Allahabad High Court
Ramgiri vs State Of U.P. on 17 July, 2018
Bench: Karuna Nand Bajpayee
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?A.F.R.
Court No. - 48
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 17969 of 2018
Applicant :- Ramgiri
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P.
Counsel for Applicant :- Lalit Kumar Srivastava,Girraj Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J.
This third bail application has been filed seeking the release of the applicant on bail in Case Crime No.100 of 2016, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307,504 I.P.C., Police Station- Narkhi, District- Firozabad. The first bail application was rejected by this Court on 18.10.2016 on merits and the second bail application was rejected by this Court on 19.1.2018 in non-prosecution.
Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State. Perused the record.
The only submission raised by the counsel for the applicant is that subsequently after the rejection of the bail application of the accused-applicant, the co-accused Harikesh and Rajpal, have been granted bail by other Benches of this Court on 3.11.2016 and 19.11.2016 respectively, and therefore, on the ground of parity the applicant also may be released on bail as the evidence against the applicant bears factual semblance with the evidence available against the aforesaid co-accused.
Learned A.G.A. has opposed the prayer for bail.
The perusal of bail order passed in favour of co-accused reveals that the factum or the order of rejection of applicant's bail was never brought to the notice of the aforesaid Bench of this Court. It is difficult to say as to what view would have been taken by other Bench, if this relevant fact would have been brought to its notice. The perusal of bail rejection order passed by this Court reveals that the merits of the case have already been gone into and this Court did not find it fit to release the applicant on bail. If before passing the order in the case, some bail order with regard to another co-accused is available and is brought to the notice of the Court then the Court pays due regard to the same. Not that the ground of parity is any absolute rule of law but ordinarily unless there are strong circumstances to take a different view, the view taken by other Benches is considered, respected and paid due regards by all Courts. But the situation is altogether different when a particular view has already been taken and it is found that subsequently the co-accused has obtained bail from another Bench and that too by suppressing the material factum of rejection of present applicant's bail. It is wholly unreasonable and unjustifiable to argue that just because subsequently another co-accused has succeeded to obtain bail after suppressing this Court's order, this should be good ground for this Court to revisit the findings given by it earlier and change its order just to bring the same in consonance with the subsequent orders passed with regard to co-accused by another Bench. Contention in this regard is fatuous and specious both. If already some order has been passed by some Court on the point of bail or with regard to any matter which is similar in nature then such an order must be placed before another Court while it is being called upon to adjudicate upon such matter, if not as a principle of law then at least as a matter of good faith and fair play. It is not at all necessary that if the bail of co-accused has been rejected by another Bench then the bail applications of all other accused persons of the same case must be rejected by all other benches, if they are so moved. The principle of parity is normally pressed successfully in order to obtain the bail, if the allegations and the evidence in support of them are same with regard to such accused persons, but the principle of parity does not apply in the same manner where the bail of one accused has been rejected. But and nevertheless, it is certainly the right of the Court to be informed about all relevant and material facts and circumstances of the case and also the fate of similar matters which attended them earlier in different Courts or in the same Court. It is only after being fully informed and after considering all such facts that a particular court can formulate its view correctly. Such disclosure goes a long way to avert uncalled-for dichotomy in judicial verdicts and helps to sustain public faith in the judicial institution. It is trite law and everybody knows about it that where there are two cross cases, the evidence of one case is not at all to be considered or looked into by the Court while adjudicating upon the point of innocence or guilt of accused of another cross case. Yet the settled principle of judicial prudence recognized by all Courts is that two cases which are cross cases in nature must be tried together and decided as far as possible by the same Court. This principle has emanated and evolved for similar reasons as have been expatiated upon herein before. When both the cross cases are tried and decided by the same Court, the chances to arrive at contradictory findings get automatically averted and minimized which helps the Court to give consistent findings and not such contradictory findings which may not be reconciled with each other. For all these similar reasons the Courts expect that if by the same accused some earlier application has been filed with regard to similar matter or if there is some decision in the same matter that has already been given on the same or similar point by the same court or subsequently by the higher court or if the co-accused in the same case has on the same issue already obtained certain order favourable or unfavourable, as the case may be, the same ought to be brought to the notice of the Court so that it may proceed to decide the matter pending before it in perspective of the same and may not get bluffed and be misled in sheer ignorance of such material and and relevant information. It has become a common sight now to see the proliferation of diverse opinions in similar matters and one of the prime reasons attributable to it is the non disclosure of the material facts and material orders on similar issues that are already existing with regard to same accused or with regard to another accused involved in the same case. One must come out with clean conscience in the Court and approach it with clean hands. There is no scope for anybody to play hide and seek in the Courts.
This Court has once again given a second look to the merits of the case on the persuasive request of the counsel but once again feels constrained and deems it proper to adhere to its earlier view and does not find it a fit case to release the applicant on bail in the facts and circumstances of the case. The merits have already been gone into and there is no such good fresh ground which may persuade the Court to take a different view.
The second bail application of the applicant, therefore, stands rejected.
Order Date :- 17.7.2018/Naresh
