Bhupendra Singh Chauhan vs State Of U.P.
2018 Latest Caselaw 3427 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

?A.F.R. 
 
Court No. - 48
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1250 of 2014
 

 
Appellant :- Bhupendra Singh Chauhan
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Dharmendra Singhal,R.P.S. Chauhan,Shivam Yadav,Yadvendra Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Govt. Advocate,S.M. Pandey
 

 
Hon'ble Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J.

Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Singh,J.

Ref: Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 290346 of 2016.

List has been revised. Learned counsel for the appellant is present along with learned A.G.A. None has appeared on behalf of the informant even after repeated calls.

This second bail application has been filed seeking the release of the appellant on bail in S.T. No. 263 of 2009, Case Crime No. 349 of 2009, under Section 302 I.P.C. and S.T. No. 296 of 2009, Case Crime No. 350 of 2009, under Section 25 Arms Act, Police Station- Kasganj, District- Kasganj. The first bail application was rejected by this Court on 1.7.2014 on merit.

Heard learned counsel for the appellant.

Perused the record.

Counsel for the appellant has once again tried to reopen the merits of the case and take us through the evidence all over once more. It was also submitted that after the rejection of the earlier bail application on 1.7.2014 sufficient time has elapsed yet the appeal has not been heard and, therefore, on the ground of long detention appellant may be released on bail.

Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the record.

The perusal of the earlier bail rejection order reveals that this Court has already gone through the record and has passed the order on the merits of the case. It was not found to be a fit case where the accused could be released on bail. The law on the point of second bail is well settled. Unless there is a fresh ground, a new bail application cannot be successfully moved. It is also well settled that a fresh ground does not mean a new argument by the same counsel or a new argument by another counsel who may be subsequently engaged. Fresh ground means a ground which did not exist at at the time of hearing of the earlier bail application. This aspect of law has been settled long back by the Division Bench in the case of Satya Pal vs. State of U.P., 1999 CRI.L.J. 3709. This Bench has all the reasons to agree with this view, otherwise there cannot be any end to moving new bail applications frequently time and again. Every time the counsel may claim to have discovered some new aspect or angle in the merits of the case and may insist that now the Court should give a re-look to the matter in that perspective. Such a course will be very detrimental to the discipline of the Court and will also go to result often in a fruitless exercise. Once the Court adverts to the record of the case and passes a particular order, it is ordinarily presumed that all relevant aspects of the case have been considered by the Court. It is also not necessary that while expressing its view rejecting the bail, all what was argued before the Court should be recorded in the order. It is also not necessary that everything which has been seen by the Court in the record should also be recorded in the order. Bail orders by its very nature are not supposed to be very lengthy. The Courts also abstain from writing elaborate orders on the point of bail, lest it may go eventually to cause prejudice to either side. Bail orders are the orders passed at an interim stage and are not to be construed as final reflections on the merits of the case. Therefore, this Court does not see any merits even in this contention of the counsel that there are several aspects of the case which were not considered by the Court. The Court records only those reasons or aspects of the case, while dictating the bail order, which in its opinion are sufficient to arrive at the decision. If certain reasons are sufficient to reject the bail or allow the bail, there is hardly any need to burden the order by all other aspects of the case or to add to the weight of the order by enumerating each and every other aspects which have been seen by the court. But that would not go to mean that those aspects which do not find their place in the order were not adverted to by the Court. Reference in this regard may be usefully made to the case of Girind Singh vs. State of U.P. and others in Criminal Appeal No.3294 of 2010. In any view of the matter even though the position of law in this regard is quite clear but on the over insistence of the counsel this Court has once again gone through the record.

This is a case in which there is evidence to show that the appellant-husband has murdered his wife. He is the sole accused in the case. The bullet has gone through and through. The motive which is said to have prompted the appellant to commit such ghastly crime was that the deceased is said to have got an insurance of Rs. 5,00,000/- and it is said that probably in order to realize the same money she was done to death. The weapon of offence was also discovered at the pointing out of the accused. The husband and the wife lived in the same premises and even the hostile witnesses have affirmed about the presence of the accused there around the time of occurrence. The subsequent conduct of the appellant after committing the crime is also highly incriminating and pregnant with adverse inferences as it is apparent on the face of record that the appellant never reported the matter to the police. The defence pleas taken on his behalf are contrary in nature. It appears that at some stage of trial, the suggestion on behalf of the accused-appellant was made that it was a case of suicide. But that suggestion crashes to ground in the wake of the post mortem examination report of the deceased which shows that she was shot at from the back side. It is highly implausible to suggest that she would have managed her body in a way that would succeed to get shot from the back side. Another plea that some other miscreants had committed the crime is again not in consonance with the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and there is no good reason at all to accept even this defence plea. In such an event as suggested by accused the appellant should have been the first person to rush to the police station and report the matter which has not been done by him at all. The circumstances under which the appellant's wife got murdered inside the premises in which both of them dwelt together as tenants are within the special knowledge of the appellant and the onus to prove or explain them is heavily upon his own shoulders which he has utterly failed to discharge. The merits of the case have already been gone into earlier and this Court had not found it to be a fit case in which the appellant could be released on bail. This is true that the appellant has spent quite sometime behind the bar and ordinarily this Court feels inclined to take a liberal view in favour of the accused in such a situation. But the sheer detention period cannot be a conclusive ground to release the accused on bail in all cases regardless to the merits of the case. There cannot be a straightjacket formula to be applied universally. The circumstances of the crime, the gravity of the offence, nature of evidence, the depravity of the accused and several such other factors are very relevant considerations to be kept in perspective before such liberty may be granted. The present matter at hand is one in which the murder appears to have been perpetrated for reasons of reprehensible rapacity of the accused. Being the husband he was supposed to be the first protector of his wife. Ironically enough it is he who has presided upon the liquidation of his wife's life. She was a helpless lady and in the seclusion of his residence she was brutally killed. The evidence available on record is conclusive and this Court does not see any good ground on the basis of which the impugned judgement upholding his guilt may be castigated or on the basis of which it may be said that the accused-appellant has even a prmia facie case in his favour.

It sounds paradoxical but it is a common sight to behold and is not infrequent to see these days that if a conviction has been recorded in a certain case in the wake of sufficiency of evidence available against an accused, the appellants or their legal representatives tend to duck and shirk back from final hearing of the appeal. Ostensibly it is so, either under the apprehension of a feared unfavourable verdict or for the reason of not being very sure about a favourable verdict from the appellate court. This uncalled for escapism contributes to the delays in the final hearing and then attempts are made to make capital out of the same and seek bail in the name of prolong detention where accused are in jail. Such a tendency cannot be countenanced with and this Court does not feel inclined to succumb to such a contrivance. If the appellant's counsel so desires he can always argue finally upon the merits of the case and get the appeal decided. The paper book is already ready. If the counsel has any inclination, this Court has no disinclination to undertake final hearing of appeal.

So far as the matter of bail is concerned, the Court has once again re-looked into the merits of the case on the insistence of the appellant's counsel though the same have already been adverted to while hearing the first bail application. Looking to the nature of offence, its gravity and the evidence in support of it and the overall circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that the appellant has not made out a case for bail.

Therefore, the second prayer for bail of the appellant also stands rejected.

Order Date :- 30.10.2018

Naresh