Siemens Limited vs Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 920 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Court No. - 38								    A.F.R.
 
Case :- ARBITRATION AND CONCILI. APPL.U/S11(4) No. - 5 of 2019
 
Applicant :- Siemens Limited
 
Opposite Party :- Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. And Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Ronak Chaturvedi,Anurag Khanna,Senior Advocate
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Kapil Dev Singh Rathore,Girish Chand Sinha,Mukesh Kumar Singh
 

 
Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.

Re: Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 1 of 2019 & Re: Civil Misc. Review Application No. 2 of 2019.

1. Heard Sri Girish Chand Sinha and Sri Mukesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the applicant in review application and Sri Anurag Khanna, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ronak Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the respondent-claimant.

2. The present review application has been filed by the Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (herein referred to as the 'opposite party') being opposite party no.1 in Arbitration and Conciliation Application U/S 11(4) No. 5 of 2019. For ready reference, the relevant part of the order dated 08.05.2019, is quoted herein:

"Heard Sri Anurag Khanna, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Ronak Chaturvedi and Sri Shivank Diddi, counsel for the applicant and Sri Abhishek Srivastava, learned Chief Standing Counsel/Special Counsel and Sri Mayank Singh, learned counsel for the respondents.

This application is field under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by which the applicant has prayed for appointment of sole Arbitrator to resolve the dispute.

The applicant is a company, indulged in manufacturing rendering services in the sector of electricity related to component, supply and distribution.

The applicant company has entered into an agreement with the respondents Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited for supply of certain goods and related services viz. Implementation.

The said agreement executed in between the applicant and respondent no.1 on 25th day of August, 2014.

The said agreement dated 25th August, 2014 provides the special conditions of contract as well as general conditions of contract. The said agreement further provides as follows:-

"IN WITNESS whereof the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed in accordance with the laws applicable in exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court Of Judicature in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India and all courts subordinate to its exclusive Jurisdiction on the 25th August 2014 indicated above."

Clause GCC 7.2 of the said agreement provides as follows:-

"The formal mechanism for the resolution of disputes shall be:

If the parties fail to resolve such a dispute or difference by mutual consultation within twenty-eight (28) days form the commencement of such dispute and difference, either party may require that the dispute be referred for resolution to the formal mechanisms, described below (The date of commencement of the dispute shall be taken from the date when this clause reference is quoted by either party in a formal communication clearly mentioning existence of dispute or as mutually agreed):

a. The mechanism for resolution of disputes for bidders shall be in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of 3 (three) Arbitrators. Each Party shall agree and nominate a third Presiding Arbitrator.

b. The Arbitrators shall necessarily be retired High Court Judges and the umpire shall be a retired Chief Justice.

c. The place for arbitration shall be State of Uttar Pradesh."

Learned counsel for the respondent-Nigam has raised the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the instant application.

Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the conditions so as stipulated in Clause GCC 7.2 provides to resolve the dispute or the difference by mutual consultation within 28 days from the commencement of such dispute and difference.

Learned counsel for the respondent therefore submits that the applicant has not approached the Nigam as such has approached the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. Lucknow who has nothing to do with the dispute or difference arose between the parties.

Per contra, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on a document/letter dated 23rd August, 2018 by which the applicant has addressed the Executive Engineer, Madhayanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, office of the Managing Director, 4A, Gokhale Marg, Lucknow. 'Subject' so as mentioned in the said letter clearly indicates that the letter has been issued by the applicant for settlement of claims.

Admittedly the instant application has been filed by the applicant after expiry of the period so as indicated (28 days) in January, 2019.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, though no observation is required to be made on the merits of the issue, it cannot be disputed, at present, there exists a dispute between the parties, and that such dispute arises under the written agreement entered into between them, and also there exists an arbitration clause for resolution of such dispute. Further, the parties have not been able to appoint an arbitrator, of their own.

In view of above and as agreed in between the counsels representing the respective parties, this Court has no option but to appoint ............

List on 30th May, 2019."

3. At the outset, Sri Khanna, learned Senior Advocate appearing for M/s Siemens Limited (herein referred to as the 'claimant'), has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the review application. It is his submission that the application is not maintainable in law. The Arbitration Act being a complete code, there is no inherent or other power of review. No such application may be entertained in absence of a specific provision. Second, it has been submitted that in any case, the order dated 08.05.2019 being a consented order, no application for review would lie against the same. Third, he has also objected to the delay in filing the present review application. In view of the preliminary objections raised, it is considered desirable that the same may be first dealt with before proceeding to hear the substantive grounds of review.

4. On the other hand, according to Sri Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, this Court being a Court of record has ample power to review its orders, to correct its record. Inasmuch as the opposite party had never given his consent and the order dated 08.05.2019 came to be passed by the Court, overlooking the preliminary objection, which fact was first recorded in that order, this Court is obliged to correct its record and entertain the review application. In that regard, reliance has been placed by Sri Sinha on a recent decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Pushpalata Jain Vs. M/s. Raj Enterprises; AIR Online 2020 MP 551. He has also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Pratibha Industries Ltd.; AIROnline 2018 SC 891 and on a decision of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corp. & Anr. Vs. Indra Raj Verma & Anr.; AIR 2018 All 6. As a second limb of his submission, Sri Sinha would further submit that the review being sought is a procedural review and therefore, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors.; 1980 Supp 1 SCC 420, the review application is asserted to be wholly maintainable. Third, he has supported his submission on the strength of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, to submit that by virtue of Section 16 of that Act, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are applicable to the present proceedings as well and, therefore, the present review application would lie.

5. As to consent, it has been submitted by Sri Sinha that at no point of time any consent had been given by the opposite party to the appointment of an independent arbitrator. Referring to his objections filed to the Arbitration and Conciliation Application U/S 11(4) No. 5 of 2019 and the contents of paragraph no.2 thereof, he submits that the opposite party had first taken objection to the appointment of an independent Arbitrator by the Court both on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction (at Allahabad), as also on account that application being pre-mature as no effort had been made by the applicant in terms of Clause GCC 7.2 which mandatorily required the parties to first resolve their dispute/s by mutual consent. Not only that objection had been specifically raised in the written objection, but it had also been raised at the time of hearing as is recorded in the order dated 08.05.2019 in paragraph no.8 thereof. Thereafter, without referring to that preliminary objection raised by the opposite party and without recording the submissions advanced by the opposite party, a simple observation has been made "in view of above and as agreed in between the counsels representing the respective parties, this Court has no option but to appoint ...............". The said observation is stated to have been made under a mistake arising from the fact that Arbitration and Conciliation Application U/S 11(4) No. 5 of 2019 came to be heard along with Arbitration and Conciliation Applications U/S 11(4) Nos. 6 of 2019, 7 of 2019 and 8 of 2019. In those cases, an objection as had been raised by the present opposite party, may not have been raised and pressed. In those circumstances, there was consent between those parties for appointment of an independent arbitrator. Owing to that fact, a patent mistake or error has crept in the order of this Court dated 08.05.2019 which may be rectified. Last, it has been submitted, there is no delay in filing the review application.

6. The above submissions have been vehemently opposed by Sri Khanna. In support of his preliminary objection, Sri Khanna had first relied on two earlier decisions of this Court in Smt. Chandra Dickshit Vs. Smart Builders; 2008 SCC Online All 85 and M/s. Shiv Hare Builders through Proprietor, Agra Vs. Executive Engineer, Provincial Division, Public Works Department; 2010 SCC Online All 2309, to submit that the issue is no longer res integra inasmuch as in both those decisions it has been clearly opined that the order passed appointing an Arbitrator is not amenable to review. In that regard, he has also relied on a recent Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Antikeros Shipping Corporation Vs. Adani Enterprises Limited; 2020 (3) MhLJ 855, wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Pratibha Industries (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party and opined that an appointment made under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') is not amenable to review jurisdiction.

7. On the issue of procedural review, it has been submitted by Sri Khanna, though remedy of procedural review may remain to be exercised in an appropriate case, however, the opposite party has failed to establish any ground of procedural review in the admitted facts of the present case. Not only the opposite party was served notice in ARCO No. 5 of 2019 but it had filed its objections and was duly represented at the time of the order dated 08.05.2019 being passed. Thus, no ground of procedural review arises as the principles of natural justice and other rules of procedure were duly complied.

8. Second, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr.; (1982) 2 SCC 463, it has been submitted that the consent as recorded in the order dated 08.05.2019 is final and binding. The opposite party not only gave its consent through counsel as was then recorded in the order, but no objection was raised on the next date when the order of appointment of the Arbitrator was confirmed. No ground was taken, to that effect in the Special Appeal filed by the respondent. He has also referred to the grounds of appeal (as annexed to his counter affidavit). Then, even in the SLP filed by the respondent, no ground of challenge was raised to assert the lack of consent. Also, that leave to appeal was confined to challenge the order dated 23.8.2019 passed by the Division Bench. No challenge was raised to the order dated 8.5.2019. Thus, according to Sri Khanna, the issue of consent was dead. It was never raised, except in the present review application filed with a long delay for which there is no explanation.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, the admitted facts of the case are that the Arbitration and Conciliation Application under section 11(4) No. 5 of 2019 was filed by the claimant in January 2019, seeking appointment of an independent arbitrator for resolution of its disputes with Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. and U.P. Power Corporation Limited. Admittedly, there exists a written agreement between the parties containing an arbitration clause. Upon notice, the Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. put in appearance and filed its objections to the aforesaid application. Paragraph no.2 of the said objection reads as under:

"II. The respondent no.2 was nowhere party to the agreement and, therefore, he should not be arrayed as party to the petition. As such, once again, the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed for mis-joinder of parties.

III. The agreement, between the parties, was executed at Lucknow and as such, work and duty in this reference to the agreement was to be done in Lucknow, therefore, the petitioner has wrongly filed the petition at Allahabad, knowing very well this fact that the Bench of this Hon'ble Court at Lucknow has exclusive jurisdiction into the matter. As such, the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed for want of appropriate jurisdiction.

IV. The petition, filed by the petitioner for appointment of Arbitrator, is pre-mature as per Clause-GCC 7.2, which is referred in the petition itself, says that any request for arbitration could only be entertained only after the parties fail to resolve such disputes or differences by mutual consultation within 28 days from the commencement of such disputes and differences.

V. The GCC also provies that in case of arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of 3 Arbitrators and each party shall nominate one Arbitrator and these two nominated Arbitrators shall mutually agree and nominate a third Presiding Arbitrator. However, the petitioner himself has violated the terms of the contract and insisted for sole arbitrator. Therefore, directly approaching this Hon'ble Court for appointment of Arbitrator is wrong and illegal."

10. Around the same time, other applications came to be filed by the claimant with respect to similar disputes with other distribution companies namely - Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Pachimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited. Upon exchange of pleadings, all four applications being ARCO Nos. 5 of 2019, 6 of 2019, 7 of 2019 and 8 of 2019 came to be listed and heard together. The same independent arbitrator was proposed on all applications, by four separate orders, all dated 08.05.2019. Thereafter, for consent of the proposed Arbitrator, the matters were again listed on 30.05.2019 whereupon the Court allowed all the applications. At this stage, against the aforesaid order, the opposite party alone filed Special Appeal No. 696 of 2019. A copy of that has been annexed by the claimant - to its counter affidavit to the review application. That appeal was dismissed by order dated 01.07.2019, as not maintainable. Against that order, the opposite party preferred Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court being No. 17628 of 2019, which came to be dismissed, vide order dated 23.08.2019 on following terms:

"We find no ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court in view of the consent recorded. At this state, the learned counsel has prayed for withdrawal of the petition with liberty to approach the concerned court. Liberty is granted.

However, liberty is not granted to assail the impugned order afresh in this Court.

The Special Leave Petition, is accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn."

11. Thereafter, the present review application came to be filed on 01.10.2019 on which affidavits have been exchanged and the matter has thus ripened for hearing.

12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, it may be seen, at the time of the Special Leave Petition (filed by the respondent), being dismissed on 23.08.2019, the Supreme Court had granted liberty to the respondent to approach this Court. Though that observation may not give rise to maintainability of the review application if it is found otherwise not maintainable, at the same time, in the context of the explanation of the delay, it may be recorded that there were no other proceedings pending or permissible on that date. The review application was filed on 1.10.2019 i.e., within 40 days of the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court wherein leave to approach this Court had been granted.

13. First, it is observed, the review application was filed within reasonable time after the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court. Second, it may not be forgotten liberty had been granted to the respondent, by one Constitutional Court to approach another. In view that fact alone, the litigant who has approached the other Constitutional Court with that certified liberty, may not be left bemused and aggrieved, at the refusal or reluctance offered by the other Constitutional Court to allow him audience, on account of a small delay, if any. Cause shown is sufficient. Delay condoned. Accordingly, the delay condonation application is allowed.

14. Insofar as reliance has been placed by Sri Khanna on the orders in the cases of Smt. Chandra Dickshit Vs. Smart Builders (supra) and M/s. Shiv Hare Builders (supra), it may be noted, both orders had been passed by the then Chief Justice(s) of this Court, on 25.1.2008 and 26.11.2010, on applications filed seeking review of earlier orders passed under Section 11(6) of the Act, as it stood then. Undisputedly, at that time, the provisions of the Section 11(6) of the Act were materially different from those that existed when order dated 8.5.2019 came to be passed. Prior to the amendment made vide Act no. 3 of 2016 (with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015), Section 11(6) of the Act read as below:

"(6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,-

(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or

(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or

(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment".

15. The amended section 11(6)(c) of the Act reads:

"(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure,

a party may request the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or any person or institution designated by such Court to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.

16. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal Vs Associated Contractors; (2015) 1 SCC 32 has clearly opined (in the context of the unamended section 11(6) of the Act) that an application filed before a Chief Justice (either of a High Court or the Supreme Court) or his designate, was not an application filed before the Court of which that judge may be the Chief Justice or his designate. It was observed:

"17. .................It is obvious that Section 11(12)(b) was necessitated in order that it be clear that the Chief Justice of "the High Court" will only be such Chief Justice within whose local limits the Principal Civil Court referred to in Section 2(1)(e) is situate and the Chief Justice of that High Court which is referred to in the inclusive part of the definition contained in Section 2(1)(e). This sub-section also does not in any manner make the Chief Justice or his designate "court" for the purpose of Section 42. Again, the decision of the Chief Justice or his designate, not being the decision of the Supreme Court or the High Court, as the case may be, has no precedential value being a decision of a judicial authority which is not a Court of Record."

(emphasis supplied)

17. On the other hand, under the amended law, with which alone we are concerned, the power to appoint an arbitrator came to be vested in the High Court - as a Court, in place of its Chief Justice. Therefore, the order dated 08.05.2019 is indisputably an order passed by the High Court. Accordingly, the ratio, if any, involved in the two (single judge) decisions of this Court relied upon by Sri Khanna would stand distinguished, upon change of law. Similarly, in Antikeros Shipping Corporation (supra), the order of appointment of an independent arbitrator had been made on 21.04.2011 i.e., prior to 23.10.2015 - the date of enforcement of the amendment to section 11(6)(c) of the Act. Therefore, it was also an order passed by the person or institution designated by the Chief Justice of that Court and not by the Bombay High Court, itself.

18. In the present case, the order appointing an independent arbitrator had been passed post amendment, on 08.05.2019. Clearly, it is an order passed by the High Court, in exercise of the power vested on it under section 11(6)(c) of the Act. Therefore, the reasoning being attempted by Shri Khanna, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. That line of reasoning would remain applicable to cases falling under the unamended law only.

19. As to the nature of power, whether judicial or administrative, in the context of the unamended section 11(6)(c) it was held to be an administrative power, Ador Samiya (P) Ltd. Vs Peekay Holdings Ltd.; (1999) 8 SCC 572 as affirmed by a three-judge bench decision in Konkan Railway Corp. Vs Mehul Construction Co. Ltd.; (2000) 7 SCC 201. Later, upon another reference, in Konkan Railway Corp. Vs. Rani Construction (P) Ltd.; (2002) 2 SCC 388, a five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court confirmed the view expressed by the three-judge bench in Mehul Construction case. Finally, in SBP & Co. Vs Patel Engineering Ltd.; (2005) 8 SCC 618, a seven-judge Constitution bench held the power under section 11(6)(c) of the Act to be a judicial power, to be exercised either by the Chief Justice of a High Court or a designated Judge of that Court. Such judicial order was held appealable under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. That being the nature of that power, upon the 2016 amendment, a judicial power now vests in this Court, in place of its earlier vesting in the Chief Justice of this Court or in his designate.

20. In Jain Studios Ltd., Through its President Vs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.; (2006) 5 SCC 501 (a rare order of a Single Judge of the Supreme Court), it was reasoned, since the order appointing an arbitrator (under unamended Section 11(6) of the Act), passed by the Chief Justice of India or his nominee is an order within the meaning of Article 137 of the Constitution of India, that order would remain amenable to review power of that Court. However, the distinction between the "Supreme Court" and its "Chief Justice" and the consequential effect on the power of review remained to be noticed. Thus, it was a judgement pronounced upon an admission between the parties. It must therefore remain confined to the facts of that case. Even otherwise, for obvious reason of Article 137 being applicable to the Supreme Court alone, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied to proceedings before this Court.

21. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Anr. Vs. Pratibha Industries Limited & Ors.; (2019) 3 SCC 203, the High Court came to appoint a neutral arbitrator on 27.06.2017 (i.e., under the amended Act). It appears, that order was later recalled. However, upon an intra-Court appeal, the order of recall was itself set-aside by a division bench of that Court. Thus, the matter reached the Supreme Court. It was held,

"10. Insofar as the High Courts' jurisdiction to recall its own order is concerned, the High Courts are courts of record, set up under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Article 215 of the Constitution of India reads as under:

"215. High Courts to be courts of record.--Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself."

It is clear that these constitutional courts, being courts of record, the jurisdiction to recall their own orders is inherent by virtue of the fact that they are superior courts of record. This has been recognised in several of our judgments."

22. That being clear as daylight, the further submission of Sri Khanna that the ratio of that case is distinguishable on facts, is plainly unacceptable. Though it is true that in that case, there was no arbitration clause, and the arbitrator came to be appointed by the Bombay High Court on a mere statement made by an officer of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, which statement was later clarified to be without authority yet, that fact distinction is wholly irrelevant to the question of existence of the inherent power of review, vested in the Court, by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Existence of a power and the ground for exercise of that power would ever remain two different issues. While no reason to exercise a power may arise in absence of the power itself, it cannot be true, vice versa. Existence of power is a pure question of law, traceable to the statutory provision, in this case Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Whether, it would be exercised, may be examined while wielding that power. However, if there was no power of review, in existence, the occasion to exercise it would never arise.

23. In view of the categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Anr. Vs. Pratibha Industries Limited & Ors. (supra) and the admitted fact that the order dated 8.5.2019 was passed by the High Court and not its Chief Justice of this Court or its designate (as distinct from the Court itself), the review application is found to be wholly maintainable.

24. As to the consent, it is seen, not only the respondent had raised a preliminary objection by means of the counter affidavit to arbitration application no. 5 of 2019 but that it had also raised preliminary objections at the stage of oral hearing. It is clearly recorded in the order dated 8.5.2019. Though, the later part of that order does record that the parties agreed for appointment of the sole arbitrator, however, that order nowhere records, at any place, that the respondent gave up its preliminary objections. It is also difficult to accept that such preliminary objection once raised, would have been given up because the order also does not record, either the exact nature of the preliminary objections raised or any consideration thereof. Then, it cannot be lost sight that the said order came to be passed along with three other orders passed on similar applications filed by the applicant, that were also decided on the same date.

25. It thus appears that an error has crept in, while passing the order dated 8.5.2019. Thereby consent of parties came to be recorded. In view of the facts noted above, I am prima facie satisfied that the respondent did not give up its preliminary objection and therefore, the consent recorded, is not a true reflection of the record of proceedings that existed before the Court. Without a doubt a mistake has thus crept in the order dated 8.5.2019, probably, as suggested by Sri Girish Chand Sinha, owing to the three other similar applications having been dealt with on the same day wherein, upon consent, a sole arbitrator was appointed, in similar circumstances. Since, the consent did not exist, a review application would be maintainable.

26. That being the nature of mistake, it is also not truly relevant that initially the respondent did not raise the ground of lack of consent. Once it appears to the Court that such consent was not existing, the Court owes a duty to itself, to keep its record straight. To deprive a litigant of rectification of a mistake in the Court's record, when that mistake otherwise appears to exist, solely because the litigant did not come to it in the first instance, may never be relevant for this Court considering the obligation cast on it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The Court is not a party to the dispute. On the other hand, a litigant has complained that its record is incorrect. Thereafter, it is necessary for the Court, as a non-partisan and independent adjudicator to correct its record especially, since the litigant is not shown to have accepted as correct the order dated 08.05.2019.

27. Accordingly, the review application is found to be wholly maintainable in law, by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India and since no consent existed (of the respondent), to appoint the sole arbitrator. The observation made in the order dated 08.05.2019, to that effect, is erroneous.

28. In so far as, it has been urged that the Court has a power of procedural review, again, there can be no dispute to that. However, no ground of procedural review has been made out in the facts of the present case. As to the third line of reasoning adopted by Sri Girish Chand Sinha relying on the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, the same is left undetermined as this Court clearly has the power to review and correct it's record by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

29. Put up the review application for consideration on 01.02.2021.

Order Date :- 18.1.2021

SA