Allahabad High Court
Balaji Stone Crusher Thru. ... vs State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. ... on 2 August, 2022
Bench: Manish Kumar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Court No. - 20
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7606 of 2019
Petitioner :- Balaji Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Smt. Kiran Saini
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7594 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S National Associates Thru. Partner Anil Sharma
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Special Secy. Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7808 of 2019
Petitioner :- Rao Stone Products Saharanpur Thru. Prop. Bhupendra Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Spl. Secy. Deptt.Of Geology And Mines And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7816 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Ganpati Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Anil Saini
Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Spl. Secy. Deptt.Of Geology And Mines And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7842 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Raja Ram Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Karan Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Spl. Secy. Deptt.Of Geology And Mines And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7846 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Neelkanth Stone Crusher And Screening Plant Thru. Partner
Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Spl. Secy. Deptt.Of Geology And Mines And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7850 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Neelkanth Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Anil Kumar
Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Spl. Secy. Deptt.Of Geology And Mines And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7874 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S S.S.Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Sukhvendra Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7886 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Tugania Stone Crusher Saharanpur Thoru.Its Partner
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Throu.Spl.Secy.Deptt.Of Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 10236 of 2019
Petitioner :- Amit Jain
Respondent :- State U.P. Thru. Special Secy. Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Anand Mani Tripathi,Akhilesh Kumar,Dilip Pandey
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 14989 of 2019
Petitioner :- Mahmood Ali And Ors.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Anand Mani Tripathi,Akhilesh Kumar,Dilip Kumar Pandey
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 11986 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Saharanpur Stone Products Trhu. Partner Mahendra Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Gagan Katyaayan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 11988 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Jai Durge Enterprises Thru. Partner Subhash Mahajan
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Garima Dixit,Himanshu
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 11999 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Mohit Stone Crusher Thru Partner Mahavir Singh And Ors.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lucknow And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Garima Dixit,Himanshu
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12003 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S River Stone Crusher Thru Partner Raj Kishore Saini
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lucknow And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Gagan Katyaayan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12022 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Baba Bansi Stone Crusher Thru. Anoop Agarwal
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Gagan Katyaayan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12027 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Maharaja Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Rishi Pal
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Gagan Katyaayan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12030 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Ganpati Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Satish Yadav
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Garima Dixit,Himanshu
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12032 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Shiv Shanker Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Rakesh Kumar Ti
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Gagan Katyaayan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12038 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Banke Bihari Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Babita
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Garima Dixit,Himanshu
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12043 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Eshwar Gramodyog Sansthan Thru. Partner Ram Kumar
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Garima Dixit,Himanshu
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12046 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Shakumbhari Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Gopal Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Himanshu
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 12050 of 2019
Petitioner :- M/S Vishwas Stone Crusher Thru. Partner Pahal Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko. And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht,Gagan Katyaayan
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 13004 of 2019
Petitioner :- Sagir Ahmad
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lucknow And Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
along with
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 3255 of 2021
Petitioner :- M/S Ganpati Stone Crusher Thru.Partner Sandeep Kaushik
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Spl. Secy. Geology And Mines Lko And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Manish Kumar,J.
1. Heard Ms. Pushpila Bisht, Sri Dilip Pandey, Sri Akhilesh Kumar, Sri Anand Mani Tripathi, Sri Gagan Katyaayan, Ms. Garima Dixit, Sri Himanshu, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing counsel for the State.
2. In all the above-noted writ petitions common questions of law are involved, thus, they have been heard in a bunch and are being disposed of by means of this common judgment to be applicable to all the writ petitions.
3. Issues involved in the aforesaid petitions are same except in Writ Petitions bearing Nos. Writ C Nos. 10236 of 2019 and 14989 of 2019 wherein the petitioners are lessee whereas in the rest of the petitions, petitioners are stone crushers.
4. The present writ petitions have been preferred for quashing of the orders passed by the respondent no. 1 whereby the orders allowing the revision on different dates had been recalled fixing the date for hearing and thereafter the order passed on different dates whereby the revisions have been dismissed by reviewing its earlier orders of allowing the revisions.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the show cause notices were issued against the petitioners by the District Magistrate, Saharanpur on different dates with charge of illegal mining carried out during the period of 2011-7. The petitioners had duly replied to the show cause notices and thereafter, the orders were passed by the District Magistrate, Saharanpur on different dates against all the petitioners levying charges for illegal mining upon the petitioners.
6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the District Magistrate, Saharanpur, petitioners had preferred appeals under Section 77 of the Rules, 1963 before the Commissioner, Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur i.e. respondent no. 2.
7. The appeals preferred by the petitioners were also dismissed by orders passed on different dates and feeling aggrieved by the same, the revisions were filed before the State Government/ Revisional Authority-respondent no. 1.
8. The Revisions preferred by the petitioners were allowed by the revisional authority by detailed orders on different dates after calling the objections from the District Magistrate, Saharanpur and the Mining Officer.
9. It is further submitted that the revisional authority in revision of Pradhan Stone Crushers, which is not the petitioner in this bunch of petitions, had sought some information from the District Magistrate, Saharanpur vide its order dated 05.03.2019 and in reply thereto, District Magistrate, Saharanpur had submitted its report stating therein that the persons who had preferred the revisions indulged in the illegal mining and the orders passed in Revision in their favour are liable to be recalled.
10. Thereafter, the revisional authority without issuing any notice or providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners had recalled its orders vide order dated 07.03.2019 passed in revision later on after notice and hearing the parties, dismissed the revisions by passing the orders on different dates.
11. The order of recall passed by the revisional authority i.e. respondent no. 1 is without jurisdiction as there is no power vested with the respondent no. 1 to recall its earlier order under the Rules, 1963. The only exception to recall the order in absence of any provision empowering the authority is if the order has been passed ex-parte. In support of their submissions, they placed reliance on the judgment passed in the case of Suresh Chandra Sharma Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, IV Kanpur and others reported in 2003 SCC Online All 399. The relevant para i.e. para no. 14 is quoted hereunder for convenience:-
14. However, the issue involved in this case has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlay's Bank case, 1980 Supp SCC 420 : AIR 1981 SC 606, wherein the distinction between a review and recalling an ex parte order has been explained and that was a case wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a matter of recalling the ex parte Award by the labour court itself. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that even in absence of any statutory provision if the labour court is satisfied that ex parte order has to be recalled, there is no bar in law for recalling the ex parte. Similar view has been reiterated in Satnam Singh Verma v. Union of India, 1984 Supp SCC 712 : AIR 1985 SC 294.
12. It is further submitted that there is no power vested with the respondent no. 1 to review its earlier order under the Rules, 1963 and hence the order has been passed without jurisdiction. In support of their submissions, they placed reliance on the following judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court.
1. Naresh Kumar and others Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2019) 9 SCC 416. The relevant paras on which reliance has been placed are 13 and 14, which are quoted hereunder:-
"13. It is settled law that the power of review can be exercised only when the statute provides for the same. In the absence of any such provision in the statute concerned, such power of review cannot be exercised by the authority concerned. This Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 808] , has held as under: (SCC pp. 445-46, paras 12-14)
"... 12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641] .)
13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844] , Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 321] , Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC 525 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 491] , State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement [State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement, (1998) 7 SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain, (2008) 2 SCC 705 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction.
14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the award dated 1-10-2003 could not have been reviewed by the Collector, and thus we allow these appeals and quash the order dated 4-7-2004 passed by the Collector in Review Award No. 16/03-04 as well as the order dated 4-3-2010 passed by the Delhi High Court in Naresh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naresh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2010 SCC OnLine Del 977 : (2010) 174 DLT 355] . The appellants shall thus be entitled to the compensation as awarded in terms of the award of the Land Acquisition Collector dated 1-10-2003, and the supplementary award dated 27-10-2004. No orders as to costs."
2. Dr. (Smt) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya Sitapur (U.P.) and others reported in (1987) 4 SCC 525. The relevant para on which reliance has been placed is 11, which is quoted hereunder for ready reference:-
"11. It is now well established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi-judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated 24-1-1987 by her order dated 7-3-1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 7-3-1987 was a nullity."
3. Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others reported in (2010) 9 SCC 437. The relevant paras on which reliance has been placed are 12 to 14, which are quoted hereunder:-
12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [AIR 1965 SC 1457] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [AIR 1966 SC 641] .)
13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844 : AIR 1970 SC 1273] , Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 321] , Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [(1987) 4 SCC 525 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 491 : AIR 1987 SC 2186] , State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement [(1998) 7 SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [(2008) 2 SCC 705 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction.
14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible."
4. Sunita Jain Vs. Pawan Kumar Jain and others reported in (2008) 2 SCC 485. The relevant paras on which reliance has been placed are 33 and 34, which are quoted hereunder:-
33. It is also well settled that power of review is not an inherent power and must be conferred on a court by a specific or express provision to that effect. (Vide Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844] .) No power of review has been conferred by the Code on a criminal court and it cannot review an order passed or judgment pronounced.
34. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] this Court held that a High Court has no jurisdiction to alter or review its own judgment or order except to the extent of correcting any clerical or arithmetical error. It deprecated the practice of filing criminal miscellaneous petitions after disposal of main matters and issuance of fresh directions in such petitions. The Court said: (SCC p. 175, para 10)
"10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error."
5. H.C. Suman and another Vs. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Cooperative House Building Society Ltd New Delhi and others reported in 1991 4 SCC 485. The relevant paras on which reliance has been placed are 33 and 34, which are quoted hereunder:-
33. The question of validity of the subsequent Notification dated August 29, 1990 whereby the earlier Notification dated October 27, 1987 was rescinded may now be considered. As noticed earlier, the Lt. Governor had passed the quasi-judicial order on August 19, 1985 in an appeal filed by the Society against the order of the Registrar declining amendment of the bye-law concerned. Relevant findings of the Lt. Governor along with the reasons therefor have already been extracted above. We have already pointed out that what weighed with the Lt. Governor in passing that order was that persons for whose benefit the bye-law was sought to be amended had become members of the Society many years ago, that their names figured even in the list of members which was supplied by the Society to the Department of Rehabilitation and which formed the basis for allotment of land to the Society and that it would be neither fair nor just to leave them in the lurch now by depriving them of their membership when they cannot become members of any other society. It was pointed out by the Lt. Governor that the proposed amendment in the bye-law was "designed to regularise such of the members". From the tenor of this order there can be no manner of doubt that the order was passed with a view to ensure that the persons who had become members of the Society many years ago should get the benefit of the amended bye-law by having their membership regularised. Such members could obviously get the benefit of the bye-law only if it was made retrospectively effective. The order of the Lt. Governor did not contemplate fresh enrolment of those persons as members after the passing of that order and the bye-law being amended in consequence thereof but it contemplated regularisation of their membership. This clearly indicated that those persons were sought to be treated as members as from the dates on which they had factually become members of the Society. We have also pointed out above that in our opinion in having the Notification dated October 27, 1987 issued, the Lt. Governor only took steps to give effect to the quasi-judicial order passed by him on August 19, 1985 so that the purpose of that order could be achieved. This being the true nature of the Notification dated October 27, 1987, the Lt. Governor cannot be said to have in any manner reviewed the quasi-judicial order dated August 19, 1985. On the other hand, the subsequent Notification dated August 29, 1990 even though purported to rescind the earlier Notification dated October 27, 1987 only it had keeping in view the nature and purpose of the Notification dated October 27, 1987 really the effect of reviewing and nullifying the quasi-judicial order passed by the Lt. Governor on August 19, 1985. In a matter such as this, it is the substance and the consequence of the Notification dated August 29, 1990 which has to be kept in mind while considering the true import of that notification. It is settled law that a quasi-judicial order once passed and having become final cannot be reviewed by the authority passing that order unless power of review has been specifically conferred. The quasi-judicial order dated August 19, 1985, as seen above, had been passed by the Lt. Governor under Section 76 of the Act. No power to review such an order has been conferred by the Act. In Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P. [(1966) 2 SCR 172 : AIR 1966 SC 828] an order had been passed by the government under Section 62 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithies and Zila Parishads Act, 1959, it was subsequently reviewed. The validity of this order of review was in question in that case. No power of review had been conferred for review of an order passed under Section 62. What was, however, argued was that the government was competent to review that order in exercise of power conferred by Section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891. Repelling this argument, it was held:
"The learned counsel for the State then contended that the order dated April 18, 1963, could itself be sustained under Section 62 of the Act. Reliance is placed upon Section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891, whereunder if any power is conferred on the Government, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. But that section cannot apply to an order made in exercise of a quasi-judicial power. Section 62 of the Act confers a power on the Government to cancel or suspend the resolution of a Panchayat Samithi, in the circumstances mentioned therein, after giving an opportunity for explanation to the Panchayat Samithi. If the Government in exercise of that power cancels or confirms a resolution of the Panchayat Samithi, qua that order it becomes functus officio. Section 62, unlike Section 72, of the Act does not confer a power on the Government to review its orders. Therefore, there are no merits in this contention."
34. We are aware that the Notification dated August 29, 1990 purports to rescind the earlier Notification dated October 27, 1987 only and does not speak in clear terms that the quasi-judicial order dated August 19, 1985 was also being rescinded. On the facts and circumstances of this case, as emphasised above, we are of the opinion that this circumstance hardly makes any difference inasmuch as even though the quasi-judicial order dated August 19, 1985 has not been expressly nullified, it has certainly for all practical purposes been nullified by necessary implication. This, in our opinion, could not be done and the Notification dated August 29, 1990 is ultra vires on this ground alone."
13. It is further submitted that there is only one exception where in absence of any statutory provisions, the authorities can review their earlier order i.e. if the order has been obtained by fraud. In support thereof, they placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1996) 5 SCC 550. The relevant paras i.e. 22, 22 and 23 are being quoted hereunder for ready reference:-
"20. By filing letter No. 2775 of 26-8-1991 along with the review petition and contending that the other letter, namely, letter No. 2776 of the even date, was never written or issued by the respondent, the appellant, in fact, raised the plea before the Commission that its judgment dated 16-11-1993, which was based on letter No. 2776, was obtained by the respondent by practising fraud not only on the appellant but on the Commission too as letter No. 2776 dated 26-8-1991 was forged by the respondent for the purpose of this case. This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be reminded that the authorities, be they constitutional, statutory or administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if they are obtained by fraud as fraud and justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
21. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural Distt. Council [1956 AC 736 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888] the House of Lords held that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate any act or order. In another case, Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502] (QB at p. 712), Denning, L.J. said:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."
22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business.
23. Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court, the courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court. Similarly, where the court is misled by a party or the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the court has the inherent power to recall its order. (See: Benoy Krishna Mukerjee v. Mohanlal Goenka [AIR 1950 Cal 287] ; Gajanand Sha v. Dayanand Thakur [AIR 1943 Pat 127 : ILR 21 Pat 838] ; Krishnakumar v. Jawand Singh [AIR 1947 Nag 236 : ILR 1947 Nag 190] ; Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram Rachpal Singh [ILR (1926) 1 Luck 341 : AIR 1926 Oudh 315] ; Saiyed Mohd. Raza v. Ram Saroop [ILR (1929) 4 Luck 562 : AIR 1929 Oudh 385 (FB)] ; Bankey Behari Lal v. Abdul Rahman [ILR (1932) 7 Luck 350 : AIR 1932 Oudh 63] ; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma v. Mammen Mammen [1955 Ker LT 459] .) The court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the court (Ishwar Mahton v. Sitaram Kumar [AIR 1954 Pat 450] ) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. (Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh [AIR 1958 Pat 618 : 1958 BLJR 651] ; Tara Bai v. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao [AIR 1985 Kant 270 : ILR 1985 Kant 2930] .)
14. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that under the Rules, 1963 though the authorities have no power either to recall or review its earlier order even then if the order has been obtained by playing fraud or it has been passed ex-parte, in that case, the order can be reviewed or recalled even in absence of power of review and recall in the statute/Rules.
15. After hearing learned counsel for the parties; going through the Act, 1963; record and the judgments relied by counsel for the petitioners, the position which emerges out is that under the Rules, 1963, the revisional authority is not empowered either to recall or review its order passed earlier.
16. In case of recall of earlier order, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Sharma (supra), wherein it has been held that in absence of statutory provision recall of order could be made if the order has been passed ex-parte, which is not the case of the State. In the present case revisions were allowed after hearing both the parties, it were not an ex-parte orders. Hence, recall orders are nullity.
17. It is also not the case of the respondents-State either in the counter affidavit or during the course of argument that revisional order allowing the revisions were obtained by playing fraud by the petitioners.
18. It is settled law that power of review can be exercised only when the statute provides or permits for the same and in absence of the same, the review application is not maintainable. The review is a creation of statute. The jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, order passed on different dates dismissing the revisions by reviewing its earlier order is nullity being without jurisdiction.
19. From the discussions made hereinabove, the order dated 07.03.2019 passed by the respondent no. 1 recalling the earlier orders passed on different dates whereby the revisions were allowed and the orders passed on different dates whereby the revisions have been dismissed are hereby quashed.
20. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are allowed.
21. Let a copy of this judgment/order be placed on the records of all the writ petitions as indicated in the title pages.
Order Date :- 2.8.2022
Ashish
