M/S Rauzagaon Chini Mills Ltd. ... vs State Of U.P. & Others
2019 Latest Caselaw 4053 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

?AFR 
 
Court No. - 25
 
Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 2077 of 1997
 
Petitioner :- M/S Rauzagaon Chini Mills Ltd. Faizabad
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sushil Kumar,Siddharth Lal Vaish,U.S. Sahai
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra,J.

(Oral)

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 9.7.1997 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Allahabad and the order dated 28.12.1993 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue)/Collector (Stamp), Barabanki and also the notice dated 16.11.1991 issued by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue)/Collector (Stamp) contained in Annexure nos.1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in 1991, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner had purchased about 100 acres of land, all agricultural, from a number of owners/recorded tenure holders by way of registered sale deeds. The said land is situated in Village Ganaully, Pargana Basaudhi, Tehsil Rudauli, District Barabanki, which at the relevant point of time was rural area and not included within the municipal limits. The Sub Registrar after duly satisfying himself about the valuation of the land had registered the sale deeds on the basis of stamp duty paid by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. Later on, the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Barabanki/Collector (Stamp), Barabanki inspected the office of the Sub Registrar, Rudauli, Barabanki in the capacity of District Registrar and in the inspection dated 18.9.1991, he directed the Sub Registrar to refer all the 43 sale deeds to his office under Section 47-A/33 of the Indian Stamp Act.

The initial defect pointed out was that the stamp duty was calculated on the basis of the land revenue payable thereon, treating the land to be agricultural land, although the same was to be used for industrial purpose/residential purpose and the stamp duty should have been calculated, taking into account the Circle rate fixed by the District Magistrate/Collector @ Rs.8 per square feet. The Sub Registrar referred all 43 sale deeds to the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) and in respect of all 43 cases, a single notice was issued on 16.11.1991. The predecessor in interest of the petitioner filed his objection in the office of respondent no.4 on 19.4.1992, saying that such a notice was vitiated as all 43 sale deeds cannot be clubbed together and there were different measurements of the plots of land that predecessor in interest of the petitioner had bought. The predecessor in interest of the petitioner also requested that the land was still recorded as agricultural land and the stamp duty was paid more than the market value fixed by the Collector for agricultural land.

Since the objections filed by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner were not being taken into account, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner also filed an application for spot inspection and a copy of the order passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority dated 4.3.1992, directing spot inspection, has been filed by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. The predecessor in interest of the petitioner being aggrieved by the continued proceedings by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.2672 (MB) of 1992 on 13.7.1992. The matter was taken up on 15.7.1992 by this Court and an interim order was passed. A copy of the said interim order has been filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition.

It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court while issuing notice and directing filing of counter affidavit, had provided that as an interim measure, even if final order is passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Barabanki, the same shall not be implemented until further orders of the Court and if the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) directs the petitioner even to pay additional stamp duty, the same shall not be realized from it until further orders of the Court.

It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the writ petition was taken up for final hearing on 22.4.1997, the Court was informed that final orders have been passed by respondent no.4 and the writ petition had become infructuous and that the writ petitioner had remedy of filing a revision before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. This Court, therefore, observed that in case the petitioner has not challenged the final orders dated 28.12.1993 before the competent authority, and if it chooses to challenge the same, its application to condone the delay in initiating the proceeding as also for grant of interim order be considered by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. It was made clear that realization of stamp duty in pursuance of the order dated 28.12.1993 would remain stayed for a period of one month to enable the predecessor in interest of the petitioner to initiate the said proceedings, if not already done.

After the order was passed by this Court, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner rushed to file revision against the order dated 28.12.1993 and was able to file 22 revisions before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority on 27.5.1997, and 19 revisions on 28.5.1997 before the Commissioner, Faizabad. Two revisions before the Additional Commissioner, Faizabad on the stamp duty. Initially, the orders passed by the respondent no.4 were stayed by the Additional Commissioner and the Commissioner in the revisions filed before them. However, on 9.7.1997, the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority dismissed all 22 revisions before him by a single order on the ground of delay in filing the same.

It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that all relevant facts were brought before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority for condoning the delay, including the two orders passed by this Court. However, Chief Controlling Revenue Authority observed that there was negligence and lack of bona fide on behalf of the predecessor in interest of the petitioner in approaching the statutory authority.

It has been submitted that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has referred to several judgments in his order dated 9.7.1997, but only citations have been given and not the cause title, therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner could not get copies of such judgments that have been relied upon to reject the application for condonation of delay and the revisions. A few of the judgments, however, which have been cited by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority could be procured and copies of them were being given to this Court for its perusal.

In Binod Bihari Singh vs. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 572, which has been referred to, in the impugned order, the Supreme Court has observed that the bar of limitation should be considered by a Court even if it is not raised by any of the parties before it. The Limitation Act is a statute of repose and bar of a cause of action in a Court of law, which is otherwise lawful and valid, because of undesirable lapse of time as contained in the Limitation Act, has been made on a well accepted principle of jurisprudence and public policy.

In the other judgment in the case of State of U.P. vs. Khalil, 1994 ALR 154, cited by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, this Court has observed that the Court has full discretion for condoning the delay but the Court, before exercising such discretion, must be satisfied on material placed on record regarding sufficiency of the cause for not preferring an appeal within the period of limitation. The Court has referred to the settled position in law that after expiry of the period of limitation, the other side acquires a right and, therefore, the delay should not be condoned, in case the Court is not satisfied that the litigant has been negligent in pursuing his cause.

It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Limitation Act applies only where limitation is prescribed. At the time when revisions were filed, there was no limitation prescribed under Section 56(1) of the Act for making such revision. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the limitation has been prescribed for filing an appeal or revision under Section 56(1)(A) of sixty days from the date of receipt of order, only by way of an amendment inserted by U.P. Act no.38 of 2001 w.e.f. 20.5.2002.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Shakti Tubes Limited vs. State of Bihar and others (2009) 1 SCC 786, and has read Paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 24 thereof. It has been submitted on the basis of the said judgment that the facts of the present case are almost similar in so far as the appellant therein had initially approached the High Court and the Court had issued notices and admitted the petition on the limited question of payment of interest on delayed payment of penalty imposed. Later on, the petitions were disposed of on the ground that the petitioner could very well file a suit. The Supreme Court considered whether the period spent in pursuing a writ petition should be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation in filing a suit in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was observed by the Supreme Court that it was not in dispute that the writ remedy was resorted to, by the plaintiff. A part of the writ petition was also admitted. The High Court did not reject the writ petition at the threshold as not maintainable. It, therefore, held that the appellant was pursuing the said remedy bona fide and in good faith.

The Supreme Court also considered whether filing of writ petition where a suit should have been filed, should be considered to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It observed that the relevant phrase to be considered is not only that the Court should have been found to be lacking jurisdiction, but some "other cause of like nature" could also be considered and it was observed that the phrase "other cause of like nature" refers not only to cases for defect of jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have failed on account of "other causes of like nature" and such a phrase is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly speaking, but others more or less similar to such deficiencies.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court has gone through the Order impugned. It is apparent that the application for condonation of delay has been rejected by the revisional authority only on the ground that in the interim order granted by this Court on 15.7.1992, there was no stay of the proceedings before the appropriate authority. The statutory authority was left free to even pass final orders but at the same time only an interim stay of such final orders and recovery in pursuance of the said final orders was granted subject to further orders passed by the Court. It has been observed by the revisional authority that the predecessor in interest of the petitioner was well aware of the next date fixed by the statutory authority and it should have pursued the matter before the statutory authority. Had it pursued the case before the statutory authority bona fide, it would have certainly come to know about the final orders being passed on 28.12.1993 itself or even within a short period thereafter. The petitioner was negligent and, therefore, it could not now ask for condoning the delay on the ground that the delay in filing the revision was bona fide and unintentional.

Since at the relevant point of time, the limitation under the Act itself was not provided for filing revisions before the revisional authority, this Court is of the considered opinion that the application for condonation of delay could not have been rejected by the revisional authority, leading to rejecting all the 22 revisions thereafter and consequential orders having been passed.

This court, therefore, quashes the order dated 9.7.1997 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the matter is remanded to the revisional authority to consider afresh on merits, and then pass appropriate orders within a period of four months from the date, a certified copy of this order is produced before it.

The writ petition stands partly allowed.

Order Date :- 3.5.2019

Sachin