Rajesh Kumar Paliwal vs Om Prakash & Others
2015 Latest Caselaw 2226 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

  AFR   
 
Reserved
 
Case :- CIVIL REVISION No. - 101 of 2011
 
Revisionist :- Rajesh Kumar Paliwal
 
Opposite Party :- Om Prakash & Others
 
Counsel for Revisionist :- Saurabh Srivastava
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Ravi Kant, Abhishek Tripathi, Tarun Agarwal
 

 
Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.

This revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 18871 has been preferred by the tenant-defendant against the judgment and order dated 19th January, 2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Kanpur Nagar2 in S.C.C. Suit No. 124 of 2008 (Sri Om Prakash and others v. Rajesh Kumar Paliwal) whereby the Court below has decreed the suit and directed for ejectment of the tenant from the accommodation in question and has also decreed the suit for arrears of rent and damages.

The essential facts are that the revisionist is a tenant of the entire first floor of a residential accommodation, being House No. 128/2, D-Block, Kidwai Nagar, Kanpur Nagar. The first floor comprises of four rooms, two latrines, bathrooms, veranda, courtyard and a kitchen. The entire first floor was earlier let out to the father of the revisionist and after his death, the revisionist is in tenancy thereof. The landlord late Om Prakash Gupta instituted the suit, which gave rise to this revision, for eviction of the revisionist, but during the pendency of the suit he passed away on 06th June, 2009, therefore, his legal heirs have been impleaded in the suit as plaintiffs-landlords.

Late Om Prakash Gupta, the landlord, had purchased the aforementioned house vide registered sale-deed dated 06th April, 1994 from its erstwhile owners, namely, Sri Uma Shanker, Sri Ram Shanker and Sri Vijai Kumar Agarwal. His name has been duly recorded in the municipal and other records. In the house in question, there are other tenants also. The parties are not in conflict on the fact that the premises in question comes within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972)3 and the revisionist-tenant is in occupation of the first floor thereof. The landlord's case is that the tenant was fully aware of the fact that he has become owner of the house in question by virtue of the sale-deed dated 06th April, 1994 but the tenant did not pay the rent, therefore, by a composite notice dated 25th July, 2008 the tenancy was determined and a demand for arrears of rent was made. The tenant has submitted a reply to the said notice and refused to vacate the accommodation inter alia on the ground that there is no default by him.

The landlord thereafter instituted a suit, being S.C.C. Suit No. 124 of 2008 (Om Prakash Gupta v. Sri Rajesh Kumar Paliwal). In the suit the landlord pleaded that after the purchase of the demised premises on 06th April, 1994, he had enhanced the rent of all the tenants including the revisionist-tenant. The rent of the accommodation under the tenancy of the revisionist was enhanced to Rs.1800/- per month and he was also liable to pay house tax, water tax and sewerage tax. The landlord has pleaded that when he demanded the rent, the tenant-revisionist misbehaved with him and refused to pay the rent. Therefore, the tenancy of the revisionist was terminated by a notice dated 25th July, 2008 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The notice was sent under the registered cover and was duly served on the tenant on 26th July, 2008. However, in spite of service of notice, it is stated, the tenant failed to pay the arrears of rent and he did not vacate the accommodation. Therefore, after the termination of his tenancy from 26th August, 2008, the landlord is entitled to recover the damages also. It is stated that the tenant has replied the notice wherein he has disputed the rate of rent. According to the tenant, the rent was only Rs.300/- per month, which he has deposited in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kanpur. It is averred in the plaint that in the the reply to the notice of the landlord, the tenant claimed to have sent a bankers cheque dated 11th August, 2008 drawn at Allahabad Bank, Kidwai Nagar Branch, Kanpur also to the counsel of the plaintiff, but the landlord has denied this fact that no such cheque was received by his counsel. The landlord has also alleged that the tenant has opened a Coaching Centre in the accommodation in question and is earning Rs.1.00 lac per month. Thus, he has sub-let the accommodation and he is liable to be evicted in terms of Section 20(2)(d) of the Act, 1972. The landlord has demanded a sum of Rs.3,10,800/- as arrears of rent @ Rs.1800/- per month and Rs.55,944/- against the water tax apart from damages. It is averred in the plaint that the arrears of rent for the period prior to 01st September, 2005 has become time barred hence, the demand has been raised after 01st September, 2005 for the recovery of the rent. The landlord has also averred that he is entitled for the damages for illegal occupation and possession from 26th August, 2008.

The tenant has filed his written statement in the suit. The stand taken by the tenant, inter alia, is that he is tenant of the entire first floor of the demised premises at the monthly rent of Rs.300/-. He has denied the claim of the landlord that agreed rent was Rs.1800/- per month. The landlord does not need the accommodation as he is comfortably residing in House No. 130/576-A, Bakerganj, Kanpur, which is a big house. The landlord had earlier filed an eviction suit, being Suit No. 266 of 1994 (Om Prakash v. Mohd. Ashfaq and another) and impleaded the tenant-defendant as defendant no. 2 therein. The said suit was filed on 18th May, 1994 and it was decreed exparte within ten days on 28th May, 1994. In the said suit it was pointed out that the landlord has claimed the rent @ Rs.300/- per month. Later on, he moved an application that he did not file the said suit and accordingly, the suit was dismissed. It is also stated in the written statement that the tenant had sent a cheque of Rs.15,000/- along with the reply to the notice of the landlord. The said cheque has definitely been received by the counsel of the plaintiff but he has falsely been denying the same. It is stated that when the tenant came to know about the exparte order dated 28th May, 1994 passed in Suit No. 266 of 1994, the tenant has deposited the rent at the rate of Rs.300/- per month in terms of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 and he had moved an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19084, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 92/74 of 1994, Rajesh Paliwal v. Om Prakash and another. In the said miscellaneous case, on the legal advice, the tenant-defendant is depositing the rent regularly. It is further averred that in addition to it, he has also deposited a sum of Rs.41,920/- in Kanpur Jal Sansthan against his water tax. In view of the above, it was claimed that no rent is due and payable by the tenant-defendant. It has also been averred that the tenant had received a notice dated 05th February, 1997 from the Executive Engineer, Kanpur Jal Sansthan, Kanpur directing him to make the payment towards the discharge of liability of water tax and sewerage tax and in response to the said notice, he has deposited a sum of Rs.41,920/- in the office of the Kanpur Jal Sansthan in the account of the landlord-plaintiff. He claimed that he has further deposited a sum of Rs.12,200/- in Misc. Case of 92/74 of 1994 arising out of Suit No. 266 of 1994, Om Prakash Gupta v. Mohd. Ashfaq and another. On the basis of the said averments, it was claimed that the amount deposited by him in Misc. Case No. 92/74 of 1994 in Suit No. 266 of 1994 may be treated as valid deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972 in the present suit. He has denied that he is running any Coaching Institute in the demised premises. Thus, there is no question of sub-letting. In the additional plea, the same facts have been reiterated.

The landlord has filed a replication wherein he has vehemently denied the fact that he had earlier filed Suit No. 266 of 1994. In fact, the tenant has got the suit filed by impersonation and when the landlord came to know about the said fact, the said suit, on his application, has been dismissed. The landlord has denied that he has received a bankers cheque for a sum of Rs.15,000/- against the arrears of rent. It is also averred that the tenant should not have sent the amount to the counsel of the landlord and the counsel is not entitled to receive the rent. The landlord has reiterated that the rent was Rs.1800/- per month.

The plaintiff has produced two witnesses; one Om Prakash as P.W.-1 and Ram Lakhan Yadav as P.W.-2. The defendants have got examined three witnesses, namely, Rajesh Paliwal, Krishna Murari Awasthi and Ashok Kumar Agarwal as D.W.-1, D.W.-2 and D.W.-3 respectively.

Both the sides have filed documentary evidences also. The Court below has referred all the evidences filed by the parties in its judgment, impugned in this revision, in detail.

The Court below has framed the following issues for determination:

"1- Whether the rent of the disputed accommodation is Rs.1800/- per month as alleged by the plaintiffs or Rs.250/- per month as alleged by the defendants?

2- Whether the defendants are defaulter in payment of rent?

3- Whether the money deposited by the defendants in Jal Sansthan Kanpur is liable to be adjusted as rent as alleged by the defendants?

4- Whether the notice given by the plaintiffs U/s 106 of T.P. Act is valid?

5- Whether the defendant has opened a Coaching Centre and changed the nature of use of the disputed accommodation and is liable to be evicted on this ground?

6- Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for any relief?"

While deciding Issue No. 1 the Court below recorded a finding that the rent of the disputed accommodation is Rs.1800/- per month. The Court below has referred the documentary and oral evidences in detail and has also taken note of the fact that after purchase of the demised premises, the landlord had enhanced the rent of all other tenants and this fact has not been denied by the tenant-defendant. The Court below has also recorded a finding that in the disputed accommodation there are four rooms, two toilets, bathrooms, veranda, courtyard, kitchen on the first floor, which is in the tenancy of the tenant. It has also been recorded that the building is situated in the heart of the market Kidwai Nagar, Kanpur and after analysing the evidences on the record, the Court below has believed the version of the landlord about the rate of rent.

Insofar as the Issue No. 2 is concerned, the Court below has also found that the tenant was in arrears of rent and accordingly, this issue was decided in favour of the landlord-plaintiff.

On the Issue No. 3, the Court below has recorded a finding that the money deposited by the tenant against the notice issued by the Executive Engineer, Kanpur Jal Sansthan, Kanpur cannot be adjusted against the arrears of rent as it was duty of the tenant to deposit the tax. The Court below has also referred the various receipts issued by the Jal Sansthan, Kanpur which indicate that the amount has been deposited by Smt. Surajo Devi C/o Rajesh Kumar Paliwal, and not by the tenant. The Court below held that it was not a proper payment and this money cannot be adjusted in rent. It has also been recorded that the tenant has deposited the money in the name of Smt. Surajo Devi, the erstwhile owner, although the tenant was in full knowledge that the landlord Om Prakash has purchased the house.

While deciding Issue No. 4 in respect of validity of the composite notice sent by the landlord determining the tenancy, the Court below found that the notice was valid and legal.

Insofar as the Issue No. 5 which relates to sub-letting is concerned, the said issue was decided against the landlord and it was found that the landlord has failed to prove the sub-letting.

Thus, on the basis of the findings recorded on the aforesaid issues, the suit was decreed by the Court below vide impugned judgment and order.

I have heard Sri Saurabh Srivastava, learned counsel for the revisionist, and Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents.

Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the monthly rent of the disputed accommodation was Rs.300/-, which was duly deposited in the Court of Judge, Small Cause under Section 30 of the Act, 1972. He submitted that the landlord had instituted a suit for eviction, being Original Suit No. 266 of 1994, Om Prakash v. Mohd. Ashfaq and another, in the month of April, 1994 itself i.e. just after purchase of the property from the erstwhile landlord. Learned counsel for the revisionist has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraphs-1 and 5 of the plaint of Suit No. 266 of 1994, which was allegedly filed by Om Prakash. It is stated that in the said suit the landlord had claimed the rent at the rate of Rs.300/- per month but the said fact has been ignored by the trial Court. He further submitted that the landlord has failed to establish that the rent was enhanced from Rs.300/- to Rs.1800/-, after he purchased the property from the erstwhile owner. He lastly urged that the Court below has wrongly placed burden of proof on the tenant. No other submission has been made by the learned counsel for the revisionist.

Although at the time of submission learned counsel for the revisionist did not cite any judgment, yet in the written submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mahendra Pratap Garg v. Smt. Vijai Laxmi General5, and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Rangammal v. Kuppuswami and another6, Alva Aluminium Limited, Bangkok v. Gabriel India Limited7, Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen8, and, Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh9. I have perused those judgments.

In Mahendra Pratap Garg (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has held that sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, 1972 gives another occasion to the tenant to save his tenancy. The tenant can deposit the admitted rent due together with interest and cost and the tender or deposit should be unconditional. The intention of the said section is that if the tenant pays or deposits the amount due, a decree for ejectment should not be passed. In the present case, the tenant has not deposited the amount due together with interest and cost. Learned counsel for the revisionist has not demonstrated from the material on the record that there is strict compliance of the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. In the present case, only vague submission has been made that the tenant has complied with Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. Even from the findings of the Court below it is evident that before the Court below also the said issue has not been raised seriously. In view of the above, I am of the view that the judgment of Mahendra Pratap Garg (supra) does not help the revisionist.

The judgment of Rangammal (supra) is in respect of burden of proof. The said case arose out of a suit for partition of joint family property. In the present case, the issue with regard to burden of proof has not been argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist. The Court below, in the present case, has recorded a finding that the landlord has proved, by the oral evidence, the fact regarding enhancement of rent. In the case of Alva Aluminium Limited, Bangkok (supra) the issue was also in respect of burden of proof. In the said case, the Supreme Court considered a dispute arising out of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A petition was filed under sub-sections (5) and (9) of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for the appointment of an independent and impartial person as a sole arbitrator. The respondent in the said case had disputed the arbitration agreement. It was contended by the respondents that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the parties. In fact, the respondent had raised the issue regarding validity of the contract document itself. In view of the above fact, the said case has no application in the present case. As mentioned above, during the course of submission learned counsel for the revisionist has not relied upon any judgment.

The case of Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) relates to service matter. In the said case, a departmental enquiry was conducted against an employee and he was dismissed from service. The employee filed a civil suit on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. In the said case, no oral evidence was led by the appellants therein and thus, the documents were not disputed in the Court by the employee. The employer did not serve any notice of admission or denial of the documents on the respondent therein during trial in terms of Order XII Rule 2 C.P.C.. In that context, the Court held that the records do not reveals that proper procedure was adopted to prove the document filed by the appellants and marked them as exhibits, therefore, the benefit of those documents could not have been accrued to the employer. The said case has also no application in the facts of the present case.

Lastly, learned counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance, in his written submission, on the judgment of Anil Rishi (supra), wherein the dispute was with regard to agreement to sell between the parties therein in respect of a property. In the said case, a plea was raised that the sale-deed was a forged and fabricated document. An application was moved by the respondent therein for deletion of the said issue and reframe the same. While passing the said order, the trial Court has observed in its order that initial burden of proving the section of a document rest upon the person alleging its execution. The dispute raised in the said case was with regard to execution of the document. Therefore, the said case also does not help the revisionist.

Learned counsel for the landlord-respondents submitted that the tenant has admitted that the respondents are landlords. The only dispute is in respect of rate of rent. The tenant has fraudulently got a suit instituted by impersonation on behalf of the landlord, being Suit No. 266 of 1994. When the landlord came to know about the said suit, he moved an application that he has not filed the said suit and it may be dismissed. Therefore, the suit was withdrawn and exparte decree was set aside. It is submitted that the Court below on comparative appraisal of the evidences of the parties has come to the conclusion that the rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute was Rs.1800/- per month and it has totally discarded the defendant's evidence. The finding of the Court below is finding of fact. The Court below has also considered the location of the disputed premises.

The property is situated at Kidwai Nagar, Kanpur, which is a very densely populated locality. It is also a commercial hub. Thus, the finding of the Court below cannot be said to be a mere guess work. It is based on pragmatic consideration, besides being based on evidence. The Court below referred to a number of precedents in this regard to buttress its finding that the rent can also be determined on the basis of rate prevailing in the locality or vicinity.

It was further urged that the finding of the Court below in respect of the default, is a finding of fact. The tenant has miserably failed to establish that he has deposited the entire amount under Section 30(1) of the Act, 1972. Therefore, it cannot be said that he stood relived of forfeiture of the property of tenancy. According to him, the Court below has rightly found that the deposit made by the tenant was sporadic and it was not casual or irregular. It was also urged that the tenant was not entitled for the benefit under Section 30(1) of the Act, 1972 as he has not established that the landlord has refused to accept the rent. There is no evidence on the record that the landlord ever refused to accept the rent. In absence of such refusal, by no stretch of imagination the deposit made by the tenant can be said to be valid. It was lastly urged that this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887 ought not to interfere with the findings unless it can be classified as perverse. In this regard, reliance has been placed on some judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and others10, Harshavardhan Chokkani v. Bhupendra N. Patel and others11, Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani (Smt.) and another12, Ramesh Chandra Rana v. Smt. Shanti Devi and others13, Sayed Bilayatul Hasan (deceased by L.Rs.) and others v. Mohammad Inam Khan and others14, and Anurag Misra v. Shri Ravindra Singh and another15.

I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.

It is a common ground between the parties that the revisionist-defendant is a tenant of the entire first floor of the demised premises. The respondents-landlord had purchased the property from the erstwhile owner vide sale-deed dated 06th April, 1994. It is also not disputed that after the purchase of the said property in 1994, the tenant has not paid the rent to the landlord. He has also not filed any evidence to establish that he sent the rent to the landlord but the landlord has refused to accept it. The tenant has pleaded that he sent a bankers cheque of Rs.15000/- to the counsel of the landlord, which fact has been vehemently denied by the landlord. No further evidence was adduced by the tenant in support of his plea. As regards the deposits made by the tenant, from the record it is established that Suit No. 266 of 1994 was dismissed as withdrawn. The landlord in his application has clearly averred that he did not file the said suit. The application of the landlord has been allowed by the Court below and the suit was dismissed on 10th November, 2008.

Regard being had to the fact that the said suit was exparte decreed on 28th May, 1994, the tenant-revisionist had filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the aforesaid judgment, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 92/74 of 1994. The claim of the tenant that in terms of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 he has deposited a sum of Rs.12,200/- and the said amount, which is still lying under the deposit for the benefit of the plaintiff, is liable to be treated as deposit made under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972 and should be adjusted against the arrears of rent and the tenant is liable to be relieved from the relief of ejectment, is wholly misconceived. The tenant, in fact, has not taken any step to deposit the entire arrears of rent under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972 in the present suit. His prayer to adjust the amount of another suit, which was withdrawn and filing of which has been vehemently denied by the landlord, cannot be accepted.

Insofar as the deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act, 1972 is concerned, the Court below has rightly, in my view, refused to accept it as valid deposit. For convenience, Section 30 of the Act, 1972 reads as under:

"30. Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances.--(1) If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it.

(2) Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building.

(3) The deposit referred to in sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) shall be made in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction.

(4) On any deposit being made under sub-section (1), the Court shall cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the alleged landlord, and the amount of deposit may be withdrawn by that person on application made by him to the Court in that behalf.

(5) On a deposit being made under sub-section(2), the Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the person or persons concerned and hold the amount of the deposit for the benefit of the person who may be found entitled to it by any competent Court or by a settlement between the parties and the same shall be payable to such person.

(6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in sub-section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in sub-section (2)."

From a simple reading of the said section, it instantly brings out that one of the conditions precedent for deposit under Section 30 is refusal of the landlord to accept the payment. In the instant case, the tenant has failed to establish that the landlord has refused to accept the rent. Moreover, from the pleadings of the written statement and the evidence of the tenant it is not established that the tenant has deposited the entire rent on the first date of hearing. Learned counsel for the tenant-revisionist has failed to satisfy the Court that the tenant has deposited regularly and within time even the admitted rent. For the aforesaid reasons, the finding of the Court below with regard to arrears of rent does not suffer from any perversity.

As regards the finding of the Court below about the rate of rent, I have perused the evidence on record. The Court below has considered the oral as well as documentary evidences of the parties and has believed the evidence of the landlord recording a finding of fact. It has also referred the fact that the premises is in the posh locality of Kidwai Nagar, District Kanpur Nagar and has also recorded that the building is situated in main market of Kidwai Nagar and has referred the statement of P.W.-2 Ram Lakhan Yadav that the contract was agreed before him and the rent was fixed at the rate of Rs.1800/- per month and this contract was between Om Prakash and late Laxmi Shanker Agrawal.

Relevant, it would be to refer that after the purchase of the demised property, the landlord has enhanced the rent of all the six tenants. Thus, it cannot be believed that the landlord has not enhanced the rent of the revisionist-tenant. This Court in the case of Kashi Nath Gupta v. Devi Lal16, has held that a finding recorded by the trial Court with regard to the default committed by the tenant-applicant cannot be gone into its correctness by the High Court in revision under Section 25 of the Act of 1887. As noticed above, the learned counsel for the tenant could not satisfy the Court that the finding recorded by the Court below is not based on evidence and it is perverse. Learned counsel for the tenant has failed to satisfy this Court that the finding of the Court below has been arrived at upon consideration of the irrelevant factors and/or any relevant fact has been ignored. He has also not pointed out that what relevant fact has not been considered by the Court below while recording a finding that the rent was Rs.1800/- per month.

As noticed above, in the written statement or any other documentary evidences there is no detail about the regular deposit of rent even at the admitted rate of Rs.300/- per month. No detail facts have been stated in any of the affidavits about the date and amount of the payment made by the tenant.

The scope of Section 25 of the Act of 1887 is well settled. The High Court should not interfere with the findings of the fact recorded by the Court below unless it can be found to be perverse. In Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury17 the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the scope of Section 25 of the Act of 1887. Paragraph-9 of the judgment is apt for the purpose which reads as under:

"(9) The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 40 Bom LR 125: (AIR 1938 Bom 223) where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed:

"The object of S. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at."

This observation has our full concurrence."

Reference may also be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Helper Girdharbhai (supra), Harshavardhan Chokkani (supra), and Mundri Lal (supra), wherein similar view has been taken.

After careful consideration of the matter, I am of the view that the findings recorded by the Court below are findings of fact and no interference is called for therein under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 25 of the Act of 1887. Thus, the revisions fails and it is dismissed.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the tenant-revisionist is granted three months' time to vacate the premises in question on the following conditions:

(i) The revisionist shall file an undertaking within one month from today before the Judge, Small Cause Court, Kanpur Nagar that on or before the expiry of the three months he will handover peaceful possession to the landlord-respondents and shall not create any third party interest in any manner.

(ii) For the period of three months, which has been granted to him to vacate the premises, he shall pay damages at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month for the use of accommodation.

(iii) In case of default in compliance of any of the conditions, the interim order shall stand vacated.

No order as to costs.

Order Date :- 09th September, 2015.

SKT/-

Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.

The revision is dismissed.

For order, see my order of the date passed on the separate sheets (sixteen pages).

Dt.- 09.09.2015.

SKT/-