Mohd. Ramjan & Another vs State Of U.P. & Others
2018 Latest Caselaw 4252 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

AFR
 
Reserved on 05.10.2018
 
Delivered on 12.12.2018
 
Court No. - 34
 

 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 5163 of 2003
 

 
Petitioner :- Mohd. Ramjan & Another
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sunil Kr. Srivastava,R.P. Yadav
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.

1. Heard Sri Sunil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State and perused the record.

2. Petitioners, working as Wood Craft Instructors (hereinafter referred to as "W.C.I.") in Government Industrial Training Institute (hereinafter referred to as "G.I.T.I.") have come to this Court by means of present writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India challenging order dated 29.11.2002 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) whereby respondent 1 has rejected their representation claiming higher pay scale of Rs.5000-8000. A writ of mandamus has also been prayed directing respondents to allow pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 to petitioners on the ground of parity since petitioners are discharging same duties, as is being discharged by Instructors working in Industrial Training Institute (hereinafter referred to as "I.T.I.").

3. I.T.Is. were established for providing vocational training and run under administrative control of a Director, Training and Employment.

4. Vide order dated 31.03.1981 issued by Director, Training and Employment, U.P. Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as "D, T & E"), petitioner 1 Mohd. Ramjan was appointed as W.C.I. on temporary and ad hoc basis in the pay scale of Rs.200-320. Similarly, vide order dated 15.7.1981 petitioner 2 Kamal Dev Rai was also appointed on temporary and ad hoc basis as W.C.I. in pay scale of Rs.200-320 in Government Wood Craft Institute, Allahabad.

5. In 1986, in view of recommendation of Pay Revision Committee, Pay scale of petitioners, i.e. Rs.200-320, was revised to Rs.354-550. Subsequently, when post to post parity was given to employees of State Government with Central Government Employees, in view of recommendations of Equivalence Committee 1989, W.C.I. were placed in the pay scale of Rs.400-615 and same was revised to Rs.975-1660 and then to Rs.3200-4950. When petitioners were given scale of Rs.400-615, W.C.I., working in I.T.I., were given scale of Rs.515-860, which was revised to Rs.1400-2600 and then they were given pay scale of Rs.5000-8000. Complaint is that this distinction has been made in 1990 and despite recommendation by D, T & E, no action was taken to do away this disparity.

6. Recommendation of D, T & E is on record as Annexure 2 to the writ petition, which shows that as per Government Order dated 18.8.1989, revised pay scale of W.C.I. was 975-1660 but D, T & E recommended higher scale of Rs.1400-2600. It is further said that since duties of W.C.I. are same as that of Instructors of I.T.I., therefore, these W.C.Is. should also be designated as "Trade Instructors" with the same pay scale.

7. Petitioners made representations and thereafter filed Writ Petition No.6619 of 2002 before this Court, which was decided vide judgment dated 15.2.2002 permitting petitioners to make representation before State of U.P., who was required to decide the same by a speaking order. Consequently, petitioners made representation dated 26.2.2002 contending that they have been appointed in G.I.T.I., Allahabad as W.C.I. and for all purposes including duties, responsibilities etc., are similarly placed with Instructors appointed in I.T.I., therefore, they should also be given same pay scale i.e. Rs.5000-8000. A reminder was also given on 11.7.2002 whereafter, vide impugned order dated 29.11.2002, State Government has rejected the said claim holding that qualification for recruitment of Instructors and Trade Instructors are different, under the Rules applicable to Instructors working in the scale of Rs.3200-4950, there is no provision for promotion as 'Trade Instructor' in pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 and post of Trade Instructor is to be filled in by 100 per cent direct recruitment, for which, a different qualification is prescribed; hence, Instructors like petitioners cannot claim pay scale at par with Trade Instructor.

8. Contention of petitioners is that the above decision of respondents is perverse, contrary to record, based on flimsy grounds and violative of fundamental rights of "equal pay for equal work" as there is no substantial distinction to maintain different pay scales.

9. Respondents have filed counter affidavit stating that prior to 1989, Government Industrial Training Institutes i.e. G.I.T.I., and Industrial Training Institutes i.e. I.T.I., were different Institutes governed by different provisions. In 1989, these two Institutions were merged. There came into existence two categories of Instructors, one, those working in G.I.T.I. in the old scale of Rs.200-320 revised to 400-615, 975-1660 and then 3200-4950. Other category of Instructors working in I.T.I. were in the higher pay scale of Rs.1400-2600, which was revised to 5000-8000. The qualification of Instructors in G.I.T.I., for recruitment was certificate/diploma. It is said that petitioners did not possess qualification, as required for Senior Scale Trade Instructor and have not completed course from National Council for Vocational Training (hereinafter referred to as "N.C.V.T."). Reference is also made to U.P. Industrial Training Institute (Instructors) Service Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1991") as amended by U.P. Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service (Second Amendment) Rules 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "Second Amendment Rules, 2003"). In para 9 of counter affidavit it is said that Instructors, who were working in Lower Grade Pay Scale and possessed certificate/course from N.C.V.T., were promoted as Trade Instructor in pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 but since petitioners did not possess such certificate, they cannot be allowed such pay scale of Rs.5000-8000.

10. In rejoinder affidavit petitioners have clarified things by stating that prior to 1989, there were two types of Institutes namely G.I.T.I and I.T.I. Working pattern of both these institutes was same, hence, Government took a decision to merge the same as there was no reason to maintain two separate institutions when for all practical purposes, there was no distinction in functioning and courses run by these Institutes. With merger, name of Institute, where petitioners were appointed, became Government Wood Working Industrial Training Institute. It is said that there were no two types of Instructors, one in Lower Grade and another in Senior Grade. There were Instructors in G.I.T.I. and similarly there was Instructor in I.T.I. It was a mere chance that Instructors in I.T.I. were given higher scale while Instructors in G.I.T.I. were given lower scale. After merger in 1989 of both these institutes, a single cadre of Instructors came into existence and to govern the same, Rules, 1991 were framed. In aforesaid Rules, there is no distinction between Instructors already working like Lower Grade Instructors and Senior Grade Instructors. Rule 4 of Rules, 1991 gave total number of posts of Instructor, and, it includes all Instructors in different I.T.Is. and there is only one cadre i.e. Instructor. This artificial distinction, sought to be drawn by respondents, has no basis and this difference in pay scale is not based on any rational justification but sheer fanciful, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of Constitution. It is said that there is no question of any promotion since there is one cadre of "Instructor" under Rules, 1991.

11. Learned counsel for petitioners contended that doctrine of "Equal Pay for Equal Work" applies when two persons are similarly situated but given different and unequal treatment. Here, in the case in hand, there is no rational or valid distinction to justify different pay scales to 'Instructor' still petitioners have been denied pay scale of Rs.5000-8000, which is being given to other 'Instructor' working in I.T.I. and artificial distinction has been created by using word "Trade Instructor" though under the Rules, 1991, cadre name is 'Instructor' and there is no reason to maintain two different pay scales for those, who are working as 'Instructor' whether coming from G.I.T.I. or I.T.I.

12. Learned Standing Counsel, on the contrary, submitted that this distinction is on the basis of qualifications, hence it is justified.

13. It cannot be doubted that when there is distinction between two sets of employees in context of qualification, nature of duties, degree of responsibility, level of quality work element of value judgment etc., there may be difference in pay scale of employees, who are holding such different post, but, when there is no substantial distinction for artificial, illogical and irrelevant reasons, different pay scales cannot be given to persons who are otherwise discharging same duties. The law in this regard is well established and this Court may have a brief retrospect of a few leading authorities on the subject.

14. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 618, Apex Court considering principle of equal pay for equal work held that it is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of Preamble and Article 39(d) of the Constitution, Apex Court held that principle of equal pay for equal work is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. However it was also held -

"It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional, avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them..."

15. In R.D. Gupta and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Administration and Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 505, the Apex Court applying principle of equal pay for equal work, in para 20 of the judgment, considered correctness of defence taken by employer justifying non application of said principle, and held -

"the ministerial staff in the NDMC constitute a unified cadre. The recruitment policy for the selection of the ministerial staff is a common one and the recruitment is also done by a common agency. They are governed by a common seniority list. The ministerial posts in the three wings of the BDNC viz, the general wing, the electricity wing and the waterworks wing are interchangeable posts and the postings an made from the common pool according to administrative convenience and exigencies of service and not on the basis of any distinct policy or special qualifications. Therefore, it would be futile to say that merely because a member of the ministerial staff had been given a posting in the electricity wing, either due to force of circumstances or due to voluntary preferment, he stands on a better or higher footing or in a more advantageous position than his counterparts in the general wing. It is not the cast of the respondents that the ministerial staff in the electricity wing perform more onerous or more exacting duties than the ministerial staff in the general wing. It therefore follows that all sections of the ministerial staff should be treated alike and all of them held entitled to the same scales of pay for the work of equal nature done by them." (para 20) (emphasis added)

16. In Federation of All India Customs and Central excise Stenographers and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 91, it was held :

"there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility justifying different pay scale. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a mater of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bonafide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination" (Para 7)

17. It was further observed that-

"the same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less, it varies from nature and culture of employment," (para 11)

18. In Jaipal and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 354, the Apex Court held :

"The doctrine of equal work equal pay would apply on the premise of similar work, hut it does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects. If the two classes of persons do same work under the same employer, with similar responsibility, under similar working conditions the doctrine of 'equal work equal pay would apply and It would not be open to the State to discriminate one class with the other in paying salary. The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work." (para 6)

19. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. J.P. Chaurasia and Ors. (1989)1 SCC 121, the Apex Court while considering justification of two pay scales of Bench Secretaries of the High Court, observed :

"Entitlement to the pay scale similar would not depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secretaries. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts. More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance. The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of Interested parties. The equation of posts or equation of pay must be left to the executive Government. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay commission. They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the court should normally accept it. The Court should not try to linker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration" (para 18)

20. In Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India and Ors. JT 1991 (1) SC 60, it was observed :

"the question of parity in pay scale cannot be determined by applying mathematical formula. It depends upon several factors namely nature of work, performance of duties, qualifications, the quality of work performed by them. It is also permissible to have classification in services based on hierarchy of posts, pay scale, value of work and responsibility and experience. The classification must, however, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved." (para 7)

21. In The Secretary, Finance Department and Ors. v. West Bengal Registration Service Association and Ors. JT 1992 (2) SC 27, the Apex Court observed :

"job valuation is both a difficult and time consuming task which even expert bodies having the assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found difficult to undertake sometimes on account of want of relevant data and scales for evaluating performances of different groups of employees. The factors which may have to be kept in view for job evaluation may include (1) the work programme of his department (ii) the nature of contribution expected of him (iii) the extent of his responsibility and accountability in the discharge of his diverse duties and functions (iv) the extent and nature of freedoms/limitations available or imposed on him in the discharge of his duties (v) the extent of powers vested In him (vi) the extent of his dependence on superiors for the exercise of his powers (vii) the need to coordinate with other departments etc. It was further observed that normally a pay structure is evolved keeping in mind several factors e.g., ((i) method of recruitment, (ii) level at which recruitment is made, (in) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre, (iv) minimum educational/technical qualifications required, (v) avenues of promotion (vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities, (vii) the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs, (viii) public dealings, (ix) satisfaction level, (x) employer 's capacity to pay. Etc. (para 12)

22. In Jaghnath v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1992 SC 126, the Court, following its earlier judgments observed:

"classification of officers into two grades with different, scales of pay based either on academic qualification or experience, or length of service is sustainable. Apart from that, higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very common in career service. There is selection grade for District Judges. There is senior time scute in Indian Administrative Service. There is suppertime scale in other like services. The entitlement to these higher pay scales depends upon seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority. The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination. The classification based on experience is a reasonable classification. It has a rational nexus with the object thereof. To hold otherwise, it would be detrimental to the Interest of the service itself." (para 7)

23. In Secretary, Finance Department and others Vs. West Bengal Registration Service Association and others, AIR 1992 SC 1203 the Court held that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judiciary and, therefore, ordinarily Courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies like the Pay Commissions, etc. It does not mean that the Court has no jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. Courts must, however, realise that job evaluation is both a difficult and time consuming task which even expert bodies having the assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found difficult to undertake, sometimes on account of want of relevant data and scales for evaluating performance of different groups of employees. This would call for a constant study of the external comparisons and internal relativities on account of the changing nature of job requirements. Some of the factors which have to be kept in view for job evaluation may include (i) the work programme of his department, (ii) the nature of contribution expected of him (iii) the extent of his responsibility and accountability in the discharge of his diverse duties and functions, (iv) the extent and nature of freedoms/limitations available or imposed on him in the discharge of his duties, (v) the extent of powers vested in him, (vi) the extent of his dependence on superiors for the exercise of his powers,, (vii) the need to coordinate with other departments, etc.

24. The Court further says that a pay structure is evolved normally keeping in mind several factors, like, (i) method of recruitment, (ii) level at which recruitment is made, (iii) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre, (iv) minimum educational/technical qualifications required, (v) avenues of promotion, (vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities, (vii) the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs, (viii) public dealings, (ix) satisfaction level, (x) employer's capacity to pay, etc. The list is not exhaustive but illustrative.

25. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Pramod Bhartiya and Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 539, the Court held as under-

"It would he evident from this definition that the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further, as pointed out by Mukharji, J. (as he then was) in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non technical lecturers working in Technical Schools is either irrational and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by mala fides, either in law or in fact (see the approach adopted in Federation case). It must be remembered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14. the burden is upon the petitioners to establish their right to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be This burden the original petitioners (respondents herein) have failed to discharge." (para 13)

26. In Shyam Babu Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 521, the Court observed :

"the principle of equal pay for equal work should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of equal pay for equal work to them. Unless it is established that there is no reasonable basis to treat them separately in matters of payment of wages or salary, the Court should not Interfere holding different pay scale as discriminatory" (para 9)

27. In Sher Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1995)6 SCC 515, the Court rejected the claim of Library staff of Delhi University and its constituent colleges regarding parity in pay with the teaching staff on the ground that the nature of duties, work load, experience and responsibilities of the two sets of employees in question are totally different from each other.

28. In Union of India and Ors. v. Delhi Judicial Service Assn. and Anr. JT 1995 (2) SC 578, the Court, reversing the judgment of High Court which allowed same scale of pay to all officers of Higher Judicial Services, held :

"We think that the high Court was not right in giving selection grade scale of pay to all the officers on the principle of equal pay for equal work. If that be so the Dist. Munsif (Junior civil Judge, Junior subordinate Judge) etc. lowest officer in judicial hierarchy is entitled to the pay of the Senior most super-time scale district Judge as all of hem are discharging judicial duty. The marginal difference principle also is equally inappropriate. Similarly of posts or scale of pay in different services are not relevant. The nature of the duty, nature of the responsibility and degree of accountability etc. are relevant and germane considerations Grant of selection grade, suppertime scale etc. would be akin to a promotion. The result of the impugned direction would wipe out the distinction between the time Scale and Selection grade officers. The learned Counsel for the Union of India, pursuant to our order, has placed before us the service conditions prevailing in the Higher Judicial Services in other States in the country. Except Gujrat which had wiped out the distinction after the judgment in all India Judges Association's case, all other States maintained the distinction between the Grade I and tirade II Higher Judicial offices or Time Scale and Selection Grade or Suppertime scales etc. In fact this distinction is absolutely necessary to inculcate hard work, to maintain character, to improve efficiency, to encourage honesty and integrity among the officers and accountability. Such distinctions would not only be necessary in the Higher Judicial Service but also, indeed in all services under the State and at every stage." (para 5)

29. In Sita Devi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. JT 1996 (7 SC 438, the Court upheld different pay scales on the basis of qualification, relying on its earlier judgments in The State of Mysore and Anr. v. P. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 and P. Murugesan and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (2) SCC 340.

30. In State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1788:1997 (1) AWC2.145 (SC)(NOC), the Court justified different pay scales, on various factors, observing as under:

"It is therefore, clear that the quality of work performed by different sets of persons holding different Jobs will have to be evaluated There may be differences in educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on the stills which the holders bring to their job although the designation of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may have a hearing on efficient performance in a job. This Court has repeatedly observed that evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale must be left to expert bodies and, unless there are any mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted." (para 8)

31. In Garhwal Jal Sansthan Karmachari Union and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) SCC 24, the Court, in para 8 of the Judgment, rejected the claim of pay parity, between employees of Jal Nigam and Jal Sansthan, on the ground of qualitative difference in the duties, function and responsibilities in the two organizations.

32. Considering difference in mode of recruitment and different service rules, in State of Rajasthan v. Kunji Raman, AIR 1997 SC 693, the Court upheld different pay scale for work charged employees and those employed in regular establishment.

33. In Union of India and Ors. v. Pradip Kumar Dey (2000) 8 SCC 580 : 2001 (1) AWC 176(SC), question of parity of pay scale of Naik, Radio Operator in CRPF and employees working as Radio Operator in Directorate of Coordination Police Wireless came up for consideration on the principle of equal pay for equal work and the Court negated parity, observing that different pay scale prescribed taking into account hierarchy in service and other relevant factors, cannot be interfered, as it would disturb entire chain of hierarchy.

34. In State of Orissa and Ors. v. Balaram Sahu and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 250 : 2003 (1) AWC 273 (SC), Court observed as under:

"Though "equal pay for equal work" is considered to be a concomitant of Article 14 as much as "equal pay for unequal work" will also be a negation of that right, equal pay would depend upon not only the nature or the volume of work, tint also on the qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility as well and though the functions may be the same, but the responsibilities do make a real and substantial difference." (para 11)

35. In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 (3) AWC 2477 (SC), it was held in para 10 -

"It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge, While taking a decision in the matter, several relevant factors, some of which have been noted by this Court in the decided case, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financial position and capacity of the State Government to hear the additional liability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind that the priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Slate Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the State Government. In the context of the complex nature of issues involved, the far-reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on the administration of the State Government, courts have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matter is not Justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any proceeding against such administrative decision taken by the Government. The courts should approach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that the decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while taking the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter..." (Para 10)

36. In State Bank of India and Anr. v. M.R. Ganesh Babu and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 556, the Court observed in para 16-

"The principle of equal pay for equal work has been considered and applied in may reported decisions of this Court. The principle has been adequately explained and crystallized and sufficiently reiterated in a catena of decisions of this Court. It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot he judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. The principle is not always easy to apply as there are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations, or even in the same organization. Differentiation in pay scales of persons holding same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the post, and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the court."

37. The difference in pay scale and wages for work charge employees and those engaged in regular establishment has been upheld in State of Punjab and others Vs. Gurdeep Kumar Uppal and others, AIR 2001 SC 2691, State of Punjab and others Vs. Ishar Singh and others, AIR 2002 SC 2422 and Punjab State Electricity Board and others Vs. Jagjiwan Ram and others, JT 2009 (3) SC 400.

38. In Deb Narayan Shyam and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others, 2005(2) SCC 286, the Court summarized as to when doctrine of equal pay for equal work would apply in the light of exposition of law laid down in catena of its earlier decisions and said:

"Large number of decisions have been cited before us with regard to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' by both sides. We need not deal with the said decisions to overburden this judgment. Suffice it to say that the principle is settled that if the two categories of posts perform the same duties and function and carry the same qualification, then there should not be any distinction in pay scale between the two categories of posts similarly situated. But when they are different and perform different duties and qualifications for recruitment being different, then they cannot be said to be equated so as to qualify for equal pay for equal work."

39. The above dictum has been followed in Union of India and Another Vs. Mahajabeen Akhtar, AIR 2008 SC 435.

40. In Haryana State Electricity Board and another Vs. Gulshan Lal and others, JT 2009(9) SC 95 the Court observed that same or similar nature of work, by itself, does not entitle an employee to invoke doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Qualification, experience and other factors would be relevant for the said purpose.

41. A three Judge Bench of Apex Court in State of Haryana and others Vs. Charanjit Singh and others, AIR 2006 SC 161 said that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course the qualities and characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that a person has not gone through the process of recruitment in certain cases make a difference. If the the educational qualifications are different then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justify a difference in pay scales. The earlier nomenclature designating a person as a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he was doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsmen in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.

42. The above view has been followed in Union of India and others Vs. Dineshan K. K., AIR 2008 SC 1026, Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation and others Vs. G.S. Uppal and others, AIR 2008 SC 2152 and Food Corporation of India and others Vs. Ashish Kumar Ganguli and others, 2009(8) SCALE 218.

43. Recently in State of Punjab and another Vs. Surjit Singh and others, 2009(11) SCALE 149, after referring to its earlier judgments, the Court has summarized dictum, in the following manner:

"In our opinion fixing pay scales by courts by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high constitutional principle of separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Realising this, this Court has in recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups (and there too the matter should be sent for examination by an Expert Committee appointed by the government instead of the court itself granting higher pay)."

44. It further says that grant of benefit of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" depends upon a large number of factors including equal work, equal value, source and manner of appointment, equal identity of group and wholesale or complete identity. The Apex Court in Surjit Singh (supra) also stressed upon that the principle has undergone a sea change and the matter should be examined strictly on the basis of the pleadings and proof available before the Court to find out whether the distinction between two based on any relevant factor or not. The onus to prove lie on the person who alleges discrimination and claims enforcement of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.

45. In State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, 2009(11) SCALE 619 the Court said that it is well settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated. Similarity in designation or nature or equation of work is not determinative for equality in the matter of pay scales. The Court has to consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, qualifications, nature of work, the value thereof, responsibility, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other words the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scale only when there is a whole sale identity between the two posts.

46. In State of Punjab Vs. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC 514, the Court said that Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those, who are left out, of course, qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay. A mere nomenclature designating a person say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. A party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal.

47. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, 2009(13) SCC 635, the Court said that doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated and that similarity of the designation or nature or quantum of work is not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales and that the Court has to consider several factors and only when there was wholesale identity between the holders of two posts, equality clause can be invoked and not otherwise.

48. In A.K.Behra Vs. Union of India & Anr., JT 2010 (5) SC 290, the Court, in paras 84 and 85, said:

"84. The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.

85. The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognize even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive."

49. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Daya Lal & Ors., 2011 (2) SCC 429, the Court culled down following principles:

"Part time temporary employees in government run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with regular employees of the government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in private employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with government employees. The right to claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute."

50. This decision has been followed in Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh and Ors. v. Mrs. Manju Mathur and Anr., JT 2011 (3) SC 179.

51. In Hukam Chand Gupta vs. Director General, I.C.A.R. and Ors. AIR 2013 SC 547, the Court observed that in order to attract doctrine of "equal pay for equal work", assessment of the nature and quality of duties performed and responsibilities shouldered by the incumbents is necessary. Even if, the two persons are working on two posts having same nomenclature, it would not lead to the necessary inference that the posts are identical in every manner.

52. Learned counsel for petitioners placed reliance on a judgment in State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Jagjit Singh and Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 148 but I find that therein basic dispute was pay parity between employees engaged as daily wager, casual ad-hoc temporary or permanent. It would be useful to reproduce paras 42, 44, 54, 55 and 57 of aforesaid judgment:

"42. All the judgments noticed in paragraphs 7 to 24 hereinabove, pertain to employees engaged on regular basis, who were claiming higher wages, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. The claim raised by such employees was premised on the ground, that the duties and responsibilities rendered by them, were against the same post for which a higher pay-scale was being allowed, in other Government departments. Or alternatively, their duties and responsibilities were the same, as of other posts with different designations, but they were placed in a lower scale. Having been painstakingly taken through the parameters laid down by this Court, wherein the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' was invoked and considered, it would be just and appropriate, to delineate the parameters laid down by this Court. In recording the said parameters, we have also adverted to some other judgments pertaining to temporary employees (also dealt with, in the instant judgment), wherein also, this Court had the occasion to express the legal position with reference to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. Our consideration, has led us to the following deductions:

42.1 The 'onus of proof', of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the Court has to establish, that the subject post occupied by him, requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see-the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case : (2003) 5 SCC 188, Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur : (2011) 2 SCC 452, the Steel Authority of India Limited case : (2011) 11 SCC 122, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case : (2014) 6 SCC 756).

42.2 The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in a "different department" vis-a-vis the reference post, does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. Persons discharging identical duties, cannot be treated differently, in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of Government (see-the Randhir Singh case : (1982) 1 SCC 618, and the D.S. Nakara case ).

42.3 The principle of 'equal pay for equal work', applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see-the Randhir Singh case : (1982) 1 SCC 618). For equal pay, the concerned employees with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see-the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case : (1988) 3 SCC 91, the Mewa Ram Kanojia case : (1989) 2 SCC 235, the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case : (1991) 1 SCC 619 and the S.C. Chandra case : (2007) 8 SCC 279).

42.4 Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay, and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' (see-the Randhir Singh case : (1982) 1 SCC 618, State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association : (2002) 6 SCC 72, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case : (2012) 12 SCC 666). Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked, merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature.

42.5 In determining equality of functions and responsibilities, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', it is necessary to keep in mind, that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar. Differentiation of pay-scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see-the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case : (1988) 3 SCC 91 and the State Bank of India case : (2002) 4 SCC 556). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' (see-State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia : (1989) 1 SCC 121, and the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case : (1991) 1 SCC 619).

42.6 For placement in a regular pay-scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected, on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis, cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay-scale (see-the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case : (2003) 5 SCC 188).

42.7 Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay-scales. Such as-'selection grade', in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as-merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see-State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia : (1989) 1 SCC 121).

42.8 If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-a-vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude, that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see-the Mewa Ram Kanojia case : (1989) 2 SCC 235, and Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy : (2004) 1 SCC 347). In such a cause, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be invoked.

42.9 The reference post, with which parity is claimed, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', has to be at the same hierarchy in the service, as the subject post. Pay-scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties and responsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see-Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey : (2000) 8 SCC 580, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case : (2012) 12 SCC 666).

42.10 A comparison between the subject post and the reference post, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be made, where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see-the Harbans Lal case : (1989) 4 SCC 459). Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see-Official Liquidator v. Dayanand : (2008) 10 SCC 1).

42.11 Different pay-scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable. And also when, the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see-the State Bank of India case : (2002) 4 SCC 556).

42.12 The priority given to different types of posts, under the prevailing policies of the Government, can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay-scales. Herein also, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable (see-State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association : (2002) 6 SCC 72).

42.13 The parity in pay, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be claimed, merely on the ground, that at an earlier point of time, the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same pay-scale. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see-State of West Bengal v. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspectors Association : (2010) 5 SCC 225).

42.14 For parity in pay-scales, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', equation in the nature of duties, is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see-Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur : (2011) 2 SCC 452).

42.15 There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay-scales, between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e., between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and Ors. working at the institutional/sub-office level (see-the Hukum Chand Gupta case : (2012) 12 SCC 666), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar.

42.16 The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable, where a differential higher pay-scale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see-the Hukum Chand Gupta case : (2012) 12 SCC 666).

42.17 Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organization, and another set of employees of a different organization, there can be no question of equation of pay-scales, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', even if two organizations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organizations, is with different entities, which are independent of one another, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not apply (see-the S.C. Chandra case : (2007) 8 SCC 279, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case : (2014) 6 SCC 756)."

"44. We shall first outline the conclusions drawn in cases where a claim for pay parity, raised at the hands of the concerned temporary employees, was accepted by this Court, by applying the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', with reference to regular employees:

44.1 In the Dhirendra Chamoli case : (1986) 1 SCC 637 this Court examined a claim for pay parity raised by temporary employees, for wages equal to those being disbursed to regular employees. The prayer was accepted. The action of not paying the same wage, despite the work being the same, was considered as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held, that the action amounted to exploitation-in a welfare state committed to a socialist pattern of society.

44.2 In the Surinder Singh case : (1986) 1 SCC 639 this Court held, that the right of equal wages claimed by temporary employees emerged, inter alia, from Article 39 of the Constitution. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' was again applied, where the subject employee had been appointed on temporary basis, and the reference employee was borne on the permanent establishment. The temporary employee was held entitled to wages drawn by an employee on the regular establishment. In this judgment, this Court also took note of the fact, that the above proposition was affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court, in the D.S. Nakara case .

44.3 In the Bhagwan Dass case : (1987) 4 SCC 634 this Court recorded, that in a claim for equal wages, the duration for which an employee would remain (-or had remained) engaged, would not make any difference. So also, the manner of selection and appointment would make no difference. And therefore, whether the selection was made on the basis of open competition or was limited to a cluster of villages, was considered inconsequential, insofar as the applicability of the principle is concerned. And likewise, whether the appointment was for a fixed limited duration (six months, or one year), or for an unlimited duration, was also considered inconsequential, insofar as the applicability of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is concerned. It was held, that the claim for equal wages would be sustainable, where an employee is required to discharge similar duties and responsibilities as regular employees, and the concerned employee possesses the qualifications prescribed for the post. In the above case, this Court rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the Government, that the plea of equal wages by the employees in question, was not sustainable because the concerned employees were engaged in a temporary scheme, and against posts which were sanctioned on a year to year basis.

44.4 In the Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch case : (1988) 1 SCC 122 this Court held, that under principle flowing from Article 38(2) of the Constitution, Government could not deny a temporary employee, at least the minimum wage being paid to an employee in the corresponding regular cadre, alongwith dearness allowance and additional dearness allowance, as well as, all the other benefits which were being extended to casual workers. It was also held, that the classification of workers (as unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled), doing the same work, into different categories, for payment of wages at different rates, was not tenable. It was also held, that such an act of an employer, would amount to exploitation. And further that, the same would be arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

44.5 In State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh : (1998) 9 SCC 595 this Court held, that daily-wagers were entitled to be placed in the minimum of the pay-scale of regular employees, working against the same post. The above direction was issued after accepting, that the concerned employees, were doing the same work as regular incumbents holding the same post, by applying the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'.

44.6 In the Secretary, State of Karnataka case : (2006) 4 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench of this Court, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and directed that daily-wagers be paid salary equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowances being paid to regular employees. Importantly, in this case, this Court made a very important distinction between pay parity and regularization. It was held that the concept of equality would not be applicable to issues of absorption/regularization. But, the concept was held as applicable, and was indeed applied, to the issue of pay parity-if the work component was the same. The judgment rendered by the High Court, was modified by this Court, and the concerned daily-wage employees were directed to be paid wages, equal to the salary at the lowest grade of the concerned cadre.

44.7 In State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh : (2006) 9 SCC 321, a three-Judge bench of this Court held, that the decisions rendered by this Court in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh : (1996) 11 SCC 77, State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj : (2003) 6 SCC 123, the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case : (2003) 5 SCC 188, and Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy : (2004) 1 SCC 347, laid down the correct law. Thereupon, this Court declared, that if the concerned daily-wage employees could establish, that they were performing equal work of equal quality, and all other relevant factors were fulfilled, a direction by a Court to pay such employees equal wages (from the date of filing the writ petition), would be justified.

44.8 In State of U.P. v. Putti Lal : (2006) 9 SCC 337, based on decisions in several cases (wherein the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' had been invoked), it was held, that a daily-wager discharging similar duties, as those engaged on regular basis, would be entitled to draw his wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (drawn by his counterpart, appointed on regular basis), but would not be entitled to any other allowances or increments.

44.9 In the Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation case : (2010) 7 SCC 739 this Court noticed, that the Respondents were employed on contract basis, on a consolidated salary. But, because they were actually appointed to perform the work of the post of Assistant Engineer, this Court directed the employer to pay the Respondents wages, in the minimum of the pay-scales ascribed for the post of Assistant Engineer."

"54. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. The same is binding on all the courts in India, Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again.

55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation."

"57. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned Counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the Appellants, that the Respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post."

53. In the present case, there is no such dispute that petitioners are ad hoc or temporary or daily wager. The only reason to deny them pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 is that other Instructor/Trade Instructors possess superior qualification than petitioners.

54. When questioned, learned Standing Counsel could not dispute that prior to 1991 there were no service rules, as such applicable, to Instructors appointed in G.I.T.I. and I.T.I. He also could not dispute that two sets of institutes when merged together, all Instructors working therein were treated as a single lot and their sanctioned strength was noticed in Rule 4 of Rules, 1991 as 1931 permanent and 1011 temporary, total 2942. This strength has now been reduced by Second Amendment Rules, 2003 to 1597 permanent and 1168 temporary i.e. 2765 in total. He also could not dispute that in the work, duties and responsibilities of petitioners qua other Instructors, there is no distinction. It may be noticed that Instructors, who were appointed in I.T.I. prior to 1989, as a matter of fact, may have possesses Certificate or Diploma or other qualification, but, the fact remains that at the time of merger in 1989, when two Institutes were merged, no distinction was carved out by State between persons working as 'Instructor' in these Institutes since all were discharging same duties. The only difference was respective trade in which they were working, for example Radio Mechanic, Wood Craft Instructor etc. Even rules, which were framed in 1991, nowhere shows any distinction between Instructor working in G.I.T.I. and I.T.I. Assumption on the part of respondents that in order to claim higher scale, there ought to have been a provision for promotion is wholly unfounded and baseless for the reason that claim of petitioners is that Instructors, who have come from I.T.I. were given higher pay scale though they were discharging equal duties, as were discharged by petitioners and others, hence there was no reason to provide lower pay scale to petitioners particularly when accepting equivalence in the institutes as well as in Instructors cadre, the same have been merged in 1989. The distinction drawn by respondents, therefore, is illusory, artificial and has no substance as such. Hence, denial of pay parity to petitioners vis a vis other Instructors, though no apparent evidence or substantial difference could be demonstrated by respondents between 'Instructors' working in merged I.T.I., in my view, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India.

55. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 29.11.2002 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat petitioners workings as Instructors at par with other Instructors, who were placed in scale of Rs.5000-8000 and to treat petitioners similarly by providing the same pay scale and give all consequential benefits within three months.

Order Date :- 12.12.2018

KA