executed in their favour but the impugned demand notice was illegally issued to respondent no. 4 who was a tenant of the petitioners and thereafter impugned sale deed was also executed in his favour. It is also submitted by the petitioners that the right of the respondent no. 4 comes after the petitioners, not in preference to petitioners. As respondent no. 4 is admittedly the tenant in the building constructed by the ancestor of the petitioners and he had been paying rent to them, therefore, impugned demand notice as well as impugned sale deed / freehold deed executed in favour of respondent no. 4 are absolutely illegal. The counsel for the petitioners further relied upon query no. 11 and its answer of Government Order dated 1.12.1998 which specifically provides that if there is rent control tenant in the building over the nazul land then former patta holder is entitled to get the freehold deed executed in his favour within 90 days and, in case, he fails only then tenant will get right to get freehold deed executed in his favour. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that impugned demand notice as well as impugned sale deed / freehold deed was executed in favour of respondent no. 4 for extraneous consideration because respondent no. 4 was a Cabinet Minister at that time and was himself part of the Nazul Committee which framed the nazul policy in the year 1998. In support of his contention, the counsel for the petitioners also placed before the Court a copy of resolution dated 16.10.1998 of sub-committee of the Council of Minister which framed nazul policy in which the respondent no. 4 being Cabinet Minister was also shown as a Member. The counsel for the petitioners also produced before the Court, copy of freehold application dated 30.1.1999 of the respondent no. 4. This application was submitted by respondent no. 4 in the capacity of rent control tenant and not in any independent capacity.

Per contra, the counsel for respondent no. 4 submitted that lease of the petitioner expired on 30.4.1975 and their renewal application was also rejected in the year 1985 and this rejection order was not challenged by the petitioners, therefore, became final and land absolutely vested in the State. Therefore, the petitioners have no right to get sale deed / freehold deed of the land in dispute executed in their favour because he cannot be considered as पूर्व पट्टा धारकas per Government Order dated 1.12.1998. The counsel for respondent no. 4 further submitted that petitioners are unauthorized occupant as per Section 2(g) of U.P. Public Premises Act because their renewal application was already rejected, therefore, being unauthorized occupant, no right can be conferred upon them to get the freehold deed executed in their favour regarding the nazul land in dispute. It was also submitted by the counsel for respondent no. 4 that notice was issued to the petitioners as well as their ancestor for making illegal construction in the land in dispute, therefore, being violator of terms and conditions of lease, equity does not lie in their favour. After expiry of period of lease, State has rejected the renewal application of the petitioners, therefore, entire rights have remitted back to the State and being owner of nazul land, State Government rightly executed freehold deed in favour of respondent no. 4.

The learned Standing Counsel contended that the petitioners while filing the present petition, they had concealed the material fact regarding the rejection of their renewal application for the land in dispute. It was also submitted that the opportunity as required in query no. 11 of the Government Order dated 1.12.1998 was given to petitioners in 1976 by giving them notice for eviction from nazul plot for making construction in violation of terms and conditions of lease. Therefore, fresh notice as per Government Order dated 1.12.1998 is not required. It was also submitted by the Standing Counsel that the notices dated 9.6.1985 and 7.7.1985 were also given to petitioners for rejecting their renewal application for the lease of nazul land and also for their eviction but petitioners had failed to comply the same, therefore, the petitioners are unauthorized occupant. It is also submitted by the Standing Counsel that sale deed cannot be cancelled in writ jurisdiction and the remedy lies before the civil court, therefore, on this ground itself, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. It was further submitted by the Standing Counsel that the petitioners are neither in de jure nor de facto possession over the land in dispute and after rejection of the renewal application, land absolutely vested in the State and notice of the same was also given by the State to petitioners in the year 1985 and after the notice dated 19.6.1985, de jure possession was taken by the State, therefore, petitioners cannot be treated in possession. Hence, in view of query no. 11 of Government Order dated 1.12.1998, petitioners are not entitled to get the freehold deed executed because they were not in possession and respondent no. 4, being the statutory tenant, has right to get the freehold deed executed in his favour. Therefore, impugned demand notice as well as sale deed in favour of respondent no. 4 are absolutely correct and justified.

In reply to the contention of respondent no. 4, the counsel for petitioners submitted that respondent no. 4 himself was co-author of the policy including right of tenant or unauthorized occupants, therefore, impugned orders are nothing but colourable exercise just to grant undue benefit to respondent no. 4 in the garb of Government Order dated 1.12.1998 by misinterpreting the same. It was also submitted that respondent no. 4, who got the right as tenant from petitioners, cannot be conferred right to get the sale deed executed depriving the petitioners, who are admittedly his landlord. This fact cannot be disputed that the entire lease rent for the entire land of Plot No. 103 was deposited by the petitioners till the date of filing application for freehold as per Government Order dated 1.12.1998. But the State Government executed the freehold deed in favour of petitioners only for commercial part of Plot No. 103 and freehold deed of remaining residential part of Plot No. 103 was arbitrary and illegally executed in favour of respondent no. 4 and noting which was the basis of issuing the impugned demand notice in favour of respondent no. 4 itself shows that freehold deed regarding residential part of Plot No. 103 was executed in favour of respondent no. 4 only on the ground that tenant of the petitioners, i.e., respondent no. 4 cannot be evicted because there is a stay order in his favour in the rent control proceeding. It was also submitted by the counsel for petitioners that notice given to the petitioners in the year 1985 cannot be referable to Para 10 of Government Order dated 1.12.1998. Even otherwise, despite the above notice, commercial part of the land of Plot No. 103 was already freehold in favour of the petitioners. It was lastly submitted in his reply by the counsel for petitioners that Government Order dated 1.12.1998 did not make any distinction between former lease holder (पूर्व पट्टा धारक) whose renewal application is pending and whose renewal application has been rejected.

After considering the submission of counsel for the parties as well as on perusal of records, sole question arises for determination is whether the petitioners come within the definition of पूर्व पट्टा धारक as mentioned in Paragraph 10 of Government Order dated 1.12.1998 despite the fact that renewal application of the petitioners as well as their ancestor Madan Lal Tekariwal was rejected. For determination of this question, Paragraph 10 of the Government Order dated 1.12.1998 is being quoted as below : -

"10. पट्टागत नजूल भूमि पर स्थित भवन के रेन्ट कन्ट्रोल के किराएदारों के पक्ष में नजूल भूमि फ्री होल्ड किए जाने हेतु निम्नानुसार व्यवस्था की गई हैः-

यदि पट्टे की अवधि समाप्त हो गई हो अथवा किसी उल्लघंन के कारण राज्य सरकार को उक्त भूमि पर पुनः प्रवेश का अधिकार प्राप्त हो गया है तो फ्री होल्ड के लिए पूर्व पट्टाधारकों को अनिवार्य रूप से फ्री होल्ड कराने हेतु 3 माह की समय सीमा निर्धारित करते हुए समयबद्ध नोटिस दिया जाएगा (उसके द्वारा आवेदन किए जाने के समय जो भी सर्किल रेट लागू होगा, उसी के आधार पर फ्री होल्ड मूल्य आंकलित होगा। उदाहरणार्थ यदि इस शासनादेश से 2 माह के भीतर आवेदन करता है तो 30.11.91 के सर्किल रेट लागू होगें)। यदि वह उक्त निर्धारित अवधि में फ्री होल्ड नहीं कराता है तो पट्टा विखंडित करने की कार्यवाही नियमानुसार पूर्ण कर रेन्ट कन्ट्रोल के किरायेदार के पक्ष में फ्री होल्ड की कार्यवाही की जायेगी और वह किरायेदार सम्बन्धित भवन का डिप्रीसिएटेड मूल्य भूस्वामी/पट्टेदार को उपलब्ध करायेगा। किरायेदार के पक्ष में अद्यतन सर्किल रेट पर फ्री होल्ड की कार्यवाही की जायेगी जहाँ एक ही पट्टागत भूखण्ड पर एक से अधिक रेण्ट कन्ट्रोल एक्ट के अन्तर्गत आवंटी अध्यासित है वहाँ उन सभी आवंटियों के द्वारा दिये जा रहे किराये के अनुपात में उन सभी की परस्पर सहमति से सम्बन्धित भूखण्ड के उनके बीच विभाजन सम्बन्धी शपथ पत्र प्राप्त कर ही फ्री होल्ड की कार्यवाही की जायेगी।

इस सम्बन्ध में मुझे यह भी कहने का निर्देश हुआ है कि उपरोक्त संशोधन एवं परिवर्धन को तात्कालिक प्रभाव से लागू करते हुए कार्यवाही की जाय तथा नीति का विस्तृत प्रचार एवं प्रसार किया जाये जिससे इसमें निहित प्राविधान सम्बन्धित पक्ष भली-भांति समझकर इसका लाभ उठा सकें।

फ्री होल्ड की समस्त कार्यवाही मा० उच्च न्यायालय में दायर रिट याचिका संख्याः32605/91 सत्य नारायण कपूर बनाम राज्य सरकार आदि में पारित निर्णय दिनांक 15.10.97 के विरूद्ध उ०प्र० सरकार द्वारा मा० उच्चतम न्यायालय में दायर विशेष अनुज्ञा याचिका संख्याः1557-59/98 में पारित होने वाले अन्तिम निर्णय के अधीन होगी।

ये आदेश वित्त विभाग के अशासकीय संख्याः ई-6-2286/दस-98 दिनांक 28.11.98 में प्राप्त उनकी सहमति से जारी किये जा रहे है।

भवदीय,

अतुल कुमार गुप्ता

सचिव"

For determination of above mentioned question, Query No. 11 and answer thereto in Government Order dated 1.12.1998 is also required to be considered and same is also quoted as below : -

"11. जिज्ञासाः मेरे पास पट्टा था परन्तु पट्टावधि समाप्त होने के बाद अब मेरा कब्जा नहीं रहा, किसी अन्य का कब्जा है। क्या मै फ्रीहोल्ड करा सकता हूँ?

समाधानः जी नहीं। पट्टावधि समाप्त होने पर फ्रीहोल्ड की सुविधा तभी प्राप्त होगी जब आपका कब्जा भी हो। परन्तु यदि भूमि पर बने भवन में रेण्ट कण्ट्रोल का किरायेदार है तो आप 90 दिन में फ्रीहोल्ड करा लें अन्यथा यह अवसर किरायेदार को मिल जायेगा।"

From the perusal of relevant part of Government Order dated 1.12.1998 which are quoted as above, it is clear that there is no distinction in Government Order dated 1.12.1998 between पूर्व पट्टा धारक whose renewal application was rejected and whose renewal application is pending. In various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts cannot add or substitute or reject any word in the enactment / legislation. In Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. 2004 (6) SCC 672, the Supreme Court observed that a construction of an enactment which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. It was observed that it was well settled principle in law that court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below : -

"16. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.

17. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse). The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai, Nathjibhai Patel). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah)."

(emphasis added)

Previously also, the Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) 323 has observed as follows : -

"14. We are at a loss to understand the reasoning of the learned Judges in reading down the provisions in paragraph 2 in force prior to November 1, 1986 as "more than five years" and as "more than four years" in the same paragraph for the period subsequent to November 1, 1986. It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities.Vide P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, Mangilal v. Suganchand Rathi, Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, Hira Devi (Smt) v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, Nalinkhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai, Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth and CST v. Auriaya Chamber of Commerce, Allahabad. Modifying and altering the scheme and applying it to others who are not otherwise entitled to under the scheme, will not also come under the principle of affirmative action adopted by courts some times in order to avoid discrimination. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power."

(emphasis added)

Accepting the interpretation of Clause 10 of the Government Order dated 1.12.1998 as pleaded by the respondents would amount to reading words in the enactment, i.e., former lease holders would be read as former lease holders whose renewal application is still pending and has not been rejected. We do not find anything in the Government Order dated 1.12.1998 which could persuade us to add such words in the enactment. There is no ambiguity or vagueness in Clause 10 of the Government Order dated 1.12.1998. Therefore, while interpreting Government Order dated 1.12.1998, distinction cannot be drawn by this Court between पूर्व पट्टा धारक whose renewal application has been rejected and whose application for renewal is pending in absence of any such distinction in Government Order dated 1.12.1998. This is also clear from the above quoted provision of Government Order dated 1.12.1998 that पूर्व पट्टा धारक (Former Lease Holder) will have first right to freehold, therefore, he is entitled to get three months' notice from the District Magistrate and if he fails to complete the formality of freehold, then his rent control tenant will be entitled to get the freehold deed executed in his favour. In the present case, despite application of the petitioners for freehold of the nazul land in dispute, demand notice for the residential part of Plot No. 103, was not issued to him to get the freehold deed executed. On the other hand, the respondent no. 4 who was the rent control tenant was given first right to get the freehold deed executed regarding the plot in dispute by issuing him impugned demand notice and thereafter during the pendency of present petition, impugned sale deed was executed in his favour by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur.

The contention of the counsel for respondent no. 4 is that on expiry of lease of plot in dispute, the same vested in the State absolutely. Therefore, the State Government was well within its power to execute the freehold deed in favour of respondent no. 4 ignoring Government Order dated 1.12.1998, cannot be accepted because action of the State Government should be as per the Government Policy regarding nazul plot, i.e., Government Order dated 1.12.1998. This fact is undisputed that respondent no. 4 was the tenant of petitioners, therefore, possession of respondent no. 4 will be deemed to be constructive possession of petitioners or possession on behalf of petitioners. The respondent no. 4 cannot get better right than the petitioners regarding freehold of nazul plot. On the one hand, the State Government itself executed freehold deed / sale deed of part of the land in Plot No. 103 and denied the same regarding other part by issuing demand notice to rent control tenant contrary to Government Order dated 1.12.1998 and thereafter executed sale deed dated 26.7.2000 for remaining part of Plot No. 103 which is in dispute. This fact also shows arbitrariness on the part of the State Government.

The argument of the counsel for respondent no. 4 also suffers from a fallacy and is self-defeating. Freehold rights, under the policy of the Government are granted only on plots which are on lease and which have not vested in the Government. No freehold rights can be granted by the Government in a plot which absolutely vests in it free from all encumbrances. Thus, even if the argument of respondent no. 4 is accepted, the freehold deed executed in his favour is illegal and contrary to law.

The argument of the counsel for the respondents that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable as it involves adjudication of the validity of the sale deed dated 26.7.2000 and this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot quash a sale deed is also not acceptable. The sale deed has been executed by the State authorities in favour of respondent no. 4 and is subject to the same scrutiny as any other act of the State authorities would be. Judicial review of state action is permissible even in contractual matters. Normally, a writ court does not exercise its prerogative jurisdiction under Article 226, in cases, where the validity of sale deeds executed by private parties are concerned in as much as adjudging the validity of the said sale deed would require oral and documentary evidence and assessment of evidence for which writ proceedings may not be the appropriate remedy. But in the present case, the sale deed, as noted earlier, has been executed by the State and the action of the State in executing the said sale deed is to be judged on grounds of jurisdiction and the principle of non-arbitrariness and non-discrimination. The issue regarding the validity of the sale deed, in the present case, does not raise any question of private law but raises questions of public law. No disputed questions of fact are involved and no evidence regarding execution of the sale deed is required in the case to adjudicate the validity of the said sale deed. The validity of sale deed is dependent on the validity of the demand notice issued in favour of respondent no. 4 and on the decision of this Court regarding the freehold rights of the petitioners in the land which right is claimed against the State. It is settled law that the power of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are plenary powers and are not fatal by any legal constrains. (Reference may be made to Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India & Ors. 1999 (6) SCC 667). The power under Article 226 is to ensure that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that various public authorities and tribunals are kept within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. The remedy provided under Article 226 is a remedy against the violation of the rights of a citizen by the State or statutory authority and it is a remedy in public law. (Reference may be made to Mohammed Hanif vs. The State of Assam 1969 (2) SCC 782). In the present case, the petitioners have approached the court for enforcement of their rights against the State and raise issues relating to the powers and jurisdiction of the State authorities. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is maintainable and the argument of the counsel for the petitioners on that ground also stands rejected. In view of the above, demand notice dated 24.7.2000 executed by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur as well as sale deed dated 26.7.2000 executed by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur in favour of respondent no. 4 are, hereby, quashed and respondent no. 2 is directed to consider the application of the petitioners for residential portion of Plot No. 103 Bungalow No. 07, Gorakhpur having area of 50,995 sq. ft. and issue demand notice to the petitioners to fulfill the formalities to execute the sale deed for the aforesaid nazul plot and thereafter on completion of formalities of aforesaid demand notice, sale deed of the aforesaid nazul plot be executed in favour of petitioners.

With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is disposed of.

Order Date :- 31.5.2023

Satyam