Smt. Usha Devi vs The State Of U.P.Thru ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 889 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

AFR
 
Court No. 20
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No.- 5072 of 2002
 
Petitioner :- Smt. Usha Devi
 
Respondent :- The State Of U.P. Thru Princ. Secy., Home (Police) Deptt., Lko.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Smt. Usha Devi, Amit Bose, Girja Dayal, Manjive Shukla
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.

The petitioner has instituted this writ proceeding for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 26th March, 2002 issued by the third respondent whereby the petitioner's claim for extraordinary pension has been rejected.

A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.

The petitioner's husband late Ram Das Kanaujia was a Constable in Civil Police. At the relevant point of time, he was posted at Police Station Chinhat, District Lucknow. On 27th December, 1993 he moved an application for sanction of leave for three days for 28, 29 and 30th December, 1993. He was supposed to join his duties in the forenoon of 31st December, 1993. It is stated that an official accommodation was allotted to the petitioner's husband within the campus of Police Station Gurumba, District Lucknow. On 31st December, 1993 in the morning the petitioner's husband moved from his official residence to his place of posting at Police Station Chinhat, where he resumed his duties. On the same day i.e. 31st December, 1993 in the evening, while on his official duty, he met an accident and was seriously injured. Later, he succumbed to his injuries on the same day in King George Medical College, Lucknow.

The grievance of the petitioner is that she is entitled for extraordinary pension under the provisions of Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Police (Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1961 (for short, the "Rules, 1961"), as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Police (Extraordinary Pension) (First Amendment) Rules, 1975 (for short, the "Rules, 1975"), as her husband died during performance of his official duty.

For sanction of the extraordinary pension the petitioner moved several representations to various authorities including Joint Secretary, Home (Police), Anubhag-6, Govt. of U.P., Lucknow, and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow. Upon one such representation, the Assistant Accounts Officer of the Uttar Pradesh Police Headquarter Allahabad vide his communication dated 04th January, 2000 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow invited comments regarding the grievance of the petitioner. The copies of the representations of the petitioner and the communication of the Assistant Accounts Officer are on the record.

On 03rd March, 2000 comments from the Inspector In-charge, Police Station Chinhat, Lucknow were also sought regarding the accident in which the petitioner's husband died. The Inspector In-charge, Police Station Chinhat, in his report dated 29th May, 2000 made a recommendation for grant of extraordinary pension to the family of the deceased Constable Sri Ram Das Kanaujia. However, the claim of the petitioner has been rejected by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow vide order dated 26th March, 2002 on the ground that the petitioner's husband has died in an accident before his joining after the leave period.

A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein the same stand as taken in the impugned order has been reiterated.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the claim of the petitioner has been rejected in a most cursory manner without assigning any reason and ignoring the material fact on the record. He further submits that the authority concerned has not considered the amendment made in the Rules, 1961 by the Rules, 1975.

Learned Standing Counsel submits that the petitioner is not entitled for the extraordinary pension as her husband died when he was on leave.

I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Before adverting to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant rules for the sake of convenience. The Rules, 1961 has been amended in 1975 by the Rules, 1975. Rules- 3 and 5 of the Rules, 1975 and the Rules, 1961, i.e. earlier and the amended rules respectively, are extracted herein-below:

LrEHk 1

orZeku fu;e

LrEHk 2

,rn~}kjk izfrLFkkfir fu;e

3& ;g fu;ekoyh jkT;iky ds fu;e cukus ds fu;a=.k ds v/khu ,sls leLr vjktif=r iqfyl deZpkfj;ksa ij ykxw gksxh pkgs og LFkk;h :i esa lsok;ksftr gksa vFkok vLFkk;h :i esa] tks Mkdqvksa ;k l'kL= vijkf/k;ksa vFkok fons'kh izfrjksf/k;ksa ls yM+us esa ekjs tk;a %

izfrcU/k ;g gS fd ,sls iqfyl deZpkjh ds ifjokj dks ftls bl fu;ekoyh ds v/khu vfHkfu.kZ; fn;k x;k gks] mRrj izns'k flfoy lfoZlst ¼,DLVªk vkfMZujh isa'ku½ :Yl ds v/khu dksbZ vfHkfu.kZ; ugha fn;k tk;sxk vkSj u ;w0ih0 fycjykbTM isa'ku :Yl] 1961 vFkok ;w0ih0 fjVk;jesaV :Yl] 1961 ds v/khu dksbZ ikfjokfjd isa'[email protected]"kd vkSj u ;w0ih0 dUVªhC;wVjh izkfoMsUV isa'ku Q.M :Yl ds v/khu ljdkjh va'knku fn;k tk;sxkA

5& ,slh e`R;q ds lEcU/k esa dksbZ vfHkfu.kZ; ugha fy;k tk;xk] tks fdlh jksx vFkok ,sls dkj.k ls gqbZ gks tks Mkdqvksa o l'kL= vijkf/k;ksa ;k fons'kh izfrjksf/k;ksa ls yM+us eas pksV yxus ls fHkUu gksA

3& ;g fu;ekoyh jkT;iky ds cuk;s fu;e ls fu;fU=r gksus okys LFkk;h ;k vLFkk;h :i esa lsok;ksftr lHkh iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa vkSj deZpkfj;ksa ¼jktif=r vkSj vjktif=r nksuksa½ ij ykxw gksxh tks Mkdqvksa ;k l'kL= vijkf/k;ksa ;k fons'kh izfrjksf/k;ksa ls yM+us esa ;k fdlh vU; drZO; dk ikyu djus ds nkSjku ekjs tk;a ;k ftudh e`R;q gks tk; %

izfrcU/k ;g gS fd ,sls iqfyl deZpkjh ds ifjokj dks ftls bl fu;ekoyh ds v/khu vfHkfu.kZ; fn;k x;k gks] mRrj izns'k flfoy lfoZlst ¼,DLVªk vkfMZujh isa'ku½ :Yl ds v/khu dksbZ vfHkfu.kZ; ugha fn;k tk;xk vkSj u ;w0ih0 fycjykbTM isa'ku :Yl] 1961 vFkok ;w0ih0 fjVk;jesaV csuhfQV :Yl] 1961 ds v/khu dksbZ ikfjokfjd isa'[email protected] vkuqrksf"kd vkSj u ;w0ih0 dUVªhC;wVjh izkfoMsUV isa'ku Q.M :Yl ds v/khu ljdkjh va'knku fn;k tk;xkA

5& dksbZ fu.kZ; vfHkfu.kZ; fu;e 3 esa mfYyf[kr dkj.kksa ls fHkUu fdlh dkj.k ls gqbZ e`R;q ds lEcU/k esa ugha fn;k tk;xkA

A simple reading of the amended rule would indicate that one more contingency has been added by the Rules, 1975 if the employees dies during performance of his duties. It is evident that the said rule has been made more liberalized as in the unamended rule the extraordinary pension was admissible only when a police personnel dies in encounters with dacoits or armed criminals or with foreign hostiles.

In view of the said amendment the only question which needs determination in the present case is whether the husband of the petitioner was on duty or not. The petitioner in paragraph-4 of the writ petition has mentioned that on 31st December, 1993 her husband had resumed his duties and he died on the same day in the evening. In the counter affidavit although this fact has been denied but it is mentioned that he was in uniform. The petitioner in her representation has stated that after the leave if a police personnel joins, he always submits his joining in the forenoon, and after 12 noon, joining is not accepted. It is also not disputed that the accident has taken place in the evening while he was in the uniform. This fact has not been considered in the impugned order. Moreover, in his report the Inspector In-charge, Police Station Chinhat has recorded that the accident has taken place in the evening and the petitioner's husband was going to Police Station for his duty. In his report he has not mentioned that the petitioner's husband had not joined his duties in the forenoon. The fact whether the petitioner's husband had joined on 31st December, 1993 in the forenoon or not, has not been considered in proper perspective. If he was in the official uniform at the time of his death, as is evident from the entry in the G.D. also, taking a view that he had not joined his duties is too technical. The amendment in Rule 3 of the Rules, 1961 clearly indicates that the intention of the rule-making authority is to extend the benefit of the rules to those persons also who dies during the performance of their duty.

The claim of the petitioner has been rejected without considering the aforesaid facts and the respondent authority has not considered the fact in the light of the amendment in Rule-3. The order impugned only mentions the conclusion without assigning any reason.

The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, (1973) 2 SCC 836, has held that reasons are links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based. They indicate how the mind is applied, whether it is administrative matter or quasi-judicial. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984, which is being consistently followed by the Courts, has held that the reason is heartbeat of the order and in absence thereof, the order is lifeless. The relevant paragraph of S.N. Mukherjee (supra) reads as under:

"36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge."

In recent time, the Supreme Court has further enlarged the scope of the reasons to such an extent that it has termed it heartbeat of every conclusion because it introduces clarity in an order and in its absence the order becomes lifeless. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision-making. It also ensures that aggrieved person must know why his representation/ application has been rejected. The need for recording the reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at original stage. In Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Supreme Court has held as under:

"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) *** *** ****

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice...."

In addition to above, while remitting the matter back, the Division Bench of this Court in its decision dated 03rd July, 2015 passed in Special Appeal No. 281 of 2010 (Smt. Usha Devi v. The State of U.P. and others) has referred a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes, AIR 1964 SC 193. The relevant part of the judgment of the Division Bench reads as under:

"In this regard, suffice would be to take note of the principles expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Agnes (supra) in the context of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the following:-

"Under S. 3 (1) of the Act the injury must be caused to the workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The question, when does an employment begin and when does it cease, depends upon the facts of each case. But the Courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily end when the "down tool" signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time and space. The scope of such extension must necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case. As employment may end or may begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his tools but also when he used the means of access and, egress to and from the place of employment."

On a comprehension of the law laid down and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the rule of commencement and discontinuance of the employment until reaching and upon leaving the place of employment, is subject to the theory of notional extension in both time and place, where an employee may be regarded as being in the course of employment, even if he had not actually reached the place of working. Thus, the journey to and from the place of employment is not excluded as such. Of course, the scope of such extension would depend on the circumstances of a given case. However, in the present matter, as noticed hereinabove, the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the abstract doctrine relating to the place of employment and has altogether ignored the theory of notional extension as laid down and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Applying the principle laid down in the case of Mrs. Agnes (supra), there is no difficulty to hold that the husband of the petitioner must be treated on duty on the fateful day when he died in the accident.

In view of the above, the impugned order dated 26th March, 2002 passed by the third respondent needs to be set aside and is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the authority concerned to reconsider the matter of the petitioner and pass the reasoned order within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.

Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.

Date :- 19th May, 2017.

SKT/-