Vijay Pal And 32 Others vs Rajendra Kumar
2021 Latest Caselaw 4999 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

						A.F.R.
 
						Judgement reserved on 8.2.2021
 
						Judgement delivered on 19.4.2021
 

 

 
Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 542 of 2020
 
Appellant :- Vijay Pal And 32 others
 
Respondent :- Rajendra Kumar
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Udayan Nandan,Sr. Advocate (Sri Shashi Nandan)
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Mahesh Sharma,Sharad Sinha
 

 
Hon'ble Saral Srivastava,J.

1. Heard Shri Udayan Nandan, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Dinesh Rai, Advocate holding brief of Shri Mahesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The plaintiff-appellants have preferred the present second appeal challenging the judgement and decree dated 2.11.2020 passed by the appellate court setting aside the judgement dated 24.9.2016 passed by the trial court decreeing the original suit No. 217 of 2007 (Vijay Pal and others vs. Rajendra Kumar).

3. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellants instituted original suit No. 217 of 2007 praying for a decree of mandatory injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from peaceful interference in his possession over plot No. 387 area 0.265 hectare situated in Village Aurangabad Ahir Pargana Agauta, Tehsil & District Bulandshahr. The plaint case was that Buddhi Singh was the owner of the plot No. 387 area 2 bigha 10 biswa situated in Village Aurangabad Ahir Pargana Agauta, Tehsil & District Bulandshahr. One Ajeet Singh and Virendra Singh son of Risal Singh, Buddhi Singh son of Jagat Singh and Jal Singh son of Meer Singh are the descendants of zamindar Fatah Chandra. They had instituted original suit No. 262 of 1991 praying for decree of declaration that they are the owner and in possession over plot No. 387 (hereinafter referred to as 'property in question). Besides above, Ajeet Singh and another instituted another suit praying that their names be recorded in the records in respect of property in question based on decreed dated 7.9.1993. The plaintiff-appellants claim that they and Ajeet Singh belong to one family but Ajeet Singh without informing the plaintiff-appellants got the aforesaid two suits decreed whereas the plaintiff-appellants are also the owner and in possession of the property in question. It is also pleaded that the name of the defendant-respondent has been fraudulently recorded in the records. The defendant-respondent being influential persons are trying to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellant which gave rise to the cause of action for filing the present suit.

4. The suit was contested by the defendant-respondent by filing a written statement denying the allegation of the plaint. In the additional plea, the defendant-respondent pleaded that the gata No. 387 is a big plot having an area of 0.632 hectares out of which 0.367 hectares is recorded in the name of Ajeet and the name of the defendant-respondent is recorded with respect to 0.265 hectares of the said gata in khasara and khatauni. The defendant-respondent specifically stated that the name of the plaintiff-appellants is not recorded in any of the revenue records. They also pleaded that the property in question is agricultural land and as there is no declaration under Section 143 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act by the competent authority, consequently, the suit is barred by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The defendant-respondent also pleaded that the property in question has been allotted to him by Gaon Sabha after following due procedure.

5. The plaintiff-appellants filed a replication stating therein that no declaration under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act is required as the Abadi on the land in question is old. Therefore, the suit is not barred by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R.Act.

6. The defendant-appellants filed an additional written statement contending inter-alia that in a suit for injunction, the declaration of rights of the plaintiff-appellants is also involved. It is further pleaded that the name of the plaintiff-appellants is not recorded in the revenue record. Consequently, the suit is not maintainable being barred by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act.

7. On the basis of pleading, the trial court has framed as many as 11 issues which read as under:-

"1- D;k oknhx.k oknxr lEifRr [ksr la0 387 jdcbZ 0-265 gS0 ds ekfyd] dkfct o nk[khy gS vkSj mDr Hkwfe ij oknhx.k dh vkcknh ,] ch] lh] Mh dk;e gS \ ;fn gkW rks izHkko \

2- D;k izfroknh la[;k 02 dk uke oknxr uEcj 387 ij xyr fdrkor o QthZ #i ls ntZ gqvk gS \ ;fn gkW rks izHkko \

3- D;k ewyokn la[;k [email protected] dk orZeku okn Ikj dksbZ izHkko gS \

4- D;k oknhx.k dks dksbZ okn dkj.k izkIr ugh gS \

5- D;k okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS \

6- D;k iznRr U;k;ky; 'kqYd de gS \

7- D;k oknxr lEifRr ij /kkjk 143 o 331 ;w0 ih0 tSM0 ,0 ,DV dk izHkko gS vkSj U;k;ky; dks okn lquus ,oa fu.khZr djus dk {ks=kf/kdkj ugh gS \

8- D;k okn esa vko';d i{kdkj u cuk;s tkus dk nks"k gS \

9- D;k oknhx.k us oknxr lEifRr dh fooj.k lgh izdkj ugha fn;k gS] tSlk fd vfrfjDr izfrokn i= 66-,&1 esa dFku fd;k x;k gS \

10& vuqrks"k \

11& D;k oknhx.k dk okn vkns'k 07 fu;e 11 lh0 ih0 lh0 ds izkfo/kkuksa ls ckf/kr gS \"""

8. The trial court decided the issue Nos. 1 to 3 and 9 jointly. In deciding the said issue, the trial court considered the plaint of original suit No. 262 of 1991 to conclude that the reading of the plaint of original suit No. 262 of 1991 reveals that Ajeet Singh has stated in the plaint that ancestors of Ajeet Singh etc. and others planted trees on the plot in question which explains that besides Ajeet Singh, there were several other members in the family, and the evidence filed by the plaintiff-appellants points that the reference of other persons made by Ajeet Singh in the plaint of original suit No. 262 of 1991 was in respect of plaintiff-appellants. Accordingly, the trial court held that the defendant-respondent would not get any benefit if the name of the plaintiff-appellants is not recorded in the revenue record. The trial court further held that the plaintiff-appellants proved his ownership over the property in question. The trial court, thereafter, proceeded to consider other evidence on record and held that the plaintiff-appellants are in possession of the property in question.

9. The trial court while deciding issue No. 7 regarding maintainability of the suit held that the right of the plaintiff-appellants concerning peaceful possession over the property in question will not extinguish only for the reason that no declaration under Section 143 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has been obtained. The trial court further held that the plaintiff-appellants have prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from peaceful interference in the property in question, therefore, the suit is cognizable by the civil court and is not barred by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act.

10. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the trial court, the defendant-respondent preferred civil appeal No. 278 of 2016 before the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. 4, Bulandshahr. The appellate court noticed that the name of the plaintiff-appellants are not recorded in any revenue record and the finding of the trial court in respect of ownership is perverse as no evidence was led by the plaintiff-appellants to prove his ownership. The appellate court further considered various pronouncement of this Court as to when the suit in respect of agriculture land is maintainable in civil court. After appreciating the facts of the case and law, the appellate court concluded that mandatory injunction can be granted only after the decree for declaration of title in respect of the property in question is granted to the plaintiff-appellant. Accordingly, it held that the suit is not maintainable before the civil court and is cognizable by revenue court. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the judgement and order of the trial court on the ground that the suit is barred by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. and dismissed the suit.

11. Challenging the aforesaid order, learned counsel for the appellants has raised the following two questions which according to him are the substantial question of law which warrants an answer from this Court under Section 100 of C.P.C.; (i). whether the appellate court has erred in law in holding that the suit is not maintainable by the civil court and is barred by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, (ii). when once the lower appellate court has found that the suit is not maintainable before the civil court, whether it was justified in dismissing the suit instead of returning the plaint to the plaintiff-appellants to present it before the appropriate court.

12. In support of question of law No. 1, counsel for the appellants has submitted that from the relief claimed in the suit, it is evident that the plaintiff-appellants have prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellants over the property in question. Since the suit is only for a decree of mandatory injunction, therefore, the suit is cognizable by the civil court and is not barred by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. He submits that the appellate court has committed a manifest error of law in recording a finding that since the name of the plaintiff-appellants is not recorded in revenue record, therefore, the plaintiff-appellants will have to obtain a decree for declaration which can only be granted by the revenue court, hence, the suit is barred by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the following judgments of this Court :

(i) Ram Awalamb and others Vs. Jata Shankar and others, AIR 1969 Allahabad 526

(ii) Ram Padarth and others Vs. Second Additional D.J. Sultanpur and others, 1989 RD 21

(iii) Khaderu Ram Teli and others Vs. Ram Karan Ahir, 1961 ALJ 854.

13. In respect of the second question raised by him, he has placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court in Ravi Singhal and others Vs. Rajeev Goyal and others, 2015 (8) ADJ 283.

14. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent contended that it is admitted on record that the name of the plaintiff-appellants are not recorded in the revenue record, therefore, relief of mandatory injunction can be granted only when the plaintiff seeks decree for declaration of title in respect of property in question. Therefore, the suit involves decree for declaration of title which relief can be granted by the revenue court. Accordingly, he submits that the suit is not maintainable before the civil court and the appellate court has rightly dismissed the suit. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the following judgements:-

(i) Hari Narain Vs. 4th ADJ Azamgarh, 2000 (1) AWC 416.

(ii) Kamla Shanker Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mirzapur, 1998 (3) AWC 1708.

15. He further contends that the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Awalamb (supra) does not come in aid to the plaintiff-appellants since the judgement of this Court in Baiju Vs. Sambhu Saran 1963 All LJ 1064 squarely covers the present case which has been noticed by the Full Bench in paragraph No. 73 of the judgement and the Full Bench has not overruled the judgment of Baiju (Supra) of this court, therefore, the appellate court has rightly held the suit is not maintainable by the civil court. He further submits that once the appellate court has held that the suit is not cognizable by the civil court, it has rightly set aside the order of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellants.

16. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record.

17. To determine the question of jurisdiction in respect of maintainability of the suit, the Full Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Ram Awalamb (supra) held that cause of action determines the jurisdiction of a court. The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in the orders to support his right to the judgment of the court. Therefore, it follows that in each case the cause of action of the suit shall have to be strictly scrutinized to ascertain whether the suit is solely cognizable by a revenue court or is impliedly cognizable by a revenue court.

18. The Full Bench in paragraph No. 50 after considering the Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has elaborated when the jurisdiction of civil court is barred. The relevant portion of paragraph No. 50 is extracted herein below:-

"50......Thus the jurisdiction of a civil court shall be barred in respect of suits based on a cause of action for any of the reliefs

(a) mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II as being cognizable by revenue court, or

(b) if on the same cause of action any relief could be obtained by means of any suit or application mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II of the Act, the relief asked for from the civil court may or may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted. In other words, (a) above relates to the class of cases where the jurisdiction of civil court is specifically barred. Under Clause (b) falls that class of cases where the jurisdiction of the civil court is impliedly barred."

19. Paragraph No. 57 of the judgement of Full Bench explained when a suit is cognizable by revenue court. Paragraph No. 57 of the judgement is extracted herein below:-

"57. Where in a suit, from a perusal only of the reliefs claimed, one or more of them are ostensibly cognizable only by civil court and at least one relief is cognizable only by the revenue court, further questions which arise are whether all the reliefs are based on the same cause of action and, if so, (a) whether the main relief asked for on the basis of that cause of action is such as can be granted only by a revenue court, or (b) whether any real or substantial relief (though it may not be identical with that claimed by the plaintiff) could be granted by the revenue court. There can be no doubt that in all cases contemplated under (a) and (b) above the jurisdiction shall vest in the revenue court and not in the civil court. In all other cases of a civil nature the jurisdiction must vest in the civil court."

20. Paragraph No. 62 of the judgement is also relevant in the context of the present case and is accordingly reproduced herein below:-

"62. The case law in this Court on this point might be classified under the following two heads:--

(a) Where several reliefs closely connected with each other can be claimed on the basis of the cause of action set forth in the plaint it has to be examined which of them is the main relief and which others are ancillary reliefs. If upon a consideration of facts constituting the cause of action the main relief is such which can be granted by the civil court the suit will be cognizable in the civil court which will proceed to grant the ancillary reliefs also. On the other hand if the main relief is specifically cognizable by a revenue court only but ancillary reliefs may be such as could be granted by the civil court the matter was cognizable only by a revenue court.

(b) The pith and substance of the allegation made in the plaint constituting the cause of action must be scrutinized in order to determine whether or not if on the same cause of action any adequate or satisfactory alternative remedy could be available to the plaintiff in the revenue court. If the answer to the scrutiny be in the affirmative, then the suit brought in the civil court must fail regardless of the consideration that in respect of the reliefs actually claimed the suit was on the face of it cognizable by a civil court."

21. From the reading of paragraph No. 62 of the judgement, it is clear that the true nature of the allegation made in the plaint constituting the cause of action must be evaluated to determine whether the plaintiff has any adequate or satisfactory alternative remedy on the same cause of action in the revenue court. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the suit is cognizable by the revenue court and it is immaterial that the suit in respect of reliefs claimed on the face of it is cognizable by the civil court.

22. Paragraph No. 73 of the judgement of Ram Awalamb (supra) is also relevant in the present case and is being extracted herein below:-

"73. The case of Baiju v. Shambhu Saran. 1963 All LJ 1064 decided by a Division Bench of this Court was for injunction based on the allegations that the plaintiff was a khudkasht holder but the defendant had got his name entered in the revenue papers and was interfering with his possession. The defendant claimed to be the tenant in possession. The lower appellate court granted the decree of injunction. The second appeal filed before the High Court was allowed on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the case because upon the facts of the case it was clear that the plaintiff must seek a declaration as to his title and, therefore, the suit was one in which relief could be granted by the revenue court."

23. Paragraph No. 76 of the judgement of Ram Awalamb (supra) explicates the points for consideration for determining the jurisdiction of the court for entertaining the suit. Paragraph No. 76 of the judgement is extracted herein below:-

"76. The main point for consideration In all cases where on a definite cause of action two reliefs can be claimed is which of the two reliefs is the main relief and which relief or other reliefs are ancillary reliefs. Where from facts and circumstances of the case the relief for demolition and injunction is the main relief there could be no reason why the jurisdiction of the civil court should be barred On the other hand if it could be said that the main relief that is to say, the real and substantial relief, could on that cause of action be of possession only then the suit will definitely lie in the revenue court. In our opinion it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule that where the suit is brought against a trespasser the only relief which the plaintiff should claim as an effective relief is that of possession and he need not try to obtain an injunction order and get the constructions made by the trespasser demolished. The revenue courts have not. been empowered to grant the reliefs of injunction and demolition and in case the defendant refuses to take away the materials from the land in dispute after the decree for possession has been passed against him the main object of the plaintiff would be frustrated. A civil court will, therefore, have the power to entertain the suit where the. main relief sought by the plaintiff is that of injunction and demolition, a relief which could be granted by the civil court only. The relief of possession will be merely ancillary relief which the civil court could grant after having taken cognizance of the suit for injunction and demolition. We respectfully agree with the view expressed by Dayal and Seth, JJ. in the case of 1966 All LJ 1084, (AIR 1967 All 358) that once the suit is maintainable for the main relief in the civil court then there is no bar for the civil court to grant all possible reliefs flowing from the same cause of action. We, however, with great respect, differ from the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of 1965 All LJ 1137 that whenever a suit is for demolition and possession against a trespasser it must always be held that the main relief was that of possession. We are of the view that the determination of the question as to which out of the several reliefs arising from the same cause of action is the main relief will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."

24. The judgement of the Full Court in Ram Awalamb (supra) in pith and substance explains what the court should consider in determining the question of jurisdiction. It also defines the cause of action which means that bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Consequently, it follows that to ascertain the jurisdiction of the court, the court must strictly scrutinize the cause of action to determine whether the suit is cognizable by a revenue court or is impliedly cognizable only by a revenue court, or is cognizable by a civil court.

25. The other judgements Ram Padarth and others vs. Second Addl. D.J., Sultanpur, 1989 RD 21 and Khaderu Ram Teli and others Vs. Ram Karan Ahir, 1961 ALJ 854 on which emphasis has been laid by counsel for the appellants, also reiterates the same proposition.

26. Now this Court considers the judgement relied upon by counsel for the respondent on the issue of maintainability of a suit before the civil court. In Hari Narain Vs. IVth Additional District Judge, Azamgarh, 2000 (1) AWC 416, this Court has held that where the title of the plaintiff is disputed and the reading of the plaint also discloses so. In such an event, the plaintiff must allege how he acquired the right and interest in the property before he could pray for a permanent injunction which could be established by declaration of the right claimed by the plaintiff, and once the court comes to this conclusion, the irresistible inference would be that the suit was really in the nature of declaration under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and thus cognizable by revenue court and not by the civil court. Paragraph No. 13 of the judgement is extracted hereinbelow:-

"13. From what has been discussed above, it appears that It was not the admitted case of the title of the plaintiff over the suit property, even according to the mere reading of the plaint. Thus, the plaintiff was obliged to allege how he obtained a right on the suit property or what was the obligation in his favour in respect thereof before he could make a prayer for a permanent injunction. That could have been established by a declaration of the right claimed by the plaintiff and once we come to this conclusion, the irresistible inference would be that the suit was really in the nature of one spoken of under section 229B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and was, thus, cognizable by the revenue court and as such, the jurisdiction of the civil court stood ousted."

27. In the case of Kamla Shanker Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mirzapur, 1998 (3) AWC 1708, the order of the trial court and revision court was assailed before this Court. This Court found that the names of the defendants have been recorded in the revenue record while petitioners name do not find place in the revenue record, therefore, the suit is cognizable by the revenue court not by the civil court. Accordingly, this court upheld the judgement of the court below. This Court in paragraph Nos. 4 & 5 detailed the reasons for concluding that the judgement of the court below is correct. Paragraph Nos. 4 & 5 of the judgement are extracted herein below:-

"4. Section 331 of the said Act prescribes that no Court other than a Court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall take cognizance of any suit in respect whereof provisions have been made in the said Act providing procedure and forum for obtaining such relief. The exclusion is clear and un-ambiguous. While expression 'except as provided by or under this Act no Court other than a Court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application".

5. Now Schedule II in Sl. No. 23 provides in column No. 3 that suit for injunction or for repair of the waste or damage prescribing the forum as Assistant Collector 1st Class in column 4 and provisions for first appeal and second appeal before Commissioner and Board respectively in column Nos. 5 and 6. Thus, it appears that suit under Section 208 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is provided in Schedule II prescribing the forum within the meaning of Section 331 of the said Act. By reason of exclusion of civil court provided under Section 331 expressly and the suit having been a suit under Section 208 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act fall within SI. No. 23 of Schedule II providing for relief in respect of the cause of action provided in column 3 before the revenue court. The Jurisdiction of civil court is barred."

28. Now, this Court proceeds to analyze the judgement of the appellate court in the light of principles elucidated by the court for determining the jurisdiction of a court. According to the plaintiffs' case in the plaint, he belongs to the family of Ajeet Singh. Ajeet Singh and other persons instituted two suits, one in civil court numbered as original suit No. 262 of 1991 seeking a declaration that they are the owner and in possession of the property in question and another suit before the revenue court for recording their names in the revenue record. The plaintiff-appellants admits in paragraph Nos. 3 & 4 of the plaint that Ajeet Singh and others got the aforesaid two suits decreed without informing the plaintiff-appellants. It is further averred in paragraph No. 7 of the plaint that the respondent by playing fraud has got their names recorded in revenue record in respect of the property in question. It is further averred that cause of action for filing the suit arose when the defendant-respondent started illegally interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellants.

29. Specific case of the defendant-respondent in the written statement is that he became the owner of part of the gata No. 387 under allotment by the Gaon Sabha. It is also the case of the defendant-respondent that the plaintiff-appellants has no interest in the property in question and accordingly, the suit is not cognizable by the civil court.

30. However, the case of the plaintiff-appellants are that they are the owner and in possession of the property in question, but pleadings of paragraph Nos. 3, 4 & 7 of the plaint reveals that the name of plaintiff-appellants is not recorded in the revenue record. It is also admitted by them that the name of the defendant-respondent is recorded in the revenue records. It is a different matter that the question as to whether the allotment of property in question to the defendant-respondent by Gaon Sabha was as per law. The said question is engaging the attention of this Court in Writ-B No. 5625 of 2018, but the plaintiff-appellants cannot take advantage of the weakness of the case of the defendant-respondent. The plaintiff-appellants has to stand on their leg. If the pleadings of the plaint disclose that the title of the plaintiff-appellants over the property in question is doubtful or plaintiff appellants are not certain about their title over the property in question, in such case, the plaintiff-appellants in order to succeed has to seek a decree of declaration of title.

31. Thus, the contention of counsel for the appellants that it is a suit for injunction which is cognizable by a civil court based on Full Bench judgment in the case of Ram Awlambh (supra) is not sustainable for the reason that the title of the plaintiff is not admitted by the defendant and further, the plaint does not disclose as to how the plaintiff-appellants acquired the title over the property in question. It is also pertinent to note that the plaintiff-appellants did not adduce any evidence to prove that they belong to the family of Ajeet Singh and are the owner of the property. Accordingly, this court finds that the trial court committed a manifest error of law in holding that the plaintiff-appellants belong to the family of Ajeet Singh without there being any assertion in this respect in the plaint of original suit No. 262 of 1991. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the appellate court has rightly held that the aforesaid finding of the trial court is perverse and not sustainable. This court is further of the opinion that the controversy in hand is covered by the judgment of this court in Baiju Vs. Shambu Saran, 1963 All LJ 1064 referred in paragraph np. 73 of the full judgment of Ram Awalamb and judgment of Hari Narain (Supra).

32. Thus, for the reasons given above, this Court finds that the appellate court has not committed any illegality in concluding that the suit is cognizable by revenue court and not by the civil court. Therefore, question No. 1 is answered against the plaintiff-appellants.

33. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, this Court finds that the same is covered by the judgement of this Court in the case of Ravi Singhal and others Vs. Rajeev Goyal and others, 2015 (8) ADJ 283 (DB). Paragraph No. 11 of the judgement is extracted herein below:-

"11. In view of above exposition of law and considering the fact that Court below has correctly came to the conclusion that in respect to orders passed under the provisions of Act, 1972, Civil Court in a suit under Section 9 C.P.C., has no jurisdiction to declare orders passed by competent authority under Act, 1972 illegal, it had not authority to proceed to decide other issues on merits. In our view, the Court below has rightly held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In these circumstances, the only way open to it was to return the plaint instead of proceeding to decide other issues on merits and dismiss the suit. "

34. Accordingly, this Court finds merit in the submission of learned counsel for the appellants and modify the order of the appellate court.

35. For the reasons given above, this Court maintains the order and judgment of the appellate court holding that the suit is not cognizable by the civil court but set aside the part of the order of the appellate court by which it has dismissed the suit. Accordingly, this Court directs the court below to return the plaint to the plaintiff-appellants for presenting before the court of competent jurisdiction.

36. For the reasons given above, the second appeal is partly allowed with no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 19.4.2021

Jaswant