Ram Badal Mishra vs U.O.I. Thru. General Manager ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 496 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Reserved
 

 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 273 of 2021
 
Appellant :- Ram Badal Mishra
 
Respondent :- U.O.I. Thru. General Manager Northern Railway New Delhi
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Pradeep Kumar Singh,Amrita Singh,Manish Kumar Srivastava
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Manendra Nath Rai,Mahendra Kumar Misra
 

 
Hon'ble Manish Mathur,J.

(1) Heard Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for appellant and Mr. Mahendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for respondent.

(2) First Appeal From Order under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 has been filed against order dated 30.09.2021 whereby application for condonation of delay in filing claim has been dismissed along with the claim application.

(3) Vide order dated 26.11.2021, appeal had been admitted while summoning the lower court records, which have been forwarded by the tribunal concerned.

(4) Learned counsel for appellant submits that upon death of Late Ajay Kumar, on 05.07.2015, the appellant who is his father and dependent went into shock and was mentally disturbed for a prolonged time due to which claim application was filed with a delay of three years and six months. It is submitted that in the application for condonation of delay, cogent ground had been indicated for filing the claim application with considerable delay. It is submitted that the delay in filing claim application was neither deliberate nor intentional and occasioned only due to advice of counsel as per which considerable time was lost in obtaining police reports and other papers to establish death of deceased. It is submitted that the aforesaid factors have been completely ignored by the Tribunal while rejecting claim on the ground of delay. It is submitted that the provisions of Act being beneficial in nature, the Tribunal should have leaned towards hearing on merits instead of rejecting the claim application on technicalities.

(5) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Union of India has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for appellant with the submission that no cogent explanation was furnished by the claimant for filing claim application after three years and six months. It is submitted that actually the claim has been filed after four years, five months and 25 days from the date of alleged accident and it is only after excluding one year limitation that the delay comes to three years five months and 25 days as on the date of filing of claim application. It is submitted that such a delay was clearly intentional and willful particularly since the delay has not been precisely explained and as such was rightly rejected by the Tribunal.

(6) Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material available on record, it is evident that claim application of the appellant has been rejected by means of impugned order, while rejecting application for condonation of delay on the ground that reason for delay has been given only in general terms and has not been explained satisfactorily.

(7) Considering the aforesaid submissions, the following point of determination is being framed:

(i) Whether the Tribunal erred in law in rejecting the claim application on the ground of limitation without adverting to purpose of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987?

(8) With regard to aforesaid proposition regarding condonation of delay, it is apparent that there was an actual delay of more than four years in filing claim from the date of alleged accident but it is also important to bear in mind that the concept of compensation for accident arising out of and due to use of Railway in terms of Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 is clearly a beneficial legislation. The introduction and statement of objects and reasons of the Act of 1987 clearly indicates that the Act has been introduced to make the Indian Railways accountable to Indian Citizens in a democratic setup and to make it more efficient and accountable. As such, the aspect of condonation of delay is required to be seen in the context of a beneficial legislation enacted for the purposes of awarding compensation to persons who are injured or die due to an accident arising out of use of Railway property.

(9) Considering the said fact that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, normal conditions for condonation of delay in such situations are required to be relaxed.

(10) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others versus National Union Water Front Workers and others reported in 2001 (19) Lucknow Civil Decision 1339 has clearly held as follows:-

"9. ................... It is now well settled that in interpreting a beneficial legislation enacted to give effect to directive principles of the state policy which is otherwise constitutionally valid, the consideration of the Court cannot be divorced from those objectives. In a case of ambiguity in the language of a beneficial labour legislation, the Courts have to resolve the quandary in favour of conferment of, rather than denial of, a benefit on the labour by the legislature but without rewriting and/or doing violence to the provisions of the enactment".

(11) It is thus clear that while interpreting a beneficial legislation, an effort has to be made to give effect to the objective of the enactment, which in the present case is consideration of claim for compensation in view of loss suffered to the life or person of an individual.

(12) It is also settled proposition of law as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Singh and Others Versus Birbal and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 that limitation is statute of repose. It ordinarily bars remedy but does not extinguish a right with the only exception to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act 1968 pertaining to institution of suit for possession of any property.

(13) With regard to the concept of condonation of delay, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Manoharan versus Sivaranjan and others reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 163 has held as follows:-

"Answer to Point (ii)

8.In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 845], it was held that power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing the cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the case read as under: (SCC pp. 102-104, paras 11-13)

"11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172] held that the expression ''sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: (SCC p. 108, para 3)

''1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'

12. After referring to the various judgments reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266] , Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram [(1916-17) 44 IA 218 : (1917) 6 LW 592 : ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94] , Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006] , Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : (1979) 118 ITR 507] ,Lala Mata Dinv. A. Narayanan[(1969) 2 SCC 770 : (1970) 2 SCR 90] ,State of Keralav. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981 Supp SCC 72] , Milavi Devi v.Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366] ,O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] , Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172] , Prabha v.Ram Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] ,G. Ramegowdav. Land Acquisition Officer[(1988) 2 SCC 142 : (1988) 3 SCR 198] ,Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v.Union of India [(1991) 1 SCC 174] ,Binod Bihari Singhv.Union of India[(1993) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1993 SC 1245] ,Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India [1993 Supp (1) SCC 487] ,Ram Kishan v.U.P. SRTC[1994 Supp (2) SCC 507] and Warlu v. Gangotribai [1995 Supp (1) SCC 37] this Court inState of Haryana v.Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132 : (2002) 143 ELT 249] held: (SCC p. 138, para 11)

''11. ... The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid down to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.'

To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634 : AIR 1996 SC 2750] .

13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab [(1995) 6 SCC 614 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 57 : (1995) 31 ATC 787] this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : (2008) 228 ELT 162] this Court held that the purpose of the Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : (2008) 228 ELT 162] : (SCC p. 127, para 9)

''9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court."

"In Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village Vs. Bhargavi Amma (dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321, it is observed that the words sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the each case and also the type of case. It was held that word 'sufficient cause' occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.

In K. Subbarayudu and others Vs Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) (2017) 12 SCC 840, Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 11 has held that the term "sufficient cause" is to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. When no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the appellants, the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach in condoning the delay."

(14) Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present case, it is apparent that the Tribunal has taken a very pedantic and hidebound view of the application for condonation of delay. It is no doubt true that the claim was filed with considerable delay but the Tribunal was required to have taken a pragmatic approach to advance the cause of merit and justice instead of rejecting the application for condonation of delay merely on the ground of delay of three years and six months.

(15) Considering the fact that claim application was filed in terms of a beneficial enactment, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to have taken a pragmatic and justice oriented approach in condoning delay in filing claim application which related to death of the claimant's son. The tribunal has not recorded any finding that delay occasioned in filing the claim was deliberate, willful or intentional on the part of claimant. Without recording any such finding, the Tribunal was not required to have rejected the claim application. As a result the point of determination is answered in the affirmative in favour of appellant.

(16) In view of aforesaid observations, it is apparent that impugned order dated 30.09.2021 is not in accordance with law and is therefore set aside. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The application for condonation of delay in filing claim petition consequently stands allowed. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal concerned for consideration afresh of the claim application on merits.

(17) Office is directed to remit the lower court record expeditiously for the said purpose.

Order Date :- 05.04.2022                                                 (Manish Mathur,J.)
 
Subodh/-