M/S Kamalsons, A Partnership Firm ... vs Mrs. Sajma And Others
2021 Latest Caselaw 9452 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

?Court No. - 20
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 989 of 2012
 
Appellant :- M/S Kamalsons, A Partnership Firm Thr.Partner Naveen Chadha
 
Respondent :- Mrs. Sajma And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Brijendra Chaudhary,Raghunath Singh,Vijai Kumar Srivastava
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Prabhakar Trivedi
 

 
Hon'ble Manish Mathur,J.

(C.M. Application No.31633 of 2018 for Restoration of the Appeal)

Application has been filed seeking restoration of the appeal to its original number by recalling of order dated 14.03.2018 whereby the appeal had been dismissed in default of appearance. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of answering respondent does not have any objection in case the appeal is restored to its original number. In view thereof the application is allowed and the appeal is restored to its original number recalling the order dated 24.03.2018.

(Order On Memo of First Appeal From Order)

Heard learned counsel for appellant and learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.5.

The appeal is being heard and decided today itself by the consent of learned counsel for parties.

It is admitted between the parties that the respondents no.1 to 4 are merely proforma respondents and their being unrepresented at the final hearing is of no consequence.

First appeal from order has been filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 against the judgment and award dated 28.05.2012 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ District Judge, Barabanki in Claim Petition No.231 of 2009 whereby the claim petition was allowed determining liability for payment of compensation upon the owner of the offending vehicle who is appellant herein.

The short question of law involved in the present appeal pertains to interpretation of Section 66 and Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Learned counsel for appellant has submitted that the offending vehicle was a goods vehicle with unladen weight capacity of 1625 kg and laden weight of 2750 Kg as indicated in the registration certificate. It is submitted that the issue with regard to determination of liability for compensation was formulated as issue no.6 by the tribunal and has been held against the appellant. Learned counsel has submitted that as per Section 66(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988, the use of a vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether actually carrying passenger or goods or not has to be in term of conditions of permit granted or countersigned by Regional State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority. It is submitted that in terms of Section 66(3)(i), the provision of Section 66(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act would not be applicable to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3000 kg. It is therefore submitted that the laden weight of the offending vehicle as per the registration certificate being 2750 Kg was well within the limits specified under Section 66(3)(i) of Motor Vehicles Act, due to which the offending vehicle did not require any specific permit. Therefore, the findings of the tribunal against the appellant is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.5 has refuted the submissions advanced by learned counsel for appellant with the submission that the provision of Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act have to be seen in the context of the definition of gross vehicle weight as given in Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 whereby the gross vehicle weight in respect of any vehicle means the total weight of the vehicle and load certified and registered by the registering authority as permissible for that vehicle. In view of aforesaid submission, learned counsel submits that for the said purpose, the total weight of the vehicle has to be taken as an addition of unladen weight plus the laden weight. Considering the aforesaid, it is submitted that the total unladen weight of the offending vehicle being 1625 Kg was required to be added to the laden weight of the vehicle being 2750 kg i.e. a total weight of 4375 Kg. It is submitted that the condition would indicate gross vehicle weight of the offending vehicle exceeding 3000 Kg as indicated in Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, due to which the offending vehicle was required to have a permit for plying. Since the offending vehicle did not have any permit to ply the goods, the same constituted a breach of the Insurance Policy due to which the answering respondent was not liable for compensation in terms of Section 150(2)(a)(i)(C) of the Motor Vehicles Act as the purpose of the vehicle was not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used.

In view of the aforesaid submissions, the following point arises for determination, which is as follows:-

"Whether the offending vehicle was required to ply only with a permit in accordance with Section 66(1) and the consequences on plying without such permit under 150(2) (a) (i) (C) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988."

With regard to the aforesaid point of determination, it is clear that the respondent no.5, being Insurance Company was liable to be excluded for payment of compensation in terms of Section 150(2) (a) (i) (C) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 in case the offending vehicle was being plied for a purpose which was not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. The said question has to be seen in the context of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The aforesaid section is as follows:

"66. Necessity for permits.-(1) No owner of a Motor Vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorizing him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used:

Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorize the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage:

Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorize the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either when carrying passengers or not:

Provided also that a goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorize the holder to use the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him.

(2) The holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the drawing of any trailer or semi-trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed:

1[Provided that the holder of a permit of any articulated vehicle may use the prime-mover of that articulated vehicle for any other semi-trailer]

(3) The provisions of sub-section(1) shall not apply-

(a) to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise;

(b) to any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by a person acting under contract with a local authority and used solely for road cleansing road watering or conservancy purposes;

(c) to any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance purposes;

(d) to any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance of corpses and the mourners accompanying the copies;

(e) to any transport vehicle used for towing a disabled vehicle or for removing goods from a disabled vehicle to a place of safety;

(f) to any transport vehicle used for any other public purpose as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf;

(g) to any transport vehicle used by a person who manufactures or deals in motor vehicles or builds bodies for attachment to chassis, solely for such purposes and in accordance with such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf;

(i) to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3,000 Kilograms;

(j) subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, to any transport vehicle purchased in one State and proceeding to a place, situated in that State or in any other State, without carrying any passenger or goods;

(k) to any transport vehicle which has been temporarily registered under Section 43 while proceeding empty to any place for the purpose of registration of the vehicle;

(m) to any transport vehicle which, owing to flood, earthquake or any other natural calamity, obstruction on road, or unforeseen circumstances, is required to be diverted through any other route, whether within or outside the State with a view to enabling it to reach its destination;

(n) to any transport vehicle used for such purposes as the Central or State Government may, be order, specify;

(o) to any transport vehicle which is subject to a hire-purpose, lease or hypothecation agreement and which owing to the default of the owner has been taken possession of by or on behalf of the person with whom the owner has entered into such agreement, to enable such motor vehicle to reach its destination; or

(p) to any transport vehicle while proceeding empty to any place for purpose of repair.

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), sub-section (1) shall, if the State Government by rule made under Section 96 so prescribes, apply to any motor vehicle adapted to carry more than nine persons excluding the driver."

From a reading of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is discernible that use of Motor Vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether carrying any passengers or goods or not is prohibited unless and until, it is in accordance with the condition of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorizing the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used.

The exception to Section 66(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act is indicated in Sub-section (2) with the relevant portion being Sub-section 3(i) which indicates that the provisions of Sub-section (1) would not apply to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3,000 Kg.

The definition of the word 'gross vehicle weight' has been defined in Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act which is as follows:

"(15) "gross vehicle weight" means in respect of any vehicle the total weight of the vehicle and load certified and registered by the registering authority as permissible for that vehicle;"

The definition of the word 'gross vehicle weight' indicated in Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly means the total weight of the vehicle and the load certified and registered by the registering authority. The terms of the aforesaid section would clearly imply that the gross vehicle weight of any vehicle would mean the base unladen weight of vehicle plus the load certified by registering authority as being permissible for that vehicle.

In the present case, a perusal of the registration certificate indicates that the offending vehicle has an unladen weight of 1625 Kg with laden weight being 2750 kg. The basic explanation of the gross vehicle weight as indicated in Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would mean the base unladen weight of the vehicle plus the weight of load permitted. In the registration certificate the laden weight of the vehicle in question is clearly indicated as 2750 kg. The meaning thereof clearly is that the base unladen weight of the vehicle is 1625 Kg with permissible load of 1125 kg. which in its entirety would constitute laden weight of the vehicle.

The submission of learned counsel for answering respondent that the gross vehicle weight of the offending vehicle as defined in Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act would mean the addition of unladen weight of 1625 kg with laden weight of 2750 kg does not hold good since the same would do violence to the definition of the word gross vehicle weight as defined under Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988. From a bare understanding of Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988, such an explanation to the definition cannot be sustained.

With regard to interpretation of statute, it is now well settled that the same is to be read in its entirety and the purport and object underlying the statute is required to be given effect to by applying the principles of purposive construction. It is well settled that in construing the wordings of legislation, interpretation which restricts the operation of the statute should be avoided and a purposive construction should be adopted which would not defeat the very purpose of the Act.

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok Vishnu Kate has observed as under:-

13.In Hindustan Lever Ltd.v.Ashok Vishnu Kate[(1995) 6 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1385] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42)

"41. In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this Court in Workmenv. American Express International Banking Corpn. [(1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940] wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made the following observations : (SCC p. 76)

'4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoidedand the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced.Judges ought to be more concerned with the "colour", the "content" and the "context" of such statutes(we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion inPrennv.Simmonds[(1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237 (HL)] ). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is,Surendra Kumar Vermav.Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court[(1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] we had occasion to say : (SCC p. 447, para 6)

"6. ?Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions." '

42. Francis Bennion in hisStatutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659 thus:

'A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by?

(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or

(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).'

At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of 'Purposive Construction' in contrast with literal construction. The learned author has observed as under:

'Contrast with literal construction.?Although the term "purposive construction" is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a swing by the appellate courts away from literal construction. Lord Diplock said in 1975:"If one looks back to the actual decisions of the [House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the last 30 yearsone cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive constructionof statutory provisions." The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way?

?I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it.' "

Once the entire laden weight of the offending vehicle as per registration certificate is indicated as 2750 kg, obviously no permit for the offending vehicle was required in terms of Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

From a perusal of the impugned judgment and award, it is apparent that although such a plea had been taken by the appellant but the same has been rejected while deciding issue no.6. However, the reasoning of the tribunal with regard to such submission of the appellant is not quite understandable since the aforesaid submission has been rejected only on the ground that provisions of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act would be applicable only in case they are notified in the official gazette and since no such notification has been issued in the official gazette, the appellant would not derive any benefit from Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The impugned judgment and award does not indicate as to why the provision of Section 66 were required to be separately notified in the gazette once the Act itself in its entirety has been notified and published in the gazette of India Extract, part II dated 22.05.1989 and had come into force on 01.07.1989. Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not indicate that it would have to be notified separately in the gazette. The said provision being a part and parcel of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 therefore stood notified alongwith notification of the Act itself in May, 1989. The said ground by the Tribunal is clearly against the provisions of statute.

Considering the aforesaid, it is held that the offending vehicle being covered by provisions of Section 66 (3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act was not required to have a special permit since its gross vehicle weight in terms of Section 2(15) was below 3000 kg. The liability fastened by the Tribunal upon appellant as such was incorrect and against the provisions of law. In view of aforesaid, the appeal succeeds and is allowed setting aside the judgment and award dated 28.05.2012 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ District Judge, Barabanki in Claim Petition No.231 of 2009, so far as it relates to issue no.6 pertaining to liability of appellant to satisfy the award. As a consequence, it is held that the Respondent No.5 i.e. the National Insurance Company Ltd. is required to satisfy the award. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Order Date :- 4.8.2021

Subodh/-