Allahabad High Court
Yogendra Singh vs State Of U.P. And Another on 30 November, 2018
Bench: Yashwant Varma
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Court No. - 6
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 25239 of 2018
Petitioner :- Yogendra Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another
Counsel for Petitioner :- Vijay Kumar Singh,Shashi Prakash Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.
Heard Sri G.K. Singh learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel.
This petition impugns an order dated 04 September 2018 pursuant to which the District Magistrate, disagreeing with the report submitted by the enquiry officer, has proceeded to issue a direction for appointment of another enquiry officer and for proceedings being drawn afresh.
Sri Singh learned Senior Counsel submits that the aforesaid order has come to be passed without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause. It is his submission that the order impugned would clearly be contrary to the principles as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Vs. Kunj Behari Misra 1998 (7) SCC 84.
Learned Standing Counsel does not dispute the legal position and therefore, states that the ends of justice would merit the matter being remitted to the District Magistrate to proceed afresh in accordance with law.
The Court notes that in Kunj Behari Misra, the following pertinent observations came to be entered:-
"18.Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained inKarunakar case[(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] .
19.The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer."
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind coupled with the admitted position that the petitioner was not provided any opportunity to show cause, it is evident that the impugned order cannot be sustained.
Accordingly this writ petition stands allowed. The impugned order dated 04 September 2018 is hereby quashed. The matter shall in consequence stand remitted to the District Magistrate Azamgarh to proceed in the matter afresh and in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations made hereinabove.
Order Date :- 30.11.2018
faraz
