Amit Negi vs State Of U.P. & 2 Others
2017 Latest Caselaw 3984 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A. F. R.
 
 "Reserved"
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 11665 of 2017
 
Petitioner :- Amit Negi
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & 2 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Samit Gopal
 
Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.,Sudhir Mehrotra
 

 
Hon'ble Krishna Murari, J.

Hon'ble Akhilesh Chandra Sharma, J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Krishna Murari, J)

By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner, a practising Advocate of this Court, has challenged the legality and validity of the first information report dated 16.06.2017 lodged by the respondent no. 4 implicating him and other co-accused registered as case crime no. 0329 of 2017 under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/409 IPC, Police Station Cantt. District Allahabad.

It may be pertinent to note at this stage that first information report was lodged in pursuance of an order dated 29.05.2017 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No. 1330 of 2017, Lawyers Civilian Society through its Secretary Vs. State of U. P. and others. We called for the record of PIL from the registry. On perusal thereof, we find that PIL was filed seeking the following reliefs :

"1. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the Registrar General, High Court, Allahabad to lodge the first information in regard to fraud and forgery committed by the concern respondents with this Hon'ble Court and Apex Court by filing the writ petitions in the name of fake and dead persons with ulterior motive.

"2. Issue a writ of mandamus initiating the judicial inquiry in regard to fraud and forgery committed by the respondents and the modus oprendi of the investigation so that the real culprits who have misused the process of this Hon'ble Court may be punished.

3. Issue a writ of mandamus directing Central Beauro of Investigation to investigate into the Case crime no. 310 of 2014, under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/406/465/ 489/ 193/198/199/200/120-B IPC, and under section 3, Prevention of Public Property Damages Act, Police Station Cantt., District Allahabad according to law.

4. Issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the present case.

5. To award costs of the petition."

PIL was preferred by a society by the name of Lawyers Civilian Society claiming to be a society of lawyers working for the betterment of health and environment condition of Allahabad city as well as other parts of the country. I

Various allegations were made in the said PIL in respect of functioning of Sam Higginbottom Institute of Agriculture Technology and Sciences, Naini, Allahabad popularly known as Allahabad Agricultural Institute which was declared a Deemed University under Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 by the Government of India, New Delhi vide notification dated 15th March, 2000. Allegations were also made against the Vice-Chancellor and other officials involved in the affairs of running of the said University, who were also impleaded as respondents.

Facts pleaded in the PIL relevant for the present dispute is that alleging illegal activities of the officers of the institute various writ petitions in the name of dead and fake persons were filed which were dismissed with costs. It was also pleaded that on the basis of dismissal of writ petition filed by fake and dead persons, many genuine writ petitions were dismissed and many illegal acts of the accused-respondents got implied sanction of this Court and Hon'ble Apex Court. The most relevant part of the pleadings in the PIL for the purpose of present dispute is that first information report had been lodged by one Rakesh Kumar Dwivedi under sections 419/420/ 467/468/ 471/406 /465/ 489/193/198/199/200/120-B IPC read with section 3 of the Prevention of Public Property Damages Act dated 23.12.2014 which was registered as case crime no. 310 of 2014, Police Station Cantt., District Allahabad.

A perusal of the aforesaid first information report annexed along with the PIL as Annexure '7' goes to show that present petitioner was not named therein. The allegation in the first information report was that accused persons named therein manipulated and committed fraud by filing several writ petitions in the name of dead persons against themselves and got the writ petitions dismissed by this Court. The first information refers to a total of 26 petitions classified in two groups being writ petitions filed by dead person and writ petition filed by fake persons on a farzi address. The first group consists of 5 petitions, said to have been filed in the name of one Keshav Prasad Mishra who is alleged to have died on 20.04.1993. The details of said five petitions are as under :

1. Writ petition no. 42441 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

2. Writ petition no. 42411 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others

3. Writ petition no. 42418 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others

4. Writ petition no. 42524 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

5. Writ petition no. 38640 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

The second group consists of 21 writ petitions, the details of which are as under :

1. Writ petition no. 30715 of 2003, Ram Gopal Tripathi Vs. Dr. Sarvajeet Herbert and others,

2. Writ petition no. 19818 of 2003, Intzar Ahmad Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

3. Writ petition no. 21125 of 2003, Intzar Ahmad Vs. Dr. Sarvajeet Herbert and others,

4. Writ petition no. 30716 of 2003, Intzar Ahmad Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

5. Writ petition no. 30155 of 2003, Intzar Ahmad Vs. Board of Directors and others,

6. Writ petition no. 38641 of 2003, Kuldeep Narayan Vs. Board of Directors and others,

7. Writ petition no. 44533 of 2002, Ram Narayan Pandey Vs. Rajendra B. Lal and others

8. Writ petition no. 19822 of 2003, Ram Narayan Pandey Vs. Dr. Sarvajeet Herbert and others,

9. Writ petition no. 30718 of 2003, Ram Narayan Pandey Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

10. Writ petition no. 39159 of 2004, Ram Narayan Pandey Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

11. Writ petition no. 21121 of 2002, Abdul Latif Vs. Dr. Sarvjeet Herbert and others,

12. Writ petition no. 30713 of 2003, Abdul Latif Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others,

13. Writ petition no. 37643 of 2004, Abdul Latif Vs. Board of Directors and others,

14. Writ petition no. 55290 of 2003, Ram Singh Vs. Board of Directors and others,

15. Writ petition no. 55297 of 2003, Ram Singh Vs. Board of Directors and others,

16. Writ petition no. 55302 of 2003, Ram Singh Vs. Board of Directors and others

Even at the cost of repetition, it is stated here that in the first information report, neither petitioner was named nor there were any allegations against him.

The Division Bench while hearing PIL vide order dated 03.03.2017 directed the learned counsel for the High Court to place the entire material before the Litigation Committee for perusal and to take an appropriate decision.

From a perusal of record of the Litigation Committee, which was also summoned by us from the Registry, we find after examining the matter in pursuance of the order passed on judicial side, the Litigation Committee required the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad to conduct a preliminary investigation with respect to 26 writ petitions filed in the name of dead and fake persons and to submit a report in the matter. The record further reflects that preliminary enquiry report was submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad along with covering letter on 14th May, 2017 which was again examined by the Litigation Committee and a report was made which was placed before the Division Bench hearing PIL No. 1330 of 2017.

The Bench after considering the resolution of the Litigation Committee disposed of the PIL on 29.05.2017 by making following order :

"In view thereof, we dispose of this writ petition with direction to the Registrar General to take further steps for complying the decision taken by the Litigation Committee. Once the crime is registered, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) shall complete the investigation/further investigation and submit report/charge sheet before the appropriate Court at the earliest. It is open to the petitioners to produce material, if they have any, in support of the allegations against the accused persons before the I.O. We hope and trust that the I.O. shall also look into the material that will be placed on record by the petitioners. The original resolution passed by the Litigation Committee along with supporting materials placed before this Court is returned to the counsel for the High Court with direction to produce a copy of the resolution on record."

In pursuance of the aforesaid direction, the impugned first information report has been lodged.

Sri Gopal Swarup Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Samit Gopal, appearing for the petitioner, vehemently contended that the impugned first information report and the earlier first information report registered as case crime no. 310 of 2014, Police Station Cantt., Allahabad relate to the same offence and same dispute and thus, is barred and is liable to be quashed. It is further submitted that legally there cannot be two first information reports registered in relation to the same occurrence or different events or incidents two or more but forming part of the same transaction and registration of second first information report is contrary to law and to very spirit of section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance in support of the contention has been placed on the pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U. P. and another (2013) 6 SCC - 384.

The second submission advanced by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner is that a bare perusal of impugned first information report does not disclose any ingredients to constitute any cognizable offence against the petitioner. It is further submitted that allegations contained against the petitioner in the first information report are to the effect that at the time when the statement of co-accused was being recorded, the petitioner was appearing perplexed, haggard and disturbed which is merely an observation and by any stretch of imagination cannot constitute any offence nor the same can constitute the basis of alleged involvement of the petitioner or attribute his complicity in the alleged offence.

From the record, we find that despite time having been allowed, the State-respondents has not filed any counter affidavit rather an affidavit termed as "Affidavit/Progress of investigation" on behalf of Investigating Officer, respondent no. 3 has been filed. A short counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of respondent no. 4. A perusal of the same goes to show that there is no denial of factual averments and the crux is that first information report was lodged in compliance of the judicial order dated 29.05.2017.

Learned Additional Government Advocate and Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, Special Counsel appearing for respondent no. 4, submitted that since FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence against the petitioner hence there is no occasion to interfere in the matter or to quash the same and the petition is liable to be dismissed.

Before we proceed to consider and test the arguments advanced by the parties, we may complete factual matrix of the case as culled out from the pleadings of the parties.

With regard to earlier first information report dated 24.12.2014 registered as case crime no. 310 of 2014, the Investigating Agency after completing the investigation submitted a report no. 02 of 2015 dated 07.01.2015 under Section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. against ten persons, namely, Rajendra Bihari Lal, Sunil Bihari Lal, Vinod Bihari Lal, Ajay Kumar Larense, Ranjan John, Gadian Singh, Robin L. Prasad, Ramakant Dubey and Sarvajeet Herbart. Pleadings further go to show that the charge-sheet prepared by the Investigating Agency was cancelled and the investigation was transferred to crime branch. Crime Branch submitted a charge-sheet under section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. dated 18.10.2015 but only against nine persons. Prem Masih son of late Rahmat Masih who was named as an accused was not implicated. The charge-sheet was forwarded to the court of concerned Magistrate and was registered as case no. 1764 of 2015. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad took cognizance vide order dated 27.10.2015. All accused persons were summoned to face trial. Record further reflects that matter was sent for further investigation. The Investigating Agency after completing the investigation submitted another report under Section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. being report no. 01 of 2015 dated 04.01.2016 exonerating all the accused from the offence. The said final report was forwarded to the court of concerned Magistrate. The first informant who was put to notice appeared before the court and gave his no objection on affidavit for acceptance of the final report. Accordingly, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad vide order dated 03.08.2016 accepted the final report and the matter was consigned.

It is not clear from the pleadings and record as to how after submission of the charge-sheet, the matter was sent for further investigation but this fact need not detain us in as much as it has got no relevance in so far as the present dispute is concerned. We have only recorded the aforesaid facts to emphasise that in so far as present petitioner is concerned, he was neither named in the said first information report nor his name cropped up during investigation and the matter after investigation was closed.

We now proceed to analyse the arguments advanced before us.

The first contention raised before us is as to whether it is permissible to register two different first information reports in relation to the same incident.

Chapter XII of the Code relates to information to the Police and their powers to investigate.

The Chapter begins with Section 154 which deals with the information in cognizable offence. The section prescribes that every information relating to commission of cognizable offence whether given oral or otherwise to the Officer In-charge of a Police Station, has to be reduced in writing by him or under the direction of such officer and shall be signed by the person giving information. The substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. It may be appropriate to reproduce the said section which reads as under :

"154. Information in cognizable offence.- (1) Every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.

(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.

(3) Any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of a officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence."

This section places an obligation upon officer in charge of a police station to register the information received by him in respect of commission of cognizable offence and to record the same as prescribed. More popularly known as first information report, it sets the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173 (2) of the Code.

On a plain reading of language of Section 154 Cr. P. C. we do not think that it can be construed or even remotely suggested that there can be more than one first information report in respect of same occurrence, the only exception being a counter case set up by the accused in the first information report or on his behalf alleging a different version of the same incident. The view being taken by us finds support from various pronouncements of the Apex Court. Reference may be made to the decision of Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U. P. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The question before the Apex Court was in relation to lodging of first information report with aid of Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. or otherwise independently within the ambit of section 154 Cr. P. C. as to whether there can be more than one first information report in relation to the same incident or different incidents arising from the same occurrence. The issue was answered in paragraphs 15 and 16 as under :

"15. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Section 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced to writing by the officer in-charge of a Police Station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173 (2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the Investigating Agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the Police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, re-investigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167 (2) of the Code. [Ref. Rita Nag Vs. State of West Bengal [(2009) 9 SCC 129] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors. (SLP (Crl) No.9185-9186 of 2009 of the same date).

16. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the Court to lay down one straight jacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case. In the case of Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration) [(1979) 2 SCC 322], the Court was concerned with the registration of a second FIR in relation to the same facts but constituting different offences and where ambit and scope of the investigation was entirely different. Firstly, an FIR was registered and even the charge- sheet filed was primarily concerned with the offence of conspiracy to cheat and misappropriation by the two accused. At that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars (case property) out of the country. It was also not known that some other accused persons were parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the court, which subsequently surfaced in London. Earlier, it was only known to the Police that the pillars were stolen as the property within the meaning of Section 410 IPC and were in possession of the accused person (Narang brothers) in London. The Court declined to grant relief of discharge to the petitioner in that case where the contention raised was that entire investigation in the FIR subsequently instituted was illegal as the case on same facts was already pending before the courts at Ambala and courts in Delhi were acting without jurisdiction. The fresh facts came to light and the scope of investigation broadened by the facts which came to be disclosed subsequently during the investigation of the first FIR. The comparison of the two FIRs has shown that the conspiracies were different. They were not identical and the subject matter was different. The Court observed that there was a statutory duty upon the Police to register every information relating to cognizable offence and the second FIR was not hit by the principle that it is impermissible to register a second FIR of the same offence. The Court held as under :

"20.Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working of the criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualize a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all, the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of the other persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Cr. P. C. in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the Court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light.

21. As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in the Cr. P. C. 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.

22. As in the present case, occasions may arise when a second investigation started independently of the first may disclose a wide range of offences including those covered by the first investigation. Where the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the first case, it is up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior court to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrates themselves may take action suo motu. In the present case, there is no problem since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the prosecuting agency. It was submitted to us that the submission of a charge-sheet to the Delhi court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala court amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. We do not think that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge-sheet filed in the Delhi court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 Cr. P.C, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would have done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal permission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice. We are also satisfied that there has been no illegality. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed."

Apex Court in the aforesaid case further went on to observe that the Court in order to examine the impact of two or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of ''sameness' to find out whether the FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. It may be relevant to quote the observation made by the Apex Court in this regard in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Reports.

"23. The First Information Report is a very important document, besides that it sets the machinery of criminal law in motion. It is a very material document on which the entire case of the prosecution is built. Upon registration of FIR, beginning of investigation in a case, collection of evidence during investigation and formation of the final opinion is the sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. The possibility that more than one piece of information is given to the police officer in charge of a police station, in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences, cannot be ruled out. Other materials and information given to or received otherwise by the investigating officer would be statements covered under Section 162 of the Code. The Court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of ''sameness' to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible, This is the view expressed by this Court in the case of Babu Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [(2010) 12 SCC 254]. This judgment clearly spells out the distinction between two FIRs relating to the same incident and two FIRs relating to different incident or occurrences of the same incident etc."

"24. To illustrate such a situation, one can give an example of the same group of people committing theft in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions. Even if the incidents were committed in close proximity of time, there could be separate FIRs and institution of even one stating that a number of thefts had been committed, would not debar the registration of another FIR. Similarly, riots may break out because of the same event but in different areas and between different people. The registration of a primary FIR which triggered the riots would not debar registration of subsequent FIRs in different areas. However, to the contra, for the same event and offences against the same people, there cannot be a second FIR. This Court has consistently taken this view and even in the case of Chitra Shivraj Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2010) 14 SCC 444], the Court took the view that there cannot be a second FIR in respect of same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the First Information Report."

In the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, we now proceed to examine the factual aspect of the present case in the light of the principles settled by the Apex Court.

In the earlier first information report lodged at Police Station Cantt. District Allahabad by one Rakesh Kumar Dwivedi on 24.12.2014 registered as case crime no. 310 of 2014 under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/406/465/489/193/198/199/200 and 120-B IPC, the main allegation was that the authorities of Agricultural Institute (Deemed University), whose new name is Sam Higginbottom Institute of Agriculture Technology and Sciences, Naini, Allahabad are indulging in corruption in a large scale and misusing the grant and in order to cover up, they were getting the writ petitions filed in the name of dead persons and fake persons and by deceit and fraud getting it dismissed in order to get seal and approval from the High Court. It was alleged that writ petition no. 42414 of 2003, writ petition no. 30710 of 2003, writ petition no. 42411 of 2003, writ petition no. 42418 of 2003, writ petition no. 42524 of 2003 and writ petition no. 38644 of 2004 were got filed fraudulently in the name of Keshav Prasad Mishra son of Ram Prasad Mishra, who was already dead having died as long back as 20.04.1993.

It was further alleged that writ petition no. 30715 of 2003 and writ petition no. 19818 of 2003 were got filed through one Ram Gopal Tripathi son of Sita Ram Tripathi, resident of 41, Leader Road, Allahabad, who was a fake person and not in existent. Similarly writ petition no. 21125 of 2003, writ petition no. 30716 of 2003 and writ petition no. 39155 of 2004 were got filed through a fake person Intzar Ahmad son of late Ali Ahmad, resident of 562 Sultanpur Bhava, Allahabad. Writ petition no. 38641 of 2004 was filed through fake person, Kuldeep Narain Singhu son of Sita Ram Singh, resident of 117, Swami Vivekanand Marg, Allahabad, writ petition no. 44533 of 2002, writ petition no. 19822 of 2003, writ petition no. 30718 of 2003, writ petition no. 39159 of 2004 were got filed through another fake person, Ram Narain Pandey son of Gopal Prasad Pande, resident of 48, Daraganj, Allahabad, writ petition no. 21121 of 2003, writ petition no. 30713 of 2003, writ petition no. 38643 of 2004 were filed through a fake person Abdul Latif son of Abdul Matin, resident of 50, Kolhan Tola, Allahabad, writ petition no. 55290 of 2003, writ petition no. 55297 of 2003, writ petition no. 55302 of 2003 were got filed through a fake person Ram Singh son of late Dashrath Singh Patel, resident of village Sarangapur , Reewa Road, Karchhana, Allahabad.

The other allegations were made against the persons named as accused in the said first information report that one Rajendra Bihari Lal was illegally continuing on the post of Vice Chancellor of the Institute for many years and drawing salary against law and has appointed his brother as Pro Vice Chancellor and is involved in the money laundering and thus offence of defrauding the court by getting the writ petitions filed in the name of dead persons and fake persons and getting it dismissed and obtaining seal of approval of High Court by illegal act by getting those petitions need to be investigated and the accused be punished.

Thus, in effect, the main allegation in the first information report was against the persons named as accused therein in getting the writ petitions filed before this Court in the name of dead person, fake person and non-existent persons.

First information report also records that detail of the aforesaid writ petitions and orders passed therein finds place in a detailed order passed by this Court in writ petition no. 65292 of 2003, Ram Singh Vs. Board of Directors, Allahabad Agricultural Institute, copy whereof was annexed with the first information report.

It may be relevant to mention at this stage that all the aforesaid writ petitions were filed in the year 2003 and 2004 either in the form of writ petition or in the form of public interest litigation and were dismissed by various Division Benches in the year 2003 and 2004 itself. While dismissing various writ petitions, Division Benches also imposed costs ranging from Rs.20,000.00 to Rs.1,00,000/-. It may be relevant to quote following observations made by Division Bench while dismissing writ petition no. 387643 of 2004 vide judgment and order dated 20th September, 2004.

"In our opinion, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has no locus-standi in the matter. The petitioner has said in para 26 of the petition that he is a social worker and interested in the welfare of the citizens. In our opinion, this is hardly sufficient to maintain a public interest litigation. We are constrained to observe that public interest litigation has today in our country, to much extent, become a blackmailing tactics. The petitioner's object often is to get notice issued to the respondents and thereafter go to the respondents asking for huge amount of money for withdrawing the petition. We have made these comments on numerous occasions including cases where petitions had been filed against the present respondent, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute. For instance, in Writ Petition No. 45524 of 2003 Keshav Prasad Mishra vs. Board of Directors, Allahabad Agricultural Institure and others, deided on 19.9.2003, a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) was a member', observed :-

"The petitioner Keshav Prasad Mishra has been repeatedly filed writ petitions in this Court against the Allahabad Agricultural Institute and its Management, Principal etc.

We have already dismissed about one dozen such writ petitions. For instance in writ petition no. 30712 of 2003 Keshav Prasad Mishra vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute, decided on 21.7.2003 we passed the following order:-

"Totally vague allegations have been made in this petition. It seems to be more a publicity interest litigation rather than a public interest litigation.

Petition dismissed.

Sri Ravi Kant, Amit Negi and J. Nagar have appeared for the respondents."

In writ petition no. 44533 of 2002, Ram Narain Pande Vs. Dr. Rajendra B. Lal and others decided on 21.10.2002 we pass the following orders:-

"The petitioner is challenging appointment of respondent no. 1 as the Vice Chancellor of Allahabad Agriculture Institute which has been declared to be a deemed University.

We find no illegality in the appointment of respondent no. 1.

Petition is dismissed."

We are informed that Keshav Prasad Mishra, Ram Narain Pande, etc. all belong to one group which are bent upon blackmailing the respondents.

Today five writ petitions have been filed by Keshav Prasad Mishra against the same respondents. By these petitions the appointments of various officials of the Allahabad Agricultural Institute have been challenged. No counsel has even appeared to press these petitions while Sri J. Nagar, Sri Ravi Kant, Sri Yashwant Varma, Sri B.N. Singh and Sri Amit Negi have appeared for respondents. It is evident that this group of people have resorted to blackmail tactics against Allahabad Agricultural Institute, and are filing repeated petitions against them and their officials for blackmailing purposes. This is clear abuse of the process of the Court.

The petitioner Keshav Prasad Mishra has not even disclosed what locus-standi, he has in the matter. He has only stated that he is a social worker interested in welfare of citizens, and even this allegation has been made on the basis of legal advice.

In our opinion in our country most persons, who claim to be social workers are nothing but blackmailers. People who have nothing to do after declare themselves to be social workers and resort to blackmailing tactics against reputed persons so that they can extract money. All these cases against Allahabad Agricultural Institute and its officials appear to be motivated by such purposes.

In Balco Employees Union vs. Union of India, 2002 (2) SCC 33 (vide para 79), the Supreme Court has observed that nowadays public interest litigation is tending to become public interest litigation or private interest litigation. In para 80 of the judgement the Supreme Court has also observed that in recent times P.I.L. has increasingly been abused.

The writ petition is therefore dismissed on the ground of lack of locus-standi in the petitioner, and also because it appears to be a mala fide petition for blackmailing purposes. While we dismiss this writ petition we also impose costs of Rs.20,000/- in each of these petitions filed today, and the same must be paid by the petitioner to the High Court Legal Aid Committee within a month from today, failing which it will be recovered by the District Magistrate, Allahabad as arrears of land revenue and will be paid to the Legal Aid Committee.

Petition is dismissed with the above observation and direction."

Similarly in writ petition no. 55290 of 2003 Ram Singh vs. Board of Directorate, Allahabad Agricultural Institute & others, decided on 15.12.2003, a division bench of this court while dismissing the petition and imposing heavy costs on the respondents observed:-

"A series of Writ Petitions have been filed in this Court against the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Allahabad, its vice Chancellor and other officials, which have all been dismissed by this court. In our opinion these are nothing but blackmailing tactics and publicity interest litigation rather than public interest litigation.

Writ petition No. 44533/2002, Ram Narain Pande Vs. Dr. Rajendra B Lal and others and Writ Petition no. 44534/2002, Ram Gopal Tripathi Vs. Dr. Rajendra B. Lal were filed for issuing a writ of quo-warranto restraining Dr. R.B. Lal from functioning as Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad Agricultural Institute (Deemed University). These writ petitions were dismissed on 21.10.2002 by the following orders:-

"The petitioner is challenging appointment of respondent no. 1 as the Vice Chancellor of Allahabad Agricultural Institute which has been declared to be a deemed University.

We find no illegality in the appointment of respondent no. 1.

Petition is dismissed.

Sd/Hon'ble M. Katju, J.

Sd/Hon'ble R. Tiwari, J.

Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 44536/2002, Ram Narain Pande Vs. Dr. S. Herbert and others and Writ Petition No. 44538/2002, Ram Gopal Tripathi vs. Dr. S. Herbert Registrar, Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Allahabad (Deemed University) were filed. These writ petitions were dismissed on 21.10.2002 by the following orders:-

"The petitioner is challenging appointment of respondent no. 1 as the Registrar of Allahabad Agricultural Institute which has been declared to be a deemed University.

We find no illegality in the appointment of respondent no. 1.

Petition is dismissed.

Sd/Hon'ble M. Katju, J.

Sd/Hon'ble R. Tiwari, J.

Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 19818 of 2003, Ram Gopal Tripathi Vs. Dr. S. Herbert & others, Writ Petition No. 19822 of 2003, Ram Narain Pandey Vs. Dr. S. Herbert & others, Writ Petition No. 21121 of 2003, Abdul Latif Vs. Dr. S. Herbert & others and writ petition no. 21125 of 2003, Intizar Ahmad Vs. Dr. S. Herbert & others were filed praying that the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 be restrained from holding Yeshu Darbar in the premises of Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Allahabad (Deemed University). These writ petitions were dismissed on 08.05.2003 and it was held that India is not a country belonging to Hindus alone. India belongs to all citizens, Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Jew etc. Everybody is equal in our country. No one is a second class citizen in our country. India is a secular and not a feudal country like Pakistan in which non-Muslims and even certain sects of Muslims like Shiyas or Ahmadiyas are regarded as second class citizens and are persecuted. Citizens of all religious and communities are equal and first rate citizens of our country and we are proud that all religions are treated equally in our country. It is because of the wisdom and for sightedness of our Founding Fathers who provided for secularism in our Constitution that India is surviving even now. With so much diversity, so many castes, religions, lingual and ethnic groups etc. it could not have survived otherwise.

With the above observation, those petitions were dismissed.

Subsequently, Writ Petition No. 42411 of 2013, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute & others, Writ Petition No. 42414 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute & others, Writ Petition No. 42418 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute & others, Writ Petition 42524 of 2003, Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute & others, Writ Petition No. 42581 of 2002. Mritunjay Prasad Sharma Vs. Dr. S. Herbert & Others, were filed before this Court for issuing a writ of quo warrant restraining Dr. Mani Jacob from working as Chancellor, Dr. Rajendra B. Lal from working as vice-chancellor, Dr. S. Herbert from working as Registrar, Mrs. Sudha Lal from working as Campus Coordinator and Mr. Ranjan A. Jhon from working as Finance Comptroller. These writ petitions were dismissed by the following orders:-

"The petitioner Keshav Prasad Mishra has been repeatedly filed writ petitions in this Court against the Allahabad Agricultural Institute and its Management, Principal etc.

We have already dismissed about one dozen such writ petitions. For instance in Writ Petition no. 30712 of 2003 Keshav Prasad Mishra Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute, decided on 21.7.2003 we passed the following order:-

"Totally vague allegations have been made in this petition. It seems to be more a publicity interest litigation rather than a public interest litigation.

Petition dismissed.

Sri Ravi Kant, Amit Negi and J. Nagar have appeared for the respondents."

The petitioner in this case has not disclosed any locus-standi. In Balco Employees Union of India 2002 (2) SCC 333 (vide para 79), the Supreme Court has observed that nowadays Public Interest Litigation is increasingly tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation. In para-80 of that judgment the Supreme Court has also observed that in recent times PIL has increasingly been abused. The same view has been taken in Goruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & another Vs. C.K. Rajan & others 2003 (7) SCC 546 vide para -52. In Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of West Bengal , 2003 AIR SCW 6105 the Supreme Court has castigated such mischievous and malafide P.I.L.

In our opinion, all petitions were filed by the same group of people and it is nothing but blackmailing tactics. We consequently impose cost of Rs.25,000/- on the petitioner, which he must deposit within a month with the D.M. Allahabad, failing which it will be recovered from the petitioner by the District Magistrate, Allahabad as arrears of land revenue, and utilized for any public welfare work.

The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Let the Registrar General sent copy of this judgment forthwith to the D.M., Allahabad."

Against the judgment in Keshav Prasad Mishra vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute, in Writ Petition No. 30712 of 2003, decided on 21.7.2003, a S.L.P. was filed in the Supreme Court being Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 20132/2002, which was dismissed on 3.2.2004.

Finally, in the operative portion, the said Division Bench observed as under:-

"We are informed that by now 20 writ petitions have been filed against the Allahabad Agricultural Institute by so-called social workers and we are convinced that they are adopting blackmailing tactics. We have repeatedly warned the persons against filing such petitions which are only a waste of time of the court and are intended to blackmail the respondents but to no effect, although we have imposed heavy costs on the petitioners.

We feel now the time has come to impose heavier costs so that such blackmailing tactics come to an end. We therefore dismiss this petition and impose cost of Rs.1,00,000/- on the petitioner. It will be deposited by him within one month with the Registrar General, High Court at Allahabad failing which it will be recovered from him by the District Magistrate, Allahabad as arrears of land revenue. The cost realised shall be deposited with the High Court Legal Aid Committee, Allahabad."

It is, thus, clear that all the aforesaid writ petitions were considered by different Division Benches and finding that they have been filed with ulterior motive in order to black mail the institution and being devoid of any merits were dismissed.

Now coming to the impugned first information report which has been lodged by respondent no. 3 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 409 IPC naming the petitioner and three others as accused. As already stated above, the impugned first information report has been lodged on the basis of a judicial order passed in Public Interest Litigation No. 1330 of 2017, the details in respect whereof has already been mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. In the said PIL, the detail of the writ petitions in respect whereof earlier first information report was lodged finds place in paragraph 32 of the PIL. A comparison goes to show that the writ petitions referred to in the earlier first information report and the public interest litigation are one and the same. On the basis of judicial order, the matter was examined by the Litigation Committee, which required the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad to conduct a preliminary enquiry. On the basis of the preliminary enquiry report, the Litigation Committee on 25.05.2017 resolved as under :

"With reference to the resolution passed by the Litigation Committee dated 9th March, 2017, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad in respect of 26 writ petitions filed in the name of dead and fake persons has submitted preliminary enquiry report along with covering letter dated 14th May, 2017.

The Litigation Committee having regard to the order passed by the Division Bench dated 3rd March, 2017 in Public Interest Litigation No. 1330 of 2017 (Lawyers Civilian Society Through its Secretary Versus State of U.P. & 13 Others) and on the office note dated 17th May, 2017 has carefully gone through the preliminary enquiry report. The Committee finds:

(a) all the writ petitions are stated to be verbatim to each other,

(b) these writ petitions were filed by three Advocates out of which two Advocates could not be traced out,

(c) writ petitions have been filed in the name of dead persons or with the name and address of the petitioners, who are not traceable and are, therefore, in the name of fake persons.

(d) reliefs prayed for in most of the writ petitions are practically one and the same.

(e) despite earlier writ petitions being dismissed, fresh writ petitions were filed for which exact reason is not discernible.

(f) huge sum of expenses has been incurred towards the litigation.

The Litigation Committee is of the opinion that prima facie there has been misuse of process of Court. Prima facie, the report further discloses commission of a cognizable offence for which first information report has to be lodged. The Registrar General is required to do the needful.

Since the matter is under consideration Before the Division Bench in Public Interest Litigation No. 1330 of 2017 (Lawyers Civilian Society Through Its Secretary Versus State of U.P. & 13 Others), let this resolution be placed before the Bench along with enquiry report."

On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the Division Bench hearing the PIL passed an order to lodge an FIR and directed the Investigating Officer to complete the investigation and submit report/charge-sheet before the appropriate court. A perusal of the impugned first information report further goes to show that it records in verbatim the order dated 29.05.2017 passed by the Division Bench in public interest litigation and the conclusion drawn in the preliminary enquiry report submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad and nothing else. For the first time, the name of the petitioner surfaced in the preliminary enquiry report and that is how he has been named as an accused in the impugned first information report. The ambit and scope of investigation on the basis of impugned first information report was in respect of same writ petitions filed in the name of dead person or in the name of such petitioners who are not traceable i. e. in the name of fake person. The writ petition number and details of the writ petitions are exactly the same in the earlier first information report as well as in the impugned first information report and the allegations in both the first information reports are the same that the writ petitions have been got filed by the accused themselves and got dismissed in order to obtain seal of approval over their illegal activities in the institution.

In both the FIRs the main charging sections of the IPC are the same except for that the earlier first information report contained additional sections 406/465/489/193/198/ 199/200/120-B IPC and Section 3 of the Prevention of Public Property Damages Act which are not there in the impugned first information report. The other difference is that the impugned first information report has also been lodged under Section 409 IPC whereas the said section was not at all in the earlier first information report. However, certain additional sections mentioned in the earlier first information report does not make any difference in as much as scope and ambit of investigation under both the first information reports is the same i. e. misuse of the process of the court by filing writ petitions in the name of dead persons or fake persons. In view of settled law any subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences need not be registered as a fresh first information report and the investigating agency is under an obligation to investigate not merely cognizable offence reported in the first information report but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of same transaction or the same occurrence. We may reproduce the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in this regard contained in the case of T. T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala and others, 2001 (6) SCC 181:

"From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of Cr. P. C. only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Cr. P. C. Thus there can be no second F.I.R. and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the F.I.R. in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a Police Station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Cr.P.C."

We find it expedient to mention at this stage itself that from a perusal of the records, it appears that facts of filing of the earlier first information report in respect of the same incident/occurrence was not at all noticed by the Litigation Committee and even the investigating agency which conducted the preliminary enquiry also never cared to look into their own records.

From the above facts and discussions, it necessarily follows that earlier first information report registered as case crime no. 310 of 2014 which ultimately culminated into final report and the impugned first information report relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence. On rationalisation of the facts and circumstances of both the first information reports and applying the test of sameness, we are of the opinion that both the first information reports relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence and part of the same transaction. That being the factual position, in view of the settled proposition of law on the subject by the judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court referred to above, the impugned first information report being a second first information report is impermissible and not liable to be sustained.

The second argument advanced by the learned Senior Advocate is that a bare reading of impugned first information report does not disclose commission of cognizable offence also merits consideration.

It is, no doubt, correct that investigating agency has statutory right to investigate into cognizable offence over which the Court do not possess any supervisory jurisdiction under the provisions of the Cr. P. C. As long back as 1944 Privy Council spelt out the power of police to investigate a crime in the case of Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18: 46 Cri LJ 413 as under :

"In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

However, the plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence was not held to be unlimited but subject to limitation as pointed out in paragraph 31 of the reports as under:

"No doubt if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation, and for this reason Newsam J. may well have decided rightly in Chidambaram Chattiar V. Shanmugham Pillai [1938] A. I. R. Mad. 129. But that is not this case."

It now stands well settled by judicial pronouncements that where the investigating agency transgresses it statutory power of investigation this Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India or inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. and Apex Court can interdict the investigation to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.

Reference may be made to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs.Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Crl. Law Journal - 527 where after considering its earlier decision on the issue rendered in the cases of R. P. Kapoor Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, S. N. Sharma Vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, (1970) 1 SCC - 561, Prabhu Dayal Deorah Vs. District Magistrate, Kamrup, (1974) 1 SCC-103, Nandini Satpathu Vs. P. L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424 and State of West Bengal Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha (1982) 1 SCC 561 the Apex Court approved the view taken by the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad's case (supra). In paragraph 102 of the reports, it has been observed as under :

"In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

The above list, as noted, is illustrative and not exhaustive.

Thus, a just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the Court.

In the light of above principles propounded by the Apex Court, we now proceed to test from the factual matrix of this case whether the allegations against the petitioner constitute commission of any cognizable offence.

In so far as present petitioner is concerned, one of the allegation against him is that while statement of one of the co-accused R. B. Lal was being recorded, his lawyers, which included the petitioner were present and statement of R. B. Lal was got prepared by them and while his statement was being recorded, petitioner and other Advocate who were present appeared to be perplexed, haggard and disturbed. The aforesaid facts recorded in the first information report are only based on an observation by the Officer who was recording the statement of co-accused which is not verifiable and we are of the considered view that the same cannot constitute any offence nor constitute the basis of alleged involvement of the petitioner or his complicity in the alleged offence.

Otherwise also from a perusal of the first information report, we do not find any allegations against the petitioner to constitute any offence under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/409 IPC.

Section 419 IPC prescribes punishment for cheating by personation. There are no allegations that petitioner has cheated by any personation. Thus offence under said section cannot be said to be made out against the petitioner.

In so far as Section 420 IPC is concerned, there are no allegations against the petitioner that he received any money from the Institute directly as fees or even expenses and thus it cannot be said that he dishonestly induced to deliver any money or any property, so as to constitute any offence under the said section.

Offence under section 467 and 468 IPC also cannot be said to be made out against the petitioner in as much as the writ petitions in respect whereof allegations have been made were tested on the judicial side and were dismissed. Except for making bald allegations that petitions were got prepared in connivance with the counsel for the institute, there is not even a reference to any material to even remotely suggest involvement of the petitioner in preparation and filing of the writ petitions. The ingredients to constitute an offence under said sections of IPC are totally missing and thus no offence under the said sections can be said to be made out in so far as the petitioner is concerned. The only reason recorded for the aforesaid conclusion is perplexion and some unusual behaviour of the petitioner while the statement of co-accused R. B. Lal was being recorded. The same is merely an observation of the officer recording the statement and does not rest upon any verifiable material. We also fail to understand as to how the petitioner has been held responsible for filing successive writ petitions nor there is any basis for the allegations that the said writ petitions were never opposed by the petitioner. The judicial order passed on those writ petitions records presence of the petitioner as counsel for the Institute.

For the same reason offence under Section 471 IPC is also not made out. There are no allegations that petitioner ever used any document as genuine knowing or believing it to be forged.

Similarly there are no allegations of any criminal breach of trust so as to constitute an offence under Section 409 IPC against the petitioner. There is not even an allegation that he was ever entrusted with any property or money or had any dominion over the same in his capacity as panel lawyer for the institute. In the absence of such allegation, any offence under the said section cannot be attributed to the petitioner.

We find it rather strange that the officer who has submitted report has analysed the judicial order passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court to come to the conclusion that all the writ petitions filed were not opposed by learned counsel appearing for Institute and no substantial arguments were raised and thus, the writ petitions were filed in connivance with the petitioner. In our opinion, this analysis of the judicial order passed by a co-ordinate Bench this Court was impermissible and beyond the power of the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry. Further, the conclusion recorded in the preliminary enquiry report that the purpose of filing the writ petitions by opposite group of persons for the purpose of blackmailing does not appear to be established is directly in the teeth of the finding recorded by the Division Bench while dismissing the said writ petitions. On more than one occasion while dismissing the said writ petitions, Division Bench had observed that it is evident that this group of people have resorted to blackmail tactics against Allahabad Agricultural Institute, and are filing repeated petitions against them and their officials for blackmailing purposes. The conclusions drawn in the preliminary enquiry report in this regard to implicate the petitioner is not only directly in the teeth of findings recorded in the judicial order but clearly contemptuous. The judicial order cannot be permitted to be commented upon in such fashion by an Investigating Officer or for that matter by any body except the Court higher in hierarchy. It may be noticed at this stage that some of the orders passed by this Court were subject matter of challenge before the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 20132 of 2003, Ram Goptal Tripathi Vs. Allahabad Agricultural Institute and others, SLP (Civil) No. 20913 of 2003, SLP (Civil) No. 22069 of 2003 which were dismissed by a common order dated 03.02.2004.

In view of the aforesaid facts and discussions, it is clear that there are no ingredients in the F. I. R. to constitute commission of any cognizable offence in so far as present petitioner is concerned.

We are conscious of the fact that impugned F.I.R. has been lodged in pursuance of a judicial order passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court.

It is the bounden duty of the investigating agency to act in accordance with the law of land. It may be apt to quote following observation made by Lord Denning in the case of R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner 1968 (1) All E. L. R. 763:

"I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable, to enforce the law of the land. He must take steps so to post his men that crimes may be detected; and that honest citizens may go about their affairs in peace. He must decide whether or no suspected persons are to be prosecuted; and, if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it is brought; but in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself."

For the aforementioned discussions and reasons even though the impugned FIR dated 16.06.2017 was lodged under a judicial order passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court but the same cannot be held to be valid and sustainable in so far as present petitioner is concerned on the touch stone of settled legal principles.

As a result, writ petition stands allowed and the impugned first information report dated 16.06.2017 registered as case crime no. 329 of 2017 under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/409 IPC, Police Station Cantt., District Allahabad stands quashed in so far as the present petitioner is concerned.

In the facts and circumstances, we do not make any order as to costs.

Date : 05.09.2017                                                   (Krishna Murari, J)              
 
Dcs. 
 

 

 
                                                    (Akhilesh Chandra Sharma, J)