Manoj Jaiswal Throu.His Next ... vs Union Of India Throu ...
2015 Latest Caselaw 2794 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

-1-
 
Reserved on 03.09.2015
 
Delivered on 30.09.2015
 
Court No. - 1
 
Case :- HABEAS CORPUS No. - 5 of 2015
 
Petitioner :- Manoj Jaiswal Throu.His Next Friend Manish Gupta
 
Respondent :- Union Of India Throu Secy.Ministry Of Home Affairs &
 
Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- B.K. Shukla, P.K. Rai
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate, A.S.G., Vimal Kumar
 
Srivastava
 
Hon'ble Dinesh Maheshwari,J.

Hon'ble Rakesh Srivastava,J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rakesh Srivastava J.)

1. This is a petition through jail under Section 226 of the

Constitution for issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus by Manoj

Jaiswal, who has been detained by an order of detention dated

11.10.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Barabanki, under

sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980

(for brevity 'Act') with a view to prevent him from acting in any

manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

2. The grounds of detention, as communicated to the detenue by

the District Magistrate on the basis of which the detention order

was passed, are as follows:

dk;kZy; ftyk eftLV s ª V] ckjkc ad h

fu#f) ds vk/kkj

pwafd vkns'k la[;k [email protected] fnukad 11&10&2014 ds vUrxZr

vki eukst tk;loky mez yxHkx 33 o"kZ] iq= fouksn

tk;loky] fuoklh nf{k.k Vksyk cadh] Fkkuk dksrokyh uxj]

tuin ckjkcadh dks jk"Vªh; lqj{kk vf/kfu;e] 1980 ¼vf/kfu;e

la[;k [email protected]½ dh /kkjk 3 mi /kkjk ¼2½ ds v/khu fu#)

fd;k x;k gSA

vr,o] mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&8 ds micU/kksa ds vuqlj.k

esa ,rn~}kjk vkidks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkidks fu#)

djus ds vk/kkj vuqorhZ izLrj esa fn;s x;s gS% &

fnukad 15&01&2014 dks nksigj 02 cts vkius vius

vU; lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk cadh cktkj] Fkkuk dksrokyh uxj]

tuin ckjkcadh esa vjfoUn ;kno dks repa s ls Qk;j djds

u`'kal gR;k dj nhA bl ?kVuk dh izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ e`rd

vjfoUn ;kno ds HkkbZ iq:"kksRre yky ;kno us vijk/k

la[;k&[email protected]] /kkjk&[email protected]@[email protected]@302 Hkkjrh;

n.M fo/kku] Fkkuk dksrokyh uxj] tuin ckjkcadh esa iathd`r

dh x;hA e`rd vjfoUn ;kno dk iksLV ekVZe fnukad

15&01&2014 dks gqvkA iksLVekVZe esa e`rd vjfoUn ;kno dh

e`R;q vkXus;kL= dh pksVksa ls gksuk ik;k x;kA

bl vijk/k ds xokg iq:"kksRre yky ;kno] v'kaw ;kno]

lksuw ;kno ,oa iznhi ;kno us vius&vius c;kuksa esa mDr

u`'kal gR;k dh ?kVuk dk leFkZu fd;k gSA xokgksa us tgka ,d

lkFk mDr dkfjr ?kVuk dk leFkZu fd;k gS ogha nwljh

vksj ;g Hkh lk{; gS fd vki }kjk dkfjr mDr u`'kal

gR;kdk.M ls yksd dkQh Hk;Hkhr gks x;s gSa] Mj ds dkj.k

vius ?kjksa ds njokts o f[kM+fd;ka cUn dj yh] yksx ?kjksa ls

ugha fudysA nqdkusa cUn gks x;h yksx vko';d oLrq,a [kjhnus

ls oafpr gks x;sA LFkkuh; yksd O;oLFkk fNUu&fHkUu gks x;h

vkSj tuekul dk veu pSu vLr O;Lr gks x;kA vki }kjk

dkfjr mDr u`'kal gR;kdk.M dk lekpkj fofHkUu lekpkj i=ksa

esa izeq[krk ls izdkf'kr gqvkA ftldks i<+dj tuthou esa Hk;

O;kIr gks x;k vkSj O;kid :i ls tuekul dk veu pSu

foijhr :i ls izHkkfor gqvkA vki }kjk dkfjr mDr

gR;kdk.M esa vHkh Hkh yksx nqdku] ?kj o dkjksckjh Mjs o lgesa

gSA

vki fnukad 27&01&2014 ls ftyk dkjkxkj] ckjkcadh

esa fu#) gSA vki tekur ij NwVus dk iz;kl dj jgs gSa rFkk

ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa tekur izkFkZuk i= izLrqr dj fn;k

gSA vkids tekur ij NwVus dh iw.kZ lEHkkouk gSA ;fn vki

tekur ij NwVdj tsy ls Ckkgj vk x;s rks iqu% xaHkhj vijk/k

?kfVr djds yksd O;oLFkk dks Hkax djsaxsa ,oa tuekul ds

veu pSu dks fCkxkM+saxsaA

mi;qZDr vk/kkjksa ls esjk ;g lek/kku gks x;k gS fd vkids }kjk

,slh fdlh Hkh jhfr esa dk;Zokgh fd;s tkus dh lEHkkouk gS] tks

yksd O;oLFkk cuk;s j[kus ds izfrdwy gS] vkSj vkidks ,slh jhfr

esa dk;Zokgh djus ls] tks yksd OloLFkk cuk;s j[kus esa izfrdwy

gS] dks jksdus ds mn~ns'; ls] ;g vko';d gS fd vkidks fu#)

fd;k tk;sA

vkidks mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&8 ds vuqlj.k esa ,rn~}kjk

lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkidks ,sls vkns'k] ftlds v/khu

vki fu#) fd;s x;s gSa] ds fo#) fujks/kd vf/kdkjh ¼ftyk

eftLVsªV½ rFkk jkT; ljdkj dks izR;kosnu nsus dk vf/kdkj gSsaA

;fn vki fujks/kd vf/kdkjh ¼ftyk eftLVsªV½ dks izR;kosnu nsus

ds vius vf/kdkj iz;ksx djuk pkgsa rks mls] ml dkjkxkj] tgkWa

vki fu#) gSa] ds v/kh{kd ds ek/;e ls ;Fkk'kh?kz izLrqr

djsA ,sls izR;kosnu ij] ;fn og fujks/kkns'k tkjh gksus ds 12

fnol vFkok jkT; ljdkj }kjk fujks/kkns'k dk vuqeksnu gksus]

tks Hkh igys gks ds ckn izkIr gksxk rks fujks/kd vf/kdkjh

¼ftyk eftLVsªV½ }kjk ml ij fopkj ugha fd;k tk

ldsxkA ;fn vki jkT; ljdkj dks ,slk izR;kosnu nsus ds

vius vf/kdkj dk iz;ksx djuk pkgsa rks vki mls lfpo] x`g

foHkkx] mRrj izns'k ljdkj] y[kuÅ dks lEcksf/kr djds ml

dkjkxkj] tgkWa vki fu#) gSa] ds v/kh{kd ds ek/;e ls izLrqr

djsaA

vkidks mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 9 ,oa 10 ds lUnHkZ esa

,rn~}kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkidks ,sls vkns'k] ftlds

v/khu vki fu#) fd;s x;s gSa] ds fo#) ;fn vki mRrj izns'k

jkT; lykgdkj cksMZ] y[kuÅ dks Hkh viuk izR;kosnu nsuk

pkgsa rks mls v/;{k mRrj izns'k jkT; lykgdkj cksMZ] y[kuÅ

dks lEcksf/kr djds dkjkxkj] tgkWa vki fu#) gSa] ds v/kh{kd

ds ek/;e ls ;Fkk'kh?kz izLrqr djsaA vkidks ;g Hkh lwfpr fd;k

tkrk gS fd vkidk ekeyk mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&10 ds

v/khu vkidh fu#f) dh okLrfod frfFk ds rhu lIrkg ds

vUnj mRrj izns'k jkT; lykgdkj cksMZ] y[kuÅ dks lanfHkZr

fd;k tk;sxk vkSj vkids izR;kosnu ij] ;fn og foyEc ls

izkIr gksxk rks mDr cksMZ }kjk ml ij fopkj ugha fd;k

tk;sxkA

vkidks ;g Hkh lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mDr vf/kfu;e

dh /kkjk&11 dh mi/kkjk ¼1½ ds vuqlkj mRrj izns'k jkT;

lykgdkj cksMZ] ;fn vko';d le>s vFkok ;fn vki pkgs rks

vkidks mDr cksMZ }kjk lquk tk;sxkA ;fn vki mDr cksMZ }kjk

viuh O;fDrxr lquokbZ djuk pkgs rks ;g ckr vki vius

izR;kosnu esa fof'k"V :i ls fy[ks rFkk dkjkxkj] tgka vki

fu#) gSa] ds v/kh{kd ds ek/;e ls jkT; ljdkj dks izLrqr

djsaA

vkidks mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&14 ds vuqlj.k esa

,rn~}kjk ;g lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkidks ,sls vkns'k]

ftlds v/khu vki fu#) fd;s x;s gSa] ds fo#) dsUnzh;

ljdkj dks Hkh izR;kosnu nsus dks vf/kdkj izkIr gSA ;fn vki

dsUnzh; ljdkj dks izR;kosnu nsus ds vius vf/kdkj dk iz;ksx

djuk pkgs rks vki mls lfpo] Hkkjr ljdkj] x`g ea=ky;

¼vkUrfjd lqj{kk foHkkx½] ukFkZ Cykd] ubZ fnYyh dks lEcksf/kr

djds ml dkjkxkj] tgkWa vki fu#) gSa] ds v/kh{kd ds ek/;e

ls izLrqr djsaA

¼;ksxs'oj jke feJ½

ftyk eftLVsªV

ckjkcadhA

3. The detention order as well as grounds of detention was served

upon the petitioner. The District Magistrate sent a report to the

State Government about the passing of detention order together

with the grounds of the detention and all the particulars bearing

on the same. The said report and the particulars were

considered by the State Government and it approved of the

detention order under sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act and

sent a report to the Central Government under section 3 (5) of

the Act. The State Government forwarded the case of the

petitioner to the Advisory Board in due course under section 10

of the Act along with detention order together with the grounds

of detention. The representation made by the petitioner to the

State Government was also placed before the Advisory Board.

The Board considered the material placed before it, including

the representation of the petitioner and after hearing the

petitioner in person, sent its report to the State Government

under subsection (1) of section 11 of the Act. According to the

Board there was sufficient cause for detention of the petitioner.

In pursuance of the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board

the State Government, in exercise of its powers under subsection

(1) of section 12 of the Act, confirmed the order for

detention of the petitioner and the same was communicated to

the petitioner.

4. In response to the rule nisi, Sri Yogeshwar Ram Mishra the

District Magistrate, Barabanki, who had passed the impugned

order, has filed a counter affidavit to which the petitioner has

filed his rejoinder affidavit. In his counter affidavit, the District

Magistrate has explained the circumstances which led to the

issuance of the detention order. In the counter affidavit, the

allegations made by the detenu have been controverted and it

has been unequivocally stated that the Constitution safeguards

of Article 22 (5) and that of section 8 of the Act, have been

strictly complied with.

5. The detention order was passed by the District Magistrate on

11.10.2014 and at that point of time the petitioner was under

detention in District Jail Barabanki on the basis of an FIR dated

15.01.2014 lodged by Purushottam Lal Yadav - the brother of

the deceased in Case Crime No. 40 of 2014, under Sections

147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC lodged at Police Station Kotwali

Nagar, District Barabanki. It may be mentioned, at this stage,

that the detenu has since been granted bail on 23.07.2015, but

in view of the order of detention, he has not been released.

6. The contentions raised by Sri P.K. Rai, learned counsel for the

petitioner are three-fold:

a. The grounds, at the worst, do no more than to suggest a

possible 'law and order' situation and not a 'public order'

situation and therefore the detention on the ostensible

ground of preventing him from acting in a manner

prejudicial to public order was not justified.

b. In the absence of any past history, the detention of the

petitioner on the solitary incident, referred to in the ground

of detention, was totally unwarranted.

c. The petitioner, who was in jail when the detention order was

passed, had not moved any bail application and as such there

was no apprehension of breach of public order from him.

In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed

reliance upon the cases reported in (1990) 2 SCC 456, Devaki

v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 181,

Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur & Ors. and

(2012) 2 SCC 176, Yumman Ongbi Lenbi & Ors. v.. State of

Manipur & Ors.

7. Sri R.K. Diwedi, however, relying upon the records of the

proceedings and the affidavit filed by the detaining authority,

has supported the order of detention.

8. We have heard Sri P. K. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner

and Sri R.K. Dwivedi, learned Government Advocate and

perused the record.

9. The distinction between the concept of public order and that of

law and order has been adverted to by the Apex Court in a

catena of decisions. The question whether a man has only

committed a breach of law and order or acted in a manner

leading to disturbance of public order is a question of degree of

the reach of the act upon society is no more res integra. In the

case reported in AIR 1966 SC 740, Dr Ram Manohar Lohia v.

State of Bihar it was observed that the contravention 'of law'

always affects 'order' but before it could be said to affect 'public

order', it must affect the community or the public at large. One

has to imagine three concentric circles, the largest representing

"law and order", the next representing "public order" and the

smallest representing "security of State". An act may affect "law

and order" but not "public order", just as an act may affect

"public order" but not "security of the State".

10. In paragraph 3 of the case reported in (1970) 1 SCC 98, Arun

Ghosh v. State of West Bengal. it was held as follows:

"Public order was said to embrace more of the

community than law and order. Public order is the even

tempo of the life of the community taking the country as

a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of

public order is to be distinguished, from acts directed

against individuals which do not disturb the society to the

extent of causing a general disturbance of public

tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect

upon the life of the community in a locality which

determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a

breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs

another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but

the life of the community keeps moving at an even

tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take

another case of a town where there is communal tension.

A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an

act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and

it affects the even tempo of life and public order is

jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace

large Sections of the community and incite them to make

further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the

public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own

gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in

its potentiality it may be very different."

In the same paragraph the Apex Court has held as follows:

"It means therefore that the question whether a man has

only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in

a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order

is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the

act upon the society. The French distinguish law and

order and public order by designating the latter as order

publique. The latter expression has been recognised as

meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of

law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petition No.

179 of 1968 drew a line of demarcation between the

serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order

which affect the community or endanger the public

interest at large from minor breaches of peace which do

not affect the public at large. He drew an analogy

between public and private crimes. The analogy is useful

but not to be pushed too far. A large number of acts

directed against persons or individuals may total up into a

breach of public order. In Dr Ram Manohar Lohia's case

examples were given by Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ.

They show how similar acts in different contexts affect

differently law and order on the one hand and public

order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the

harm and its affect upon the community. The question to

ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of

the community so as to amount a disturbance of the

public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving

the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? This question

has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no

formula by which one case can be distinguished from

another."

11. The principle enunciated above has been followed by the Apex

Court in all subsequent cases. It is, therefore, necessary in each

case to examine the facts to determine as to whether the act

referred to in the grounds of detention falls in the realm of 'law

and order' problem or it had the reach and potentiality so deep,

so as to disturb the society, to the extent of causing a general

disturbance of public tranquillity.

12. It would appear from the ground of detention that the petitioner

and his associates attacked Arvind Yadav and his associate with

firearms in the open market in broad daylight which resulted in

the death of Arvind Yadav. It has been further stated that the

above act of the petitioner and his associates created terror and

panic amongst the people of the locality and thereby disturbed

public order. The daring act of the petitioner in a busy market,

in our opinion, affected public order and not merely law and

order. The said act, certainly, caused terror and panic in the

locality and affected those who watched the whole thing in fear

as helpless spectators. The act in question adversely affected the

even tempo of life of the community and caused a general

disturbance of public tranquility

13.On behalf of the petitioner, a reference has been made to T.

Devaki's case (supra). The petitioner in that case had attacked

the Minister in a seminar. He threw a knife towards the minister

with an intention to kill him but he missed the target and fell

down at the stage. The police caught hold him and those who

accompanied him were also overpowered by the police and

consequent to the conduct of the petitioner the proceeding of

the seminar was interrupted for "only a while" and since the

proceedings of the seminar were interrupted for a while it was

held that the petitioner's activity in that case did not and could

not affect public peace and tranquility. The decision is thus of

no help to the petitioner.

14.We now come to the second submission made by the learned

counsel for the petitioner that detention on a solitary incident,

referred to in the ground of detention, was totally unwarranted.

15.It is also settled that a solitary act of omission or commission

can be taken into consideration, by the detaining authority to

pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of

the act is such that it disturbs public tranquillity by creating

terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of

people in the specified locality where the act is alleged to have

been committed.

16. In paragraph 14 of the case reported in (1983) 4 SCC 301,

Alijan Mian v. Distt. Magistrate the Apex Court has held as

follows:

"14. Now the question arises whether the two incidents

were sufficient for the detaining authority to initiate

proceedings for preventive detention. It is for the

detaining authority to have the subjective satisfaction

about the apprehension of the breach of the public order

from the incidents mentioned above. Even one incident

may be sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority. It all

depends upon the nature of the incident. In the case in

hand the detaining authority was fully satisfied that there

was apprehension of breach of public order from the

petitioners in case they were bailed out, of which there

was every likelihood. This contention in our opinion has

no force."

17. In the case reported in (1989) 4 SCC 509, Bimla Rani v. Union

of India the Apex Court opined as follows:

"8. It is true that the incident on 13-4-1989 was a solitary

one so far as the detenu was concerned, but the question

is whether the incident had prejudicially affected the

public order. In other words, whether it had affected the

even tempo of life of the community. As observed in

Alijan Mian case, it is for the detaining authority to have

the subjective satisfaction about the apprehension of the

breach of the public order and that even one incident may

be sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority in that

regard depending upon the nature of the incident. It is not

disputed by Mr Lalit that a single incident may disturb

the tranquillity and the even tempo of life of the

community.

18. In the case reported in (1994) 5 SCC 54, Attorney General for

India & Others Vs. Amratlal Prajivandas & Others, though

the matter related to the COFEPOSA, a nine judges Bench of

the Apex Court has inter alia held as under:-

"Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to

sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an

order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to

indicate that it is an organised act or a manifestation of

organised activity. The gravity and nature of the act is

also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it

gives rise to an inference that the person would continue

to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. "

19.In the ground of detention, the detaining authority on the basis

of relevant and cogent material, has elaborately stated the effect

of the incident. The detaining authority has categorically stated

that on account of the incident fear and terror was spread in the

hearts of the public in the market. In our opinion, even though it

was solitary incident but in the circumstances, it was sufficient

for the detaining authority to arrive at a finding that the even

tempo of life had been disturbed which had prejudicially

affected the public order. In view of the above the second

submission made on behalf of the petitioner also cannot be

upheld.

20. This leads us to the third contention made on behalf of the petitioner.

The question as to whether a person who is in jail can be

detained under detention law has been the subject-matter of

consideration before the Apex Court time and again, and it has

been consistently held in such cases that there was no law in

passing a detention order even against a person under custody,

however, at the time of passing the detention order, the

detaining authority should be aware that the detenu was already

in custody and was likely to be released on bail. The conclusion

that the detenu could be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of

the detaining authority and once it is established that the

detaining authority was conscious of the said fact, its subjective

satisfaction based on materials, normally, should not be

interfered with.

21. In (2004) 8 SCC 106, at page 118, T.P. Moideen Koya v. Govt.

of Kerala the Apex Court held as follows:

"19. The very object of passing a detention order being to

prevent the person from acting in any manner prejudicial

to maintenance of public order or from smuggling goods

or dealing in smuggled goods, etc., normally there would

be no requirement or necessity of passing such an order

against a person who is already in custody in respect of a

criminal offence where there is no immediate possibility

of his being released. But in law there is no bar in passing

a detention order even against such a person if the

detaining authority is subjectively satisfied from the

material placed before him that a detention order should

be passed. A Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v.

District Magistrate held as under: (SCR p. 929)

"As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be

any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the

authority from passing an order of detention against a

person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the

relevant facts in connection with the making of the

order may differ and that may make a difference in the

application of the principle that a detention order can

be passed against a person in jail."

20. In Vijay Kumar v. State of J&K it was held: (SCC p.

48, para 10)

"If the detenu is already in jail charged with a serious

offence, he is thereby prevented from acting in a

manner prejudicial to the security of the State. Maybe,

in a given case there yet may be the need to order

preventive detention of a person already in jail. But in

such a situation the detaining authority must disclose

awareness of the fact that the person against whom an

order of preventive detention is being made is to the

knowledge of the authority already in jail and yet for

compelling reasons a preventive detention order needs

to be made."

22.A perusal of the grounds of detention would show that the

detaining authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu

was actually in jail custody and there was material before him

to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously

contended that the petitioner had not moved any bail

application before this Court as alleged in the grounds of

detention and has thereby questioned the observations made by

the detaining authority that the detenue was likely to be

released on bail. The learned counsel for the petitioner has,

however, candidly accepted that a notice for filing bail

application on behalf of the petitioner had been given in the

office of the Government Advocate.

23.For filing a bail application under Chapter XVIII Rule 8 of the

Allahabad High Court Rules, at least 10 days notice is required

to be given. As soon as notice is given, the intention to move

the bail application is clear and the State cannot presume

negative that despite giving the notice bail application would

not be moved. Therefore, the authorities concerned cannot be

faulted in presuming that the petitioner was making attempt to

get himself released on bail.

24. In habeas corpus writ petition no. 2690 of 2015, Robin Tyagi

versus Union of India & Ors. a Division Bench of this court

had the occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. The

Division Bench held as follows:

"Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioner,

contends that the grounds of detention reply nonapplication

of mind in as much as the bail was granted in

case Case Crime. No. 200 of 2014 by the High Court on

1.8 .2014, but grounds of detention could not have

proceeded on such a presumption. This has been

countered by the learned A.G.A. clearly contending that a

bail application is moved under ChapterXVIII Rule 8 of

the Allahabad High Court Rules wherein at least 10 days

notice is required to be given. The notice was given and

then the bail application was filed on 30.7 .2014. Thus,

the State will be presumed to have knowledge about the

said bail application having been filed an attempt being

made by the petitioner to get himself released on bail.

The aforesaid contention of the learned A.G.A. appears to

be correct, and therefore has to be accepted."

25. In support of the third contention learned counsel for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon the case of Huidrom

Konungjao Singh (supra). In the said case the detention order

passed against the petitoner of that case, who was in jail, was

set aside. In that case no bail application, whatsoever, was

moved on behalf of the petitioner and as such there was no

possibility of the accused being released from jail custody

accordingly the detention order was set aside. That is not the

case here. Thus, the petitioner does not derive any benefit from

the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh (supra). The case of

Yumman Ongbi Lenbi (supra) on which reliance has been

placed is also of no help to the petitioner. In the said case the

detention order was passed after almost 12 years after the last

FIR was filed against the petitioner of that case and it was held

that there was no live link of the earlier incident and incident in

respect of which the detention was passed.

26.In view of the above, the third contention raised in behalf of the

petitioner also fails.

27.For the foregoing discussion, we find no force in any of the

contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The petition is

accordingly dismissed.

Order Date : 30.09.2015

Pradeep/-

(Rakesh Srivastava, J.) (Dinesh Maheshwari, J.)