Gopal Singh And Others vs State Of U.P. And Another
2019 Latest Caselaw 284 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 

 
Court No. - 59
 

 
1.Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 395 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Gopal Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
2. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 937 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Devendra Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Rakesh Kumar,S K Chaturvedi,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C. (U.O.I.),Subodh Kumar
 

 
3.Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1029 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Lokendra Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,S.K. Chaturvedi,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C. (U.O.I.),Subodh Kumar
 

 
4. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1031 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Chhetar Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C. (U.O.I.),Subodh Kumar
 

 
5. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1032 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Om Veer Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C. (U.O.I.),Subodh Kumar
 

 
6. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1034 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Than Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C. (U.O.I),Subodh Kumar
 

 
7. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1035 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Bidha
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturvedi,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,S.N. Singh,Subodh Kumar,U.N. Sharma
 

 
8. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1036 of 1995
 
Appellant :- Kishan Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
9. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 387 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Surendra Pal Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- A.K. Misra,U.K. Misra,V K Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C(U.O.I.),Subodh Kumar
 

 
10. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 388 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Randhir Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
11. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 390 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Gulab Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
12. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 392 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Goverdhan Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
13. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 393 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Chhitar Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
14. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 394 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Randhir Singh And Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,C.S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
15. Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 396 of 1996
 
Appellant :- Sahab Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vikram Nath,A.K. Misra,Manoj Yadav,Rakesh Kumar,Shashwat Kishore Chaturve,U.K. Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,Subodh Kumar
 

 
Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J.

1. Determination of compensation for acquisition of land under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, which was initially requisitioned under the defence of India Act, 1962, as well as payment of solatium and interest, is involved in the present appeals.

2. Heard Sri S.K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the claimants-appellants and Sri Subodh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent Union of India.

3. With the consent of learned counsels for the parties, all first appeals are being heard together. All the first appeals except First Appeal No.390 of 1996 (Gulab Singh vs. State of U.P. and others), and First Appeal No.394 of 1996 (Randhir Singh and others State Of U.P.) relate to land acquired in village Patholi, Tehsil Sadar, District Agra. The First Appeal No.390 of 1996 and First Appeal No.394 of 1996 relate to land acquired in village Bilhara.

Facts

4. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that by Notification under Section 29(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1962'), total land measuring 494.356 acres of village Patholi, Bilhara and Nagla Biaswa, Tehsil and District Agra, were requisitioned on 26.10.1965. Possession was taken on 28.10.1965. By judgment dated 26.09.1972 in First Appeal No.279 of 1969 (Surendra Pal Singh and another vs. State through Land Acquisition Officer, Agra) arising from award of the arbitrator dated 02.09.1968 in proceedings of requisition under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1952'), annual letting value of the land of the appellant S.P. Singh and Gindrawal Singh, both residents of Village and Post Office Patholi, Pargana and District Agra was determined @ Rs.14,000/- per annum for 60 bighas land, i.e. Rs.233/- per bigha. However, entitlement of the aforesaid appellants to recovery was restricted to their claim of Rs.10,500/- per annum. State of U.P. preferred S.L.P. (Civil) No.305 of 1974 (After Notice), which was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court by order dated 04.04.1974. Thus, the annual letting value of land of village Patholi for payment of rent, was finally determined @ Rs.233/- per bigha.

5. The aforesaid requisitioned area measuring 494.356 acres was acquired by Notification dated 11.11.1972 under Section 7 of the Act 1952 for blast pans scheme. District Judge, Agra was appointed as arbitrator by order dated 18.04.1980 for determination of compensation and 64 cases of claimants were registered as acquisition cases. These 64 land acquisition cases were decided by the impugned common judgment and award dated 29.05.1992 passed by District Judge, Agra determining the compensation of the acquired land of three villages, as under:

Village Patholi

Category of Land

Parta rate

Rate at which compensation should be awarded for each bigha land

Kabli Barha Awwal

Rs.4.75

Rs.1205/- per bigha

Nakabil Barha Awwal

Rs.4.50

Rs.1142/- per bigha

Kabil Barha Doyam

Rs.4.37

Rs.1108/- per bigha

Nakabil Barha Doyam

Rs.3.50

Rs.888/- per bigha

Nakabil Rooth

Rs.2.50

Rs.634/- per bigha

Village Basua

Barha Doyam

Rs.4.75

Rs.1206/- per bigha

Rooth

Rs.4.50

Rs.1108/- per bigha

Nakabil Rooth

Rs.2.50

Rs.634/- per bigha

Village Bilhera

Pukhta Gonda Awwal

Rs.7.62

Rs.1932/- per bigha

Barha Awwal

Rs.6.00

Rs.1522/- per bigha

Barha Doyam

Rs.4.81

Rs.1220/- per bigha

Kabil Barha Awwal

Rs.4.75

Rs.1205/- per bigha

Kabil Barha Doyam

Rs.4.50

Rs.1142/- per bigha

Nakabil Barha Awwal

Rs.4.37

Rs.1108/- per bigha

Nakabil Barha Doyam

Rs.3.50

Rs.888/- per bigha

Nakabil Rooth

Rs.2.50

Rs.634/- per bigha"

6. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment dated 29.05.1992 passed by the District Judge, Agra under Section 8 of the Act 1952 in L.A. Case No.7 of 1981 (Narendra Pal Vs. U.P. State) and other connected 63 land acquisition cases, the present first appeals have been filed under Section 11 of the Act 1952.

7. With the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, following questions are framed for determination:-

(a) Whether the compensation of the acquired land determined by the District Judge, Agra by the impugned common judgment dated 29.05.1992 is inadequate and requires enhancement? If the answer is in affirmative, then what should be the amount of compensation per bigha?

(b) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the solatium granted by the District Judge, Agra by the impugned common judgment dated 29.05.1992 @ 15%, needs to be enhanced to 30%?

(c) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the claimants-appellants are entitled for interest on the amount of compensation determined under Section 8 of the Act, 1952 even in the absence of any specific provision for grant of interest?

(d) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the amount of compensation determined by the arbitrator under the impugned judgment under Section 8 of the Act 1952 can be interfered with in appeal under Section 11 of the Act?

8. Sections 7, 8, 9 and 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Rule-9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Rules, 1953 and Sections 29 and 30 of Defence of India Act, 1962 are relevant for the purposes of determination of questions/ points formulated above and, therefore, these provisions are reproduced below:

Relevant Provisions:

"(A) Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952

(i) Section 7. Power to acquire requisitioned property.--(1) Where any property is subject to requisition, the Central Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary to acquire the property for a public purpose, at any time acquire such property by publishing in the Official Gazette a notice to the effect that the Central Government has decided to acquire the property in pursuance of this section:

Provided that before issuing such notice, the Central Government shall call upon the owner of, or any other person who, in the opinion of the Central Government, may be interested in, such property to show cause why the property should not be acquired; and after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person interested in the property and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, the Central Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.

(2) When a notice as aforesaid is published in the Official Gazette, the requisitioned property shall, on and from the beginning of the day on which the notice is so published, vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances and the period of requisition of such property shall end.

(3) No property shall be acquired under this section except in the following circumstances, namely:--

(a) Where any works have, during the period of requisition, been constructed on, in or over, the property wholly or partially at the expense of the Central Government and the Government decides that the value of, or the right to use, such works should be secured or preserved for the purposes of Government; or

(b) where the cost of restoring the property to its condition at the time of its requisition would, in the determination of the Central Government, be excessive and the owner declines to accept release from requisition of the property without payment of compensation for so restoring the property.

(4) Any decision or determination of the Central Government under sub-section (3) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.

(5) For the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section (3) "works" includes buildings, structures and improvements of every description.

(ii) Section- 8. Principles and method of determining compensation.

(1) Where any property is requisitioned or acquired under this Act, there shall be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out, that is to say.-

(a) where the amount of compensation can be Fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement;

(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government shall appoint as arbitrator a person who is, or has been, or is qualified for appointment as, a Judge of a High Court;

(c) the Central Government may, in any particular case, nominate a person having expert knowledge as to the nature of the property requisitioned or acquired to assist the arbitrator and where such nomination is made, the person to be-compensated may also nominate an assessor for the same purpose;

(d) at the commencement of the proceedings before the arbitrator, the Central Government and the person to be compensated shall state what in their respective opinion is a fair amount of compensation;

(e) the arbitrator shall, after hearing the dispute, make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid; and in making the award, he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), so far as they are applicable;

(f) where there is any dispute as to the person or persons who are entitled to the compensation, the arbitrator shall decide such dispute and if the arbitrator finds that more persons than one are, entitled to compensation, he shall apportion the amount thereof amongst such persons;

(g) nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) shall apply to arbitration under this section.

(2)The amount of compensation payable for the requisitioning of any property shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2A) and (2B), consist of-

(a) a recurring payment, in respect of the period of requisition, of a sum equal to the rent which would have been payable for the use and occupation of the property, if it had been taken on lease for that period; and

(b) such sum or sums, if any, as may be found necessary to compensate the person interested for all or any of the following matters, namely :-

(i) pecuniary loss due to requisitioning;

(ii) expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises;

(iii) expenses on account of reoccupying the premises upon release from requisition; and

(iv) damages (other than normal wear and tear) caused to the property during the period of requisition, including the expenses that may have to be incurred for restoring the property to the condition in which it was at the time of requisition.

(2A) The recurring payment, referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2), in respect of any property shall, unless the property is sooner released from requisition under section 6 or acquired under section 7, be revised in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2B) - (a) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act for the period of five years or a longer period immediately preceding the commencement of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1975-

(i) first with effect from the date of such commencement, and

(ii) secondly with effect from the expiry of five years, thirdly with effect from the expiry often years, from such commencement;

(b) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act immediately before such commencement for a period shorter than five years and the maximum period within which such property shall, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1A) of section 6, be released from requisition or acquired, extends beyond five years from such commencement,-

(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the competent authority under section 4, and

(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect from the date of expiry often years, from the date on which the revision made under sub-clause (i) takes effect;

(c) in any other case,-

"(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the competent authority under section 4 -, and

(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect from the date of expiry of ten years, from the date on which the revision under sub -clause (i) takes effect.

(2B) The recurring payment in respect of any property shall be revised by re-determining such payment in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-section (1) read with clause (a) of sub-section (2), as if such property had been requisitioned under this Act on the date with effect from which the revision has to be made under sub-section (2A).

(3) The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under section 7-shall be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition.

(iii) Section-9.Payment of Compensation

The amount of compensation payable under an award shall, subject to any rules made under this Act, be paid by the competent authority to the person or persons entitled thereto in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the award.

(iv) Section-11. Appeals from awards in respect of compensation

Any person aggrieved by an award of the arbitrator made under section 8 may, within thirty days from the date of such award, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned or acquired property is situate:

Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.

(B) Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Rules, 1953

(i) Rule-9 Compensation. (1) An authority to whom the powers of the Central Government have been delegated shall, as far as may be, associate with itself the local officer of the Central Government concerned with the property in fixing compensation under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 8, and obtain the approval of the Central Government in the administrative ministry concerned or of any officer authorised by that Government in this behalf.

(2) Compensation for requisitioned property, other than agricultural land, shall be paid by the competent authority quarterly in arrears. In the case of agricultural land, the compensation shall be paid either annually or on release of the land whichever is earlier. The compensation shall be paid either in cash or by cheque at the discretion of the competent authority.

(3) The competent authority shall, as soon as may be practicable after the making of a requisitioning order or the service of a notice of acquisition, communicate to each person interested an offer of what, in the opinion of the competent authority, is a fair amount of compensation payable to such person in respect of the property requisitioned or acquired.

(4) If the owner of the property is not readily traceable or if there be no person competent to alienate the property or if the ownership of the property is in dispute or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of the amount offered as compensation, the competent authority shall deposit in court the amount of the compensation as determined by him under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 8. The competent authority shall at the same time submit to the Central Government a report setting forth the full facts of the case with all connected papers and apply for the appointment of an arbitrator. Where the compensation is recurring, the competent authority shall, in case covered by this sub-rule, deposit the amount in court from time to time in arrears as it falls due.

(5) (i) Every person interested to whom an offer is made under sub-rule (3) shall, within fifteen days of the receipt of the offer, communicate in writing to the competent authority his acceptance or otherwise of the offer. If he accepts the offer, the competent authority shall enter into an agreement with him on behalf of the Central Government in Form 'K'.

(ii) In the following circumstances the competent authority may, at his discretion, make, to all eligible claimants 'on account' payment up to 80 per cent of the amount which, in his opinion, is likely to be assessed as compensation or recurring compensation as the case may be-

(a) when there is likely to be delay in assessing compensation;

(b) where the competent authority has made an assessment but there is delay in reaching an agreement though there is a reasonable prospect of agreement being reached; or

(c) where it is clear that an agreement cannot be reached.

(iii) If the competent authority makes an 'on account' payment under clause (ii), he shall enter into an agreement with the person to whom payment is made on behalf of the Central Government, in Form-'L' with such modification as the nature of the case may require.

(6) If any person to whom an offer is made under sub-rule (3) does not accept the offer or does not within fifteen days of the receipt of the offer communicate in writing to the competent authority his acceptance or otherwise of the offer, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit to the Central Government a report setting forth the full facts of the case, particularly as regards the nature and extent of disagreement between himself on the one hand and the said person on the other hand and he shall also forward with the report all connected papers. The competent authority shall at the same time deposit in court the amount offered by him to the said person under sub-rule (3).

(C) Defence of India Act, 1962

(i) Section 29. Requisitioning of immovable property.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if in the opinion of the Central Government or the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of India, civil defence, public safety, maintenance of public order or efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, that Government may by order in writing requisition any immovable property and may make such further orders as appears to that Government to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning:

Provided that no property or part thereof which is exclusively used by the public for religious worship shall be requisitioned.

(2) The requisition shall be effected by an order in writing addressed to the person deemed by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, to be the owner or person in possession of the property, and such order shall be served in the prescribed manner on the person to whom it is addressed.

(3) Whenever any property is requisitioned under sub-section (1), the period of such requisition shall not extend beyond the period for which such property is required for any of the purposes mentioned in that sub-section.

Question No.(a)

9. Perusal of the impugned award shows that large number of sale deeds were filed in evidence by the claimants which were held by the court below to be not good exemplar. The respondents have filed two sale deeds in evidence, namely, a sale deed dated 11.10.1971 of land of Village Patholi, measuring 5 bigha 4 biswa and 7 biswancie transferred for consideration of Rs.5250/- (hereinafter referred to as "sale deed A") and sale deed dated 18.5.1972 of 31 bigha 7 biswa 9 biswanices land of Village Bilhera for a consideration of Rs.40,000/-(hereinafter referred to as "sale deed B"). The sale deed "A" was held by the court below to constitute a better exemplar. While coming to this conclusion the court below has not considered at all the affidavit of brother of the Vendee Ranbir Singh dated 20.11.1951 filed in evidence as paper No.59 Ga in which it was stated that the said land was received from the grandfather (Nana) and due to peculiar circumstances its sale was shown at a very low rate. Similarly, while holding the aforesaid sale deed "B" to constitute a good exemplar, the court below has not considered at all the affidavit of Dalip Singh, dated 23.11.1991, filed in evidence as paper No.60 Ga in which Dalip Singh has stated that the said land was initially owned by his grandfather (Nana) Sri Damodar Singh who had no son and, therefore, to avoid the possibility of any dispute by family members after his death, he gave the land to his son-in-law (daughter's husband) by gift but shown it as a sale by executing a registered sale deed. The affidavit of Sri Liladhar Sharma, dated 30.3.1992, filed in evidence as paper No.67 C which was completely ignored by the court below, specifically mentioned existence of water tank, bank, school, post office, railway station, bus stand, post graduate degree college in the vicinity of the acquired land and the fact that Village Patholi was under residential scheme of Nagar Maha Palika since the year 1971 and that large number of Government employees, who are in service in Agra, used to reside on rent in Village Patholi.

10. Instead of determining the market value of the acquired land in terms of the provisions of Section 8(3) of the Act, 1952 by determining the price of the requisitioned property as it would fetch in the open market if sold on the date of acquisition, the court below determined the compensation/market value by merely observing that "after having considered the entire material on record I have to come to the conclusion that compensation in the present case should be awarded at the following rates in respect of the land of the three villages" Thus, impugned judgment of the court below does not disclose at all any legally sustainable basis for determination of the market price of the acquired land in terms of Section 8(3) of the Act 1952, at different rates depending upon the soil quality. The rate of compensation so determined has already been mentioned in paragraph no.4 above and as such to avoid repetition it is not being reproduced here again.

11. Although the court below has noticed the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramachandraiah Etc. Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Sagar, 1973 (1) SCC 352 (Para 4) which provides for determination of market value on the basis of net annual income multiplied by 20, but did not follow this judgment merely observing that this does not exclude the other methods of ascertaining the market value and that the method of multiplication by 20 is applied in cases where the market value is assessed on the basis of annual income from the land. It is pertinent to mention here that acquired land of the claimant was requisitioned in the year 1965 and its annual rental income was finally determined @ Rs.233/- per bigha. It further appears that the court below followed the soil wise rates of compensation submitted by the Collector probably on the basis of some assessment made by the Collector Agra, dated 18.4.1977 (paper no.4 Ga). This is not permissible. Compensation has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1952.

12. Scheme of the Act for payment of compensation of acquired land is reflected in Sections 7,8 and Section 9 of the Act, 1952 and Rule 9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Rules, 1953. Section 7 of the 1952 Act confers powers upon Government to acquire requisitioned property. Principles and method of determining compensation are laid in S. 8. If the amount of compensation cannot be agreed upon, as mentioned above, the Central Government is to appoint an Arbitrator vide S. 8(1)(b) read with R. (10)(1) of the Defence of India (Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property) Rules, 1962. As per S. 8(1)(e) the Arbitrator shall, after hearing the dispute, make an award determining the amount of compensation, which appears to him to be just and (fair) and in making the award he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3) as far as applicable. Sub-sec. (2) relates to compensation concerning requisition while sub-sec. (3) lays down that the compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under S. 7 shall be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition.

13. In view of the above discussion, I find that the impugned judgment, determining the market price of the acquired land can not be sustained and is hereby set aside. Matter is remitted back to the court below to determine compensation of the acquired land in accordance with law, expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties.

Question No. D

14. This question has been framed on an objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents. Undisputedly, the impugned award has been passed under Section 8 of the Act, 1952. Section 11 of the Act, 1952, provides that any person aggrieved by an award of the arbitrator made under section 8 may, within thirty days from the date of such award, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned or acquired property is situate. Thus, a statutory appeal has been provided against an award of the arbitrator under Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, the compensation determined by the arbitrator under Section 8 can be interfered with in an appeal under Section 11 of the Act 1952. Question No. D is answered accordingly.

Question No. B & C

15. These questions appears to be covered by a judgment of this Court in Sharafat Ali Vs. State of U.P. & others 1987 ALL. L.J. 321 (paras 6,10,11 & 12), judgment of Hon'ble upreme Court in P.C. Goswami Vs. Collector of Darrang 1982(1) SCC 439, (para 7) and Dilawar Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2010(14) SCC 357 (paras 1 & 4 to 8).

16. In the case of Sharafat Ali (supra) this Court relied upon an unreported decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3058 of 1983 (Goverdhan Vs. Union of India), decided on 31.1.1983, a judgment of this Court in Smt. Chandravati Devi Vs. State of U.P. 1986, All LJ 1203 and judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhag Singh Vs. Union Territory 1985 3 SCC 737 and Joginder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another 1985 (1) SCC 231 and held as under :

"6. I am in respectful agreement with this view. In this connection my attention has been invited also to an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3058 of 1983 (Goverdhan v. Union of India) decided on 31st January, 1983, in which it was held:--

"In this appeal, it is urged before us that the High Court should have awarded solatium and should also have awarded interest from the date of the original award to the date of payment. We are satisfied that the appellants are entitled to relief on both counts. The payment of solatium at 15% is obligatory under the Land Acquisition Act and for the same reason it should be regarded as obligatory under the Defence of India Act. The circumstance that the appellants did not specifically pray for solatium in their petition does not disentitle them to an order directing payment of solatium. As regards the claim of interest we think that it is only right that interest should be awarded to the appellants for the entire period up to the date of payment, the rate of interest being that at which interest has already been awarded by the High Court for the period ending May 8, 1967."

7. This is to be found relied upon by the learned single Judge in Smt. Chandravati Devi v. State of U.P (Writ Petn. No. 12829 of 1981 and others decided on 3rd March, 1986 reported in 1986 All LJ 1203 ). Those petitions, it may be pointed, arose out of this very requisition followed by acquisition which has given rise to the petitions before me. Learned Judge therein has awarded solatium as also interest to the claimants placing reliance on the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, which evidently holds good equally for purposes of these petitions, which arise in the same process.

10. Section 7 of the 1952 Act confers powers upon Government to acquire requisitioned property. Principles and method of determining compensation are laid in S. 8. If the amount of compensation cannot be agreed upon, as mentioned above, the Central Government is to appoint an Arbitrator vide S. 8(1)(b) read with R. (10)(1) of the Defence of India (Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property) Rules, 1962. As per S. 8(1)(e) the Arbitrator shall, after hearing the dispute, make an award determining the amount of compensation, which appears to him to be just and (fair) and in making the award he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3) as far as applicable. Sub-sec. (2) relates to compensation concerning requisition while sub-sec. (3) lays down that the compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under S. 7 shall be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition. Read along with S. 25, extracted above, these are the provisions relevant in respect of the determination of compensation in such a case. The requisition in the case before us had been made prior to Jan. 10, 1968, when the revocation of the Proclamation of Emergency issued under the Defence of India Act, 1962, took place. The property had not been released from the requisition before the said date that is, Jan. 10, 1968. In contrast to S. 37, Defence of India Act, 1962, S. 8(1)(e) contemplates just compensation to be awarded and this would, therefore, include within its fold what has otherwise been regarded as just, fair or reasonable in the matter of compensation. It is true that S. 23(2) or 28, Land Acquisition Act for that matter do not apply in terms to acquisition, which has taken place under the Defence of India Act or the Act, 1952. But it is the principle underlying the same, which has been made applicable as was held directly by the Supreme Court in the case of Goverdhan referred to above. My attention has been drawn also in this connection to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Union of India v. I Addl. Dist. Judge, Meerut (Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1981) dated Feb. 14, 1983 (reported in AIR 1983 All 258), wherein the case of an acquisition made under the Defence of India Act, 1962, interest has been awarded, but the solatium was declined. In that case the decision of the Supreme Court in Goverdhan dated Jan. 31, 1983, which is directly in point, could not be brought to the notice of the Bench. Since the law laid down by the Supreme Court squarely covers the point at issue concerning the solatium and interest both, the same is binding and has to be given effect to.

12. For the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 7710 of 1983 it was further contended, however, that they are entitled to the benefit of enhanced rate of solatium and interest on the principles of restrospectivity given to the relevant provisions under S. 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984). That the claimants are entitled to solatium and interest has already been dealt with, the question now is as to the rate thereof. For that too it does not appear that there is rational basis for departure from the rate admissible ordinarily keeping in view the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In so far as the Writ Petition No. 7710 of 1983, is concerned, the award of the Arbitrator under S. 8(1) of the Act 1952, was given on March 8, 1983, that is to say after April 30, 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, and before September 24, 1984 the date of the commencement of that Act. It is true that there is no appeal pending before this Court against that award, but since this award came to be given after 30th April, 1982, and before September 24, 1984, the claimants would be entitled to the enhanced rate of solatium and interest as has been held by the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory , (1985) 3 SCC 737 : (AIR 1985 SC 1576 at p. 1581). In Smt. Chandrawati Devi (1986 All LJ 1203 ) (supra) the position in this respect was different because therein the award was given on August 10, 1981, that is before April 30, 1982, and of course, there was no appeal pending. The right to compensation, it has been held, arises when the land vests in the State while its quantification may be concluded much later. The owner of the land is entitled to be paid the true value of the land on the date of taking over of possession, (vide Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 231 : (AIR 1985 SC 382)). In conformity with the decision in Bhag Singh's case (supra), therefore, the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 7710 of 1983 are entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% on the amount of enhanced compensation as also interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date on which possession of their land was taken up to the date of payment of such enhanced compensation."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

17. In the case of P.C. Goswami (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of payment of solatium under the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 and following the law laid down in the case of State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter (Civil Appeal No. 848 of 1977) decided on 1.4.1980 reported in AIR 1980 SC 1438 held that there is no justification for discriminating between an acquisition under one Act and an acquisition under another Act in so far as payment of solatium is concerned.

18. In the case of Dilawar Singh (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of payment of solatium and interest under the provisions of the the Act 1952 and framed the following questions for determination:

Whether award of solatium and interest is permissible even in cases where acquisition of land is made under Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952?

19. This question has also arisen in the present First Appeal. The aforequoted question has been answered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Dilawar Singh (supra) (paras 1, 4 to 8) as under:

"4. It is common ground that the provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 do not make any provision for the grant of solatium or interest to the expropriated landowners. The absence of any such provision in the said Act was in fact made a basis for a challenge to the constitutional validity of the enactment which was repelled by this Court in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla 1993 (Supp) 2 SCC 149. This Court pointed out that any comparison between acquisition made under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 with that made under the Land Acquisition Act would be odious in view of the dissimilarities between the two enactments. That decision was followed in subsequent pronouncements of this Court in Union of India v. Chajju Ram 2003 (5) SCC 568 where a similar attack was mounted against the constitutional validity of Defence of India Act, 1971 but repelled by this Court relying upon the decision in Hari Krishan Khosla. What is noteworthy is that in both these matters this Court had made a distinction between cases in which there was inordinate delay in the appointment of an Arbitrator and consequent delay in the determination of the amount of compensation payable to the owners and other case where there was no such delay. In paragraph 79 of the judgment of this Court in Hari Krishan Khosla, this Court observed:

"This is a case in which for 16 years no arbitrator was appointed. We think it is just and proper to apply the principle laid down in Harbans Singh Shanni Devi v. Union of India (Civil Appeal Nos. 470 and 471 of 1985, disposed of by this Court on February 11, 1985). The Court held as under:

"Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and particularly in view of the fact that the appointment of the arbitrator was not made by the Union of India for a period of 16 years, we think this is a fit case in which solatium at the rate of 30 per cent of the amount of compensation and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum should be awarded to the appellants. We are making this order having regard to the fact that the law has in the meanwhile been amended with a view to providing solatium at the rate of 30 per cent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum."

5. Even in Union of India v. Chajju Ram (supra), this Court noted the delay in the appointment of an Arbitrator and directed that the amount of interest and solatium paid to the land owners decades back shall not be recovered from the land owners. This Court observed:

"In these cases also, it is said that the arbitrators have not yet been appointed despite the demand made in this behalf by the respondents. The amount of solatium at the rate of 15% per annum and the interest thereupon had been paid in the early eighties when the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared the said Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

In the peculiar fact situation obtaining in these cases and inasmuch as the amounts sought to be recovered are small which were paid to the respondents decades back, we are of the opinion that interest of justice shall be met if the appellants are directed not to recover the amount of compensation from the respondents pursuant to or in furtherance of this judgment. However, we hasten to add that this direction shall not be treated as a precedent."

6. The above decisions were then followed by this Court in Prabhu Dayal and Others v. Union of India 1995 (4) SCC 221. That was also a case where the appointment of Arbitrator was delayed by 22 years. This Court relying upon the decision in Hari Krishan Khosla and Harbans Singh v. Union of India, C.A. Nos. 470 & 471 of 1985 disposed of on 11th February 1985, observed:

"It is next contended that the appellants are entitled to the solatium though in law they are not entitled but in equity they are entitled to the solatium for the reason that for 22 years arbitrator was not appointed to determine the market value. In support they relied upon the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla. Therein this Court relied upon another judgment in Harbans Singh v. Union of India. In that judgment this Court said that having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the fact that the appointment of the arbitrator was not made by the Union of India for period of 16 years, this Court considered in equity to give solatium at the rate of 30 per cent of the amount of compensation and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum should be awarded to the appellants therein. In this case, the question of appointing the arbitrator would arise only when the market value offered was rejected by the claimants. The offer was made and rejected on 13-10- 1961 and the arbitrator came to appoint on 22-9-1966 after five years. Under these circumstances, the claimants are entitled to solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the market value. The appellants did not challenge the rate of interest granted at 6 per cent. Accordingly they are also entitled to the interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The appellants are entitled to the relief as stated above. No costs."

7. We may at this stage to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Union of India v. Parmal Singh and Others 2009 (1) SCC 618 where the question whether solatium and interest could be awarded to the expropriated land owners under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 was once again examined. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh AIR 1961 SC 908, Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (supra) and Union of India v. Chajju Ram 2003 (5) SCC 568 and the English decision in Swift and Co. v. Board of Trade 1925 AC 520(HL) and Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. v. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission 1928 AC 492, this Court upheld the award of interest in favour of the landowners. This Court said:

"When a property is acquired, and law provides for payment of compensation to be determined in the manner specified, ordinarily compensation shall have to be paid at the time of taking possession in pursuance of acquisition. By applying equitable principles, the courts have always awarded interest on the delayed payment of compensation in regard to acquisition of any property. When a requisitioned property is acquired, as possession had already been taken from the landholder, the compensation becomes payable from the date of acquisition. When a property is requisitioned, the landowner is compensated for the denial of possession by paying compensation based on the rent it would have fetched had it not been requisitioned. But once the property is acquired, the rent is stopped, as compensation based on open market value becomes payable against acquisition. Therefore, while interest is payable, it is not awarded from the date of requisition (taking over of possession) but only from the date of acquisition. This principle has been recognised and applied by the courts consistently."

8. It is noteworthy that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has in Union of India v. Inder Singh and Anr. In LPA No. 1918 of 1989 and connected matters upheld grant of solatium and interest in regard to a similar acquisition made in terms of a notification issued in January 1970. While doing so the High Court placed reliance upon its decision in Shankar Singh and Others v. Union of India 1988 (1) PLR 163 Mr. Subramanium, learned Solicitor General fairly conceded that no appeal has been preferred by the Union of India against the decision in Shankar Singh's case (supra) or that delivered in Union of India v. Inder Singh and Anr (supra). In that view of the matter therefore and having regard to the fact that there was an inordinate delay of 16 years in the appointment of an Arbitrator in the present cases, we have no hesitation in holding that the principle laid down by this Court in the decisions referred to above would entitle the land owners to the benefit of solatium and interest especially when the owners who have lost land in similar circumstances and for the same purpose have been given such a benefit."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

20. In view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court that in matters of acquisition made under the Provisions of the Act 1952, the land owners shall be entitled to the benefit of solatium and interest. The Question No. B & C are answered accordingly and it is held that the claimants-appellants shall be entitled for solatium and interest in terms of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.C. Goswami (supra) and Dilawar Singh (supra) and Govardhan (supra) and the judgment of this Court in Sharafat Ali (supra). Since, the impugned award has been set aside and the matter has been remanded, therefore, it is directed that the court below shall also award solatium and interest in accordance with law at applicable rates.

21. For all the reasons stated above, all the appeals are allowed. The impugned award dated 29.5.1992, passed by the District Judge, Agra, in so far as it relates to the appellants, is hereby set aside. Matter is remitted back to the court below to pass an award afresh in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above, expeditiously, preferably within eight months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order, without granting any unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties.

Order Date :- 28.2.2019/vkg