Pappoo Alias Ram Kumar vs State Of U.P.
2016 Latest Caselaw 6295 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

Court No. - 9                                                                                 AFR                                     									       Reserved  
 
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 207 of 1997                  
 

 
Appellant :- Pappoo alias Ram Kumar
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- S.S.Yadav,Raj Kumar Pandey
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate
 

 
Hon'ble Dr. Vijay Laxmi,J.

This appeal has been preferred by Pappoo alias Ram Kumar against the judgment and order dated 15.04.1997 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.13, Lucknow in ST No.221 of 1995, State versus Pappoo alias Ram Kumar and another, in Case Crime No.35 of 1992, under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC, Police Station - Gosaiganj, District Lucknow, whereby he found the the appellant guilty under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to 7 years RI along with fine of Rs.3,000/- and directed the appellant to undergo additional imprisonment for six months in default of payment of fine. The appellant has been acquitted for the charges under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. The co-accused Guddu @ Sangam has been acquitted for the charges under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC.

2. As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged by the complainant Sant Ram, the father of the victim alleging that the daughter of the complainant Saroj Kumari aged about 14 years was enticed and taken away by the appellant, Pappoo alias Ram Kumar of his village and Guddu @ Sangam Lal son of Ramsumiran on 29.01.1992 at about 10.00 PM. The complainant failed to trace his daughter despite all efforts, thus he lodged a written report on 01.02.1992 in police station concerned and Case Crime No.35 of 1992, under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC was registered in Police Station - Gosaiganj, Lucknow. It was also stated in the FIR that the daughter of the complainant has taken silver ornaments of about ¼ Kg with her. The investigation was conducted by the investigating officer. The statements of witnesses were recorded. The spot inspection was made and the site plan was prepared. The victim was recovered after 12 days and was given in the custody of the complainant. The victim was got medically examined and after completing the investigation the charge sheet was ultimately submitted in the Court under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC.

3. The charge was framed against the accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined Sant Ram PW-1, Saroj Kumari PW-2. the victim, Sub-Inspector Amar Singh Gautam PW-3, the Investigating Officer, Dr. J.P. Gupta PW-4 and Dr. Manorama Bahuguna PW-5. The complainant Sant Ram PW-1 stated on oath that her daughter has gone out of house on the date of the incident i.e. 29.01.1992 at about 10.00 PM to give fodder (chara) to the cattle. When she did not come back, he made efforts to search her everywhere and with her relations but failed and thereafter the report was lodged on police station concerned. After 10 to 12 days of the incident when he was standing on the check post of village Gosainganj along with Sub-Inspector and two constables he saw his daughter coming from the northern side. The first information report was proved by the witnesses which is Ex. K-1 on record.

4. The victim Saroj Kumari PW-2 stated on oath that she was given allurement by Pappoo @ Ram Kumar of good food and good clothes and to marry thus she eloped with him on the date of the incident at about 10.00 PM. She was aged about 13 years of age at the time of the incident. Pappoo took her to Lucknow with the help of one Guddu on a cycle. They took her to Khurram Nagar where they resided in a rented room at the rate of Rs.150/- per month. The two rooms were taken on rent. Pappoo and victim stayed in one room and Guddu in another room. She stated that the accused Pappoo repeatedly committed rape on her forcibly on the point of knife without her consent during this period.

5. The investigating officer, Amar Singh Gautam PW-3 stated on oath that he made spot inspection, prepared site plan and recovery memo which are Ex. K-2 to K-3 respectively. This witness also proved charge sheet, chik report and GD which are Ex. K-5 to K-7 respectively.

6.	Dr. J.P. Gupta, Radiologist, Mahila Hospital was also examined, who prepared X-ray report of the victim and  proved it which is       Ex. K-8 on record.
 
7.	Dr. Manorama Bahuguna, PW-5 stated on oath that she was posted in Lucknow Woman Hospital as Medical Officer on 10.2.2012. On that date the victim was brought to the Hospital by constable, Shakila Shaukat for medical examination. The length of the girl was 56 inches and she was having 14 X 14 teeth. There was no injury on private parts or anywhere on the person of the prosecutrix. The age of the victim was found to be between 16 to 17 years of age.
 
8.	The accused was examined under Section 313 CrPC who stated that  he was falsely implicated in this case. No evidence was produced by the accused in his defence.
 

9. The Learned Trial Court has held on the basis of the evidence of the prosexutrix, as corroborated by the other evidences that there was not only a sexual intercourse between the accused and the prosecuterix, but the same was without the consent and against the will of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix was held to be 18 years of age on the date of the incident. Though there was delay in lodging the FIR but it was satisfactorily explained. Accordingly, the accused-respondent was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and sentenced as above. As against this, an appeal came to be filed before this Court.

10. I have heard Shri Raj Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri V.K. Singh, learned A.G.A for the State and gone through the record.

11. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant vehemently argued that the case was not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Though the factum of accused- appellant having committed sexual intercourse with the victim was proved but the absence of injuries on the person of the victim was a material fact not excluding the possibility of the victim having been a consenting party. The delay in lodging the FIR was not satisfactorily explained. The delay coupled with the medical report rendered the prosecution case doubtful.

12. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further pointed out that the whole prosecution story was extremely unnatural and weak. The Learned Counsel pointed out that the prosecutrix was undoubtedly a grown up girl and though as per the prosecution case, she was raped for about 12 days, but she kept quiet. The Learned Counsel argued that the delay in lodging the FIR was fatal and further suggested that there was an element of "consent" on the part of the prosecutrix, and as such, there was no question of any rape. The Learned Counsel further suggested that even otherwise, the absence of any injury on the person of the prosecuterix suggests that the prosecutrix engaged herself in the intercourse as per her will, and Trial Court has failed to consider this important aspect. Lastly, The Learned Counsel suggested that there was in fact, no sexual intercourse, muchless, against the consent of the prosecutrix and the accused was falsely implicated in this case.

13. The learned counsel for the respondent-State has vehemently opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel of the accused-appellant and submitted that none of them was sustainable and none could be a reason for doubting the prosecution case in the given facts and circumstances and hence the conviction was liable to be confirmed.

14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the trial Court was fully justified in passing order of the conviction of the appellant. It is true that the golden thread which runs throughout the cob-web of criminal jurisprudence as administered in India is that nine guilty may escape but one innocent should not suffer. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the Court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on prawl for easy preys, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females. It is the spurt in the number of unmerited acquittals recorded by criminal courts which gives rise to the demand for death sentence to the rapists. The courts have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women. It would be appropriate to remind ourselves of what Supreme Court has said through Dr. A.S. Anand, J., as His Lordship then was, in State of Punjab Vs. Gurmeet Singh & Ors., 1996 (2) SCC 384.

..A rapist not only violates the victims privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.

15. The questions arising for consideration before me are: Whether the prosecution story, as alleged, inspires confidence of the court on the evidence adduced? Whether the prosecutrix, is a witness worthy of reliance? Whether the testimony of a prosecutrix who has been a victim of rape stands in need of corroboration and, if so, whether such corroboration is available in the facts of the present case? What was the age of the prosecutrix? Whether she was a consenting party to the crime? Whether there was unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R.?

16. I may however state that a mere delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground by itself for throwing the entire prosecution case overboard. The Court has to seek an explanation for delay and test the truthfulness and plausibility of the reason assigned. If the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the Court it cannot be counted against the prosecution. So are the observations made by Supreme Court in Karenel Singh Vs. State of M.P. (1995) 5 SCC 518 repelling the defence contention based on delay in lodging the FIR. In the present case, in our opinion the delay in lodging the F.I.R. has been satisfactorily explained. The case of the complainant is that when her daughter did not come back after giving fodder (chara) to the cattle on the date of the incident, the complainant made every effort to search his daughter everywhere and also with his relations. When he failed, the report was lodged on 01.02.1992. Thus, the delay is fully explained and no inference can be drawn against the prosecution on the ground of delay in lodging the FIR.

17. Before holding a person guilty under Section 376 IPC, it is important to determine the age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time. In this case, the prosecution came with a case in FIR that the victim was 14 years of age. The victim stated her age to be 13 years but according to the defence case, the victim was major at the relevant time. According to medical evidence her age was found 16 to 17 years. The prosecution having failed to produce any documentary evidence regarding age of the victim, then the reliance has been placed on medical evidence to determine the age of the victim. Regarding the medical assessment based on the radiological observation judicial notice can also be taken giving margin of two years as has been held in the case of Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Government of J. and K. MANU/SC/0031/1982 : AIR 1982 SC 1297. In that case, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side.

18. It is also settled law that if two views are possible then the one favourable to the accused has to be adopted. In the case of Harendra Narayan Singh v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0416/1991 : AIR 1991 SC 1842, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the basic rule of criminal jurisprudence is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case of circumstantial evidence, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the Court should adopt the latter view favourable to the accused. In the instant case, Dr. Manorama Bahuguna has mentioned the age of the victim as about 16 to 17 years. In the circumstances, the age of the victim can be taken to be 18 years at the relevant time and on this point the finding as recorded by the learned Trial Court is correct.

19. The contention of learned AGA that the girl was minor at the relevant time is therefore not tenable and cannot be accepted. Moreover, the co-accused Guddu @ Sangam has been acquitted of all charges and the appellant has been aquitted of charges u/s 363 and 366 IPC by the learned Trial Court observing that the age of the victim was 18 years during the relevant period. No counter appeal has been filed by the State against the acquittal of the Guddu @ Sanga, thus, the findings of learned Trial Court have become final in this regard.

20. It is argued by learned counsel for the accused that the prosecutrix was major at the relevant period, who had willingly gone with the accused Pappoo alias Ram Kumar to Kurram Nagar, Lucknow. She lived with Pappoo for 12 days in a rented room and if they had any intercourse it was with her consent. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish any offence against the accused person. The girl being major, who took her own decision. Learned Trial Court has wrongly appreciated the evidence on record and has erred in concluding that the girl was not the consenting party and the accused committed the offence under Section 376 IPC. The facts and circumstances of the case amply show that she was consenting party. Learned Trial Court has wrongly convicted the accused under Section 376 IPC and he is entitled to be acquitted.

21. However, for the offence of rape as defined in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, the sexual intercourse should have been against the will of the woman or without her consent. If she be of 16 years of age or above, her consent cannot be presumed; an inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. The victim of rape stating on oath that she was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse or that the act was done without her consent, has to be believed and accepted like any other testimony unless there is material available to draw an inference as to her consent or else the testimony of prosecutrix is such as would be inherently improbable. It may be recalled in that in view of section 114-A, Evidence Act inserted by Criminal Laws (Amendment), Act,1983, there has been effected radical change in law relating to rape so far as the evidence relating to rape is concerned. The law is now in view of Section 114-A, Evidence Act that if the fact of sexual intercourse is proved and the victim says that she did not consent to that act, the onus shifts to the accused to show that the accused was a consenting party.

22. In State of U P v. Chhotey Lal, 2011(2) SCC 550, the Supreme Court observed that 'Consenting' means consent of the will and submission under the influence of fear or terror cannot amount to real consent. To quote the relevant extract:

This Court in a long line of cases has given wider meaning to the word `consent' in the context of sexual offences as explained in various judicial dictionaries. In Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (Second Edition), Volume 1 (1977) at page 422 the word `consent' has been explained as an act of reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good or evil on either side. It is further stated that consent supposes three things--a physical power, a mental power, and a free and serious use of them and if consent be obtained by intimidation, force, meditated imposition, circumvention, surprise, or undue influence, it is to be treated as a delusion, and not as a deliberate and free act of the mind.

15. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition), Volume 1 (1971) at page 555 explains the expression `consent', inter alia, as under

.................... .............

" "Consent," within Penal Law, ' 2010, defining rape, requires exercise of intelligence based on knowledge of its significance and moral quality and there must be a choice between resistance and assent. People v. Pelvino, 214 N.Y.S. 577" ...................... ..........

" "Consenting" as used in the law of rape means consent of the will and submission under the influence of fear or terror cannot amount to real consent. Hallmark v. State, 22 Okl. Cr. 422" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

23. In the instant case, the victim before me is 18 years of the age. She has clearly stated that she was subjected to sexual intercourse by the accused on the point of the knife. She was not a consenting party. She was put in fear by the accused. She further stated that the appellant accused locked the rented room from outside when he used to go out for his work. She was left with no opportunity to escape. The circumstantial evidence corroborates her in all material particulars.

24. I have found the testimony of prosecutrix PW2 trustworthy and unembellished. The prosecutrix has been subjected to lengthy cross-examination. The trial court has found the prosecutrix reliable. I too find no reason to disbelieve her testimony. A father would not ordinarily subscribe to a false story of sexual assault involving his own daughter and thereby putting at stake the reputation of the family and jeopardizing the married life of the daughter. I find the testimony of victim reliable and lending support to the narration of the incident by the victim.

25. It would be apt here to remind one of the observations of the supreme court in a case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat(1983) 3 SCC 217, where the supreme court said, a girl or a woman in the tradition bound non permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the society, including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. She would face the risk of loosing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a reasonable or an acceptable family. In view of these similar factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to book. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. In this case, no reason has been proved, not even suggested during cross-examination of the witness why the victim or any member of her family would falsely implicate the accused roping him in false charge of rape.

26. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being a criminal charge. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice would do. Reference may be had to a long chain of decisions, some of which are Rameshwar 1952 SCR 377, Sidheshwar Ganguly AIR 1958 SC 143, Madhoram & Anr. (1973) 1 SCC 533, State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990) 1 SCC 550, Madam Gopal Kaddad (1992) 3 SCC 204 Shri Narayan AIR 1992 (3) SCC 615, Karnel Singh 1995 (5) SCC 518, Bodhisattwa Gautam 1996 (1) SCC 490 & Gurmit Singh (supra). I may quote from the last of the above said decisions where the rule for appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix in such cases has been succinctly summed up in the following words :-

If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.

27. The observations made in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai (Supra) deserve special mention which must be kept in mind invariably while dealing with a rape case. The Supreme Court observed as follows :

"9. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyze the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the western world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life.

28. It is further argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the medical report does not support the prosecution case where no injury was found on the private parts or anywhere else on the person of the victim. The victim herself admitted during her cross-examination that she had gone with Pappoo @ Ram Kumar voluntarily. It is argued that statement of the victim that she did not get any opportunity to raise outcry and to escape from the rented room was not reliable. She stayed with him in the rented room for 10 to 11 days which was situated by the side of road and there was also window opening towards road. Thus it is argued that the victim was having full opportunity to raise the outcry and to seek help of the passerby to escape from his custody. She never made an effort to escape or to protest. She was a consenting party and no rape was committed on her. However, the contention is not sustainable since it is settled principle that in the same set of circumstances, the reaction of different individuals may be different. In Rafiq v. State of U.P. AIR 1989 SC 96, the supreme court made the following observations in this regard:

Indeed, from place to place, from age to age. from varying life-styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with dead uniformity but realistic diversity lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny. The same observation holds good regarding the presence or absence of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the aggressed.

29. It is also argued by learned counsel for the accused that no statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 CrPC. The evidence of prosecutrix suffered from infirmities. The conviction was based on such evidence which was not sustainable. The contradictions in the statement of the father of the victim and the victim herself created doubt about the correctness of prosecution version. There was sole testimony of victim. The father of the victim stated during cross-examination that he was not aware about the venue of residence of Pappoo @ Ram Kumar while victim stated during cross-examination that the Pappoo was her neighbour whose house was situated about 4 to 5 houses away from her house. However, the alleged contradictions are minor and negligible. The evidence of a victim of a sex offence is entitled to great weight. But corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction of rape. The totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the appellant and this court has no hesitation in accepting her evidence.

30. I find no force in the contention of Learned counsel of the appellant that the prosecutrix was a willing party to the sexual assault made by the accused. Upon an evaluation of evidence available on record I am satisfied to hold that the victim is a witness of truth. Her testimony inspires confidence. Other evidence available on record lends assurance to her testimony. The Trial Court had rightly held that sexual assault amounting to rape was committed on her by the accused-respondent. The Trial Court was justified in holding her to be not a consenting party to the sexual assault on her.

31. This takes me to the last argument about the quantum of sentence. The Court below has awarded 7 years of imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3,000/-. A reference to Section 376 of IPC shows that although the minimum sentence is prescribed, the Court is empowered to award lesser punishment for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment. The proviso to Section 376(1), Indian Penal Code, as it stood prior to its amendment in the year 2013 expressly states that the Court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years in an offence under Section 376(1), Indian Penal Code, "for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment". It will be appropriate here to quote the relevant extract of the ruling of Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v.Vinod Kumar, Cri.Appeal No. 1887 of 2008, Judgement dt.18.05.2012 in this regard:

20. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that punishment should always be proportionate/ commensurate to the gravity of offence. Religion, race, caste, economic or social status of the accused or victim are not the relevant factors for determining the quantum of punishment. The court has to decide the punishment after considering all aggravating and mitigating factors and the circumstances in which the crime has been committed. Conduct and state of mind of the accused and age of the sexually assaulted victim and the gravity of the criminal act are the factors of paramount importance. The court must exercise its discretion in imposing the punishment objectively considering the facts and circumstances of the case. The power under the proviso is not to be used indiscriminately in a routine, casual and cavalier manner for the reason that an exception clause requires strict interpretation. The legislature introduced the imposition of minimum sentence by amendment in the IPC w.e.f. 25.12.1983, therefore, the courts are bound to bear in mind the effect thereof.

The court while exercising the discretion in the exception clause has to record "exceptional reasons" for resorting to the proviso. Recording of such reasons is sine qua non for granting the extraordinary relief. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no straight jacket formula can be laid down.

32. After giving my anxious consideration to the aforesaid facts and circumstances and arguments advanced on behalf of the accused by learned counsel Shri Raj Kumar Pandey and the arguments advanced by Shri V.K. Singh, learned A.G.A, I am convinced that this is a matter in which it would be appropriate to reduce the term of sentence from minimum seven to three years. The incident in this case took place in the year 1992. More than twenty four years have passed since then. This appeal itself is pending for last more than nineteen years. The evidence that has come on record clearly shows that the prosecutrix had willingly accompanied the appellant, left her home and spent more than 11 days in his Company. The prosecutrix was eighteen years old when she eloped with the appellant taking silver ornaments from her home.

33. The appellant was a young man of about 20 years when this incident took place, who was unmatured and first offender. He according to the version of the victim herself took the victim back to her village after 12 days when she intended to go back to her parents. To quote the relevant extract of statement of prosecutrix:-

tc eq>s vius ekWa&cki dh ;kn vkus yxh vkSj eSaus iIiw ls dgk rks mlus dgk fd eSa ?kj igqWapk nwWaxkA

34. The reasons mentioned above, specially the fact which persuades me to take a lenient view in the matter of sentence and awarding less than the minimum prescribed sentence of seven years is that prosecutrix aged 18 years had willingly left her parents' house to be with the appellant taking silver ornaments, which is more than evident from the facts of the case. I am inclined to accept that this and other reasons stated in detail above are sufficient and can be said to be adequate and special reasons for awarding lesser sentence for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC.

35. I am, therefore, inclined to allow the appeal partly by reducing the sentence for offense punishable under Section 376 of IPC from RI of seven years to RI of three years. The sentence of fine is however, confirmed. One copy of this order be sent to learned trial court.

Order accordingly.

Order Date :- 30.9.2016

KR