Ranchhor Singh vs A.D.C.And Others
2019 Latest Caselaw 2683 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 

 
RESERVED ON 10.10.2018
 
DELIVERED ON 09.4.2019
 
Court No. - 54
 

 
Case :- WRIT - B No. - 9148 of 1979
 
Petitioner :- Ranchhor Singh
 
Respondent :- A.D.C.And Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- W.H. Khan,Gulrez Khan,J.H. Khan
 
Counsel for Respondent :- V. Malviya,A.K. Srivastava,Kunal Ravi Singh,Manjari Singh,R.P. Shashtri,S.C.,Siddhartha Pandey,V.D. Ojha
 

 
Hon'ble Salil Kumar Rai,J.

Heard Sri W.H. Khan, Advocate assisted by Sri Gulrez Khan, for the petitioners and their heirs and Sri Kunal Ravi Singh, for respondent no. 4 and his heirs.

The disputed plots in the present writ petition as well as in the consolidation proceedings from which the present writ petition arises are Plot No. 734 (1-4-0) and Plot No. 736 (1-1-0) which are included in Khata No. 116. Notification under Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1953') regarding the village was issued on 10.9.1972. In the basic year records, the petitioners were recorded as co-tenure holders of the disputed plots and since 1372 Fasli, the respondent no. 4 was recorded in Varg 9 against the disputed plots, i.e., as occupier of the disputed plots without the consent of the tenure holder. In the partal done under Section 8 of the Act, 1953 also the respondent no. 4 was found in possession over the disputed plots. The petitioner no. 4 was recorded as minor in the revenue records on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953. A dispute has been raised in the writ petition regarding the age of the petitioner and the details of the dispute shall be referred subsequently. The respondent no. 4 filed objections under Section 9 of the Act, 1953 claiming to be Sirdar of the disputed plots alleging that he had matured his rights by adverse possession as he was in possession of the plots since before the date of vesting as prescribed in the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950. On the said objections of respondent no. 4, Case No. 4445 under Section 9-A (2) of the Act, 1953 was registered before the Consolidation Officer, Banda, i.e., respondent no. 3. The petitioners filed their reply denying the possession of respondent no. 4 over the disputed plots stating that the entries in the revenue records reflecting the possession of respondent no. 4 were not in accordance with law and were made without giving any notice to the petitioners. In their reply, the petitioners also stated that petitioner no. 4 was a minor and therefore the respondent no. 4 cannot claim to have matured his rights as Sirdar on the basis of adverse possession over the disputed plots. On the pleadings of the parties, the Consolidation Officer framed three Issues for decision. The first was as to whether the respondent no. 4 was a Sirdar of the disputed plots, the second issue was as to whether the petitioners were in possession of the disputed plots and the entries in the revenue records in favour of respondent no. 4 were in accordance with law and the third was as to whether the objections filed by respondent no. 4 were liable to be dismissed on the ground that they had been filed beyond time.

The Consolidation Officer, i.e., respondent no. 3 vide his judgment and order dated 11.10.1976 partly allowed the objections of respondent no. 4. In his order dated 11.10.1976, the Consolidation Officer held that the entries recording the name of respondent no. 4 in Varg 9 were made after issuing PA-10 to the petitioners which was served on petitioner nos. 1 and 2 and the said entries were made in accordance with law. In his order dated 11.10.1976, the Consolidation Officer held that respondent no. 4 had proved his possession over 12 Biswa of Plot No. 734 only since 1372 Fasli and therefore had not matured his rights by adverse possession and consequently rejected the claim of respondent no. 4 over 12 Biswa of Plot No. 734. However, in his order dated 11.10.1976, the Consolidation Officer also held that the respondent no. 4 had proved his possession over the rest 12 Biswa of Plot No. 734 and 1 Bigha 1 Biswa of Plot No. 736 since 1370 Fasli and as the entries in the revenue records reflecting the possession of respondent no. 4 were made in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Land Records Manual, the respondent no. 4 had matured his rights by adverse possession over the same. In his order dated 11.10.1976, the Consolidation Officer also held that the respondent no. 4 could not claim adverse possession against the petitioner no. 4 as he was a minor till 1973. Consequently, the respondent no. 3 vide his order dated 11.10.1976 rejected the claim/objections of respondent no. 4 so far as 12 Biswa of Plot No. 734 was concerned but held the respondent no. 4 to be Sirdar of 3/4 of the rest 12 Biswa of Plot No. 734 and of 1 Bigha 1 Biswa of Plot No. 736 along with petitioner no. 4 who had 1/4 share in the same. The petitioners filed Appeal No. 542 of 1977 against the order dated 11.10.1976 so far as the same was in favour of respondent no. 4. The order dated 11.10.1976 was also challenged by respondent no. 4 through Appeal Nos. 548 of 1977 and 1034 of 1977 to the extent it rejected the claim of respondent no. 4. The respondent no. 2 vide his order dated 19.11.1977 dismissed Appeal Nos. 548 of 1977 and 1034 of 1977 filed by respondent no. 4 but allowed Appeal No. 542 of 1977 filed by the petitioners and consequently rejected the claim of respondent no. 4 as raised through his objections and directed that the basic year entries regarding Plot Nos. 734 and 736 be retained. While passing the order dated 19.11.1977, the respondent no. 2 held that the entries in the revenue records which showed respondent no. 4 to be in possession of the disputed plots were not made in accordance with the Land Records Manual and were, therefore, not reliable and the adverse possession of respondent no. 4 over the disputed plots was not proved by the evidence on record.

The order dated 19.11.1977 passed by respondent no. 2 was challenged by respondent no. 4 under Section 48 of the Act, 1953 before the Assistant Director of Consolidation, i.e., respondent no. 1 through Revision Nos. 2297 of 1979 and 2298 of 1979. The respondent no. 1 vide his order dated 10.10.1979 allowed the aforesaid revisions and directed that respondent no. 4 be recorded as Sirdar of the disputed plots. In his order dated 10.10.1979, the respondent no. 1 reversed the findings of respondent no. 2 that the revenue entries reflecting the possession of respondent no. 4 over the disputed plots were not made in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Land Records Manual and relying on the revenue entries in favour of respondent no. 4 held that the respondent no. 4 was entitled to be recorded as Sirdar of the disputed plots as he had proved his adverse possession for more than 6 years. In his order dated 10.10.1979, the respondent no. 1 also held that the fact that the petitioner no. 4 was a minor was not relevant to decide the rights of respondent no. 4 because even if one co-tenure holder had attained majority the possession of the stranger/trespasser would be against all co-tenure holders including the tenure holders who were minor.

The order dated 10.10.1979 passed by respondent no. 1 has been challenged in the present writ petition.

It was argued by the counsel for the petitioners that all the petitioners were co-sharers and the petitioner no. 4 was a minor and under a legal disability and the other co-sharers who had attained majority could not have given a valid discharge without the concurrence of petitioner no. 4 regarding the disputed plots. It was argued that, in the circumstances, by virtue of Section 7 of Limitation Act, 1963 the period of limitation would not run against any petitioner and the rights as claimed by respondent no. 4 had not matured and in his order dated 10.10.1979, the respondent no. 1 had committed an error of law apparent on the face of record by holding that respondent no. 4 had matured his rights over the disputed plots even though the petitioner no. 4 was a minor. It was further argued by the counsel for the petitioners that the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation in his order dated 19.11.1977 were findings of fact and the respondent no. 1 has exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Act, 1953 in reversing the findings of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation by acting as a court of fact and assessing evidence on pure issues of fact and recording findings denovo on the question of legality of entries in the revenue records in favour of respondent no. 4. It was argued that in view of the aforesaid, the order dated 10.10.1979 was illegal and contrary to law and liable to be set-aside. In support of his arguments, the counsel for the petitioners has relied on the judgments of this Court reported in Badal Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. (1970) ALJ 510 (FB) (LB), Shahzad Singh & Ors. Vs. Pheku Singh & Ors. (1972) ALJ 818 and Surendra Singh & Anr. Vs. The Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. AIR (1976) Allahabad 510.

Rebutting the arguments of the counsel for the petitioners, the counsel for the respondents has argued that it was apparent from the evidence on record that the entries in the revenue records in favour of respondent no. 4 were made as per the procedure prescribed in the Land Records Manual and the respondent no. 4 had matured his rights by adverse possession over the disputed plots and therefore was entitled to be recorded as Sirdar of the same. It was argued by the counsel for the respondents that the findings recorded by respondent no. 2 in his order dated 19.11.1977 regarding the entries in the revenue records and the possession of respondent no. 4 were contrary to the evidence on record and perverse and the respondent no. 1 had rightly interfered in the same. It was argued that, in the circumstances there was no jurisdictional error in the order dated 10.10.1979 passed by respondent no. 1 in view of the Explanation-III of Section 48 of the Act, 1953 which was brought in effect from 10.10.1979. It was further argued by the counsel for the respondents that the petitioner no. 4 did not institute any proceedings during the limitation period for eviction of respondent no. 4 and Section 7 of the Limitation Act referred in the judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioners was applicable only when a suit could be filed jointly by the tenure holders. It was argued that in the present case, the petitioners were recorded separately in the revenue records and the petitioner no. 4 was entitled to file a suit for ejectment of respondent no. 4 from his share in the disputed plots. It was argued that the petitioner no. 4 never filed any objections during the consolidation operations or any suit even after attaining majority and in any case the proposition formulated by the counsel for the petitioners was not applicable in cases of adverse entries based on PA-10 which are rooted in procedural law. It was argued that for the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 10.10.1979 passed by respondent no. 1 is according to law and the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. In support of his arguments, the counsel for the respondents has relied on the judgments reported in Ram Shakal & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (1987) RD 264, Rachappa Totappa Vs. Madivalawa Rachappa (1944) 46 Bombay Law Report 683 and Sheo Nand & Ors. Vs. The Deputy Director of Consolidation Allahabad & Ors. AIR 2000 (SC) 1141.

Before proceeding to decide the case, it would be relevant to note that in the writ petition a supplementary affidavit has been filed by respondent no. 4 annexing a copy of the family register showing the year of birth of petitioner no. 4 as 1946. The supplementary affidavit has been filed to show that petitioner no. 4 was not a minor and had attained majority by 1964, i.e., 1371 Fasli, and therefore the claim of respondent no. 4 cannot be defeated on the ground that petitioner no. 4 was a minor on the date the consolidation proceedings were notified under the Act, 1953. A reading of the different orders passed by the consolidation authorities would show that before the consolidation authorities, the respondent no. 4 had not challenged the fact that petitioner no. 4 was a minor. In his order dated 11.10.1976, the Consolidation Officer has recorded that respondent no. 4 was not able to contradict the age of petitioner no. 4 as reflected in the revenue records which showed that the petitioner no. 4 was a minor till 1973. The said findings were not challenged by the respondent no. 4 before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. The respondent no. 4 did not challenge the said findings in the revisions filed by him before respondent no. 1. It is apparent from the order dated 10.10.1979 that before respondent no. 1, the respondent no. 4 had taken the case that he had matured his rights by adverse possession and the same cannot be denied on grounds of minority of petitioner no. 4. In that view, the plea sought to be raised by respondent no. 4 through the document annexed with his supplementary affidavit regarding the age of petitioner no. 4 is being raised for the first time before this Court. The respondent no. 4 cannot be permitted to build a new case in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The findings regarding the age of petitioner no. 4 as recorded by the Consolidation Officer have attained finality and cannot be re-opened in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the plea regarding the age of petitioner no. 4 sought to be raised by respondent no. 4 through his supplementary affidavit and the document attached with it, is rejected.

The petition is being decided on the basis of the findings of the Consolidation Officer as recorded in his order dated 11.10.1976 that the petitioner no. 4 was a minor till 1973 and was, therefore, a minor on the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, 1953, i.e., 10.9.1972.

The issue that arises for consideration by this Court in the present writ petition is as to whether the respondent no. 4 had matured his rights as Sirdar over the disputed plots by adverse possession even though the petitioner no. 4 had not attained majority till the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, 1953 but other petitioners had attained majority by the date the limitation prescribed for ejectment of respondent no. 4 had expired?

Findings on the power of Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act, 1953 and on the legality of the revenue entries in favour of respondent no. 4 would be required only if the answer on the aforesaid issue is against the petitioner.

It was held by this Court in Ram Vriksha Vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur & Anr. 2005 (99) RD 295 that if before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation consolidation operations intervened then the limitation prescribed for filing a suit under Section 209 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1950) stood arrested. Paragraph no. 15 of the judgment containing the relevant observations of the Court is reproduced below:

"15. ... After commencement of the consolidation operation no suit under section 209 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act can be filed, the jurisdiction being barred and hence non-filing of suit would confirm no rights on the person who was in possession on the date the consolidation proceedings started if the limitation for a suit under section 209 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has not, till then run out. In other words if before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation consolidation intervenes then the limitation prescribed by section 209 stands arrested. The view taken by me finds support from a Division Bench judgment of our Court in the case of Smt. K. Devi v. Joint Director of Consolidation U.P. and others."

(Emphasis added)

In Smt. Kishan Devi Vs. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P. & Ors. (1973) ALJ 395, it was held that after the notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953 the non-filing of a suit by the aggrieved person conferred no rights on the person who was in possession on the date the consolidation proceedings had started, if the limitation for a suit under Section 209 of the Act, 1953 had not till then run out. The relevant observations of the Court in Paragraph no. 4 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below:

"4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the reason given by the learned Single Judge for refusing the relief to the petitioner was not correct. We are of opinion that he is right in this submission. The consolidation operations had started in 1961 and the objection had been filed on 16th June 1961. The period of six years from the date of the decree from which respondents entered into possession would, therefore, not expire before the consolidation proceedings had commenced. The respondents could not, therefore, acquire any title by adverse possession even if their possession is deemed to commence from 3rd January 1957. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the issue of notification under the Consolidation of Holdings Act will not arrest the running of limitation under Secs. 209 and 210 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. We are, however, of opinion that it was not open to the appellant to institute a suit under Sec. 209 of the Zamindari Abolition Act after consolidation proceedings had commenced. Sec. 49 bars the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit under Sec. 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. If the jurisdiction of the court is barred, no person can file a suit. Hence, the non-filing of the suit would confer no rights on the person who was in possession on the date the consolidation proceedings had started, if the limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had not till then run out."

(Emphasis added)

In appendix III of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Rules, 1952, the limitation period prescribed, at the relevant time, for filing a suit under Section 209 of the Act, 1950 was six years from 1st of July following the date of occupation. In his order dated 10.10.1979, the respondent no. 1 has held that respondent no. 4 was in possession over the disputed plots since 1370 Fasli. Thus, the period of limitation for filing a suit under Section 209 of the Act, 1950 would start from 1st of July, 1964 and the respondent no. 4 would have matured his rights by adverse possession on 30th of June, 1970. However, on 30th June, 1970, the petitioner no. 4 was a minor.

In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajab Singh Vs. Antram AIR (2009) SCW 2238, Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1963') are applicable to proceedings under the Act, 1953.

Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act, 1963 deal with the rights of minors so far as limitation for instituting any proceedings are concerned. The said provisions are reproduced below:-

"6. Legal disability.--(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule.

(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply.

(5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this section ''minor' includes a child in the womb.

7. Disability of one of several persons.--Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Explanation I.--This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property.

Explanation II.--For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint family property.

8. Special exceptions.--Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application."

(Emphasis added)

A joint reading of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act, 1963 shows that in case the person having the right to sue or to file an application suffers from a disability referred in Section 6, he may file the suit or application within the same period as would have otherwise been allowed after the disability has ceased. Minority is one of the disabilities referred in Section 6. Section 7, to some extent, limits the indulgence given by Section 6. It provides that where one of the several persons jointly entitled to sue or file an application is under any such disability, i.e., the disability stipulated in Section 6 and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of the person under disability, there will be no extension of limitation and ordinary period of limitation would apply against all such persons including the persons under disability. But, where no such discharge can be given, limitation, by virtue of Section 6, shall extend with reference to all the persons and not only with reference to the person under disability and time will not start to run against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability of all has ceased. Section 8 is in the nature of proviso to Sections 6 & 7 and restricts the period of limitation which can be extended under Sections 6 and 7 to a maximum period of three years.

In the light of Section 7 of Act, 1963 reference may be made to the judgment of this court in Surendra Singh Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation AIR 1976 Allahabad 510, wherein this court held that one co-sharer in a joint Bhumidhari holding cannot give a valid discharge on behalf of other co-sharers. Observations made by the court in paragraph nos. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 are reproduced below:-

"6. Section 210 of the said Act provides that if the suit is not brought under Section 209, the person retaining possession shall become Sirdar where the land forms part of the holding of a Bhumidhar. Section 209, inter alia, lays down the condition that a person should not only have taken or retained possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force, but also without the consent of the Bhumidhar concerned. So, if there are more than one Bhumidhar entitled to a holding, the trespasser must be in possession without the consent of all of them. Proof of lack of consent of one of them, or proof of consent of one of them, will not enure to the benefit of the trespasser in acquiring sirdari rights under Section 210 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act, even in case where the suit is not brought under Section 209 of the said Act.

7. It is suggested that where there are more than one co-sharers in the Bhumidhari holding, their joint consent is necessary.

Section 7 of the Limitation Act provides:-

......

8. The crux of the matter, which requires consideration, is whether a co-sharer can give valid discharge without concurrence of the other co-sharers. In the case of Sarda Prasad v. Lala Jamuna Prasad, (AIR 1961 SC 1074) the Supreme Court has held that the word "discharge? occurring in Section 7 of the Limitation Act means to free from liability and that the provisions of this Section apply to a case of delivery of possession of an immovable property, Section 7 of the said Act hence on its own terms will be applicable to a suit for possession of an immovable property. In the case of Deshraj v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1970 All WR (HC) 16), a Division Bench of this Court has held that on a reading of Section 341 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act with Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act it is clear that Section 6 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suits under Section 209 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. On the same reasoning the provisions of Section 7 of the Limitation Act will also be applicable to proceedings under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.

9. On the question whether one co-sharer alone can give discharge without the consent of the other, the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Jawahar Singh v. Udai Prakash, (AIR 1926 PC 16) is directly on point. It was held therein that a suit brought by some sons within three years of their majority to set aside alienation by father is not barred though one of the sons had long before three years reached majority. This principle was laid down in relation to Section 7 of the Limitation Act. The same principle, in our opinion, would be applicable to a situation where one of the sons does not bring the suit for possession against a trespasser within three years of his attaining majority, while the other son continues to be a minor. In terms of Section 7, the son who had attained majority first cannot give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the other. In that event the period of limitation would not run against them. The time will start running when the other brother also ceases to be under the disability, namely, when he becomes major.

10. ...

11. ...

12. ...

13. The requirement that all the co-sharers must be present before the Court also leads to the implication that one of them is not entitled to give a valid discharge without concurrence of the other co-sharers. As for the applicability of Section 7 of the Limitation Act, non-enactment in U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act of a similar provision to Section 246 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is immaterial."

(Emphasis added)

In view of the judgment of this Court in Surendra Singh (supra), one co-sharer in a holding cannot give a valid discharge without the concurrence of other share holders and the period of limitation would not run against them and time shall start running only when the other co-sharer also ceased to be under the disability, i.e., when he attains majority. Thus, the respondent no. 4 could not have matured his rights by adverse possession before the disability of respondent no. 4 ceased and the limitation prescribed for filing a suit under Section 209 of the Act, 1950 read with Section 8 of the Act, 1963 expired in relation to petitioner no. 4. The petitioner no. 4 was a minor till 1973. In the light of the judgments of this Court in Smt. Kishan Devi (supra) and Ram Vriksha (supra) time ceased to run against petitioner no. 4 because of the intervention of consolidation proceedings under the Act, 1953 on 1.4.1972. Time ceased to run against petitioner no. 4 on 1.4.1972 as after the said date petitioner no. 4 could not have filed any suit for ejectment of respondent no. 4. Consequently, in view of the judgment of this Court in Surendra Singh (supra), time would also not run against other petitioners and respondent no. 4 cannot be held to have matured his rights by adverse possession over the disputed plots. Thus, the findings of respondent no. 1 that the respondent no. 4 had matured his rights by adverse possession over the disputed plots and acquired Sirdari rights cannot be sustained. The impugned order dated 10.10.1979 passed by respondent no. 1 is liable to be set-aside.

In view of the aforesaid, no findings are required on the issues regarding the power of respondent no. 1 and the legality of revenue entries in favour of respondent no. 4.

The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 10.10.1979 passed by respondent no. 1 is, hereby, set-aside.

Order Date :- 9.4.2019

Satyam