Bhoora @ Firoz vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others
2017 Latest Caselaw 3703 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
                                                      Judgement Reserved on 22.8.2017
 
			                     Judgement Delivered on 28.8.2017
 
Court No. - 21
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 16750 of 2017
 
Petitioner :- Bhoora @ Firoz
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Tapan Kumar Mishra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.,Shiv Sagar Singh
 

 
Hon'ble Krishna Murari,J.

Hon'ble Akhilesh Chandra Sharma,J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Akhilesh Chandra Sharma,J.)

The petitioner has approached this Court with the prayer for quashing First Information Report bearing case crime no. 146 of 2017 u/s 323, 452, 504 and 506 IPC, P.S. Kotwali, District-Meerut. Brief facts necessary to dispose of this petition are recapitulated as under:

The Respondent no. 3/complainant-Vijay Kumar Rastogi was sitting in his shop on 05.08.2017. The petitioner was coming from Gola Kuwa, and started abusing the respondent and attacked upon him. He also got beaten the respondent by his bodyguard. On the same day, first information report was lodged against the petitioner and his bodyguard u/s 323, 452, 504 and 506 IPC, in P.S. Kotwali, District-Meerut. The petitioner has now moved this Court for quashing the First Information Report, and other proceedings against him, in view of settlement and compromise between the parties.(Annexure-2)

Heard Sri T.K. Mishra, learned counsel for petitioner, learned AGA and Sri Shiv Sagar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no. 3-first informant, and have also gone through material placed on record.

It is submitted by learned counsel for petitioner and respondent no.3/complainant that all the offences except offence u/s 452 IPC, are compoundable offences. They further submitted that the alleged incident took place outside the shop and thus, no offence u/s 452 IPC is made out.

It may be mentioned that under Section 320(1) CrPC certain offences in IPC can be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of the table in that provision. Also, in view of Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. certain other offences can be compounded with the permission of the court. However, Section 320(9) specifically states:

"320(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section."

The pivotal question which arose for the consideration of the Court is whether the Court can grant permission to compound the non-compoundable offences or quash the proceedings in view of the settlement? At this stage, I deem it appropriate to deal with some decided cases dealing with this proposition.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the celebrated case reported as State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswami and others, AIR 1977 SC 1489 : (1977 Cri LJ 1125), observed that the High Court under its inherent powers can quash the proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that ends the justice required that the proceedings ought to be quashed. In the said judgment, the Court observed that ends of justice are higher than ends of mere law. Though, justice has got to be administered according to the laws made by the legislatures. The Court observed in the said case that the Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court also observed that lame prosecution be quashed. The relevant portion which could have vital bearing in determining and adjudicating the controversy, is reproduced as under:

"In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in similar circumstances have quashed the prosecution and have granted permission to compound the offence in Y. Suresh Babu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1987) 2 JT (SC) 361. In this case, the appellant was convicted under Section 326 IPC in a non compoundable offence by the Sessions Court and his conviction was affirmed by the High Court. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant moved the apex court. It is mentioned in the judgment that through the intervention of well wishers, the parties who are from the same locality have reconciled their differences to preserve amity and good relations. The learned counsel for the accused/appellant submitted that his client has a feeling of remorse. While taking an oral view of the facts and circumstances, the Court granted leave to the party to compound the offence and conviction was set aside.

In Mahesh Chand and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan; 1990(3) Recent Cri R 332 and Kailash and others Vs. State of Haryana; 1992(3) Recent Cri R 198(Punj & Hry), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have granted permission for compounding of the offence under Section 326 I.P.C.

In Chiranji Lal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 3 SCC 371 (1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court granted permission for compounding a non-compoundable offence. While granting the permission, the Court observed that the Complainants have appeared before the Court and have stated that they have compromised the matter and have received the compensation and no rancour is now left in their hearts against the appellant. In these circumstances, the Court allowed the application and sanctioned the compounding of offence.

In R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239), the Supreme Court had an occasion to lay down some guidelines for the High Courts for exercising its inherent powers. The Court observed that it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. But this power can always be used for securing the ends of justice. The Supreme Court and the High Courts have been consistent in their approach that the High Courts have inherent powers to quash proceedings where allowing the proceedings to go on would be an abuse of process of law and/or where the ends of justice require the proceedings to be quashed. But as far as power of compounding a non-compoundable offence is concerned, there is conflict of opinion among the High Courts. The courts have examined this issue on various occasions and arrived at different findings.

In Vijender Jain, J. of the Delhi High Court in R.S. Arora Vs. State; 1995 JCC 439 has also taken the view that the High Court has the power to compound even the non-compoundable offences. The Court observed that this power should be exercised sparingly. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced.

"It is true that offences which are non-compoundable in relation to the quashing of such offences, the High Court has to act with great caution and circumspection but to agree with the arguments of learned counsel for the State that those offences which are non-compoundable in view of the Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court will be without power although parties have settled their matter amicably would be to make the provisions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. nugatory and ineffective. The Parliament has specifically provided Section 482 in the Cr.P.C. and High Court in exercise of these powers which are plenary are neither fettered by any provision of the code and certainly not by Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. So long as these powers are exercised by the High Court to secure the ends of justice and to stop abuse of the process of the Court. Compromise in modern society is a sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. Compromise is the soul of justice. Exercising the inherent powers. Under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in disputes which emanates out of matrimonial differences, landlord-tenant matters or commercial transactions are to advance the course of justice. No useful purpose will be served after the parties have amicably settled their disputes, buried their past, want to live in a sprit of peace and harmony to relegate them before the police and the Courts, that will be sheer abuse of the process of Court and instead of securing justice would amount to perpetuating injustice to such parties, who have compromised their matters."

In B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another, AIR 2003 SC 1386, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with a similar as question in hand, held as under:

"It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. "

Their Lordship of the Supreme Court in similar circumstances have quashed prosecution and have granted permission to compound the offence in Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others, (2008) 16 SCC.

In Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla & others, AIR 2017 SC 1312 their lordship of Supreme Court has observed that,

"The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorded perceptions and is not a slave to anything; except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C. Or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C."

In light of above law declared by Supreme Court, and in view of the fact mentioned above, we are of the opinion that in the interest of both sides to put an end of this criminal proceeding, because even if the proceeding is not quashed, they are unlikely to result in conviction if the complainant and the witnesses do not support the prosecution story in Court. Considering such futile proceedings would be unnecessarily a drain upon the time, money and other resources, not only of the parties and witnesses, but also of the Court.

In view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case and law declared by the apex Court and other Courts for securing the interest of justice, we deem it appropriate in the interest of justice to quash the FIR No. 146 of 2017 u/s 323, 452, 504 & 506 IPC, Police Station-Kotwali, Distt.- Meerut and proceedings arising therefrom.

With this, writ petition is allowed.

Order Date :- 28.8.2017

Shalini