C/M Shri Mateshwari Purva ... vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others
2017 Latest Caselaw 3113 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

AFR
 
Court No. - 17
 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 35509 of 2017
 
Petitioner:- C/M Shri Mateshwari Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya (J.H.S.)
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Shiva Nand Pandey
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.

The petitioner is a Committee of Management of an educational institution which runs and conducts a Junior High School. It has instituted this writ petition for a direction upon the District Basic Education Officer, Azamgarh to nominate his nominee for being Member of the Selection Committee for selection of three Assistant Teachers in the institution in question.

The Court is flooded with spate of writ petitions of similar nature seeking a direction upon the authorities concerned either to grant permission to fill up the post or for the approval of the appointment made by the Committee of Management in Junior High Schools.

The essential facts of the case are that Shri Mateshwari Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Krishna Nagar (Pilkhua), District Azamgarh1 is a Junior High School. The State Government has enlisted it for the financial aid. The school is regulated under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 19722 (U.P. Act No. 34 of 1972), and the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 19783 are applicable to it.

In the school one post of Headmaster and four posts of Assistant Teacher are duly sanctioned, against which one Headmaster and four Assistant Teachers were working. It is stated that they were duly approved and were drawing their salaries from the salary payment account.

At present only a Headmaster and one Assistant Teacher is functioning in the school. On 30th June, 2011 an Assistant Teacher retired. Thereafter two more Assistant Teachers retired on 30th June, 2013. As regards the fourth post, one Ravish Kumar Tiwari is working. He has filed a writ petition in this Court claiming his appointment which is pending.

Earlier, the Committee of Management could not initiate the selection process because the State Government had imposed a ban on the appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff in the Junior High Schools. The State Government relaxed the ban in the year 2014 but it has imposed a condition that the selection process will be initiated after a detailed guideline is issued by the Director of Education (Basic), U.P.. The said guideline was issued in March, 2015, whereby the Committee of Managements were allowed to initiate the process of selection.

After the ban was relaxed, the petitioner moved an application before the District Basic Education Officer seeking his permission to initiate the selection process under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1978. On 31st March, 2016 the District Basic Education Officer granted permission for issuance of advertisement to appoint three Assistant Teachers in the school subject to certain conditions mentioned therein.

Pursuant to the permission of the District Basic Education Officer dated 31st March, 2016, the Committee of Management of the school advertised three posts of Assistant Teachers in two newspapers, namely, 'Rashtriya Sahara' and 'Swatantra Chetna' on 15th April, 2016. From the record it appears that there were some errors in the advertisement, hence both the advertisements were cancelled and a fresh advertisement was issued in the same newspapers on 29th July, 2016.

On 12th August, 2016 the Committee of Management of the school requested the District Basic Education Officer to appoint his nominee in the Selection Committee as required under Rule 9 of the Rules, 1978.

The grievance of the petitioner is that in spite of the fact that the District Basic Education Officer has accorded permission to issue advertisement for the recruitment on three posts of Assistant Teachers, he has not taken any decision for nominating the expert in the Selection Committee despite several representations and requests.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. Since no factual dispute is involved, without calling response from the respondents the writ petition is being disposed of finally at this stage, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, in terms of the Rules of the Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the school is governed under the provisions of the Act, 1972. The school complies with all the statutory provisions and imparts education upto Junior High School, where the children upto the age of 14 years receive education. Hence, it is duty of the State Government to ensure that for the smooth functioning of the institution, teachers are appointed on the sanctioned posts. He further submits that keeping the posts of teachers vacant for indefinite period causes serious prejudice to the interest of the students which violates the fundamental rights of the children to receive quality education.

Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the executive orders cannot override the statutory provisions. The State Government issues executive orders to ban the recruitment process in the basic schools for an indefinite period and without any justifiable ground. In past, this Court has set aside several similar ban orders but the State Government, ignoring the law laid down by this Court, goes on to issue executive orders to ban the recruitment of the teachers and non-teaching staff on one or other pretext.

He has placed reliance on the following judgments:

(i) Durgesh Kumari v. State of U.P. and others, (1995) 3 UPLBEC 1387;

(ii) Ram Samhar v. District Inspector of Schools, Sultanpur and another, (1997) 2 UPLBEC 1390;

(iii) Chandra Bhan Kanaujiya v. Joint Director of Education and VIth Region, Lucknow, 2010 (4) ADJ 809 (LB); and,

(iv) State of U.P. and others v. The U.P. Pradhanacharya Parishad, Lko and another, Special Appeal Defective No. 266 of 2015, dated 13th July, 2015.

Learned Standing Counsel submits that the State Government had taken a policy decision to ban the recruitment in the aided institutions. Hence, no appointment could be made during the period when the order was operative.

I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The Act, 1972 governs two categories of schools: the schools run by the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education4 and the schools established and managed by the societies (private institutions). The institutions of first category are governed under the Act, 1972 and the service conditions of the teachers are governed under the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 19815. Non-teaching staff of such institutions are governed under the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Staff Rules, 19736. The institutions run by the Board are mostly situated in the rural areas and they cater the need of the marginalised section of the society in the remote villages and semi-urban areas.

The schools which have been established and run by the societies are also recognised by the Board. These private institutions are of two types: one which receive aid from the State Government and they are called aided institutions; and, the second are those which do not receive aid from the State Government and they are managed by the societies/ Managements from their own resources.

The Junior High Schools of the latter category are also governed under the provisions of the Act, 1972, but the services of their teachers are governed under the Rules, 1978 and in case such institutions receive aid from the State Government, they are also governed under the Uttar Pradesh Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 19787. Non-teaching staff of these institutions are governed under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Ministerial Staff and Group 'D' Employees) Rules, 19848.

The short question which arises for determination in the case is as to whether imposing indefinite and frequent bans by the State Government by executive orders on the recruitment of teachers and staff can be declared arbitrary and violative of fundamental rights of children of the age of six to fourteen years because they are deprived of quality education due to vacancies in the posts of teachers in the schools/institutions.

The directive principles contained under Article 45 of the Constitution of India provide that the State shall make an endeavour to provide free and compulsory education for all children upto the age of 14 years.

The Supreme Court for the first time considered the scope of Article 45 of the Constitution in the case of Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka and others9. The Court interpreted Articles 21, 41 and 45 along with Articles 38 and 39(a) & (f) of the Constitution and came to hold that right to education is a concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part-III of the Constitution and the directive principles which are vital in the governance of the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and these principles have to be read into the fundamental rights. The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles cast an obligation on the State to create conditions in which the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution can be enjoyed by all the citizens and in case the right to education is not treated as a fundamental right, the education shall remain beyond the reach of large majority of this country which is illiterate.

The judgment of Mohini Jain (supra) was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others10, wherein it has been held that right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution does take in the right to education in it. In Unni Krishnan (supra) the Supreme Court also considered the need to give emphasis on the primary education, which a child receives by the time he completes the age of 14 years, and held that the limits of the economic capacity is immaterial. The Court emphasised for giving priority to the primary education and commended that at least the State should honour the command of Article 45 and it must be made reality. The relevant part of the judgment in Unni Krishnan (supra) reads as under:

"172. ...It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of the "limits of its economic capacity and development" as does Article 41, which inter alia speaks of right to education. What has actually happened is -- more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education than to -- and at the cost of -- primary education. (By primary education, we mean the education, which a normal child receives by the time he completes 14 years of age.) Neglected more so are the rural sectors, and the weaker sections of the society referred to in Article 46. We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the priorities for the Government -- we are only emphasising the constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45, 46 and 41. Surely the wisdom of these constitutional provisions is beyond question. This inversion of priorities has been commented upon adversely by both the educationists and economists."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

Keeping in view the law laid down in Mohini Jain (supra) and Unni Krishnan (supra), the Parliament by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002 has inserted Article 21A in the Constitution to make a law, which provides free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years to meet the goal contemplated in the directive principles under Article 45. It gives a fundamental right to the children of the age of six to fourteen years of free and compulsory education.

To achieve the objective of Article 21A of the Constitution, the Parliament enacted the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 200911.

The provisions of the Act, 2009 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust through President and another v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel and another12, wherein the Court emphasised that there is need to earnestly implement Article 21A of the Constitution as without education a citizen can never come to know of his other rights and there is also need that priority has to be on primary and elementary education, which is foundation for higher education. The Court considered the importance of primary and elementary education in the following terms:

"21. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that imparting elementary and basic education is a constitutional obligation on the State as well as societies running educational institutions. When we talk of education, it means not only learning how to read and write alphabets or get mere information but it means to acquire knowledge and wisdom so that one may lead a better life and become a better citizen to serve the nation in a better way.

**** **** ****

26. In view of the above, education and particularly that elementary/basic education has to be qualitative and for that the trained teachers are required. The legislature in its wisdom after consultation with the expert body fixes the eligibility for a particular discipline taught in a school. Thus, the eligibility so fixed requires very strict compliance and any appointment made in contravention thereof must be held to be void."

(Emphasis supplied)

In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi13, the Supreme Court has considered the Education Code of Uttar Pradesh which deals with the basic schools. The Court found that the children of the age group of six to eleven years are normally the students of junior basic schools and those of the age group of eleven to fourteen years are the students of senior basic schools. The relevant part of the judgment is extracted below:

"22. Educational Code of Uttar Pradesh (Revised 1958 Edn.) which has been placed on record is significant. Clauses (x) and (xxvi) of Para 1 define "institution" and "school", respectively, as follows:

"1. (x) 'Institution' means an educational institution. Such institutions are divided into the following two classes:

(a) 'Recognised institution' means an institution which imparts the course of instruction prescribed or recognized by the Department or the Intermediate Board or a University, and satisfies one or more of these authorities, as the case may be, in the matter of efficiency. Such an institution is open to periodical inspections by an officer or officers of the Department and its students are eligible for admission to public examinations conducted by the Department, or the Intermediate Board, or a University;

(b) 'Unrecognised institution' means an institution that does not come under the above definition of recognised institutions;

* * *

(xxvi) 'School' means a recognized institution which follows the curriculum prescribed by the Department or the Intermediate Board. There are several types of schools as follows:

(a) 'Nursery school' means a school where children of pre-basic stage, i.e. from about three to six years of age are taught;

(b) 'Junior Basic School' means a school teaching children generally between 6 and 11 years of age in Classes I to V (i.e. primary section);

(c) 'Senior Basic School' or 'Junior High School' means either a school preparing students for the Junior High School Examination of the Department or a school teaching Classes I to VIII or VI to VIII (middle section);

Note.--Basic Schools include both Senior or Junior Basic Schools as well as single schools with Classes I to VIII.

(d) 'Higher Secondary School' means a school which with or without lower classes maintains Classes IX and X and/or XI and XII and prepares students for the High School and/or Intermediate Examinations of the Intermediate Board or a University;"

A perusal of the aforesaid judgment shows that the Court has found that children of the age of 6 to 14 years receive their studies in the State of Uttar Pradesh in Junior Basic Schools and Senior Basic Schools, thus it is a constitutional obligation on the State to provide free and compulsory education in these institutions.

One of the common stands taken by the State in similar matters is that exercise is being undertaken by the State to find out the teachers-- students ratio in terms of the Schedule provided in the Act, 2009 and the financial crunch. In the same cases, a stand has been taken that the Central Government has not provided fund from financial year 2012-13 onwards for providing infrastructure in the primary schools. For the financial year 2015-16 the State is yet to receive Rs.2485.09 crores and in the financial year 2016-17 a sum of Rs.3618.46 crores has not been released by the Central Government to the State Government. Hence, the State Government from its own resources has managed Rs.6103.55 crores for the disbursement of the salaries to the teachers and other expenses. It was also contended that in a report of the Auditor General of India (31st March, 2016) in Para 2.1.82 it is mentioned that in the year 2015-16 the number of the students enrolled in the primary and upper primary schools in the Government and private aided institutions, which was 3.71 crores in the year 2012-13, has declined to 3.64 crores, hence there is a sharp declination in the enrolment of children in the primary and upper primary schools by 18.6%.

Insofar as the stand of the State that they are undertaking an exercise to achieve the student-teacher ratio in terms of the Schedule provided in the Act, 2009 is concerned, it does not stand to reason. The Act, 2009 and its Rules are effective for the last more than five years and previously also the same exercise has been sought to be done. Moreover, in respect of the aided educational institutions the strength of teaching and non-teaching staff is determined in terms of various executive orders, circulars and guidelines, under which the State authorities regularly undertake exercise to determine the strength of teaching and non-teaching staff vis-a-vis strength of students, infrastructure and other parameters provided under the Government orders and guidelines.

Indisputably, the institutions are seeking permission from the State authorities to fill up the vacancies against the sanctioned posts. If they make any appointment beyond the sanctioned strength, it is always open to the educational authorities to decline the approval on simple ground that the appointment has been made beyond the sanctioned strength. However, in the case of the appointment made against the posts which have been duly sanctioned, the State cannot withhold permission or the approval if the appointment has been made following the procedure under the statutory provisions.

The State Government has no authority to deprive the students of the age group of six to fourteen years, who study in the primary and upper primary schools, of the quality education. Due to vacancies in the posts of teachers, their education is badly affected much less to say about the quality education.

Insofar as the stand taken by the State Government that in case the State Government issues Government orders imposing a ban on the appointment of teachers and non-teaching staff, during the said period no appointment can be made. No doubt, under the provisions of the Act, 1921, under Section 9(4) the State Government can impose ban in respect of the appointment in the institutions. The said power of the State Government has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ramji Dwivedi v. State of U.P. and others14. However, in that case the Supreme Court found that the State Government was justified in imposing ban in view of the fact that it promulgated the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board Ordinance, 1981 (8 of 1981), which was replaced by the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (Act No. 5 of 1982). The said Act envisages setting up of a Commission for selection and recommending appointments of teachers including Heads of Institution. The power of the Committee of Management for appointment of teachers under Sections 16-E and 16-F of the Act, 1921 was taken away by establishing a separate Commission under such Ordinance, which was replaced by the aforesaid Act.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a judgment of this Court in Chandra Bhan Kanaujiya (supra). In the said case it was held that the State Government has no authority to put a ban on the appointment of teachers in Intermediate Colleges on ad hoc basis. The learned Single Judge, in the said case, has relied on a judgment of Kumari Prabhabati Dikshit v. U.P. Madhyamic Shiksha Sewa Ayog, Allahabad15. The attention of the Court was not drawn to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Durgesh Kumari (supra), wherein the judgment of Prabhabati Dikshit (supra) has been held to be no longer good law. The Division Bench relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Ramji Dwivedi (supra) has held that the State Government in the facts and circumstances of the case was justified to issue ban order. In the said case, the State Government wanted to decentralize the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission by providing four Regional Selection Boards, so that there may not be delay in making appointments. In view of the said policy decision, the legislation were in contemplation and in the meantime an order was issued for the temporary ban on the selection.

In Vipin v. State of U.P. and others16 the issue of imposing ban again fell for consideration. This Court, after referring a large number of earlier judgments on this issue, held that the State Government has power to issue Government order under Section 9(4) of the Act, 1921, but a specific order has to be issued in terms of Section 9(4) and the intention of the Legislature has to be considered. The Court further held that order under Section 9(4) of the Act, 1921 has to be issued in terms of Article 162 of the Constitution but any other order issued by the State Government in respect of other departments or a general order or any rule under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot ipso facto apply to the employees of the school governed by the Act, 1921. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under:

"56. ...Thus the intention to exercise such a power in relation to the institutions in question cannot be necessarily gathered unless a specific intention can be culled out. The issuance of a general direction bringing about a change in policy also has to be seen from the angle that a successor government upon fresh elections cannot ordinarily alter policies which are supposed to be continued in public interest. The State Government therefore realized that such a ban would adversely affect the education of children studying in such institutions and consequently itself issued a Government order in May, 2012 exempting the applicability of the ban on the appointment of teachers. This therefore indicates that the State Government was not treating the appointment of teachers in institutions to be at pari materia with other appointments under the State Government. The aforesaid conclusions therefore undoubtedly lead to the inference that if there is no intention discernible the same cannot be inferred by necessary implication. The Government order dated 15.3.2012 also therefore cannot be adopted or applied by necessary implication in relation to the appointment of Class III and Class IV employees in institutions governed by the 1921 Act."

As regards the judgment of State of U.P. and others v. The U.P. Pradhanacharya Parishad, Lko and another (supra), the said decision is distinguishable as it has been given on its own facts and has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

The aforesaid judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner relates to power of the State Government under Section 9(4) of the Act, 1921. In the Act, 1972 there is no such specific corresponding provision of Section 9(4) of the Act, 1921. Section 13 of the Act, 1972 deals with the control by the State Government over the Board. It enjoins that the Board shall carry out such direction as may be issued to it from time to time by the State Government for the efficient administration of the Act, 1972. Section 13 of the Act, 1972 reads as under:

"13. Control by the State Government.--(1) The Board shall carry out such directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the State Government for the efficient administration of this Act.

(2) If in, or in connection with, the exercise of any of its powers and discharge of any of the functions by the Board under this Act, any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government, or between the Board and any local body, the decision of the State Government on such dispute shall be final and binding on the Board or the local body, as the case may be.

(3) The Board or any local body shall furnish to the State Government such reports, returns and other information, as the State Government may from time to time require for the purposes of this Act."

A reading of Section 13 of the Act, 1972 shows that the State Government for the efficient administration of this Act can issue a direction to the Board. Thus, it cannot be said that the State Government has no power to issue ban order for efficient administration of this Act. Under Section 9(4) of the Act, 1921 the State Government can issue itself a direction which is evident from the language used under Section 9(4) of the Act, 1921. But as held by the Supreme Court in Dr. Ramji Dwivedi (supra) and Durgesh Kumari (supra) these powers can be exercised for a cogent reason and it cannot be used in ordinary course. There must be strong reasons and grounds for imposing a ban on the appointments.

The decision of the State Government to issue the executive orders imposing ban on the appointment in the primary and upper primary schools (Junior High Schools) should be made keeping in the mind the object of the enactment of the Act, 2009 and Article 21A of the Constitution, which is a fundamental right. It is well-settled law that citizens' fundamental rights cannot be violated on any ground save the reasonable restriction on such fundamental rights. In the recent judgments mentioned above, the Supreme Court while interpreting Article 21A of the Constitution and the provisions of the Act, 2009 has not referred any restriction on free and compulsory education of children of the age group of six to fourteen years, except in the case of minority institutions with certain conditions. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (Registered) and others v. Union of India and others17.

As regards the stand of the State regarding lack of fund, it is a trite that lack of fund cannot be a ground to ignore the primary education in the country. Way back in the year 1995 before insertion of Article 21A in the Constitution by the Eighty-sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court in the case of State of H.P. v. H.P. State Recognised & Aided Schools Managing Committees and others18 has considered the same stand of the Government of Himachal Pradesh, where lack of fund was taken as one of the grounds for not providing grant in aid to the private institutions, where children of the age of six to fourteen years were studying. The Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily a child in this country joins the school at the age of five years and the children studying in the middle school would be less than 14 years of age, hence the State Government is under an obligation to provide free education to the children studying in the Government Middle Schools (In the State of Uttar Pradesh, Junior High Schools/Basic Schools/ Primary Schools/ Upper Primary Schools). The Court turned down the stand taken by the State Government about the lack of fund. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under:

"17. It is high time that the State must accept its responsibility to extend free education to the children upto the age of fourteen. Right to education is equally guaranteed to the children who are above the age of fourteen, but they cannot enforce the same unless the economic capacity and development of the State permits the enforcement of the same. The State must endeavour to review and increase the budget allocation under the head 'Education'. The Union of India must also consider to increase the percentage of allocation of funds for "Education" out of the Gross National Product."

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Anand Kumar Yadav and others19 has quoted with approval the view expressed by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Yadav and others v. Union of India and others20 in respect of importance of the appointment of qualified teachers. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (as he then was) speaking for the Full Bench held as under:

"93. The object and purpose of introducing the TET is to ensure that a teacher who embarks upon instructing students of primary and upper primary classes is duly equipped to fulfill the needs of the students, understands the relevance of education for a child at that stage and can contribute to the well rounded development of the child. Teaching a child is not merely a matter of providing information. Deeply embedded in the process of imparting education is sensitivity towards the psyche of the child, the ability to understand the concerns of a young student of that age, the motivations which encourage learning and the pitfalls which have to be avoided..... These requirements should not be viewed merely as norms governing the relationship of a teacher with the contract of employment. These norms are intended to fulfill and protect the needs of those who are taught, namely, young children. India can ignore the concerns of its children only at the cost of a grave peril to the future of our society..."

The Supreme Court in Environmental and Consumer Protection Foundation v. Delhi Administration and others21 had the occasion to consider somewhat similar facts. The Court took serious view regarding long number of vacancies of teachers in basic/primary schools in Delhi and issued directions to fill up the vacancies without delay. The Court has also expressed its unhappiness regarding existing large number of vacancies of teachers. The Supreme Court made following observations:

"6. In the latter part of the affidavit, the learned Chief Secretary has indicated that out of the sanctioned posts of TGTs of 25,690 posts, 1536 posts are to be filled up by direct recruitment and 3426 posts are to be filled up by promotion and in the concluding portion of the affidavit he says that it would take about two years in the whole process for filling up these vacancies.

7. On the one hand we appreciate the frank and candid admission by the learned Chief Secretary but on the other hand, we are astonished about the inordinate delay which takes place in filling up of these posts. If these Selection Boards take two years or more, then they must start the process of filling up of vacancies two or three years before the vacancies arise. Dates of retirement of teachers are known at the time of their appointment.

8. The right of children to free and compulsory education has now become part of fundamental right under Article 21-A of the Constitution and Parliament has passed the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, on 26-8-2009. There cannot be any justification for such an inordinate delay of this magnitude in filling up these vacancies. The learned Chief Secretary in his letter to the Chairman, Union Public Service Commission has mentioned that acute shortage of teachers is affecting the study and the administration of the school. In other words, it is infringing the fundamental rights of the children."

The principles emerging from the decisions referred above are: the objective of Articles 45 & 21A of the Constitution and the Preamble of the Act, 2009 show that the State should make endeavour to provide quality education to the children studying in these institutions. The quality education cannot be imparted in absence of the qualified teachers and proper infrastructure in the institutions run by the Board or the institutions run by the societies/ private institutions.

For the reasons recorded herein-above, I am of the view that it would be appropriate to issue following directions in the matter:

(I) The first respondent is directed to issue appropriate direction to the Director of Education (Basic), U.P. and the District Basic Education Officers of all the districts to take expeditious decisions for granting permission to fill up the posts of teaching and non-teaching staff in the Junior High Schools and to take decision regarding approval within a reasonable time, failing which the responsibility should be fixed of the authority concerned in case there is unexplained inordinate delay in taking decision on their part.

(II) A direction is issued to the District Basic Education Officer, Azamgarh, the second respondent, to take appropriate decision in accordance with law in the light of the law discussed above expeditiously, preferably within six weeks from the date of communication of this order, having regard to the fact that the posts of Headmaster and three Assistant Teachers are lying vacant in the school.

With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed.

No order as to costs.

The office is directed to send a copy of this order to the first respondent.

Order Date :- 9.8.2017

Digamber/SKT/-