Rameshwar And Others vs State Of U.P. And Another
2015 Latest Caselaw 541 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

?A.F.R.
 
Court No. - 44
 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 10310 of 2010
 
Applicant :- Rameshwar And Others
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Nalin Kumar Sharma
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt. Advocate,A.K.S.Bais,Amit Daga,Anand Kumar Yadav,Manoj Yadav,Sushil Kumar Sharma
 

 
Hon'ble Mrs. Ranjana Pandya,J.

Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A.

This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed with the prayer to quash the entire proceedings of criminal case no. 946 of 2007 (State vs. Sanjeev Kumar & others) as well as order dated 26.07.2008, under Sections 420, 467, 468 I.P.C., Police Station Purkaji, District Muzaffar Nagar, pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Muzaffar Nagar.

It has been contended on behalf of the applicants that earlier the applicants had approached this Court against the order dated 26.07.2008 passed by the court below, but the criminal revision was dismissed as not pressed. Counsel for the applicants has further contended that there is absolutely no evidence on record to frame charges against the accused.

Counsel for the opposite parties have submitted that since liberty was not given to the applicants to file fresh revision or application, the present application has been barred.

The lower court has mentioned in its order that the matter in question needs appraisal of evidence which has to be adduced in the matter. As far as the provisions of Section 227 Cr.P.C. are concerned in 2001 AAR 394 (SC), Om Wati Vs. State (Delhi Administration), it has been laid down as under:-

"7. Section 227 of the Code provides that if upon consideration of record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused for which he is required to record his reasons for so doing. No reasons are required to be recorded when the charges are framed against the accused persons. This Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal [2000 (1) SCC 722] held that there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge. Taking note of the burden of the pending cases on the courts, it wa s held:

"Even in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. This is clear from Section 245. As per the first sub-section of Section 245, if a Magistrate, after taking all the evidence considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge the accused. As per sub-section (2) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless. Under both sub-sections he is obliged to record his reasons for doing so. In this context it is pertinent to point out that even in a trial before a court of session, the Judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused (vide Section 227 of the Code). But if he is to frame the charge he may do so without recording his reasons for showing why he framed the charge.

If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at this stage, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the court should avoid expressing one way or the other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act, 1985".

8. At the stage of passing the order in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the Court has merely to peruse the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If upon consideration, the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused, the Judge must proceed to frame charge in terms of Section 228 of the Code. Only in a case where it is shown that the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence cannot show that the accused committed the crime, then and then alone the court can discharge the accused. The court is not required to enter into meticulous consideration of evidence and material placed before it at this stage. This Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs. Dilip Nathumal Chordia & Anr. [1989 (1) SCC 715] cautioned the High Courts to be loathe in interfering at the stage of framing the charges against the accused. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice staring the court in the face. The opinion on many matters can differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular point, as there are courts but that would not justify the High Court to interdict the trial. Generally, it would be appropriate for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed.

9. Dealing with the scope of Sections 227 and 288 of the Code and the limitations imposed upon the court at the initial stage of framing the charge, this Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh [AIR 1977 SC 2018] held:

"Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under S.227 or S.228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."

Hence, the trial court in the present case has rightly held that prima-facie there is evidence against the accused to frame charges.

There is no illegality in the impugned order and the application is liable to be rejected.

Accordingly, the application is rejected.

Order Date :- 18.5.2015

sailesh