Sri Anil Kumar Gupta And Anr. vs Pawan Kumar Singh And 25 Others
2015 Latest Caselaw 3451 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

AFR
 
Chief Justice's Court
 

 
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 707 of 2015
 

 
Appellant :- Sri Anil Kumar Gupta And Anr.
 
Respondent :- Pawan Kumar Singh And 25 Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Ramesh Upadhyay,S.C.
 
Counsel for Respondent :- V.K. Singh
 

 
Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
 
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.

This special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 has arisen from an order of the learned Single Judge dated 5 March 2014 in a proceeding for contempt instituted by the respondents. In order to appreciate the issue which arises in the intra court appeal, a brief reference to the factual background would be necessary.

A batch of writ petitions was filed before this Court in 2007 in order to challenge orders which were issued by the State Government on 11 September 2007, 18 September 2007 and 30 September 2007, cancelling recruitments which were made to the posts of constables in the civil police and provincial armed constabulary. Apart from challenging the Government Orders cancelling the selections, the writ petitions also questioned the validity of orders of termination that were issued to the selected candidates. By a judgment and order dated 8 December 2008, the lead writ petition, Pawan Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P.1 and the batch of connected writ petitions came to be allowed in the following terms:

"In view of the discussions above and the findings recorded thereon, this and the connected writ petitions, succeed and are allowed. The various Government Orders cancelling the recruitment by various Recruitment Boards and the consequential orders terminating the appointment of the candidates are also quashed, however, subject to the observations made hereinabove. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to cost."

Special appeals were filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. During the pendency of the special appeals, a statement was made on behalf of the original petitioners who had succeeded before the learned Single Judge, that no contempt petition would be instituted in the event that the special appeal was decided at an early date. The statement is recorded in the form of an Advocate's letter dated 7 March 2008 to the Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police. The special appeals were decided on 4 March 2009. Both the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench (Janardan Sahai and Rakesh Sharma, JJ) agreed in coming to the conclusion that the orders of the State Government cancelling the selection/appointment could not be sustained. The State Government was permitted to conduct an exercise of separating the tainted from the non-tainted candidates. Subject to the grant of this liberty, the appeals were dismissed. Both the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench agreed upon the final order that was to be passed. Special leave petitions were filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Division Bench. By an interim order dated 25 May 2009, the Supreme Court issued the following directions:

"In the meantime, appointments may be made of the selected candidates but in the appointment order it shall be clearly mentioned that this appointment is provisional and shall be subject to the decision of this special leave petition."

In pursuance of these directions which were issued by the Supreme Court, an order was issued by the State Government on 27 May 2009 granting provisional appointment to the selected candidates subject to the result of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. On 23 October 2009, the Supreme Court confirmed the ad interim order dated 18 May 2009 which was made absolute till the disposal of the appeal. The State Government withdrew the appeals and special leave petitions which were filed before the Supreme Court on 8 March 2013. Accordingly, while allowing the prayer for withdrawal, the appeals and special leave petitions were dismissed as withdrawn.

A contempt application was filed in 2009 at Allahabad complaining of a breach of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Initially, on 28 March 2009 when the application was filed, the grievance was that, despite the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8 December 2008 quashing the termination, the successful petitioners had not been reinstated in compliance with the judgment and order "although there was no interim order during the pendency of the special appeal". The prayer as it was originally drafted was in the following terms:

"It is therefore, respectfully prayed that the Hon'ble Court be graciously be pleased to summon the opposite parties personally before this Hon'ble Court and punish them for willfully and deliberately disobeying the judgement and order dated 8.12.2008 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.P. Singh in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.45645 of 2007 (Pawan Kumar Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others) and quashing the termination of the applicants, by not reinstating the applicants forthwith in compliance of the judgement and order aforesaid, which was subsequently confirmed by the division bench of this Hon'ble Court in Special Appeal No.244 of 2009 (State of U.P. Vs. Pawan Kumar Singh and others) vide judgment and order dated 4.3.2009, although there was no interim order during the pendency of the special appeal and/or pass such other and further order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, during the pendency of the present contempt petition; so that justice be done. The cause of action arose on 7-3-2009."

Subsequently on 27 September 2013, a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the applicants in the contempt proceedings in which it was sought to be contended that the petitioners were entitled to all consequential benefits following the setting aside of the cancellation of their appointments but they had not been paid their salary for the period during which the special leave petition was pending before the Supreme Court. The averment in the supplementary affidavit was to the following effect:

"That since the learned Single Judge has quashed the order of cancellation of appointment of the applicants, therefore applicants are entitled to all consequential benefits but the respondents have not paid salary to the applicants during the period in which the Special Leave Petition was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore it cannot be said that the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court has been complied with by the respondent department."

From the record, it emerges that a contempt petition2 was also instituted before the Lucknow Bench in the meantime in 2013. By a judgment and order dated 16 January 2014, a learned Single Judge at the Lucknow Bench (Dr. Satish Chandra J) dismissed the contempt petition. Reading the order of the learned Single Judge, it appears that in Writ Petition No.7270 (S/S) of 2007, an order had been passed for reinstatement of those constables in service with back wages. In a special appeal filed by the State against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9 April 2009, a Division Bench by its judgment dated 25 August 2009 had extended the benefit of the order passed in the special appeal which had been filed by the State against the main judgment in Pawan Kumar Singh (supra). Consequently, while disposing of the contempt petition, the learned Single Judge held that in the special appeal no back wages had been granted and the special leave petition which had been filed before the Supreme Court had also been withdrawn by the State. Consequently, the view which was taken was that the order of the learned Single Judge at Lucknow granting back wages had merged with the order of the Division Bench and since the Division Bench while disposing of the special appeal had not granted back wages, no contempt had been made out. The contempt petition was accordingly dismissed on 16 January 2014.

On 10 February 2014, the State filed an application in the contempt proceedings which were pending at Allahabad for discharging the notice of contempt which had been issued in the meantime against the Principal Secretary (Home). The case of the State Government was that all the successful petitioners had been issued with letters of appointment on 27 May 2009 by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and similarly in other districts, appointment orders had been issued to candidates who were found not to be tainted. The State submitted that the claim which has now been agitated for the payment of arrears of salary was misconceived since the successful petitioners had not been granted any direction for the payment of salary for the period during which they had not actually worked. This, it was submitted, would give rise to a fresh cause of action but would not be a ground for initiating contempt proceedings. The submission of the State in paragraph 11 of the application for discharge of the contempt notice reads as follows:

"That, now the applicants/petitioners are agitating the matter on the ground that they have not been paid their arrears of salary for the period when they were selected and appointed and they were allowed to join their service in 2009. It is stated that the claim of arrears of salary of the petitioners is misconceived. The petitioners have been allowed to join their service in pursuance of the direction issued by this Hon'ble Court and there was no direction issued by this Hon'ble Court to allow the salary of such recruits for the period for which they have not actually worked and they were not in service at all. Such claim of the petitioners may give a fresh cause of action for demanding their salary, but it may not give cause of action for taking action under the contempt proceedings initiated against the opposite parties."

The State also adverted to the order passed by the learned Single Judge at Lucknow on 16 January 2014 dismissing another contempt application.

On 5 March 2014, the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge in the contempt application. The learned Single Judge held that (i) once the orders of termination had been quashed, the effect would be that the orders of termination would cease to exist as a result of which the employees would be entitled to all consequential benefits and would be deemed to be in continuous service; (ii) though it would be arguable as to whether the successful petitioners would at all be entitled to back wages for the period during which the orders of termination were in force, there could be no denial of their entitlement to the payment of salary from the date of the judgment of the learned Single Judge on 8 December 2008. On the first of the aforesaid aspects, the observations of the learned Single Judge read as follows:

"The effect of the termination orders being quashed would be that there was no termination order in the eye of law and the terminated employees would be deemed to be in continuous service and entitled to all consequential benefits. It is not an issue that all the terminated constables have been reinstated w.e.f. 27.5.2009 and they are receiving their salary ever since then. The only issue which remains to be considered is as to whether they would be entitled to uninterrupted service benefits from the date of entering into service and also with regard to their entitlement to payment of salary / back wages for the period they have remained under termination i.e. from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement."

On the second aspect, the learned Single Judge has observed thus:

"It may be an arguable case that applicants may not be entitled to back wages for the period when the orders for termination were in force but there can be no issue that applicants would not be entitled to the salary from the date of judgement of the writ Court. Thus, prima facie case of non compliance of the judgement of the writ Court is made out. Accordingly, the Principal Secretary (Home), U.P. Lucknow and the Director of General of Police, U.P. Lucknow need to be summoned. Since this matter is engaging attention of the Government for quite some time, learned Advocate General and learned Chief Standing Counsel have already appeared on a number of occasions and the stand taken by them has already come on record it is not necessary to issue formal notices to the present Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police."

Consequently, holding that a prima facie case for non-compliance of the judgment of the writ Court was made out, the learned Single Judge summoned the Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police.

Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 4 March 2014, an appeal3 was filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before a Division Bench. By a judgment and order dated 9 September 2015, the Division Bench held following, inter alia, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. Chunilal Nanda4 that an appeal under Section 19 was maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is an order imposing a punishment for contempt. Applying this test, it was held that since the learned Single Judge had not passed an order imposing a punishment for contempt nor were any charges framed, the appeal was not maintainable under Section 19. However, while dismissing the appeal, the Division Bench left it open to the appellants to pursue the remedy of an intra court appeal following the decision in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank (supra) where it was held that if the High Court, in a contempt proceeding, decides an issue or makes any direction relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, the aggrieved person is not without remedy and can challenge it by means of an intra court appeal if the order is of a learned Single Judge.

The observations of the Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank (supra) permitting such an intra court appeal to be filed, which have been extracted in the judgment of the Division Bench, read as follows:

"V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)."

Liberty has accordingly been granted in terms of the above observations of the Supreme Court.

The submissions which have been urged on behalf of the appellants by the learned Chief Standing Counsel are that:

(i) In exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the Court has to determine as to whether a judicial order, as it stands, has been duly implemented or not. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it is not open to the Court to travel beyond the order of which a breach is complained of nor can the Court decide issues which have not been decided or issue directions supplemental to those which were issued by the Court in the original instance;

(ii) The learned Single Judge while deciding the batch of writ petitions on 8 December 2008 set aside the recruitment and the consequential orders terminating the appointments of candidates. No back wages or arrears of salary were granted nor was any direction issued in regard to continuity in service. No directions in regard to continuity, arrears of salary or consequential benefits were issued by the Division Bench which disposed of the special appeals on 4 March 2009;

(iii) During the pendency of the civil appeals and special leave petitions before the Supreme Court and in compliance with the interim order dated 25 May 2009, provisional appointments were granted to the selected candidates on 27 May 2009 subject to the result of the proceedings. Eventually, the civil appeals and the special leave petitions were withdrawn before the Supreme Court on 8 March 2013. The State has bona fide complied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 8 December 2008 by granting appointment to all the selected candidates who were not found to be tainted;

(iv) The claim for arrears of salary, continuity of service or back wages would amount to a fresh cause of action. The State cannot be held guilty of contumacious conduct or wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court; and

(v) The observations of the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 5 March 2014 to the effect that the setting aside of the orders of termination would result in the employees being deemed to be in continuous service and would be entitled to all consequential benefits travel beyond the scope of the original order of which the breach has been complained of. Hence, following the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court, it was urged that the learned Single Judge was in error in coming to the conclusion as he did in the impugned order and in summoning the Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police.

On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents by learned Senior Counsel that:

(i) The constables who were originally appointed in 2005 continued until their services were terminated in 2007 following the cancellation of the recruitment and the orders of termination;

(ii) Following the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8 December 2008, the order of the Division Bench dated 4 March 2009 and the interim directions which were issued by the Supreme Court on 25 May 2009, fresh appointments were granted to the successful petitioners on 27 May 2009;

(iii) The petitioners who have succeeded before the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench cannot be treated as fresh appointees who have been appointed on 27 May 2009 and the question is not merely of arrears of salary but of the grant of service benefits once the orders of termination have been set aside;

(vi) The successful petitioners would be deemed to be in continuous service from the dates of their initial appointment following the quashing of the orders of termination; and

(v) The learned Single Judge has correctly come to the conclusion that the petitioners would be entitled to arrears of salary from the date of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 8 December 2008. No arrears have been granted for the period during which the writ petitions were pending.

The rival submissions fall for consideration.

In assessing the merits of the rival submissions, it would be necessary to bear in mind the basic parameters governing the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction. The High Court, when it exercises jurisdiction to punish for a breach or disobedience of its order, has to first and foremost have due regard to the directions which were issued and of which a breach is complained. It is trite law that while dealing with a contempt petition, the High Court cannot go behind the order of which a breach is complained or, for that matter, decide upon issues which are left undecided. Orders supplemental to what has been decided by the order of which a breach is complained, cannot be issued in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction. These principles have been enunciated in several decisions of the Supreme Court. For the purpose of the present proceedings, it would be necessary to refer to some of those decisions.

In Jhareswar Prasad Paul vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly5, the principle was enunciated in the following observations:

"...At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order..."

Subsequently a Bench of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Director of Education, Uttaranchal vs. Ved Prakash Joshi6 dealt with a situation where a Single Judge of the High Court had issued certain directions while disposing of a contempt petition on the foundation of a non-compliance with an earlier decision of the learned Single Judge dated 16 September 1997. In that case, it was sought to be urged that once an order of termination had been set aside, it is deemed that the incumbent had continued in service and would be entitled to salary and allowances as if there was no break in service. Hence, it was urged that it was open to the contempt court to act as an executing court and to issue further directions to compel the authority to take action in consonance with the settled law. Accepting the submission, the High Court had disposed of the contempt petition. This appears from the statement of facts contained in the following extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court:

"The High Court was of the view that no positive directions could have been issued for arrears of salary. The Competent Committee was yet to consider the question of regularization under the U.P. Regularization of Adhoc Appointments (on posts outside purview of U.P. Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 (in short the 'Rules'). Reference was made also to certain decisions to hold that once the order of termination is set aside, it is to be deemed that incumbent had continued in service and would be entitled to salary and allowances as if there was no break in service. It was also held that when an authority acts in disregard to a settled position in law, the commission or omission would amount to contempt even if such an act may not amount to wilful disobedience. The contempt court can act like an executing Court and can issue further directions to compel the authority for taking action which is in consonance with settled law. It was accordingly held that respondent no.1-the applicant was entitled to arrears of salary from the date of his termination upto the date of reinstatement in service. The contempt petition was accordingly disposed of."

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and held that while exercising the contempt jurisdiction, it was not open to the learned Single Judge of the High Court to resolve a matter of ambiguity or indefiniteness in the original order of which a breach was complained nor was it open to the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction to take upon itself the power to decide the original proceedings in a manner which was not dealt with by the Court originally. The Supreme Court observed as follows:

"While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take the view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., JT 1999 (10) SC 486. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity of indefiniteness in the order, it is for the concerned party to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher Court. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt the Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In the words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside."

Consequently, the order of the High Court in the contempt proceedings was set aside, however, leaving it open to the appellant in that case, if he was aggrieved by the denial of arrears of salary, to approach the appropriate forum by pursuing such remedy as is available in law.

In a subsequent decision in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Shyam Bihari Lal Gupta7, a Bench of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court dealt with a matter which related to the execution of a decree passed in a suit for a declaration that termination of service was void. The suit had been decreed on the ground that the termination was void ab initio and continuity of service was granted to the respondent/plaintiff. Execution applications were thereafter filed for the grant of back wages which were resisted by the employer on the ground that the decree which was sought to be executed had not awarded back wages. The plea of the employer was not accepted by the executing court and a revision under Section 115 of CPC was dismissed by the High Court. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the specific non mention of the grant of a monetary benefit was a relevant factor. Since the decree did not grant any monetary benefits specifically, it was held that an execution application was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Supreme Court relied upon an earlier decision in Rajasthan SRTC vs. Ladulal Mali8.

Finally, we may also advert to a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman & MD, ONGC vs. M. George Ravishekaran9. The principles which must govern the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction have been formulated thus:

"...The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above..."

Now, it is these principles which would have to be applied to the present case. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 8 December 2008 set aside the orders passed by the State Government cancelling the recruitment which was made by the Recruitment Board and consequential orders terminating the appointment of candidates. Reading the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8 December 2008, as it stands, it is evident that there were no directions either in regard to the grant of continuity in service or for the payment of back wages or arrears of salary. The submission of the respondents is that once the orders of termination had been quashed and set aside, the employees would be deemed to be in continuous service from the date of their initial appointment and could not have been treated as fresh appointees as they were, when appointment letters were issued to them on 27 May 2009 in pursuance of the interim directions to the Supreme Court. This submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the deeming fiction which the respondents claim, cannot be a matter of adjudication in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction. The parameters for the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction mandate that the duty of the Court is to plainly read the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8 December 2008 (which was confirmed by the Division Bench on 4 March 2009) as it stands and to determine whether there has been a breach or non-compliance. All the successful petitioners who are not found to be tainted have admittedly been granted appointment in service. The issue as to whether they would be entitled to the grant of continuity and back wages, could not have been the subject matter of determination in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction, since the order of the learned Single Judge and the decision of the Division Bench made no direction thereon. The grant of back wages and continuity of service cannot be a matter of implication or deeming fiction. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order dated 5 March 2014 has, in fact, carried out an exercise of going behind the original order dated 8 December 2008 by coming to the conclusion that once the termination orders had been set aside, the effect of the quashing of those orders would be that there would be no termination order in the eyes of law and that the employees would be deemed to be in continuous service with an entitlement to consequential benefits. The learned Single Judge has, in other words, traversed beyond the parameters of the original order dated 8 December 2008 and has granted a supplemental direction which was not issued in the first instance. Similarly, the observation that it would be arguable whether the employees would be entitled to back wages for the period during which the orders of termination were in force, but that their entitlement to back wages after the judgment of the High Court could not be questioned, is to essentially adjudicate upon a matter which was not the subject matter of the earlier proceedings. Consequently and applying the principles which have been formulated in the judgments of the Supreme Court which we have referred to above, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has exceeded the limitations on the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction by recording a prima facie case of contempt and in summoning the Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police. The order which has been passed by the learned Single Judge, for these reasons, is unsustainable.

Similarly, the directions for the grant of future wages from the date of the judgment and order dated 8 December 2008 was a matter which related to the future and could not have been adjudicated upon in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction.

We, accordingly, allow the special appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 5 March 2014. The contempt application filed by the respondents shall accordingly stand dismissed.

The special appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 27.10.2015

VMA

(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.)

(Yashwant Varma, J.)

Chief Justice's Court

Civil Misc. (Delay Condonation) Application No.343065 of 2015

In re :

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 707 of 2015

Appellant :- Sri Anil Kumar Gupta And Anr.

Respondent :- Pawan Kumar Singh And 25 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Ramesh Upadhyay,S.C.

Counsel for Respondent :- V.K. Singh

Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice

Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.

This application seeks condonation of delay of 1 year 181 days in filing the special appeal.

Since the delay has satisfactorily been explained in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned.

The application is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 27.10.2015

VMA

(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.)

(Yashwant Varma, J.)