Kamla Shankar Gupta vs State Of U.P. And Another
2023 Latest Caselaw 16242 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

                     Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:117575				                
 
REPORTABLE
 
Reserved on May 11, 2023
 
Delivered on May 23, 2023
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 

 

 

 
X						                  			 ..Revisionist
 
v/s
 
State of U.P.  & Another					 	   ...Opposite Parties
 

 
JUDGMENT

HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR PACHORI, J.

1. Heard Sri S.P.S. Parmar, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri Ghanshyam Kesarwani, Learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and perused the material available on record. Despite the service of notice upon opposite party no. 2, none has appeared.

2. The present criminal revision has been preferred by the revisionist/juvenile through his father to set aside the judgment and order dated May 24, 2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge Court No. 1 Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 2018 by which the appellate court has rejected the Criminal Appeal and affirmed the order dated January 19, 2018 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Bhadohi whereby the Juvenile Justice Board (hereinafter referred as "JJB") convicted and awarded the revisionist/juvenile to undergo observation home for a period of six month and imposed fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 376, 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Court (in short "I.P.C.) and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter referred "D.P. Act").

3. Brief facts of the present case are that the marriage of the daughter of first informant was solemnized with co-accused Jai Shankar Gupta on April 27, 2014 according to Hindu rites and rituals and he spent money over his capacity in the marriage but after some time of the marriage, the revisionist and other co-accused persons started cruelty and harassment with his daughter for demand of additional dowry of Rs. 50,000/- and refrigerator, cooler and they threatened his daughter to dire consequences, in case their demand is not fulfilled by her parents. The victim had told her parents about the incident when she came to her maternal home. The first informant persuaded the revisionist and other accused persons but after some time they again made cruelty with the victim for demand of additional dowry. The revisionist committed rape with the victim prior one and a half months ago. When the victim made a complaint to her husband and in-laws, they committed maarpeet with her by kicks and fist and stove and locked her in a room and would not let him eat or drink. On February 20, 2016 at about 4:00 p.m., they thrashed and abused her and left the victim near Girbargaon Middle School by a car. This incident was seen by Anil Kumar Mishra, Dinesh Kumar Gupta and other persons of locality.

4. The First Information Report has been registered on May 4, 2016 on the basis of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. dated April 5, 2016 against the revisionist/Juvenile (brother-in-law of the victim) and other co-accused Jai Shankar (husband of the victim), Subhash Chand (father-in-law of the victim) and Asha Devi (mother-in-law of the victim) as case crime no. 48 of 2016 under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. After completing the investigation of the case, supplementary charge sheet was submitted against the revisionist before JJB, wherein the revisionist declared juvenile on July 1, 2016.

5. The JJB on the basis of the statement of the revisionist was recorded for framing of charge against the revisionist under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

6. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 3 witnesses, PW-1 victim, PW-2 Satya Narain (father of the victim), PW-3 Sanju Devi (mother of the victim). The prosecution witnesses PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 had not supported the prosecution case and they had been declared hostile by the prosecution. However PW-1 supported the prosecution case in her further re-examination. The revisionist admitted the genuineness of the prosecution documents due to which the examination of other formal witness had been discharged.

7. After examining the prosecution evidence, the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of the revisionist was recorded, wherein he stated that the prosecution evidence is false and he has been falsely implicated in the present case due to enmity. He denied to led any evidence in defence.

8. Learned counsel for the revisionist argued before the JJB that the prosecution witnesses including the victim had not supported the prosecution case and they were declared hostile; after re-examination by the prosecution, opportunity had not been given to the revisionist to cross-examine the victim; the victim changed her statements in her re-examination due to which she cannot be considered a trustworthy witness; the medical examination of the victim was conducted after one and a half month of the incident.

9. Learned JJB after thorough examination of the prosecution evidence found that the victim (PW-1) supported the prosecution case in her re-examination and found guilty under Sections 498-A, 323, 376, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and awarded the revisionist to undergo observation home for a period of six month and imposed Rs. 5,000/- fine.

10. The appellate court found that the revisionist had not filed any appeal against the rejection of application by the JJB which was filed for cross-examination of the victim. He cannot further assail the judgment on this ground and there is no illegality in the appreciation of evidence and rejected the appeal. Being aggrieved by the impunged judgments and orders, the revisionist has preferred this revision.

11. Learned counsel for the revisionist vehemently urged that;

(i) the FIR was lodged on May 4, 2016 on the basis of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. dated April 5, 2016 by father of the victim after about one and a half month of the last incident. There is no explanation for delay in moving the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The delay in lodging the FIR assumes significance and casts a complete shadow of doubt on the prosecution case.

(ii) the JJB convicted the revisionist and found the charges against the revisionist proved on the basis of un-controverted evidence of PW-1 victim for the reasons below:

(a) initially; PW-1, PW-2 (father of the victim) and PW-3 (mother of the victim) had not supported the prosecution case and they were declared hostile.

(b) after completing the prosecution evidence statement of the revisionist under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded on April 25, 2017;

(c) thereafter the prosecution re-examined the victim under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. which was applied for proving the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

(d) in re-examination firstly, the victim proved her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., after that the prosecution asked some leading question in her chief-examination, wherein she denied her earlier hostility.

(e) no opportunity to cross-examine PW-1 had been given after re-examination of the victim, even after moving the application in this regard.

(iii) the prosecution case depends on solitary evidence of PW-1 and there is no other corroborating evidence. Even the prosecution could not prove the date and time of the incident with regard to the offence of rape.

(iv) the JJB did not seek any explanation with regard to the evidence put-forth by the victim in her re-examination. The statement of the revisionist under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had not been recorded after re-examination of the victim. The evidence led in re-examination cannot be used against the revisionist.

12. In the aforesaid background, it has been submitted that the JJB as well as the appellate court committed a gross error of fact as well as law. The prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction as recorded is against the weight of evidence and principal of natural justice. Hence, the impugned judgments and orders are liable to be set aside.

13. Per contra; learned Additional Government Advocate supported the judgments and orders passed by the JJB as well as the appellate court and submitted that the findings recorded by the JJB are on appreciation of the evidence and rightly held the revisionist guilty, which are neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence on record; the charges levelled against the revisionist had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, his conviction do not warrant any interference. The judgments and orders passed by the JJB and the appellate court are liable to be affirmed. The present criminal revision is liable to be dismissed.

14. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of learned AGA and have carefully perused the judgment passed by the court below.

15. Before I proceed to examine the weight of the submissions made on behalf of the parties, it would be useful to notice the law with regard to the ambit and scope of the power of the revisional court in interfering with the judgment of conviction.

16. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander & Another, (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court observed as under: (SCC p. 12 page 475)

"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits."

17. The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2008) 11 SCC 76, observed as under:

"9. In Duli Chand v. Delhi Admn, (1975) 4 SCC 649 the scope of invoking jurisdiction of the High Court in criminal revision was examined and it was held in a case involving vehicular accident as follows: (AIR p. 1960)

"The question whether the appellant was guilty of negligence in driving the bus and the death of the deceased was caused due to his negligent driving is a question of fact which depends for its determination on an appreciation of the evidence. Where the Magistrate, and the Additional Sessions Judge arrived on assessment of the evidence, at a concurrent finding of fact that the death of the deceased was caused by negligent driving of bus by the accused and the High Court even though justified in refusing to reappreciate the evidence reviewed the same in order to satisfy itself that there was evidence in support of the finding and that the finding was not perverse, came to the conclusion that the evidence established the death of the deceased was caused by the negligent driving of the bus by the accused, the Supreme Court on an appeal under Article 136 refused to interfere."

10. In State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu, (1979) 1 SCC 328, it was held that the High Court should not have interfered with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the Sessions Judge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction when there was no error of fact or law arrived at by the trial court or the Sessions Judge.

11. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452, it was held that the revisional jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappriciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice."

18. In State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand & Others, (2004) 7 SCC 659, it has been observed that: (SCC p. 22 page 664)

"22. The Revisional Court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred on the a appellate court by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 401 CrPC. Section 401 CrPC is a provision enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of appellate court, if necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a part of power of revision conferred on the High Court or the Sessions Court. Section 397 CrPC confers power on the High Court or Sessions Court, as the case may be,

"for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court."

It is for the above purpose, if necessary, the High Court or Sessions Court can exercise all appellate powers. Section 401 CrPC conferring powers of an appellate court on the revisional court is with the above limited purpose. The provisions contained in Section 395 to the Section 401 CrPC, read together, do not indicate that the revisional power of the High Court can be exercised as a second appellate power."

19. The findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered by the Supreme Court in Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 observed as under: (SCC p. 20 page 199)

"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence', or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admin.1, Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons2, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE3, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad4, Aruvelu v. State5 and Gomini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P.6)"

20. At this stage further questions arising for consideration before me are: Whether the prosecutrix, is a witness worthy of reliance? Whether the testimony of PW-1 who has been a victim of sexual assault stands in need of corroboration and, if so, whether such corroboration is available in the facts of the present case? Whether the findings of fact recorded by the JJB be held to be perverse?

21. It is settled position of law that a conviction can be based entirely on the statement of a rape victim, a detailed discussion on this subject is to be found in Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh7, as, thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix if found to be worthy of credence, and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. (Vide: Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh8, Ganesan v. State Rep. By Station House Officer9, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh10, Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh11, Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi)12, State of Rajasthan v. Babu Meena13, Mohd. Iqbal and another v. State of Jharkhand14, and Mohd. Ali v. State of U.P.15)

22. It is a well settled proposition of law that a prosecutrix cannot be considered to be an accomplice. As a rule of prudence, courts should normally look for some corroboration of her testimony in order to satisfy itself that the prosecutrix is telling the truth and that a person, accused of rape, has not been falsely implicated. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be relied upon without corroboration. It has also been laid down that the type of corroboration required must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence. However, if the court may find it difficult to accept the testimony of the prosecutrix, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. (Vide: Rameshwar s/o Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan16, Sidheswar Ganguly v. State of West Bengal17, Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana18, Modho Ram & Anr. v. The State of U.P.19, State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain20, Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey & Anr.21, State of Rajasthan v. Shri Narayan22, Karnel Singh v. State of M.P.23, Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty24, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.25 and State of U.P. v. Pappu @ Yunus & Anr.26)

23. It is settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, may not prompt the court to reject the evidence in its entirety. (Vide: State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash27, State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony28, State Rep. By Inspector of Police v. Saravanan & Anr.29)

24. It is a settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions, and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting the evidence to separate the truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions, and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness. As the mental capabilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statement of witnesses. (Vide: Sohrab & Anr. v. The State of M.P.30, Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat31, Prithu @ Prithi Chand & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh32, and State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar & Ors.33)

25. The delay in lodging the FIR in a sexual assault cannot normally affect the prosecution case, as held by the Supreme Court in various judgments, but where there is an inordinate delay in registration of the FIR, in such circumstances, it casts a cloud of suspicion on the credibility of the entire prosecution story and such type of delay would certainly be regarded as fatal to the prosecution case and thus, the whole prosecution case is under the cloud of suspicion and doubt. (Vide: Satyapal v. State of Haryana34, Karnel Singh v. State of M.P.35)

26. The absence of injuries on the body of the prosecutrix, generally, gives rise to an inference that she was a consenting party to coitus and shows that the prosecutrix did not resist but the absence of injuries is not by itself sufficient to hold that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. (Vide: Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana36, Devinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh37)

27. It is settled position of law that a statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. It can be used to corroborate the statement of a witness. It can be used to contradict a witness. (Vide: Ram Kishan Singh v. Harmit Kaur and another38).

28. It has been vehemently argued that the opportunity to cross-examination to the victim had not been given even after filing of the application by the JJB which violates the principles of the natural justice.

29. Having gone through the record of the JJB, it has been found that the chief-examination of the victim (PW-1) was recorded firstly on January 30, 2017 which was deferred and continue on February 10, 2017 after completing the chief-examination, the prosecution declared the victim (PW-1) as hostile and started cross-examination to the victim. On that date no endorsement has been made about the completing or deferring the cross-examination of the victim.

29 (i). The statement of the revisionist under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded on April 25, 2017 after completing the prosecution evidence.

29 (ii). On June 16, 2017, the prosecution was moved an application (paper no. 41D) under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for re-examination of the victim to prove the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The JJB summoned the victim without any speaking order.

29 (iii). On August 11, 2017, the statement of the victim in re-examination was recorded which was not completed and deferred. Thereafter, on August 18, 2017 the further re-examination was recorded and the prosecution was proved the statement of the victim recorded under 164 Cr.P.C. as Ex.Ka-3 and after proving the statement aforesaid, some leading questions by the prosecution in her re-examination were asked to the victim, wherein the victim she denied her earlier statement.

29 (iv). On August 29, 2017 the revisionist filed an application for permission to cross-examination of the victim which was rejected after observing as the application was filed under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. for cross-examination to victim.

29 (v). It is clear from the record that the victim re-examined on the basis of an application of the prosecution under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and after re-examination of the victim which was completed on August 18, 2017. After recording the statement of the revisionist under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on April 25, 2017 and after re-examination of the victim, opportunity to cross-examination to the victim (PW-1) had not been given. It is also a surprising fact that after completing the re-examination of the victim (PW-1) the statement of the revisionist under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had not been recorded by the JJB.

30. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan39, it has been observed that the rules of natural justice, require that a party must be given the opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence upon which he relies, and further that, the evidence of the opposite party should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party. Not providing the said opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, would violate the principles of natural justice.

31. In the absence of such an opportunity, it cannot be held that the matter has been decided in accordance with law, as cross-examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of natural justice. (Vide: Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.40, Union of India v. T. R. Varma41, Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen42, M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & Ors.43, New India Assurance Company Ltd . v . Nusli Neville Wadia and Anr.44, Rachpal Singh & Ors. v. Gurmit Kaur & Ors.45, Biecco Lawrie Ltd. and others v. State of West Bengal & Anr.46 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha47)

32. The scope of Section 313 Cr.P.C. considered by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya vs State Of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722, it was observed that: (SCC p. 30 page 735)

"30. In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused person under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice i.e. audi alterum partem. This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the court must take note of such explanation. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the incriminating material that has surfaced against him. The circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration."

33. Keeping in mind the legal principles noticed above, now, I shall examine the weight of the submissions with reference to the evidence led by the prosecution and the findings returned thereon.

34. The revisionist (brother-in-law of the victim) was 14 years 7 month and 3 days old on February 20, 2016 as declared by the Juvenile Justice Board vide its order dated July 1, 2016. As per prosecution case, after of marriage of the victim (PW-1) which was solemnized on April 27, 2014 and till February 20, 2016 the revisionist and other accused person made cruelty, harassment and committed Marpeet with the victim for demand of additional dowry of Rs. 50,000/- and refrigerator, cooler. On February 20, 2016 at about 4:00 p.m., the revisionist and other accused persons thrashed and abused the victim and left her near parental house and the revisionist committed of offence of rape with the victim prior one month and 15 days of February 20, 2016.

35. PW-1 (the victim), PW-2 (father of the victim) and PW-3 (mother of the victim) have not supported the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution. So far as concerned with the regard to the offence of rape PW-1 in re-examination proved her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. But it is settled proposition of law that a statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. It can be used to corroborate the statement of a witness. It can be used to contradict a witness. PW-1 firstly she stated that the revisionist had not committed rape with her and she had given the statement before the Magistrate on the instance of the police; secondly she stated in her re-examination that she stated in earlier examination under the effect of compromise by which the parties settled the matrimonial dispute out of the court and permanent alimony had been given to the victim but now she want to punish the revisionist for the offence of rape as he committed with her.

36. It is settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana48, Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa49, Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka50 and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of M.P.51).

37. It is noteworthy that after re-examination of PW-1, opportunity to cross-examination had not been given to the revisionist and there is no other evidence to corroborate her evidence. It is also significance that prior recording the statement of the revisionist under Section 313 Cr.P.C. after re-examination of the victim and even after proving the statement under 164 Cr.P.C. by the victim, opportunity to cross-examination to the victim had not been given.

38. On a totality of the consideration of entire evidence and keeping in mind the settled position of law as noted hereinabove, I am unhesitatingly of the opinion that the testimony of PW-1 victim, is unreliable. PW-1 victim is solitary witness and the evidence of the victim does not inspire confidence. The contrary view taken by the JJB and the appellate court is against the weight of the evidence as well as principal of natural justice. I hardly find objective evaluation, analysis, or scrutiny of the testimony in a proper persepective. Both the courts, in my view, was not right and justified in lightly brushing aside that the revisionist had not filed any appeal against the rejection of application for cross-examination to the victim, when the entire prosecution rested on a sole testimony of PW-1 victim.

39. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence, it is fit case for interfere as revisional jurisdiction to set aside the impugned judgments and orders.

40. For all the reasons recorded and discussed above, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the revisionist beyond reasonable doubt. As the evidence on record does not bring home the guilt of the revisionist beyond the pale of doubt, the revisionist is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the revisionist is entitled to be acquitted of all the charges for which he was tried.

41. As a result, the criminal revision is allowed. The judgments and orders of conviction as well as awarded the revisionist to undergo observation home for a period of six month for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 376, 504 and 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and fine of Rs. 5000/-. by the JJB which was affirmed by the appellate court are set aside. The revisionist is acquitted of all the charges for which he has been tried.

42. The trial court record be returned forthwith together with a certified copy of this judgment.

(Sanjay Kumar Pachori, J.)

Date: May 23, 2023

Ishan