Raj Kapoor vs Allahabad Bank Kolkata Throu Its ...
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

Reserved Judgment
 
Court No. - 2                                                      A.F.R.
 
Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 658 of 2012
 

 
Petitioner :- Raj Kapoor
 
Respondent :- Allahabad Bank Kolkata Throu Its Chairman & M.D. & Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Manish Kumar
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Vinay Shanker,Gopal Kumar Srivastava
 

 
Hon'ble Shri Narayan Shukla,J.

Hon'ble Virendra Kumar-II,J.

(Delivered by Virendra Kumar-II, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Gopal Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for respondents.

2. This writ petition has been instituted for quashing of orders dated 6.1.2010, 31.12.2010 and 4.5.2012 passed by opposite party no. 2 to 4.

3. It is pleaded that the disciplinary authority-opposite party no. 3 vide order dated 6.1.2010 has passed punishment order of compulsory retirement from service against the petitioner, which is arbitrary and unreasonable and against the principles of natural justice. The inquiry officer has relied upon reports submitted by the Investigating Officer and approved valuer, whereas no opportunity to cross examine these witnesses was afforded to the petitioner. Opposite party no. 2-appellate authority passed order dated 31.12.2010 and opposite party no. 4 passed order dated 4.5.2012 ignoring the fact that the full and proper opportunity of hearing was not given to the petitioner to cross examine the above-mentioned witnesses.

4. It is further submitted that the petitioner had followed all the procedures as prescribed by the bank. The Inspecting Officer had submitted special report with perverted bond of mind. Following details were relied upon by the petitioner, which are mentioned in the special report as under:-

"1. A portion of the above house has been reported to be sold.

2. House has been constructed on part situated in well defined and old established Balmiki basti.

3. As Mr. Sehgal reported to be a well established person of the society. It is difficult to understand as to why Mr. Sehgal would have been residing in scavenger's colony. The sanctioning authority failed to note this aspect."

5. This special report was made foundation of charge sheet issued against the petitioner. No financial loss was caused to the bank on the basis of the conduct of the petitioner. The details of the accounts of loan has been mentioned by the bank in paragraph-8 of the writ petition, out of four accounts only two account of loan were sanctioned by the petitioner. The account of Mr. Sanjay Saxena, a reputed Chartered Accountant of Shahjahanpur has been closed as per the terms of the sanction letter. On the basis of the other account of Mr. Vinod Sehgal, no loss has been caused to the bank. This account was hurriedly closed by the petitioner's successor before the stipulated maturity of the loan through unwarranted compromise. The sufficient security was available with the bank and there was no need for the bank to rush into any compromise with Mr. Sehgal. The same argument applies to the account of Dr. Navin Kumar. The loss incurred through compromise settlement of accounts cannot be attributed to the petitioner.

6. It is mentioned that in all these four accounts, the assets were created and all the borrowers were forced to close their account at a value which were higher than the value shown by the disciplinary authority in the charge sheet. The disciplinary authority has taken a premeditation hostile and biased view, because charge against the petitioner of disbursing two installments to borrowers in two days was mentioned against the petitioner. Whereas this fact was ignored that the petitioner had disbursed one installment of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs. one lac only) in two parts of Rs.75,000/- and Rs.25,000/-.

7. It is contended that the petitioner's performance in his last assignment as Branch Manager of Staff College of Branch Indira Nagar, Lucknow laid solid foundation for the future business of the branch. The details of deposit defines profit and N.P.A. has been mentioned in paragraph no. 11 of the writ petition. It is mentioned that N.P.A. of the Branch as on 31.3.2012 was only 0.4% even after passage of four years is indicative of high standards of bank during the petitioner's tenure. This fact was also not considered by the bank-management.

8. It is contended that initially the petitioner was appointed on 2.11.1982 on the post of Probationary Officer in the Junior Management Grade-I and in the year 1991, he was promoted as Manager in J.M.G.-II. Since the work and conduct of the petitioner was always satisfactory, in the year 2003, he was promoted on the post of Senior Manager in J.M.G.-III and was transferred on 27.1.2004 in City Office Shahjahanpur Branch of the Bank as has been mentioned in paragraph nos. 11 and 12 of the writ petition.

9. It is contended that the petitioner rented out his residential accommodation of 3/17, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar to Mr. Hriday Narain Pandey and Mrs. Ratna Pandey on the recommendation of Mr. Balram Pandey, Assistant General Manager and lease out for three years and the lease deed was executed on 7.3.2006. But Mr. Hriday Narain Pandey and Mrs. Ratna Pandey had not paid rent nor vacated the petitioner's house. Shri Balram Pandey, Assistant General Manager of the bank threatened the petitioner that if the petitioner would proceed to initiate any action against Mr. Hriday Narain Pandey or Mrs. Ratna Pandey, he will ensure that the petitioner will not be able to discharge his service in the bank without any hindrance or obstacle.

10. It is further contended that the petitioner sent legal notice to his above-mentioned tenants, which irritated Shri Balram Pandey, who got annoyed with the petitioner and exercised his influence. Opposite party no. 3 vide order dated 3.10.2007 called explanation from the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation against the said notice, therefore, opposite party no. 3 was not able to take any further action against the petitioner in the said matter for more than two years. Mr. Balram Pandey, on two or three occasions and in November, 2008 threatened the petitioner. The petitioner was posted at RALC Extension Counter of KGMC Branch. Shri Balram Pandey, took charge on 1.12.2008 at Zonal Head Office, Lucknow. He visited on 4.12.2008 at 10.30 a.m. at petitioner's branch. Shri Balram Pandey, during his visit threatened the petitioner not to trouble Mrs. Ratna Pandey and Mr. Hriday Narain Pandey and threatened for his transfer. The petitioner enquired from him about his deficiency, which were not clarified by him.

11. It is further submitted that Mr. Balram Pandey was promoted in December, 2008 on the post of Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Lucknow. The petitioner was transferred by him to district Sultanpur, vide transfer order dated 16.12.2008. Shri Balram Pandey, in pre-planned manner supported the tenants of the petitioner. The representation was made on 24.12.2008 by him and requested for sanction of leave with effect from 22.12.2008 up to 21.1.2009. Another representation dated 7.1.2009 was also made by the petitioner for cancellation of transfer. He also lodged an F.I.R. at Police Station Gomti Nagar, Lucknow against his tenants. Ultimately under influence of Mr. Balram Pandey, a memorandum of charge sheet was issued on 28.2.2009 against the petitioner.

12. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 3.8.2007 against the charges levelled against him. List of documents and witnesses was annexed with the charge sheet. The petitioner was not informed about his interview for promotion from Grade-III, to Grade-IV for which the petitioner was in the zone of consideration on behest of Mr. Balram Pandey. The petitioner was harassed by Mr. Balram Pandey to grab his house. The tenants prepared forged cash receipts and forged agreement to sell to obtain an ex-parte stay order dated 23.12.2009 in their favour. This stay order was vacated by the trial court on 16.8.2011. The petitioner was compelled to sell out his house located at Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar to him. The loan taken from friends and relatives for marriage of his daughter, which was solemnized on 8.10.2011. He incurred loss of around Rs.40 lacs. He was apparently compelled to call back his son, who was student of Kirori Mal College, Delhi University due to economic hardships. The petitioner made a representation on 26.12.2009 before opposite party no. 1 in which all the facts and circumstances and harassment meted out by the petitioner at the hands of Mr. Balram Pandey were mentioned in it.

13. It is contended that charge sheet dated 28.2.2009 was issued against the petitioner in arbitrary, illegal and mala faide manner. The petitioner has not committed any illegality. Regarding four loan accounts as mentioned in the charge sheet, he replied charge sheet on 3.10.2007 to the full satisfaction of the opposite party. Another charge sheet dated 11.4.2009 was issued by the Zonal Office, Lucknow where Shri Balram Pandey was posted as Deputy General Manager. Pursuant to the memorandum of charge sheet dated 28.2.2009, the Enquiry Officer, Presenting Officer etc were appointed on 15.4.2009 and the proceedings started on 29.5.2009. The petitioner denied all the charges framed against him.

14. It is further submitted that on 16.9.2009 first substantial hearing took place during the course of departmental proceedings. The entire charges/allegations levelled against the petitioner were based on the basis of the inspection report of Shri Umesh Govil and valuation report of Shekhar Gupta. On 24.9.2009, the petitioner requested inquiry officer to call both these persons for defence purposes. But inquiry officer denied the said opportunity. On second day, 12.8.2009, list of documents and witnesses were marked as exhibits. It is mentioned that the verification report, appraisal etc. has all been done by Shri K.V. Raman and this fact was not disputed in the inquiry proceedings. On 24.9.2009, the inquiry officer in violation of principles of natural justice denied opportunity of cross examine to the petitioner and concluded the inquiry proceedings in a haste manner with the sole objective of implicating the petitioner under the influence of Superior Authority.

15. It is mentioned that the petitioner made representation on receiving reply of the presenting officer on 10/11.10.2009 but due to illness, he could not submit his reply. The petitioner subsequently came to know that even before the reply of the petitioner, the inquiry officer had already submitted its ex-pare enquiry reprot on 23.11.2009. The disciplinary authority-opposite party no. 2 without application of mind vide letter dated 30.11.2009 directed the petitioner to submit his reply against the enquiry report. The petitioner submitted his reply on 7.12.2009 mentioning in it the harassment caused by Mr. Balram Pandey. Mr. Balram Pandey was managing the every situation, and he was adamant to see the petitioner out of bank. Within short span of time, charge sheet was issued against the petitioner. he was punished on 23.9.2009 in reference of two charge sheet and in third one order was kept in abeyance. Vide order dated 8.1.2010 the scale of the petitioner has been brought down to initial of JMG Scale two from last of scale three. The appeal against above order of disciplinary authority, dated 14.10.2009 is still lying pending with D.G.M., the appellate authority, Zonal Office, Lucknow.

16. It is further submitted that the petitioner made representation dated 2.12.2009 and requested disciplinary authority to consider the detail reply of the petitioner filed by him. Opposite party no. 3 under influence of Mr. Balram Pandey passed punishment order on 6.1.2010 of compulsory retirement of the petitioner on the basis of inquiry report dated 23.11.2009. The petitioner filed statutory appeal before the opposite party no. 2 on 18.1.2009. The opposite party no. 2 without application of mind, and without appreciating the truth of the facts and circumstances, rejected the appeal of the petitioner, vide impugned order dated 31.12.2010 after elevent months. The petitioner on 26.6.2011 filed review appeal before opposite party no. 1, which was decided by opposite party no. 4 and review application was rejected without application of mind. On the basis of above facts and circumstances, and grounds, following reliefs have been sought by the petitioner in the present writ petition:-

"(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 6.1.2010, 31.12.2010 and 4.5.2012 passed by opposite party no. 3, 2 and 4 respectively contained as Annexure No.1, 2 and 2A respectively to this writ petition.

(ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to permit the petitioner to work on the post of Senior Manager and pay him regular salary as well as arrears of salary."

17. The opposite parties has filed counter affidavit in which it is mentioned that the petitioner while posted and functioning as Senior Manager of City Office Shahjahanpur Brach during 27.1.2004 to 8.8.2005 the petitioner had committed various act of omission and commission which amounts to gross misconduct. The petitioner had not only disbursed the second and third installment of House Loan of Rs.5 lacs to Sri Ram Dahin Prasad Verma within a period of two days without ascertaining the end use of Bank's fund, but also sanctioned him an Additional Housing Loan of Rs.3 lacs without ensuring end use of funds so sanctioned by him. The property was found in a skeleton condition in spite of disbursement of Rs.8 lacs, during visit/inspection by bank's official and officer of head office of the branch. The estimate obtained by the petitioner for additional housing loan was on higher side without sufficient reasons on the record of the Bank.

18. It is also contended that he neither obtained post dated cheque nor salary tie-up with the borrower's employer for recovery of loan installment. The petitioner disbursed the said housing loan without ensuring completion of documentation formalities, which amounts to gross misconduct and also the petitioner had not discharged his duties with due deligency and devotion and thereby jeopardized the bank's interest to the extent of aforesaid irregularities. Which is in violation of Regulation 3 (1) and 3 (3) of Allahabad Bank Officers Employees (Conduct) Regulation 1976. A charge sheet dated 28.2.2009 was also issued against the petitioner. The petitioner was found to commit misconduct. On 11.4.2009 another charge sheet was issued against him in respect of his posting/ functioning as Senior Manager at Bank's City Office, Shahjahanpur Branch. Another charge sheet was issued against him at Sultanpur Branch, because the petitioner also committed omission and commission in violation to Bank's Regulation. Charge sheet No. ZOL/PERS/2338 dated 11.4.2009 was also issued against the petitioner. The petitioner was punished by disciplinary authority vide order dated 23.9.2009 after conducting due inquiry of the charges levelled against him. His pay scale was reduced to lower grade from MMG-III to MMG-II by fixing basic pay at initial stage of Scale II i.e. Rs. 13,820/-.

19. It is also mentioned that another charge sheet dated 7.12.2009 containing almost 12 charges was issued to the petitioner in respect to act of omission and commission during his posting and functioning as Senior Manager Staff College Branch, Lucknow during the period from 15.6.2006 to 15.2.2008. The disciplinary authority vide order dated 8.1.2010 has kept charge sheet dated 7.12.2009 in abeyance. The departmental proceedings of charge sheet dated 7.12.2009 was kept in abeyance with liberty to reopen the same if situation warrants so. The disciplinary authority passed order dated 6.1.2010 on the basis of charge sheet dated 28.2.2009 and penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed against the petitioner.

20. It is contended that the petitioner submitted his reply on 28.3.2009 against the charge sheet dated 28.2.2009, which was not found satisfactory, hence disciplinary authority ordered for departmental inquiry vide order dated 15.4.2009. Shri R.K. Verma Senior Manager Z.O. Sitapur was appointed as inquiry officer and Sri B.K. Chaturvedi, Senior Manager, Z.O. Sitapur was appointed as Presenting Officer. Further Sri D.C. Mishra, Senior Manager, Z.O., Lucknow was appointed as Defence Assistant. These inquiry proceedings were conducted at Bank's Zonal Office, Sitapur, as per rules and in compliance of principles of natural justice. The petitioner had also inspected the management documents and entire documents, which were subject matter of the inquiry proceedings. These documents were provided to the petitioner. The charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved and inquiry officer submitted its report on 23.11.2009 to the disciplinary authority. The findings of the inquiry officer were forwarded to the petitioner vide letter dated 30.11.2009 and provided him an opportunity to make necessary action. The petitioner had submitted his representation dated 2.12.2009. The disciplinary authority after concurring with the finding of inquiry officer found charges levelled against the petitioner proved. The petitioner had participated in the inquiry proceedings together with his defence assistant and he was afforded all reasonable opportunity to defend his case. The lapses and irregularities committed by the petitioner were serious in nature, which clearly depicts that the petitioner was negligent in performing his duties. Therefore disciplinary authority vide order dated 6.1.2010 imposed penalty of compulsory retirement upon him. The statutory appeal and review appeal preferred by the petitioner has also been rejected vide orders dated 31.12.20101 and 4.5.2012 respectively by the competent authority. The reviewing authority also found that contention of the petitioner regarding compromise settlement causing loss of Rs. 1,60,604/- was also not found correct.

21. It is further contended in the counter affidavit that reviewing authority further observed that the petitioner had submitted a valuation report dated 7.6.2011 which is a created document long after issuance of charge sheet to him, which cannot be accepted at this stage and further observed that the accounts have been closed out of compromise settlement in, which Bank had to suffer loss, which are attributable to the irregularities committed by the petitioner. Moreover, the compromise proposals were settled by the efforts taken by petitioner's successor.

22. It is also contended that being concurrent findings of fact recorded by each authority i.e. the inquiry officer, disciplinary authority, appellate authority and reviewing authority, same cannot be interfered with in the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner during the course of departmental inquiry.

23. It is contended that the bank officer is required to exercise high standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of depositors and customers. Every officer/employees of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. It is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit which resulted in the case, when the officer/employee of the Bank acted without authority.

24. It is also submitted that the petitioner's allegation against the senior officer of bank such as Mr. Balram Pandey the then DGM is absolutely incorrect and is creation of petitioner's mind, which has got no relevance and no bearing in the instant case. The averments made in paragraph nos. 13 to 30 under reply are far from truth. It is further submitted that the petitioner never wanted to join his transferred place and was trying to get cancel his transfer to Sultanpur. Vide order dated 23.12.2008, the A.G.M. directed the petitioner to immediately report at his new place of posting failing which, appropriate action will be taken against him. Vide letter dated 29.12.2008, explanation of the petitioner was called for about none reporting at Sultanpur Branch on transfer from Lucknow KGMC branch. The petitioner did not join. Thereafter vide letter dated 31.12.2008, Chief Manager (Pers) Zonal Office Lucknow advised the petitioner to submit his leave application through Sultanpur Branch i.e. form the place of posting.

25. It is further mentioned that there being deliberate unauthorized absence of the petitioner, the A.G.M. of the Bank vide order dated 21.9.2011 directed the petitioner to report for duty at Sultanpur on or before 19.1.2009. Thereafter various letters regarding petitioner's unauthorized absence viz a viz indiscipline attitude and also for non payment of loan against share was sent to the petitioner directing the petitioner to report for duties at Sultanpur, but the petitioner had made all shorts of evasive attitude to avoid the joining at transferred place amounting to gross misconduct on the part of the petitioner.

26. It is further contended that the allegations of the petitioner levelled against Senior Officer of Bank Mr. Balram Pandey the then DGM is highly objectionable and same is false misconceived hence same are vehemently denied. The petitioner's averment against the then DGM that charge sheet even was issued on his instance is absolutely incorrect. The medical certificates of the petitioner indicating that he was suffering from Cervical Spondylosis which has got no bearing in the omission and commission amounting to misconduct committed by the petitioner resulting to issue charge sheet which was ultimately after due enquiry was found to be proved against the petitioner.

27. It is further submitted that in the compromise entered/submitted before the competent authority, the petitioner had admitted about robbery in the house of Mrs. Ratna Pandey and had taken moral responsibility absolutely and had assured to execute sale deed in favour of Mrs. Ratna Pandey wife of H.N. Pandey. Though the said material have got no relevance in the charge sheet under which the petitioner was awarded the punishment of compulsory retirement after due enquiry and charges found to be proved.

28. The petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating his earlier averments made in the writ petition.

29. We have pursued impugned order dated 06.01.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority, order dated 31.12.2010 passed by the appellate authority and impugned order dated 04.05.2012 passed by reviewing authority and available record. During the course of the departmental inquiry, the petitioner was served with memorandum of charge sheet and articles of charges which are as follows:-

Article-I

"While posted and functioning as Senior Manager of City Office, Shahjahanpur Branch during 27.01.2004 to 08.08.2005, Sri Raj Kapoor not only allowed disbursement of second and third installments of housing loan of Rs.5.00 lacs to Sri Ram Dahin Prasad Verma without ascertaining the end-use of bank's funds but also sanctioned and disbursed him an additional housing loan of Rs.3.00 lacs without ensuring end-use of funds so sanctioned by him.

The property was found in a skeleton condition in spite of disbursement of Rs.8.00 lacs, when subsequently visited by Bank's official during/after H.O. inspection of the branch. The estimate obtained by Sri Raj Kapoor for additional housing loan was on higher side without sufficient reasons on the record of the Bank.

Sri Raj Kapoor obtained neither post-dated cheques nor any salary tie-up with the borrower's employer for recovery of loan installments. Sri Raj Kapoor disbursed the said housing loan without ensuring completion of some documentation formalities."

Article-II

While posted and functioning as Senior Manager of City Office, Shahjahanpur Branch during 27.01.2004 to 08.08.2005, Sri Raj Kapoor sanctioned & disbursed a housing loan of Rs.6.00 lacs to Sri Vinod Kumar Sehgal without ensuring proper and complete appraisal and in violation of the Bank's circularised guidelines regarding repayment capacity of the borrower resulting in over finance.

Sri Raj Kapoor did not obtain completion certificate/visit report after disbursal of each installment and neglected to verify the end-use of the Bank's funds. Installments are not forthcoming. The account remained irregular exposing the Bank's funds to default risk.

Article-III

While posted and functioning as Senior Manager of City Office, Shahjahanpur Branch during 27.01.2004 to 08.08.2005, Sri Raj Kapoor disbursed three installments of housing loan to Sri Naveen Kumar & Smt. Prem Lata within a period of a little over two months, without ensuring the end-use of funds disbursed by him in violation of Bank's guidelines.

No completion report/certificate regarding the installments disbursed by Sri Raj Kapoor is held on the branch record. End-use of Bank's funds has not been verified by Sri Raj Kapoor. The value of house property was found to be of a very low realisable value and value insufficient to cover the outstanding advance.

Article-IV

While posted and functioning Senior Manager of City Office, Shahjahanpur Branch during 27.01.2004 to 08.08.2006, Sri Raj Kapoor sanction & disbursed a housing loan of Rs.15.00 lacs to Sri Sanjay Saxena without obtaining any estimate of construction on the records of the branch for extension of already constructed house. All the four installments were disbursed by Sri Raj Kapoor within a short period of twenty days without ensuring end-use of funds disbursed during 23.11.2004 to 05.12.2004 in violation of Bank's circularised guidelines regarding end-use utilisation.

Sri Raj Kapoor did not discharge his duties with due diligence and devotion and thereby jeopardised the Bank's interest to the extent of aforesaid irregularities. The above acts of omission and commission on the part of the said Sri Raj Kapoor are in violation of Regulation-3(1) & 3(3) of Allahabad Bank Officer employees (misconduct) Regulations, 1976 and is a misconduct in terms of the said regulations.

30. Initially, explanation dated 03.10.2007 was called for from the petitioner by the Assistant General Manager in which the details of misconduct and irregularities were mentioned as per charge sheet served against the petitioner. The petitioner has not provided copy of reply submitted by him in response to the explanation dated 03.10.2007.

31. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that opportunity for proper hearing according to principles of natural justice was not afforded to the petitioner as witness Sri Umesh Gowil, Senior Inspector, Field Inspection Office, Lucknow was not summoned for cross examination by the petitioner. Whereas he was mentioned as witness in list of witnesses relied upon by the Bank. The Enquiry Officer has rejected the request made by the petitioner to summon the witnesses Umesh Gowil and Shekhar Gupta approved valuer of the Bank. Annexure No.24 is relied upon in this regard.

32. It is also argued by learned counsel that the petitioner forwarded his defence version dated 20.11.2009 by courier service Trackon Pvt. Ltd. which was not considered by the Enquiry Officer in which it was pointed out that Sri K.V. Raman, Manager (Advances) look after the disbursement work of the housing loan and this fact was accepted by the witness MW1. Therefore, applicant was not responsible to verify end use of the installments of advance disbursed by him.

33. It is relevant to mention here that letter dated 20.11.2009 sent by the petitioner through courier was not received by the Enquiry Officer before submission of an enquiry report on 23.11.2009. Because, it is mentioned in the enquiry report that the enquiry was concluded on 24.09.2009. P.O. submitted his brief to E.O. on 08.10.2009 under copy to C.O. (petitioner). C.O./the petitioner sent a letter dated 22.10.2009, which was received at Zonal Office, Sitapur on 13.11.2009 alongwith medical certificate, stating his inability to send his brief on medical ground and requested for extension of three weeks period, which had expired on 14.11.2009. After expiry of extending period, the E.O. waited further one week, but nothing could be heard from C.O., hence E.O. submitted the report without further waiting for his brief.

34. It is also submitted that MW1 was unable to prove the evaluation report submitted by the approved valuer of the Bank and the observations made by Sri Umesh Gowil, Inspecting Officer, Lucknow. It is also further argued that after submission of report in response to the explanation dated 03.10.2007 no departmental Enquiry was initiated against the petitioner. The departmental Enquiry was initiated under the influence of Sri Balram Pandey, Zonal Head, Lucknow Zone, because he was interested that tenants Mrs. Ratna Pandey and her husband should not be dispossessed by the petitioner from the tenancy of first floor of his house No.3/17, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow.

35. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments:-

36. Hon'ble Supreme Court (Division Bench) in the case of Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 has observed as follows:-

33. In a case where the charge-sheet is accompanied with the statement of facts and the allegation may not be specific in charge-sheet but may be crystal clear from the statement of charges, in such a situation as both constitute the same document, it may not be held that as the charge was not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. (Vide State of A.P. v. S.Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] .) Thus, where a delinquent is served a charge-sheet without giving specific and definite charge and no statement of allegation is served along with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice.

34. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1986) 3 SCC 454 . this Court held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be clear, definite and specific as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague charges. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.

35. In view of the above, law can be summarised that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct.

37. Hon'ble Supreme Court (Division Bench) in the case of State of Punjab v. Bandeep Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 724 has observed as follows:-

4. There can be no gainsaying that every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion. It is beyond cavil that any authority cannot be permitted to travel beyond the stand adopted and expressed by it in the impugned action. If precedent is required for this proposition it can be found in the celebrated decision titled Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405. of which the following paragraph deserves extraction.

"8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 .

''9. ... public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.'

Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older."

7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun v. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 However, we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons. This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of this Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd. [(1993) 1 SCC 445] , Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651] , Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [(2000) 2 SCC 617] , B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. [(2006) 11 SCC 548] and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [(2007) 14 SCC 517] .

8. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has rightly concluded that no sustainable justification and rationalisation was recorded in writing at the relevant time for ordering the re-auction of only the two subject properties. However, we should not be understood to have opined that the Government is bound in every case to accept the highest bid above the reserve price. Needless to say, the presence of cartelisation or "pooling" could be a reason for the cancellation of an auction process. In addition, a challenge on the ground that the property has fetched too low a bid when compared to the prevailing market price, would also be valid and permissible provided this approach has been uniformly adhered to. In the case at hand, however, while the latter was ostensibly the reason behind the decision for conducting a fresh auction, no evidence has been placed on the record to support this contention. The highest bids, marginally above the reserve price, have been accepted in the selfsame auction. The factual scenario before us is clearly within the mischief which was frowned upon in Mohinder Singh Gill [(1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272] . We, therefore, uphold the impugned judgment for all the reasons contained therein. The assailed action of the appellant is not substantiated in the noting, which ought at least to have been conveyed to the respondents.

Hon'ble Supreme Court (Division Bench) in the case of Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 369 has observed as follows:-

38. In Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 it has been held that.

"15. ... penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."

39. In Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri [(2009) 15 SCC 620 . this Court adverted to the concept of doctrine of proportionality and eventually opined that the imposition of punishment is subject to judicial intervention if the same is exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. If the award of punishment is grossly in excess of the allegations made, it cannot claim immunity and makes itself amenable for interference under the limited scope of judicial review. The test to be applied while dealing with the question is whether a reasonable employer would have imposed such punishment in like circumstances. The question that has to be studiedly addressed is: whether the punishment imposed is really arbitrary or an outrageous defiance of logic so as to be called irrational and perverse warranting interference in exercise of the power of judicial review?

38. Hon'ble Supreme Court (Division Bench) in the case of V. Ramana v. APSRTC, (2005) 7 338 has observed as follows:-

12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.

39. Hon'ble Supreme Court (Division Bench) in the case of State of U.P. v. J.P. Saraswat, (2011) 4 SCC 545 has observed as follows:-

8. Any interference on the question of punishment is permissible in very rare cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the established charge that it would appear unconscionable and actuated by malice. In the facts of the case, the punishment given to the respondent was quite moderate and there was not even a whisper of any malice, etc. The respondent went to the USA and overstayed his leave for over a year-and-a-half on the first occasion and on the second occasion, he went to the USA without even caring to obtain leave and remained there for over four years. In those circumstances, the punishment of termination of service that would not debar from future employment was a perfectly reasonable and fair punishment and there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with that order. The High Court was equally wrong in setting aside the punishment order passed against the respondent on the ground that the State Government had not responded to his applications for extension/grant of leave or that during the long period of his absence the Government had not sent him any notice asking to resume duties by a certain date. These could never be the grounds for the High Court to set aside the punishment order passed by the State Government and to replace it by its own set of directions.

40. Hon'ble Supreme Court (Single Judge)in the case of Allahabad Bank and Ors. vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari (2017)2 SCC 308 has observed as follows :-

7. ........ But it is equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of punishment......"

......... More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

9.......We are, however, of the opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh start from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore, allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the Respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his superannuation with all service benefits on that basis, he shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his removal from service till the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his favour......"

41. Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Srivastava vs State Of U.P. And Others 1998 (4) AWC 705 has observed as follows:-

10. In the matter of disciplinary enquiries against delinquent employees, the authorities are required to act fairly, as the enquiries are of quasi-judicial nature and principles of natural Justice have to be kept in mind. The delinquent official, is required to be afforded reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witness and produce the witness in his defence. This is the minimum requirement of principle of natural justice. An enquiry officer is not entitled to collect the material against the delinquent official at his back. In Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 117, the Apex Court has ruled that the principles of natural justice require that the delinquent official is furnished with the copies of the documents relied upon against him and he should be given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce his own defence. Besides, the enquiry officer cannot collect evidence behind the delinquent official and in case the enquiry officer relies upon such evidence, the enquiry stands vitiated and is ab initio void and liable to be set aside. Admittedly. In this case the petitioner gave names of 19 persons to be examined in the enquiry but none of them was summoned by the enquiry officer on 17.10.1997 when the petitioner was summoned to appear in the enquiry before him. In Shyam Swarup Gangwar u. U. P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board. Lucknow, 1997 ALJ 2158, it is held that if the delinquent official wants to adduce evidence, the disciplinary authority has no alternative but to allow him to adduce evidence. In Matiesh Kumar Pandey v. Upper Pradhan Prabandhak, U.P.S.R.T.C., 1997 ALJ 1501, it has been observed :

"Right of defence which is guaranteed to a Government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution and to other citizens under Articles 14 and 21 as also by the rules of natural Justice is a substantive right which has to be full and complete. Mere opportunity to admit or deny a particular factual allegation amounting to a charge of misconduct alone is not the defence which is envisaged by the Constitution and rules of the natural justice."

42. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following judgments:-

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Bela Bagchi, (2005) 7 SCC 435 has observed as follows:-

14. Respondents 1 and 2 have highlighted the alleged withdrawal of grievances of the account-holder and the absence of any loss to the Bank.

15. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit which resulted in the case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 has observed as follows:-

7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him. Breach of Regulation 3 is ''misconduct' within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in a number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a bank -- for that matter, in the case of any other organisation -- every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority -- that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances -- is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit -- huge profit, as the High Court characterises it -- they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class I Officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge 9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that in spite of instructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Inquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout thesaid instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge 8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that in spite of reminders, the respondent did not submit "Control Returns" to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterised as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the Regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24.

8. We must mention that Shri V.A. Mohta, the learned counsel for the respondent, stated fairly before us that it is not possible for him to sustain the reasoning and approach of the High Court in this case. His only submission was that having regard to the age of the respondent (37 years) and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court may substitute the punishment awarded to the respondent by a lesser punishment. The learned counsel suggested that any punishment other than dismissal may be imposed by this Court. We considered this request with the care it deserves, but we regret that we are unable to accede to it. The learned counsel for the Bank, Shri V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, also stated, on instructions of the Bank, that it is not possible for the Bank to accommodate the respondent in its service in view of his conduct.

Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of A.P. SRTC v. Raghuda Siva Sankar Prasad, (2007) 1 SCC 222 has observed as follows:-

15. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the orders passed by the Labour Court and of the High Court and other annexures. In our opinion, the High Court has failed to appreciate that the delinquent employee categorically admitted that he had stolen the property of the Corporation. The Labour Court, on a careful perusal of the evidence, rightly ordered removal of the respondent from service. When the delinquent employee admitted his guilt before the enquiry officer that he had handed over the alternator from pan shop to the police authorities and further deposed that he had handed over the stolen property and requested the Labour Court to excuse him since it was his first offence, the Tribunal rightly set aside the request by taking into consideration the entire factual circumstances on record and after careful examination of the same and held that the delinquent employee does not deserve any sympathy and therefore he ordered removal from service.

18. The enquiry reports also clearly reveal that the departmental enquiry was conducted after giving fair and reasonable opportunity to the delinquent official, after following the procedure and as per the Regulations.

20. The learned Judges of the High Court have also failed to appreciate that once an employee has lost the confidence of the employer, it would not be safe and in the interest of the Corporation to continue the employee in the service. The punishment, imposed by the management in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not disproportionate and that the punishment of removal from service is just and reasonable and proportionate to the proved misconduct.

23. Interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment of the respondent herein, is not called for. In our opinion, the respondent has no legal right to continue in the Corporation. As held by this Court, in a catena of judgments that the loss of confidence occupies the primary factor and not the amount of money and that sympathy and generosity cannot be a factor which is permissible in law in such matters. When the employee is found guilty of theft, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of removal. In such cases, there is no place of generosity or place of sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering with the quantum of the punishment.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255 has observed as follows:-

28. The other contentions made by Mr Francis are in respect of procedural irregularity which, according to him, cannot be termed to be negligence on the part of the respondent. We have already held that both the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority have given ample reasons for arriving at their conclusions. This Court has held in a catena of decisions that interference is not permissible unless the orders passed by the quasi-judicial authorities are clearly unreasonable or perverse or manifestly illegal or grossly unjust.

29. Mr Francis also submitted that a sum of Rs 34,436.85 being 5% of the total loss of Rs 6,88,737.12 is sought to be recovered from the respondent and that the present departmental proceedings is the only known allegation against the respondent and there was no such allegation earlier and, therefore, a lenient view should be taken by this Court and relief prayed for by both the parties can be suitably moulded by this Court. We are unable to agree with the above submission which, in our opinion, has no force. The scope of judicial review is very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view, loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated. In the instant case, the respondent employee is found guilty of misappropriating the Corporation funds. There is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefor with the quantum of punishment awarded by the disciplinary and Appellate Authority.

35. In the instant case, the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning and, therefore, in our opinion, the matter should be dealt with firmly with firm hands and not leniently. In the instant case, the respondent deals with public money and is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity and, therefore, highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We have no hesitation to set aside the same and restore the order passed by the disciplinary authorities upholding the order of dismissal.

Hon'ble supreme court in the case of A. Sudhakar v. Postmaster General, (2006) 4 SCC 348 has observed as follows:-

27. Contention of Dr. Pillai relating to the quantum of punishment cannot be accepted, having regard to the fact that temporary defalcation of any amount itself was sufficient for the disciplinary authority to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement upon the appellant and in that view of the matter, the question that the third charge had been partially proved takes a back seat.

In Hombe Gowda Educational Trust v. State of Karnataka [(2006) 1 SCC 430 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 133] this Bench opined: (SCC pp. 436-37, paras 17-20)

"17. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is akin to one under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. While exercising such discretionary jurisdiction, no doubt it is open to the Tribunal to substitute one punishment by another; but it is also trite that the Tribunal exercises a limited jurisdiction in this behalf. The jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment could be exercised only when, inter alia, it is found to be grossly disproportionate.

18. This Court repeatedly has laid down the law that such interference at the hands of the Tribunal should be inter alia on arriving at a finding that no reasonable person could inflict such punishment. The Tribunal may furthermore exercise its jurisdiction when relevant facts are not taken into consideration by the management which would have direct bearing on the question of quantum of punishment.

19. Assaulting a superior at a workplace amounts to an act of gross indiscipline. The respondent is a teacher. Even under grave provocation a teacher is not expected to abuse the head of the institution in a filthy language and assault him with a chappal. Punishment of dismissal from services, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly disproportionate so as to shock one's conscience.

20. A person, when dismissed from service, is put to a great hardship but that would not mean that a grave misconduct should go unpunished. Although the doctrine of proportionality may be applicable in such matters, but a punishment of dismissal from service for such a misconduct cannot be said to be unheard of. Maintenance of discipline of an institution is equally important. Keeping the aforementioned principles in view, we may hereinafter notice a few recent decisions of this Court."

(See also State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava [(2006) 3 SCC 276 : JT (2006) 3 SC 48] , Workmen v. Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. [(2006) 3 SCC 297 : JT (2006) 2 SC 1] , Syndicate Bank v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati [(2006) 3 SCC 150 : JT (2006) 2 SC 73] , L.K. Verma v. H.M.T. Ltd. [(2006) 2 SCC 269 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 278 : JT (2006) 2 SC 99] and Commr. of Police v. Syed Hussain [(2006) 3 SCC 173 : JT (2006) 2 SC 332] .)

29. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dy. Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Bunni Lal Chaurasia, (2005) 11 SCC 570 has observed as follows:-

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are as follows:

The respondent was appointed as a Cooperative Supervisor in the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Federal Authority. He was placed under suspension in contemplation of departmental proceedings initiated against him under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). After the inquiry officer submitted his report, a resolution was passed on 21-12-1993, to dispense with the services of the respondent and to recover the amount from him under Section 68 of the Act. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated 20-1-1994, his services were terminated, preceded by a notice on the proposed punishment. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The learned Single Judge, after threadbare consideration of the submissions made by the respondent, dismissed the writ petition. We may mention here that the only contention raised in the writ petition was the violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as no notice was purported to have been given to him affording an opportunity to explain his case. This contention was repelled by the learned Single Judge that sufficient notices were sent to him by registered post by the appellant but he failed to appear before the disciplinary authority. The learned Single Judge also noticed that on 10-7-1993 the respondent did not appear. Notices were also published in Dainik Jagran newspaper on 2-10-1993, 9-10-1993 and 28-11-1993. The respondent also moved as many as three applications on 13-7-1993, 2-10-1993 and 28-11-1993. From the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, it appears that sufficient opportunity has been afforded to the respondent. Having failed to avail the opportunity, the respondent now is not permitted to turn back to say that no opportunity has been afforded to him.

3. The Division Bench of the High Court upset the order passed by the learned Single Judge mainly on two grounds. Firstly, no notice of proposed punishment has been given to the respondent. This finding is demolished by notice dated 13-7-1993. From the aforesaid notice, it is clear that the respondent was put to notice as to why he should not be dismissed from service. It appears that the respondent did not give a reply to the aforesaid notice. Therefore, the first ground on which the Division Bench upset the order of the learned Single Judge is erroneous. The second ground on which the Division Bench upset the order of the learned Single Judge is that, under Section 68 of the Act, there is no provision to order dismissal or removal of the respondent. While it is true that under Section 68 of the Act, there is no such provision but the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that, in fact, the order of dismissal was passed under Regulation 68 and not under Section 68 of the Act. The learned counsel has also taken us to the provisions of Regulation 68 of the Cooperative Federal Authority (Business) Regulations, 1976. A reading of Regulation 68, which is annexed to the additional affidavit filed by the appellant, would clearly show that it empowers the authority to impose major punishment like dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It appears from the facts and circumstances of this case that the authority was confused between Section 68 of the Act and Regulation 68. Be that as it may, a reading of the notice on proposed punishment dated 13-7-1993 clearly shows that the proposed punishment on the respondent appears to have been passed under Regulation 68 and not under Section 68 of the Act, although the impugned order mentions Section 68 of the Act.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Raj Kishore Yadav, (2006) 5 SCC 673 has observed as follows:-

4. On a consideration of the entire materials placed before the authorities, they came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal would meet the ends of justice. When a writ petition was filed challenging the correctness of the order of dismissal, the High Court interfered with the order of dismissal on the ground that the acts complained of were sheer mistakes or errors on the part of the respondent herein and for that no punishment could be attributed to the respondent. In our opinion, the order passed by the High Court quashing the order of dismissal is nothing but an error of judgment. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in allowing the writ petition and quashing the order of dismissal and granting continuity of service with all pecuniary and consequential service benefits. It is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed. As already noticed, the charges are very serious in nature and the same have been proved beyond any doubt. We have also carefully gone through the enquiry report and the order of the disciplinary authority and of the Tribunal and we are unable to agree with the reasons given by the High Court in modifying the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In short, the judgment of the High Court is nothing but perverse. We, therefore, have no other option except to set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the disciplinary authority ordering dismissal of the respondent herein from service. It is ordered accordingly. The civil appeal stands allowed.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC, (2005) 7 SCC 338 has observed as follows:-

4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court should have considered the question of quantum of punishment by applying the principles of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short "the Act"). It was further submitted there were minor lapses and smallness of the amount has not been considered in the proper perspective and order of termination of service should not have been passed. Learned counsel for the respondent Corporation supported the order of the Tribunal and judgment of the High Court. In Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti [(2001) 2 SCC 574 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 469 : JT (2001) 2 SC 72] , it was held that misconduct in such cases where the bus conductor either had not issued tickets to a large number of passengers or had issued tickets of lower denomination, punishment of removal is proper. It is the responsibility of the conductors to collect correct fare charges from the passengers and deposit the same with the Corporation. They act in fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if they do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare. A conductor holds a post of trust. A person guilty of breach of trust should be imposed punishment of removal from service. The factual position shows that the appellant's conduct in collecting fare at the designated place and not collecting fare from persons who had already travelled were in violation of various regulations contained in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1963 (in short "the Regulations"). In Karnataka State Road Transport case [(2001) 2 SCC 574 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 469 : JT (2001) 2 SC 72] it was held that it is misplaced sympathy by courts in awarding lesser punishments where on checking it is found that the bus conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers, though they should have, or have issued tickets of a lower denomination knowing fully well the correct fare to be charged. It was finally held that the order of dismissal should not have been set aside. The view was reiterated by a three-Judge Bench in Regional Manager, RSRTC v. Ghanshyam Sharma [(2002) 10 SCC 330 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 714 : (2002) 1 LLJ 234] , where it was additionally observed that the proved acts amount either to a case of dishonesty or of gross negligence, and bus conductors who by their actions or inactions cause financial loss to the Corporation are not fit to be retained in service.

6. The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court. Such interference cannot be a routine matter.

11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.

Hon'ble supreme court in the case of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India, (2005) 1 SCC 13 has observed as follows:-

14. In regard to the second contention that the consideration of the charge which had not been proved by the appellate authority, Mr Ramamoorthy submitted that the appellate authority had considered the charges which were not proved while enhancing the punishment. According to Mr Ramamoorthy, the appellate authority was merely concerned with Charge 5 regarding disbursement of loan to the wife of the appellant in violation of Rule 34(3)(1) of the Service Rules and that the order of the appellate authority does not in any manner disclose that the same was passed by considering the circumstances germane to the charge against the appellant which had been proved. Even accepting the contention of Mr Ramamoorthy on Charge 1, the appellant cannot come out of Charge 5, whwe see no reason to interfere with the same. As already noticed, the appellant had himself admitted his misconduct and therefore, there is no reason why the appellate authority's finding on Charge 5 should not be accepted.ich is more serious and grave in nature. However, we observe that the observations made by the appellate authority on Charge 1 while considering Charge 5, should be treated only as a passing observation and at the same time we cannot ignore or close our eyes in regard to the finding of the appellate authority on Charge 5 which is more serious and grave in nature. The appellate authority had enhanced the punishment imposed by following the procedure laid down in the Service Rules and we see no reason to interfere with the same. As already noticed, the appellant had himself admitted his misconduct and therefore, there is no reason why the appellate authority's finding on Charge 5 should not be accepted.

16. It is true that the appellate authority has proposed to enhance the punishment and imposed the penalty of dismissal on the appellant. However, the appellate authority was convinced with regard to the explanation submitted by the appellant and reduced the penalty further considering the adverse family circumstances, which could be seen from the following observation in the appellate order:

"I, therefore, direct that the earlier penalty of reduction in basic pay by one stage imposed on him by the appointing authority be enhanced to removal from service in terms of Rule 67(g) of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. The tentative decision taken while serving the show-cause notice was to dismiss Shri Sirur from service. Although, considering the acts of misdemeanour of the appellant, this was the appropriate penalty, I have taken a lenient view of the matter because of his adverse family circumstances. Removal from service would enable him to draw higher terminal benefits as compared to dismissal. The removal will take effect from the date of communication of this order and the intervening period will be treated as under suspension. I order accordingly."

31. Mr Salve invited our attention to para 17 of the judgment in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] which deals with the opinion of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. He also drew our attention to S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] in SCC paras 25, 26 and 28. The decisions relied on and cited above make one thing clear, namely, principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard-and-fast formulae and as said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA)] , these principles cannot be put in a straitjacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal to a person whose rights are going to be affected. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in Karunakar case [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing, no notice, no opportunity and no hearing but one of not affording a proper hearing that is adequate or a full hearing or violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry.

34. The bank manager/officer and employees of any bank, nationalised/or non-nationalised, are expected to act and discharge their functions in accordance with the rules and regulations of the bank. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and trust and a misconduct. In the instant case Charge 5 framed against the appellant is very serious and grave in nature. We have already extracted the relevant Rule which prohibits the bank manager to sanction a loan to his wife or his relative or to any partner. While sanctioning the loan the appellant did not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. He realised the mistake later and tried to salvage the same by not encashing the draft issued in the maiden name of his wife though the draft was issued but not encashed. The decision to sanction a loan is not an honest decision. Rule 34(3)(1) is a rule of integrity and, therefore, as rightly pointed out by Mr Salve, the respondent Bank cannot afford to have the appellant as bank manager. The punishment of removal awarded by the appellate authority is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Before concluding, we may usefully rely on the judgment Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003) 3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] wherein this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 614, para 10)

"If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal."

36. We have, therefore, no hesitation in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant and confirming the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. However, we make it clear that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the appellant will be entitled to full pension and gratuity irrespective of his total period of service. No costs.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 has observed as follows:-

8. At this stage, we may point out that there is no allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, or that the inquiry was conducted without following the procedures or rules and regulations. The only case put up before us by the respondent is that the theft or removal of lens by the respondent was not proved in the course of inquiry. This contention need not detain us any longer because going through the report of the inquiry, the inquiry officer, after examining PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 and after affording adequate opportunity to the respondent, has come to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the respondent stands proved.

11. By now it is a well-established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate authority.

15. This takes us to the last submission of the counsel for the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the offence, said to have been committed, being minor in nature and no loss being caused to the owner of the property, inasmuch as the same had been recovered on the spot, lenient punishment may be awarded in place of dismissal from service. We are unable to countenance this submission. The gravity of the offence must necessarily be measured with the nature of the offence. The respondent was a member of a disciplined force holding the rank of Head Constable. The duty assigned to him was a "bandobast" duty during the visit of the then President Bill Clinton, who ran a security risk of the highest grade. His misconduct could have led to serious security lapse resulting in fatal consequences. But, because of timely detection by the electrician, PW 4, the lens was recovered and immediately restored. We entirely agree with the inquiry officer that the charges are serious in nature, being committed by a member of a disciplined force, who deserved stringent punishment. To instil the confidence of the public in the establishment, the only appropriate punishment in such cases is dismissal from service, which has been correctly awarded.

16. It is stated that the respondent was reinstated on 19-6-2004, pursuant to the order passed by the High Court and has been working since then and pay and allowances have been paid from 19-6-2004. Since he has been paid for the period he has worked, the salary and allowances already paid to him shall not be disturbed. The respondent, however, shall not get his back wages.

17. In the premises aforestated, we are clearly of the view that the High Court has committed patent error of law which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The order of the High Court is, accordingly, quashed. The appeal is allowed. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed. Parties are asked to bear their own costs.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Taher Ali, (2007) 8 SCC 656 has observed as follows:-

4. It is an admitted position that the respondent was appointed on election duty but he absented himself from election duty. It seems that the respondent did not consider the election duty to be an important business which is very important for the whole nation. The respondent was appointed on election duty and was deputed to take security arrangement but absented himself from duty. This is a very serious lapse on the part of the respondent. The police force is a disciplined force and the respondent was detailed for such an important duty of election. He absented himself from election duty. Such kind of serious lapse cannot be treated lightly. It is a very important function and if the incumbent avoided the duty of election, he cannot escape from the liability of the penalty of compulsory retirement. We fail to understand the reason for the Administrative Tribunal or for the High Court to have remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the respondent.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that in fact, the disciplinary authority while passing the order has taken into consideration the earlier absence of the respondent from the duty. He submitted that this could not have been taken into consideration as the respondent was not aware about these incidents and those were not the part of the charges levelled against him. In support of his submission learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the judgment of this Court titled State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda [AIR 1964 SC 506 : (1964) 4 SCR 540] but in the present case we are satisfied that in fact the respondent deliberately absented himself from duty and did not offer any explanation for his absence from election duty. It is not the respondent's first absence. He also absented himself from duty on earlier occasions also. In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority. The police force is a disciplined force and if the respondent is a habitual absentee then there is no reason to ignore this fact at the time of imposing penalty. Moreover, even ignoring the earlier absence, in our opinion, the absence of 21 days by a member of a disciplined force is sufficient to justify his compulsory retirement.

Hon'ble supreme court in the case of SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 SCC 740 has observed as follows:-

20. We are of the view that the High Court has committed an error in holding that the charge-sheet should have mentioned about the details of the documents and the names of the 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that in fact, the disciplinary authority while passing the order has taken into consideration the earlier absence of the respondent from the duty. He submitted that this could not have been taken into consideration as the respondent was not aware about these incidents and those were not the part of the charges levelled against him. In support of his submission learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the judgment of this Court titled State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda [AIR 1964 SC 506 : (1964) 4 SCR 540] but in the present case we are satisfied that in fact the respondent deliberately absented himself from duty and did not offer any explanation for his absence from election duty. It is not the respondent's first absence. He also absented himself from duty on earlier occasions also. In our opinion there canwitnesses which the Bank proposed to examine and a list to that effect should have been appended to the charge-sheet. We may point out that the charge-sheet need not contain the details of the documents or the names of the witnesses proposed to be examined to prove the charges or a list to that effect unless there is a specific provision to that effect. Charge-sheet, in other words, is not expected to be a record of evidence. Fair procedure does not mean giving of copies of the documents or list of witnesses along with the charge-sheet. Of course, statement of allegations has to accompany the charge-sheet, when required by the Service Rules.

21. We notice that the presenting officer had informed the inquiring authority that the list of Bank's documents was forwarded to the charged officer vide his letter dated 21-5-1997 but the charged officer did not accept that letter. The charged officer's related letter would also indicate that he was advised not to accept the letter along with its enclosure. The presenting officer had again sent the list of Bank's documents to the charged officer vide his letter dated 27-6-1997, the same was also not responded to by the charged officer. The inquiring authority further directed the presenting officer to make arrangements for the charged official to inspect the Bank's documents. Consequently, the presenting officer vide his letters dated 30-5-1997 and 27-6-1997 made arrangements for inspection of Bank's documents on 13-6-1997, 14-6-1997, 9-7-1997 and 10-7-1997 respectively. The presenting officer was also present for facilitating the inspection but the charged officer did not turn up for inspection of the Bank's documents. In fact the inquiring authority himself had written a letter dated 25-6-1997 to the charged officer advising him that the presenting officer had again been instructed to forward the list of Bank's documents and witnesses by 30-6-1997 and get the Bank's documents inspected by him in his presence before 12-7-1997 which was the last opportunity given to the charged officer. One more opportunity was given by the inquiring authority to the charged officer to submit the list of defence documents and witnesses by 19-7-1997 but the charged officer did not give any list of defence documents and witnesses and on most of the days, the charged officer did not appear before the inquiring authority. On 6-11-1997 the charged officer walked out of the inquiry. Under such circumstances, the inquiring authority had no other alternative but to hold the inquiry ex parte. We are of the view that the inquiring authority and the presenting officer had followed procedures laid down under Rules 68(2)(v), 68(2)(ix)(a), 68(2)(viii) and 68(2)(xix) of the Service Rules.

23. The inquiring authority has examined each and every charge levelled against the charged officer and the documents produced by the presenting officer and came to the conclusion that most of the charges were proved. In a departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges on preponderance of probability and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC 618] and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab [(1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424] . The documents produced by the Bank, which were not controverted by the charged officer, support all the allegations and charges levelled against the charged officer. In a case, where the charged officer had failed to inspect the documents in respect of the allegations raised by the Bank and not controverted, it is always open to the inquiring authority to accept the same.26. This Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] held: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)

"7. ... Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence especially when the charged officer had not participated in the inquiry and had not raised the grounds urged by him before the High Court by the inquiring authority."

Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of Diwan Singh v. LIC, (2015) 2 SCC 341 has observed as follows:-

7. We have given thoughtful consideration to the above argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. The explanation put forth does not appear to be convincing, as the cashier would not have issued a receipt without counting the cash at the counter. Secondly, had the act on the part of the appellant been bona fide, he would not have made forged entry of Rs 533 in the carbon copy of ledger sheet on 13-8-1990 between Entries 12 and 13. As such, the finding of the enquiry officer holding the appellant guilty, in our opinion, cannot be said to be against the evidence on record.

8. As far as argument relating to quantum of punishment, as modified by the High Court, which results in consequential forfeiture of pensionary benefits in view of Rule 23, quoted above, is concerned, we do not find the punishment to be harsh or disproportionate to the guilt, in view of the nature of the charge of which the appellant is found guilty in the present case. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the courts.

9. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh [(2006) 6 SCC 187 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1290] , this Court, in para 18 of the judgment has expressed the views on this point as under: (SCC p. 193)

"18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs 360.95. This Court has considered the punishment that may be awarded to the delinquent employees who misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and the factors to be considered. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment."

10. In Karnataka SRTC v. A.T. Mane [(2005) 3 SCC 254 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 407] in which unaccounted amount was only Rs 93 this Court expressed its opinion in para 12 as under: (SCC p. 259)

"12. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal."

11. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 4 SCC 642 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 187] , this Court has made following observations in para 25 of the judgment: (SCC p. 654)

"25. ... In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the rule of law."

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279 has observed as follows:-

13. In view of the answer so given, it has to be now seen whether under the Regulations, the authorities concerned are required to give reasons for their decisions. Regulation 68(3) lays down the procedure the disciplinary authority is required to follow after it receives the proceedings of the enquiry including the report of the Inquiry Officer. On careful perusal thereof we find that only in those cases where the disciplinary authority considers it necessary to direct fresh or further enquiry or disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, it has to record the reasons for its such directions, but there is no such obligation if it agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that when express provisions have been made in the Regulations for recording reasons in only the first two of the three fact situations -- and not the other -- there is no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concurrence with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Even if we proceed on the basis that such an obligation is implicit, still the order of the disciplinary authority cannot be held to be bad as, on perusal thereof, we find that before concurring with the findings of the Inquiry Officer it has gone through the entire proceeding and applied its mind thereto. In our considered opinion, when the disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to reappraise the evidence to arrive at the same findings. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr Dutta that the order of punishment was liable to be struck down as it was a non-speaking order and did not contain any reason.

14. That brings us to the order of the appellate authority. Under Regulation 70(2), the appellate authority is required to consider whether the findings recorded against the officer concerned are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. This Regulation also does not obligate the appellate authority to give any reasons for its order. Assuming, that by necessary implication this Regulation also requires the appellate authority to give the reasons, still its order cannot be invalidated, as we find that it has discharged its obligation by considering the records and proceedings pertaining to the disciplinary action and the submissions made by Grover. In other words, the order clearly demonstrates that the appellate authority had applied its mind not only to the proceedings of the enquiry, but also the grounds raised by Grover in his appeal and on such application found that there was no substance in the appeal.

Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh, (2010) 11 SCC 233 has observed as follows :-

13. The enquiry officer, therefore, concluded in his report as follows:

"Assessment of evidence of presenting officer and CSO weighs heavily on PO side. He has produced the documents as available in the branch and proved that advances made were having incomplete details on each documents. The CSO has based himself on premises and has nothing to present in his defence.

On going through both written and oral evidence before me, I posed queries before CSO, whether he can produce any evidence of FDRs from bank records. The answer was negative and evasive. Further query was raised whether the borrowers could be produced to prove his contention. The reply again was negative. Hence, evaluating the document before me and other relevant evidence, I am of the opinion that Charge 1 based on Allegations 1 to 20 stands proved."

16. After considering the enquiry report, the Zonal Manager who was the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the respondent has committed misconduct under Clauses 3(1) and 15(v) read with Regulation 24 of the Punjab & Sind Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1981. He concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer. Therefore, by the order dated 6-6-2003, he imposed the penalty of dismissal from service along with recovery of pecuniary loss under the Punjab and Sind Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1997. That order has been subsequently confirmed in the internal appeal and in review.

17. As stated above, all these three orders were challenged in the above writ petition in the High Court, and have come to be set aside. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the report submitted against him by the enquiry officer was too sketchy and it did not contain any reasons in support of the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer. The High Court accepted that submission. It held that the enquiry officer merely stated in his report that certain documents in support of each of the charges were presented and also that the submissions of the petitioner in reply were not tenable and therefore, the charges stood proved. The High Court held that the documents produced were neither detailed nor their nature was explained. It further held that there was no discussion much less any analysis of the evidence presented. The Court held that no specific finding has been recorded on the basis of the evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent. The absence of good reason was held to be in breach of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order was set aside.

23. We are rather amazed at the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the material on record. The enquiry officer is an officer of a Bank. He was considering the material which was placed before him and thereafter, he has come to the conclusion that the misconduct is established. He was concerned with a serious charge of unexplained withdrawals of huge amounts by a Branch Manager in the name of fictitious persons. Once the necessary material was placed on record and when the charge-sheeted officer had no explanation to offer, the enquiry officer could not have taken any other view. The order of a bank officer may not be written in the manner in which a judicial officer would write. Yet what one has to see is whether the order is sufficiently clear and contains the reasons in justification for the conclusion arrived at. The High Court has ignored this aspect.

24. Absence of reasons in a disciplinary order would amount to denial of natural justice to the charge-sheeted employee. But the present case was certainly not one of that category. Once the charges were found to have been established, the High Court had no reason to interfere in the decision. Even though there was sufficient documentary evidence on record, the High Court has chosen to hold that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] . Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu v. State [(2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] . The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority, (1997) 4 SCC 565 has observed as follows:-

2. Economic empowerment is a fundamental right of the weaker sections of the people, in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, ensured under Article 46 as a part of social and economic justice envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution; the State is enjoined to promote their welfare effectuated under Article 38. Distribution of material resources to elongate that purpose envisaged in Article 39(b) is the means for the development of the weaker sections. The banking business and services were nationalised to achieve the above objects. The nationalised banks, therefore, are the prime sources and pillars for establishment of socio-economic justice for the weaker sections. The employees and officers working in the banks are not merely the trustees of the society, but also bear responsibility and owe duty to the society for effectuation of socio-economic empowerment. Their acts and conduct should be in discharge of that constitutional objective and if they derelict in the performance of their duty, it impinges upon the enforcement of the constitutional philosophy, objective and the goals under the rule of law. Corruption has taken deep roots among the sections of the society and the employees holding public office or responsibility equally became amenable to corrupt conduct in the discharge of their official duty for illegal gratification. The banking business and services are also vitally affected by catastrophic corruption. Disciplinary measures should, therefore, aim to eradicate the corrupt proclivity of conduct on the part of the employees/officers in the public offices including those in banks. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider, from this perspective, the need for disciplinary action to eradicate corruption to properly channelise the use of the public funds, the live wire for effectuation of socio-economic justice in order to achieve the constitutional goals set down in the Preamble and to see that the corrupt conduct of the officers does not degenerate the efficiency of service leading to denationalisation of the banking system. What is more, the nationalisation of the banking service was done in the public interest. Every employee/officer in the bank should strive to see that banking operations or services are rendered in the best interest of the system and the society so as to effectuate the object of nationalisation. Any conduct that damages, destroys, defeats or tends to defeat the said purposes resultantly defeats or tends to defeat the constitutional objectives which can be meted out with disciplinary action in accordance with rules lest rectitude in public service is lost and service becomes a means and source of unjust enrichment at the cost of the society.

3. Shri B.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that for proof of the charges none of the witnesses was examined nor any opportunity was given to cross-examine them and the petitioner has disputed his liability. As a consequence, the entire enquiry was vitiated by manifest error apparent on the face of the record. We find no force in the contention. The thrust of the imputation of charges was that he had not discharged his duty as a responsible officer to safeguard the interest of the Bank by securing adequate security before the grant of the loans to the dealers, and had not ensured supply of goods to the loanees. It is based upon the documentary evidence which has already been part of the record and copies thereof had been supplied to the petitioner. Under those circumstances, we do not think that there is any manifest error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference. It is then contended that no reasons have been given in support of the conclusions to substantiate the charges. The enquiry officer had elaborately discussed each charge and given reasons which were considered by the disciplinary authority and reached the conclusion that the charges were proved. So had the appellate authority. They are not like a civil court.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Govind Vaze v. Govt. of Maharashtra, (2008) 1 SCC 514 has observed as follows:-

24. The appellant did not elaborate as to how the provisions of the said Rules had not been followed. Only because the Rule provides for summoning of the defence witnesses, the same would not mean that the inquiry officer had no discretionary jurisdiction in this behalf. An inquiry officer cannot summon witnesses far less the Judges of the High Court who have nothing to do in the matter. The delinquent officer must show that the witnesses to be summoned have something to do with the issues involved in the disciplinary proceeding. It is evident that such a request was made only to embarrass the inquiry officer. As indicated herein before, the appellant, when questioned, could not inform us as to for what purpose he intended to examine the High Court Judges.

43. In counter affidavit, it is contended by the opposite party that the petitioner was transferred at Sultanpur Branch where he was not interested to join and moved applications for cancellation of his transfer. We have pursued transfer order dated 16.12.2008 Annexure No.5. Vide this transfer order the petitioner was directed to take charge on 22.12.2008 at Sultanpur Branch. He had to hand over the charge of Chief Manager, KGMC Branch, Lucknow.

44. The petitioner moved applications dated 24.12.2008, 06.01.2009, 07.01.2009 and 22.01.2009 for cancellation of his transfer on the ground of dispute with his tenants Mrs. Ratna and Sri H.N. Pandey. He anticipated that H.N. Pandey and Mrs. Ratna Pandey would sell out his house and take illegal possession of the ground floor also. He has not mentioned in these applications that Sri Balram Pandey was instrumental to the dispute which was prevailing during this period from 24.12.2008 up to 22.01.2009 with petitioner's tenant.

45. The petitioner, for the first time, after submission of Enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer, he made allegations against Sri Balram Pandey, Zonal Head, Lucknow Zone for the harassment meted out by the petitioner. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner has also filed a Civil Suit in Civil Court for eviction of tenants from his house. The allegations has been made in application forwarded to the C.M.D., Allahabad Bank, Head Office, Kolkata that the discussion took place with Sri Balram Pandey after service of charge sheet, when the petitioner along with his wife went to meet him and he had convinced the petitioner to complete the Enquiry without a defence. Which he eventually did by keeping faith in his words, but due to lack of knowledge in such matters, could not place his point of view very convincingly. The petitioner also did not realise that he wanted to complete this Enquiry before 30.06.2009, because on this date the Disciplinary Authority the then A.G.M. Rajesh Malviya was to retire and Balram Pandey wanted that A.G.M. should award a punishment against the petitioner.

46. It is relevant to mention here that the petitioner executed agreement to lease on 07.03.2006 in favour of high-tech Institute of Information and Technology through Hridya Narayan Pandey. Sri Balram Pandey had recommended the petitioner to lease out first floor of his house as alleged by the petitioner is not supported by this lease deed dated 07.03.2006, because Balram Pandey is not the witness of this lease deed. Some person namely Ratna Ojha is witness of this lease deed. The petitioner has not substantiated this fact by adducing evidence.

47. These allegations cannot be considered in absence of Mr. Balram Pandey the then Zonal Head, Lucknow Zone. The petitioner has not arrayed Balram Pandey as opposite party in this petition. The malice of Sri Balram Pandey contended by the petitioner was not proved during the course of departmental enquiry also. In this regard, the following case law is relevant:-

In State of Bihar and Anr. vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Anr. 1992 Supp(1)SCC222 in para 55of the judgment , the apex Court held as under :-

55. It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded economize as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no Enquiry into those allegation would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. Admittedly, both R.K. Singh and G.N. Sharma were not imp leaded. On this ground alone the High Court should have stopped Enquiry into the allegation of mala fide or bias alleged against them.

In Dr. J.N. Banavalikar vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and anotherAIR 1996 SC 326, in para 21 of the judgment , it has been held as under:-

21....Further, in the absence of implemented of the junior doctor who is alleged to have been favored by the course of action leading to removal of the appellant and the person who had allegedly passed malafide order in order to favor such junior doctor, any contention of mala fide action in fact i.e. malice in fact should not be countenanced by the court.

In All India State Bank Officers' Federation and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. JT 1996 (8)SC 550,in para 23,.....the relevant observation of the apex court relevant are reproduced as under:-

23.....the person against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. The allegation that the policy was amended with a view to benefit respondents 4 and 5 would amount to the petitioners contending that the Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put before it. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fide, which allegations, in fact, are without merit."

Recently in Federation of Railway Officers Association and Ors. vs. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 1344, it has been held as under :-

20......... Allegations regarding malafides cannot be vaguely made and it must be specific and clear. In this context, the concerned Minister who is stated to be involved in the formation of new Zone at Hazipur is not made a party who can meet the allegations....."

48. We have also pursued letters dated 23.12.2008, 29.12.2008, 31.12.2008, 12.01.2009, 02.04.2009, 18.11.2009 and 12.10.2009. Vide these orders Assistant General Manager Rajesh Malviya and Dr. Sandeep Chatterjee advised the petitioner to join at Sultanpur Branch on his transfer. But the petitioner had not responded to this advice and remained absent unauthorizedly. Vide letter dated 02.04.2009 the petitioner was informed that his request for extension of leave was refused. Vide letter dated 12.10.2009 the petitioner was again advised to join at Sultanpur Branch and it was informed that his request for transfer to Lucknow could not be considered.

49. The petitioner has disputed execution of compromise on 25.11.2008 and receipt dated 12.12.2008 relating to alleged agreement to sale of his house No.3/17, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow. He has contended that these documents were prepared forged by Hridya Narayan Pandey and Mrs. Ratna Pandey to take illegal possession of his house.

50. It is relevant to mention here that the petitioner submitted his reply dated 28.03.2009 in response of the charge sheet served upon him. No such dispute with his tenants Hridya Narayan Pandey and Ratna Pandey has been mentioned in this reply and it is not alleged that Sri Balram Pandey was instrumental to initiate this Enquiry. The allegations made in application dated 20.11.2009 are thus after thought after submission of the Enquiry report dated 23.11.2009.

51. We have also pursued enquiry report dated 23.11.2009 submitted by the Enquiry Officer R.K. Verma. The reply dated 28.03.2009 submitted by the petitioner was considered and he was afforded opportunity to inspect the management documents ME-1 to ME-35. The copies of these documents were also supplied on 12.08.2009 to the petitioner. The petitioner completed inspection of the management documents on 16.09.2009. Examination in chief with MW-1 witness was recorded by the Enquiry Officer on this date also. Documents DE-1 to DE-9 were provided by the petitioner and he had cross examined MW-1 witness on 24.09.2009. The preliminary hearing started on 29.07.2009 and concluded on 24.09.2009. The Enquiry Officer has analysed the evidence adduced by bank on articles of charges framed against the petitioner, which are as follows:-

ARTICLE-1

P.O. in his brief stated out that Sri Raj Kapoor allowed disbursement of 2nd installment of housing loan of Rs.125000/- to Shri Ram Dahin Prasad Verma on 27.05.2004 without verifying the end use of 1st installment disbursed on 22.01.2004. 3rd installment of Rs.75000/- was disbursed on 29.05.2004 (within 2 days) without verifying the end use of 2nd installment disbursed on 27.05.2004. Shri Raj Kapoor disbursed 4th installment of Rs.100000/- on 30.11.2004 without verifying the end use of previous three installments which is evident from the reply given by MW-1 to PO Q-2 and DA Q-D12. He also sanctioned additional housing loan of Rs.3.00 lac on 10.02.2005 to Shri Ram Dahin Prasad Verma without ascertaining the end use of 1st loan sanctioned/disbursed as deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-5, PO Q-7 and PO Q-8. The valuation of the property by Bank's approved valuer Shri Shekhar Gupta is Rs.3.00 lac against the disbursement of Rs.7.25 lac, as deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-3. The P.O. stated the HO Inspector observations are as under:

"i. Despite two time disbursement, the house is incomplete.

ii. 2nd loan of Rs.3.00 lac was sanctioned without observing utilization of 1st loan of Rs.5.00 lac.

iii. Chain of title deed not held.

iv. Approved map not held."

The above observations are confirmed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-4.

Supplemental recital (ME-10) for the 2nd installment is held blank, unfilled and unsigned by the manager and not witnessed by the staff member. As deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-10.

The 2 estimates are obtained one on 28.06.03 (for ground floor and 1st floor) other on 28.01.2005 (for ground floor and 1st floor)

In both the estimates the under noted items have been included.

(i) Excavation of foundation

(ii) Brickwork in foundation

Here the question arises that when the foundation was complete in 1st sanction/disbursement, there can't be any expense in this head during 2nd sanction. Also the quantity of RCC work has been increased from 18.90 CUM to 28.50 CUM.

It appears that no logic is applied in accepting the estimate of 28.01.2005, which is prepared by enhancing the amount to obtain the Bank finance.

No post dated cheques are obtained from the borrower as a measure of recovery, resultantly the account turned into NPA category.

The C.O. could not produce any evidence regarding verification of end use of funds and also could not justified the disbursement of 2nd and 3rd installment of housing loan within 2 days. He also could not produce any evidence for completion of house. The ground for sanction of additional housing loan was also not recorded and also there is no proof of end use verification of the additional sanction amount. No evidence of either salary tie up or obtained post dated cheques brought on record.

In the light of above, the charges levelled in article 1 are proved.

ARTICLE-2

P.O. in his brief stated that Shri Raj Kapoor sanctioned a housing loan of Rs.6.00 lac to Shri V.K. Sehgal on 16.07.2004 without properly appraising the loan application and the appraisal form is left blank in the columns, Gross monthly Salary/Income, Total deductions, Net monthly Salary/Income, Proposed housing loan, Net surplus.

As PO's brief Annual income of Shri V.K. Sehgal as per last income tax return (for the assessment year 2003-04) part of ME-14, is Rs.130351.00. The installments fixed for repayment is Rs.7500/- P.M. (i.e. Rs.90,000/- annually) which exceeds from the 50% of annual income (130351/2)= Rs.65175.00.

This is violation of guidelines for sanctioning housing loan to businessmen, where payment (installment fixed) should not exceed 50% of annual income.

Income tax returns are not duly scrutinized in this case. Excess housing loan vis-a-vis repaying capacity, has been sanctioned.

The housing loan was disbursed by Shri Raj Kapoor in installments. On 23.07.2004 Rs.150000.00 27.10.2004 Rs.150000.00 17.12.2004 Rs.150000.00 26.04.2005 Rs.100000.00 27.05.2005 Rs.45000.00.

No end use has been verified by Shri Raj Kapoor after disbursement of each installment of loan. No visit reports are held Deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-16, PO Q-17, PO Q-18, PO Q-19 & PO Q-20.

The property has a very low-realizable value of Rs.2.25 lacs (forced sale value) as per valuation report, dated 06.11.2007 of Shri Shekhar Gupta, (ME-21), Bank's approved valuer as deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-14.

H.O. Inspector Sri Umesh Govil during his inspection of the branch has observed as following:

Construction has not been made as per plan submitted. Total investment in the house does not appear to exceed Rs.2.50 lac., Chain of title deed not held. House has been constructed on a plot situated in a well defined and old established "Valmiki, Basti."

These observations of H.O. Inspector are also verified by the present branch Manager as under:

House was always found closed, However view from neighbor's house shows that the house is still incomplete like: Plastering, fittings, flooring are still incomplete. Bank's fund does not seem to be utilized fully. Chain of title deed not held in file. Valuation of the house as per valuation report of the Bank's approved valuer is Rs.2.25 lac. As deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-15.

Installments are not coming regularly in the account. The account has become NPA.

The C.O. could not produce any evidence for proper appraisal and over financing while assessing the income tax return. He also failed to produce any certificate or evidence regarding completion of house and verification of end use of bank's fund.

The charges levelled are proved.

ARTICLE-3

As per P.O. version Shri Raj Kapoor disbursed the three (3) installments of housing loan to Shri Navin Kumar Khanna and Smt. Premlata on 14.02.2004 Rs.25000.00, 27.02.2004 Rs.100000.00, 23.03.2004 Rs.75000.00, Confirmed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-25 and PO Q-26. No visit report is held for verification of end use of loan installment & completion of the house. All the loan installments have been disbursed in a very short period, observing no rationale for utilization of funds disbursed in earlier installments.

The valuation of the house property is just Rs.2.00 lac, as per valuation-report dated 15.10.2007 by Sri Shekhar Gupta, Bank's approved valuer, (ME-29). House is semi finished. Outstanding in the loan account is Rs.4.14 lac as on 29.07.2009 + Intt. The loan amount has become NPA. (Deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-23.)

The HO inspector during his visit of the branch has observed that Chain of title deed not held. Total investment in the construction is not more than Rs.1.25 lac., Map of the house not passed by competent authority.

Present Branch Manager has also confirmed the above observations in his report (ME-27) Deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-27.

C.O. could not produce any evidence regarding end use of bank's fund and also failed to produce any certificate regarding completion of house though the entire disbursement is made within 2 months.

Hence, charges levelled under this article are proved.

ARTICLE-4

P.O. in his brief has mentioned that Shri Raj Kapoor sanctioned a housing loan of Rs.15.00 lacs to Shri Sanjay Saxena on 23.11.2004.

No estimate for construction is obtained by the Manager and arbitrarily sanctioned the loan to applicant.

The loan request page is totally unfilled in the housing loan booklet. Neither there is any request to sanction the loan, nor any estimate for construction, in the record of the branch, yet the loan has been sanction.

The loan has been disbursed as under by Sri Raj Kapoor on 23.11.2004 Rs.375000.00, 03.12.2004 Rs.375000.00, 09.12.2004 Rs.375000.00, 16.12.2004 Rs.375000.00, deposed by MW-1 in reply to PO Q-30, PO Q-31, PO Q-32.

The 3rd and 4th installments have been disbursed without verifying the end use of loan amount. All the four installments have been disbursed within a period of just 23 days, without caring to verify the end use properly.

The C.O. could not produce any evidence of obtaining estimate for construction/extension of house. He also could not produce any completion certificate though there is post verification report submitted by the manager advances as per exibit DE-5. All the 4 installment of Rs.3.75 lacs each have been disbursed within a short period of 23 days and C.O. could not produce any logic to this effect. Though the account liquidated on 22.06.2009 as per DE-7 brought on record.

The charges are levelled are proved.

The report is presented for perusal and necessary action.

52. As far as it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that MW1 witness was unable to prove evaluation report or inspection report of Sri Umesh Gowil and Sri Shekhar Gupta. It is relevant to mention here that MW1 witness Sri Anoop Chojar, Senior Manager of his City Branch, Shahjahanpur accompanied the approved valuer Sri Shekhar Gupta. This fact has been mentioned in evaluation report submitted by Shekhar Gupta that on the date of inspection 06.11.2009 Mr. Anoop Chojar, Senior Branch Manager, Chowk Branch accompanied him. This evaluation report was submitted by Sri Shekhar Gupta approved valuer of the Allahabad Bank who had inspected the house of Vinod Kumar Sehgal. He found that this house was semi furnished and it was not maintained. Area of ground floor was found 90.7 sq. mt. and cost of ground floor was assessed @2200 per sq. mt. i.e. Rs.1,81,400/- and after 20% deduction it was assessed at Rs.1,45,000/-, cost of land was assessed at Rs.1,90,000/-. Therefore value of the property was assessed at Rs.3.35 lakhs. The condition of the building was found poor, hence MW1 witness was able to prove the report submitted by Shekhar Gupta. Likewise, the petitioner has relied upon annexure No.23 question D-43 upto D-47 only which has been provided by him which is related to file of housing loan of Vinod Kumar Sehgal. Question D-44 was put up to witness MW1 as follows:-

53. Whether you accompanied Senior Inspector Head Quarter on visit of house of Vinod Kumar Sehgal? Witness MW1 replied positively by stating Yes. He has answered question D-45 by stating that the house of Vinod Kumar Sehgal was found closed and from roof of the neighbour the view of the house was seen incomplete. Therefore, on perusal of annexure No.23, it is revealed that MW1 witness Sri Anoop Chojar accompanied also Sri Umesh Gowil, Senior Inspecting Officer, Field Inspection Office, Lucknow, while he inspected the house of Vinod Kumar Sehgal therefore rejection order of request of the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer vide annexure No.24 does not adversely affect the petitioner in any way. The petitioner had participated during the course of Enquiry and availed the opportunity of cross examination to witness MW1 Sri Anoop Chojar. He was also afforded opportunity to inspect the documents relied upon by the opposite party Bank. Copies of these documents were also supplied to him.

54. As far as the petitioner has relied upon the fact that K.V. Raman, Manager (Advances) assisted him for disbursement of installments of housing loan. It is relevant to mention here that we have pursued annexure No.38 in which duties and responsibilities of Deputy Manager (Advances) in large branch prescribed as follows:-

1. Passing of all vouchers pertaining to Advances Department which are beyond the authority of Officers.

2. Appraisal of all types of Advances proposals including renewal cases for submission to RO/ZO/HO.

3. Maintenance of diary and submission of renewal proposals in due time.

4. Hold charge of all securities/documents pertaining to Advances. This includes keys of pledge godown and timely obtention of monthly statements of stocks hypothecated to the Bank.

5. To hold charge of Govt. securities, other securities as also safe custody articles.

6. To ensure timely collection of Interest/dividend on Bank's own investments in securities and those held in custody on behalf of the customers.

7. To ensure proper and timely submission of all returns to RO/ZO/HO/RBI/Govt./Lead Bank (pertaining to advances).

8. To ensure that all books pertaining to Advances Department are balanced properly and kept up to date & also that interest is correctly applied in all the accounts.

9. To assist the Manager in meeting parties and participate in discussions.

10. Visit factories/godowns and check the stocks/machineries and submit report.

11. Maintenance of drawing power register and to ensure proper conduct of cash credit overdraft/IBD BR accounts and submission on daily lists, if required. To ensure obtention of Half-yearly Balance confirmation in respect of all loan Accounts.

12. To attend consortium meetings in the absence of the Manager and attend DCC meetings, if and when required to do so.

13. To represent the Bank in Court proceedings, attend to legal cases as and when required to do so.

14. To ensure proper follow-up of advances.

15. Ensure preparation and submission of claims under DICGC scheme.

16. To ensure preparation of advance sheets in time and assist the internal inspectors/external auditors in their inspection/audit work.

17. To assist in conducting Credit Camps if and when required to do so.

55. The duties and responsibilities of Manager (Advances) in very large and exceptionally large branches are separately provided. It is not proved by the petitioner during the course of Enquiry that branch at Shahjahanpur, where he disbursed housing loan, as mentioned in article 124, was a large branch and very large branch/exceptionally large branch. On the other hand Deputy Manager (Advances) only assists the Senior Manager of the Branch and being Senior Manager, primary responsibility of irregularities was ultimately fixed on the petitioner during the course of Enquiry, because he was the sanctioning authority for disbursement of the installments of the housing loan advance. Therefore, no benefit can be extended to the petitioner on the basis of contentions mentioned in his application dated 20.11.2009 that K.V. Raman, the then Manager (Advances) or Laxmi Narayan, Manager (Advances) assisted him for the disbursement of the installment of advances.

Decision of the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of Charge Sheet No. ZOS/VIG/RK/552 dated 28.02.2009 issued to Sri Raj Kapoor (P.F. No. 18303), Ex-Senior Manager, C.O. Shahjahanpur Branch.

"4. Having gone through the Charge Sheet, the reply to Charge sheet, the Enquiry proceedings, the Enquiry Officer's report/ findings, as also the documents/records pertaining to the instant disciplinary case, I find that the enquiry has been conducted in accordance with the provisions laid down in the aforesaid Regulations. the Charged Officer participated in the enquiry proceedings together with his defence assistant and was afforded all reasonable opportunity to defend his case. The principles of natural justice have been fully observed. I fully concur with the findings of the enquiry officer. Further, a copy of the Enquiry Officer's report/findings was forwarded to the charged officer under cover of Z.O., Sitapur letter no. ZOS/VIG/RK546 dated 30.11.2009 providing him an opportunity to make a representation within 7 days of receipt thereof. The charged officer has submitted his representation vide his letter dated 02.12.2009 which was also perused by me.

5. On a careful perusal of the Enquiry Officer's report/findings and point to point analysis of the evidence put-forth in the enquiry, I find that the charge levelled against Sri Raj Kapoor has been proved in the case of Article-I to IV.

6. On careful perusal of Enquiry Officer's findings and Charged Officer's reply, it is established that Sri Raj Kapoor while posted and functioning as Senior Manager, C.O., Shahjahanpur Branch failed to verify the end-use of funds and also failed to justify the disbursement of 2nd and 3rd instalment of housing loan within 2 days. He also could not produce any evidence for completion of house. The ground for sanction of additional housing loan was also not recorded and also there is no proof of end-use verification of the additional sanction amount. No evidence of either salary tie-up or obtention of post dated cheques brought on record in Article-I.

Sri Raj Kapoor failed to produce any evidence for proper appraisal and over financing while assessing the income tax return. He also failed to produce any certificate or evidence regarding completion of house and verification of end-use of Bank's fund in Article-II.

Sri Raj Kapoor failed to produce any evidence regarding end-use of Bank's fund and any certificate regarding completion of house though the entire disbursement is made within 2 months in Article-III.

Sri Raj Kapoor failed to produce any evidence of obtaining estimate for construction/extension of house. All the 4 instalment of Rs. 3.75 lacs each have been disbursed within a short period of 23 days by Sri Raj Kapoor in Article IV.

7. The aforesaid proven lapses irregularities committed by Sri Raj Kapoor are serious in nature and clearly depicts that the charged officer was negligent in performing his duties. ............"

Order of the Appellate Authority in the matter of appeal of Shri Raj Kapoor, the then Sr. Manager, Shahjahanpur Branch (Under ZO-Sitapur) against DA's Order Dt. 06.01.2010 in the matter of charge sheet dated 28.02.2009.

The appellate authority has observed as follows:

Shri Kapoor being not satisfied at the decision of the DA, has submitted as follows:-

* The loan of Rs.5 lac was sanctioned by his predecessor. He sanctioned the additional loan of Rs.3 lac keeping in mind under financing of the project. Rs. 2 lac comprising of 25% of total loan was disbursed in two instalments instead of one. Hence, the charge of disbursing two instalments in two days is quite base less.

* Proper and complete appraisal was done as per Bank's circularised guidelines.

* The loan was disbursed in three instalments within a span of 2 months 25 days and not 2 months as alleged in the chargesheet. It is a reasonable time for house construction.

* The loan was sanctioned and disbursed as per Bank's norms keeping in view the reputation and repayment capacity of the borrower in mind.

In view of the above, the appellant has requested to exonerate him from the charges.

The entire records of the case along with the relevant papers/documents have been placed before me being Appellate Authority for taking a decision in the matter. I as appellate Authority, have gone through the contents of the appeal preferred by the appellant vis-a-vis relative charge sheet/ documents/ records/ papers of the instant disciplinary case, decision of the Disciplinary Authority etc. applied my mind and observe as under:

* The submission in respect of 1st article is not tenable since he has not given any cogent reason as to how he could come to the conclusion that the loan sanctioned by his predecessor was under financing. The loan has been liquidated through comrpomise and Bank suffered a loss of Rs. 160604/-.

"............................................................"

* In respect of 2nd article, the contention of the appellant is not tenable as the DA has opined that the end use of fund was not ascertained and loan was disbursed without ensuring proper and complete appraisal. The outstanding in the a/c is Rs. 633740/- and the value of security is Rs. 225000/- which is much below the outstanding.

* In respect of 3rd article, the contention of the Appellant is not tenable since the charge has been correctly framed. Value of security Rs.225000/- while the outstanding is Rs.404156/-.

* In respect of 4th article, the submission of the Appellant is not acceptable as he had disbursed the entire loan amount in 20 days.

* I do not find any ground to interfere in the findings of the DA that Shri Kapoor did not perform his duties with diligence and carefulness. Since Shri Kapoor could not bring any fresh and mitigating factors in his defence, I as the Appellate Authority upheld the decision of the DA and reject the appeal preferred by Shri Kapoor.]

Order of the Review Authority in the matter of Review Application dated 24.12.2011 preferred by Sri Raj Kapoor, Ex-Sr. Manager, City Office, Shahjahanpur Branch, Under ZO-Sitapur (Compulsorily retired from service) against DA's Order Dated 06.01.2010 and Appeal Order Dated 31.12.2010 in the matter of charge sheet dated 28.02.2009

"........................

The Appellate Authority in his order has made a fresh charge that Bank has to suffer a loss of Rs. 1,60,604/- on account of compromise while compromise settlement is one of the took for reduction of NPA.

The value of the property has been deliberately shown as Rs. 2.25 lacs just to punish the petitioner. In fact the value of the property was Rs. 8.17 lacs as per empanelled valuer's report dated 07.06.2011.

The value of the property has been shown as Rs.2.25 lacs while was in fact Rs. 4.21 lacs as per empanelled valuer's report dated 09.06.2011.

All thefour accounts have been closed ow through compromise.

Having gone through the entire records of th case and the points raised by the petitioner in his review petition, I as Reviewing Authority observed as under:

* The petitioner has not brought any cogent factor in his favour. His submission that the Appellate Authority has made a fresh charge regarding suffering of loss of Rs. 1,60,604/- on account of compromise is not correct as it is nota charge rather consequence of Appellant's irregular act. Due to improper handling/monitoring the accounts became irregular and difficult of recovery leading to compromise settlement as last recourse for getting back the blocked fund incurring sacrifice. Hence his contention is not acceptable.

* The petitioner has submitted a valuation report dated 07.06.2011 which is a document created long after issuance of charge sheet to him which cannot be accepted at this stage.

* The accounts have been closed out of compromise settlement in which Bank has to suffer losses which are attributable to the irregularities committed by the petitioner. Moreover, the compromise proposals were settled by the efforts taken by his successors."

56. On the basis of above discussions and facts and circumstances, case law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help for the petitioner. On the other hand, he was afforded due and proper opportunity of hearing for cross examination of witness MW1 and for inspection of the documents relied upon by the opposite parties during the course of Enquiry. There is no infirmity, deficiency or fault in decision making process.

57. This writ petition devoid of merits, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.

Order Date :- 11.09.2017

Virendra