Yogendra Kumar Tiwari vs State Of U.P Thru.Chief Secy. ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 1471 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

AFR
 
Reserved
 

 
Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 22187 of 2016
 

 
Petitioner :- Yogendra Kumar Tiwari
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru.Chief Secy. Civil Sectt. Lko. & 2 Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Santosh Kumar Misra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C
 

 
Hon'ble Shri Narayan Shukla,J.

Hon'ble Sheo Kumar Singh-I,J.

(Delivered by Sheo Kumar Singh-I, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Santosh Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as Mr. Q.H. Rizvi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.

2. In a departmental inquiry, the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct and vide order dated 11.08.2016 issued from the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, the petitioner was dismissed from service. Aggrieved by the order, by means of this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned punishment order dated 11.08.2016 and also quashing all the departmental proceedings and with further prayer to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith with all consequential benefits.

3. Brief facts giving rise to filing of the present writ petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed in the year 1982 as a Range Forest Officer. During the posting as Range Forest Officer, Range Hathras, a Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of the petitioner for verification of 14 labourers and the petitioner was directed to verify the same from the records, the petitioner verified it but later on it was found in the inquiry that the verification made by the petitioner was not correct and some wrong entries were entered into the relevant registers by erasing the name of some labourers and including the name of others and in departmental inquiry he was found guilty for all these charges and was punished vide order dated 30.06.2016.

4. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.06.2015, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No.1139 (SB) of 2015 which was decided by this Court vide order dated 22.12.2015 and it was held as follows:-

"The punishment order exposes that Dr. Rupak De has exercised his jurisdiction as Principal Conservator of Forest, to pass the order impugned, therefore, we are of the view that the order impugned suffers from jurisdiction. Accordingly, the order dated 30 June 2015 is hereby quashed being without jurisdiction.

Since we have quashed the order of punishment only on the ground of jurisdiction, we feel it appropriate to permit the competent authority to pass a fresh order in the matter.

With the aforesaid observation the writ petition stands disposed of."

5. The only ground taken by the petitioner in the writ petition was that the order of punishment was not passed by the officer competent to pass such an order and thus the matter was again placed before the competent authority and the competent authority vide order dated 11.08.2016 passed the impugned order.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that again the impugned order has not been passed by the competent authority.

7. The services of the petitioner are governed by the Uttar Pradesh Forest Department Range Forest Officers' Service Rules, 2009 and Rule 3(b) defines the appointing authority which means the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Uttar Pradesh. The impugned order has been passed by the officer namely " Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Uttar Pradesh".

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the appointing authority as mentioned in the services rules is the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Uttar Pradesh, and the impugned order has been passed by the competent authority and the contention as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order impugned has not been passed by the authorized person is not tenable.

9. The second point as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not given an opportunity of hearing during the inquiry.

10. Similar questions were raised before this Court by filing Writ Petition No.1139 (SB) of 2015, which has been decided by this Court vide order dated 22.12.2015 and the above contention was not found correct by this Court. The prayer for quashing the departmental proceedings was considered by the Court and the relief as prayed was not granted. Thus, the contention that the petitioner was not given opportunity of hearing cannot be re-agitated in the present writ petition. Further we have gone through the inquiry report which reveals that vide different orders the delinquent employee was given sufficient opportunity of hearing. The record reveals that copy of the charge sheet and relevant records were sent on the residential address of the petitioner but he was not found there and it was reported that he has left the parental house and settled anywhere-else and after that on 18.11.2014, the petitioner appeared before the Forest Conservator at Varanasi and received the charge sheet and relevant documents. He was directed to submit reply but on 08.01.2015, 21.01.2015, 10.02.2015 and 12.02.2015 he had submitted different applications either for adjournment of the proceedings on health ground or for calling the copy of the records. Ultimately the petitioner submitted his defence on 10.02.2015 and later on he was given an opportunity of personal hearing. He had also submitted written replies on 20.03.2015 and later on the inquiry proceedings were again adjourned on several dates and later on after concluding the inquiry, the inquiry officer had submitted the report. In the departmental inquiry, it was found that certain forged documents were made to create evidence in favour of 14 labourers with intention to regularize them with ulterior motive and unlawful loss to the Government with unlawful gain to the labourers or persons making the report. There were several cuttings and erasion in the cash book and the daily book. Through perusal of the inquiry report it reveals that sufficient opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner.

11. It cannot be doubted that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula and that its application will depend upon the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. This is what has been held by the Supreme Court in K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 273; N.K. Prasada Vs. Government of India & Ors., (2004) 6 SCC 299; State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 129; Karnataka SRTC & Anr. Vs. S.G. Kotturappa & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 409; and in Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 337.

12. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines & Anr. Vs. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 the Court has observed that natural justice is not an unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference of the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. The Courts cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can they fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity, the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures.

13. In Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:-

"Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible."

14. It is equally well settled that the principles of natural justice must not be stretched too far and in this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Gupta & Ors. Vs. Asha Devi Gupta & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 492; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2371 and Canara Bank Vs. Debasis Das, AIR 2003 SC 2041.

15. In Hira Nath Mishra & Ors. Vs. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi & Anr. AIR 1973 SC 1260, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions.

16. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 made reference to its earlier decisions and observed:-

"In A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 150, it was held that the rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law. They do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is their purpose, there is no reason why, they should not be made applicable to administrative proceedings also especially when it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial ones. An unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have a more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry. It was further observed that the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. The rule that inquiry must be held in good faith and without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably is now included among the principles of natural justice." (Emphasis added)

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Subhas Chandra Sinha & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1269 while considering the cancellation of the entire examination because of use of mass copy considered the scope of the principles of natural justice in such a matter and observed:-

"It was not necessary for the Board to give an opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the Board must hold a detailed inquiry into the matter and examine each individual case to satisfy itself which of the candidates had not adopted unfair means. The examination as a whole had to go........."

18. After referring to the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court in Chairman J&K State Board of Education Vs. Feyaz Ahmed Malik, AIR 2000 SC 1039, emphasised that the Board is entrusted with the duty of proper conduct of examinations.

19. In Biswa Ranjan Sahoo & Ors., Vs. Sushanta Kumar Dinda & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2552, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine whether principles of natural justice were required to be followed in a matter where because of large scale malpractice in the selection process, the selection was cancelled and in this context it was observed:-

"Nothing would become fruitful by issuance of notice. Fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one would come forward to bear the brunt. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in not issuing notice to the persons who are said to have been selected and given selection and appointment."

20. In Union of India & Ors. Vs. O. Chakradhar, AIR 2002 SC 1119, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question whether it was necessary to issue individual show cause notices to each selected person when the entire selection was cancelled because of widespread and all pervasive irregularities affecting the result of selection and it was observed:-

"The illegality and irregularity are so intermixed with the whole process of the selection that it becomes impossible to sort out right from the wrong or vice versa. The result of such a selection cannot be relied or acted upon. It is not a case where a question of misconduct on the part of a candidate is to be gone into but a case where those who conducted the selection have rendered it wholly unacceptable."

21. In the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 853, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice by observing that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

22. Validity of an order is to be tested on the touch-stone of doctrine of prejudice. (Vide Jankinath Sarangi Vs. State of Orissa, (1969) 3 SCC 392; K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India & Ors, AIR 1984 SC 273; Sunil Kumar Banerjee Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1170; Maj. G.S. Sodhi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1617; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1074; Krishan Lal Vs. State of J&K, (1994) 4 SCC 422; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. Vs. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669; S.K. Singh Vs. Central Bank of India & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 415; State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 2319; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. S. Balakrishnan, AIR 2001 SC 2400; and Debotosh Pal Choudhury Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 68).

23. In Syndicate Bank & Ors. Vs. Venaktesh Gururao Kurati, JT (2006) 2 SC 73, the Apex Court held as under:-

"To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice."

24. In State of Assam & Anr. Vs. Mahendra Kumar Das & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1255, the dismissal of a Police Sub Inspector, in pursuance of a disciplinary enquiry, held against him, had been set aside by the High Court on the ground that the enquiry officer had collected certain information/material behind his back and the said material was not made available to the delinquent officer. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that unless such an information is relied upon by the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority, the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice cannot be entertained.

25. In Chandrama Tiwari Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 117 while dealing with a similar issue, the Supreme Court held as under:

"However, it is not necessary that each and every document must be supplied to the delinquent government servant facing the charges instead only material and relevant documents are necessary to be supplied to him. If a document even though mentioned in the memo of charges is not relevant to the charges or if it is not referred to or relied upon by the Enquiry Officer or the punishing authority in holding the charges proved against the government servant, no exception can be taken to the validity of the proceedings or the order. If the document is not used against the party charged the ground of violation of principles of natural justice can not successfully be raised. The violation of principles of natural justice arises only when a document, copy of which may not have been supplied to the party charged when demanded is used in recording finding of guilt against him. On a careful consideration of the authority cited on behalf of the appellant we find that the obligation to supply copy of a document is confined only to material and relevant documents and the enquiry would be vitiated only if non-supply of material and relevant documents when demanded may have caused prejudice to the delinquent officer."

26. This cause was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, (2002) 3 SCC 443 in which it has been observed:-

"Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that particular documents copies of which are said to have not been supplied are not indicated by the respondent much less in the order of the High Court nor their relevance has been pointed out. The submission is that the delinquent will also have to show as to in what manner any particular document was relevant in connection with the inquiry and what prejudice was caused to him by non-furnishing of a copy of the document. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon a case reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 518 Chandrama Tewari Vs. Union of India. It has been observed in this case that the obligation to supply copies of documents is confined only to material and relevant documents which may have been relied upon in support of the charges. It is further observed that if a document even though mentioned in the memo of charges, has no bearing on the charges or if it is not relied upon or it may not be necessary for cross-examination of any witness, non-supply of such a document will not cause any prejudice to the delinquent. The inquiry would not be vitiated in such circumstances. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Thiru K.V. Perumal and others (1996) 5 SCC 474 relied upon by the appellant, it is held that it is for the delinquent to show the relevance of a document a copy of which he insists to be supplied to him. Prejudice caused by non-supply of document has also to be seen. In yet another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in (2001) 6 SCC 392 State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora and another, it has been held that a delinquent must show the prejudice caused to him by non-supply of copy of document where order of punishment is challenged on that ground.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no material or document has been relied upon by the Inquiry Officer, copy of which or inspection thereof may not have been allowed to the respondent. No material has been obtained after the date of hearing nor any such material has been made use of by the Inquiry Officer. It is further submitted that in the judgment of the High Court it has nowhere been indicated that any material or document, copy of which has not been supplied to the respondent, was used much less any prejudice, if caused to the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent could not pinpoint any particular document which may have been made use of by the Inquiry Officer for establishing the charges leveled against the respondent, copies of which or inspection thereof may not have been allowed to the delinquent by the Department. No submission has been advanced on behalf of the respondent on the point of prejudice which may have been caused to the respondent by non-supply of document, if any. The High Court has also not gone into the question of the relevance of the documents copies of which are said to have not been supplied to the respondent and consequent prejudice, if caused. We therefore find that the finding of the High Court that principles of natural justice have been violated for non-supply of documents to the respondent is not sustainable. The cross-examination of a witness which was sought for, had unfortunately died which fact was also brought to the notice of the respondent."

27. While dealing with the similar case, i.e., removal of the Vice Chancellor and dealing with the grievance that no opportunity of hearing or participation in the inquiry had been given to the then Vice Chancellor, in Dr. Umrao Singh Choudhary Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., (1994) 4 SCC 328, the Apex Court held that the principles of natural justice does not supplant the law, but supplement the law. Its application may be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. In the said case while considering the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalay Adhiniyam, 1973, the Apex Court held that by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, application of the principles of natural justice had been dispensed with, and therefore if the inquiry had been held without giving an opportunity to the petitioner, therein, that would not vitiate the order of removal of the Vice Chancellor.

28. Thus, in view of the above, law can be summarised that principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down in this regard as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a particular case where the facts remain undisputed and undeniable, observation of these principles would render a futile exercise or useless/empty formality. In the application of the concept of fair play there has to be real flexibility. There is no such thing as a mere technical infringement of the said principles. Application of the said principles has to be in conformity with the statutory provisions and subject matter of the case. However, one, who alleges violation of these principles, must further establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice.

29. The case of non-supply of documents or evidence recorded behind the back of the delinquent, or not giving the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, seems to suffer from serious irregularity, but unless it is established that the material so collected in violation of the principles of natural justice has been used by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority, no such grievance can be raised.

30. In S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan & ors., AIR 1981 SC 136, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that where on admitted or undisputed facts, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue the writ to compel the observance of the principles of natural justice as it would amount to issuing a futile writ.

31. Similarly, in State of U.P. Vs. Om Prakash Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 679, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts have to see whether non-observance of any of the principles enshrined in statutory rules or principles of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. Thus, it can be held that even if in a given case there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. This Court does not function as a Court of Appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, rather it has limited power of judicial review to the departmental proceedings in which appreciation of evidence is not permissible. The Court can review only to correct the error of law or fundamental procedural requirements which lead to manifest injustice or Court can interfere with the impugned order if the same has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh & ors., AIR 1997 SC 1908.

32. In State of U.P. Vs. Om Prakash Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 679, the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed that Courts have to examine whether the non-observance of any statutory provision or principle of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. In S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 136, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where from admitted or undisputed fact, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one course is permissible to be adopted, the Court should not enforce the observance of principles of natural justice for the reason that it would amount to issuing a futile writ.

33. In A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 150, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

"The aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in the areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.... Whenever a complaint is made before the Court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case."

34. Therefore, whether the principles of natural justice should be applied in a given case, depends upon the facts and circumstances of that case. In case the principles have not been applied but if even after their observation result could have been the same, enforcing the observance of such principles would be a futile exercise. (Vide Khem Chand Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 300; and Laxmi Shankar Pandey Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 1070.

35. In U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee Vs. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 909, the students had got admission in M.B.B.S. Course by making misrepresentation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the plea of applicability of the Rules of Natural Justice observing that under the circumstances in which such benefit had been taken by the candidates concerned, do not justify attraction of the Rules of Natural Justice by providing them an opportunity of hearing. Even in a case where an applicant may not be responsible for playing fraud, his appointment can, also, be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to him in case the Authority comes to the conclusion that the appointment had been made by playing fraud by the Members of the Selection Committee though the candidate had not played any part/mischief in the said selection in Krishan Yadav Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 2166, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that when the entire selection was stinking "conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit", individual's innocence has no place as fraud unravels everything.

36. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf.

37. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Inquiry Officer had proceeded with inquiry in accordance with departmental rules and after recording the relevant evidence and considering the material on record he had submitted the inquiry report and found the petitioner guilty of misconduct. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that at this stage the evidence cannot be re-appreciated.

38. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar Vs. Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar & Ors., JT 1997 (5) SC 298 clearly held as follows:-

"..... In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court."

39. The Supreme Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh & Ors, (1997) 3 SCC 657 held as follows:-

"Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained."

40. In R.S. Saini Vs. State of Punjab (1999) 8 SCC 90, the Supreme Court observed as follows:-

"Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.

A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard."

41. In the case of Lalit Popli Vs. Canera Bank & Ors,. (2003) 3 SCC 583, the Supreme Court observed as follows:-

"While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority."

42. The decisions referred to by us clearly highlight the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. The jurisdiction of the Courts in such a matter is very limited. The order can be set-aside if it is based on extraneous grounds or there are no grounds at all for passing it or the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fide, dishonesty or corrupt practice. In other words the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference that the Court should intervene.

43. The petitioner had also filed another Writ Petition No.15646 (SB) of 2016 which was heard and decided by this Court and petition challenging the dismissal order or inquiry proceedings was dismissed.

44. Having considered the contentions of learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the petitioner had been given opportunity of hearing during the inquiry proceedings and the order impugned has been passed by the competent authority/appointing authority and thus the petition is not maintainable on this ground. Since the petitions challenging the inquiry proceedings have been previously dismissed, the petition lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

 
Order Date :- 31.05.2017
 

 
(Sheo Kumar Singh-I, J.)    (Shri Narayan Shukla, J.)
 
A. Katiyar