Shiv Kumar Alias Mukhiya vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others
2015 Latest Caselaw 1496 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Reserved
 

 
 HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. - 11547 of 2015
 

 

 
Shiv Kumar Alias Mukhiya........................................................Petitioner
 

 
Versus
 

 
 State Of U.P. And 3 Others................................................Respondents
 

 
Hon'ble Bala Krishna Narayana,J.

Hon'ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi,J.

(Judgment delivered by Hon'ble B.K.Narayana,J.)

Heard Sri I.K.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned AGA for the respondent nos. 1,2 and 3 and Sri Firoz Ahmad, learned counsel for the Union of India/ respondent no.2.

Pleadings between the parties have been exchanged and the matter is ripe for final disposal.

By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the detention order dated 04.08.2014/14.08.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Banda, respondent no.3 (Annexure-10) by which he in exercise of his power under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has ordered that the petitioner be detained in District Jail, Banda stating the grounds of detention as required under Section 8 of the Act as well as the order dated 23.09.2014 passed by the State Govt. confirming the detention order dated 04.08.2014/14.0.2014 (Annexure 15) to the writ petition.

The brief facts of the case as emerging from the pleadings of the parties are that an FIR was lodged by one Chandra Bhushan, resident of village Baurali Azam on 06.02.2014 at 6.20 p.m. against unknown persons at P.S. Bisanda, District Banda stating therein that Km. Sandhya who was daughter of his relative Ram Naresh Patel, aged about six years, had come to his house along with her grand mother to participate in a religious ceremony (yagya) organised in his house, had gone missing on 31.01.2014 at about 4.00 p.m. from his house in village Baurali Azam.

The aforesaid FIR was registered as case crime no. 22 of 2014, under Section 363 IPC, at P.S. Bisanda, District Banda.

The dead body of the deceased Sandhya was recovered from a well in the village on 08.02.2014. Inquest was conducted on 08.02.2013 between 7.30 p.m. to 9.30 p.m. and post mortem was performed on 09.02.2014 at 2.00 p.m. and since the deceased's post mortem report indicated that the she before being thrown into the well was throttled to death after being subjected to rape, case crime no. 22 of 2014 which was earlier registered under Section 363 IPC was converted under sections 363, 376, 302, 201 IPC and Section 4 of Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The investigation of the case continued for several months without making any headway despite the frequent change of Investigating Officers. The name of the petitioner as an accused in the aforesaid case surfaced for the first time in the statement of one Sunder recorded by the Investigating Officer on 18.05.2014 in which he stated that on the date of the incident he had seen the deceased sitting on the lap of the petitioner in his guava grove at 5.15 p.m.. On the basis of his last seen evidence, the Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet against the petitioner on 26.05.2014 and sent him to jail. The bail application moved by the petitioner moved before the Special Judge/ Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1 Banda was rejected by him by his order dated 14.07.2014. Thereafter the petitioner moved a application for bail before the High Court which was registered as bail application no. 41263 of 2014.

While the petitioner was confined in jail in connection with the aforesaid case, the impugned order of preventive detention was passed by the respondent no.3 on 04.08.2014 against the petitioner and served upon him in District Jail Banda along with the grounds of detention under Section 8 of the National Security Act. The order of preventive detention dated 04.08.2014/14.08.2014 passed by respondent no.3 apart from narrating the facts already stated hereinabove further reflected that the same was passed on the basis of report of S.P., Banda which itself was based upon the confidential report of the local intelligence unit forwarded to him by Inspector In-charge stating that the petitioner who was accused in case crime no. 22 of 2014, under Section 302, 201 and 376 IPC had moved a bail application before the High Court and there was every likelihood of his being released on bail and in case he was released on bail there was strong possibility of his involving himself in illegal activities and hence his detention under the Act was imperative in order to maintain public order. The impugned order also reflects that after the dead body of the victim Km. Sandhya was found in a well and it came to light that before being murdered, she had been raped the members of the public became very angry and demanded District Magistrate to get the case solved soon and an atmosphere of fear had gripped the community. Public order had been disturbed and with a view to maintain law and order, heavy police force had to be deployed at the post mortem house. Angry villagers had organised a demonstration in front of the D.M.'s residence information whereof was promptly given to the superior officers through R.T. Set and additional police forces were requisitioned from other police stations. As a result of the heinous offence of rape and murder of a minor girl committed by the petitioner and his subsequent act of throwing her dead body in the well, the tranquillity of the community was totally disturbed and an atmosphere of fear had prevailed.

The petitioner filed a representation before the State of U.P. through Secretary Home Secretary, State of U.P. and before the Union of India through Home Secretary and also before the District Magistrate, Banda on 12.08.2014. In his representation the petitioner had categorically stated that the petitioner who was an old man aged about 60 years was absolutely innocent and he had falsely been implicated as an accused in the case crime no. 22 of 2014 by the local police as a measure of vendata against his uncle Shishupal who had filed several complaints before the higher authorities against the local police highlighting the inaction on the part of the local police in the investigation of the case in hand and their deliberate attempt to shield Reshma and her husband Arjun whose names had figured as prime suspects in the concerned case during investigation, by introducing a got up witness Sunder after 2-1/2 months of the incident who gave evidence of last seen against the petitioner in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The State Govt. approved the detention order dated 04.08.2014/ 14.08.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Banda vide order dated 13.08.2014 (Annexure-13). The Central Govt. also rejected the petitioner's representation by order dated 03.09.2014 (Annexure-14). The petitioner appeared before the Advisory Board and thereafter on the basis of the opinion of the Advisory Board tendered under Section 11 of the Act, the State Govt. passed an order on 23.09.2014 for detention of the petitioner in jail for twelve months commencing from 04.08.2014.

Learned cousnel for the petitioner submitted that the subjective satisfaction of the respondent no.3 (detaining authority) recorded in the impugned detention order is based upon insufficient, non existent and irrelevant grounds which has totally invalidated the same and further more since the respondent no.3 (detaining authority) has exercised his power under Section 3(2) of National Security Act illegally and arbitrarily, the impugned order cannot be sustained and accordingly is liable to be quashed.

Per Contra learned AGA submitted that the petitioner has been accused of having committed the heinous offence of raping a minor girl and thereafter committing her murder and throwing her dead body in a well. He further submitted that the act of the petitioner affected the community and lead to disturbance of current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of public order and it did not effect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed. The satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on the relevant materials placed before him showing that the act of the petitioner was such that it disturbed the tempo of life of the community, there was disturbance in the village as well as in the places nearby. He next submitted that the detaining authority upon being apprised that the petitioner had moved bail application for his release before the Hon'ble High Court and there was every likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and since at the very prospect of the petitioner being enlarged on bail, a feeling of fear had gripped the villagers and if he was actually released on bail, he would again indulge in anti-social activities and hence to prevent such prejudicial activity in future, the detaining authority had rightly passed the detention order against the petitioner and the same warrants no interference by this Court.

We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings of the parties as well as the other material brought on record and the case laws cited before us to which we will refer as and when the context requires.

The Apex Court in the case of Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi Vs. State of Manipur and others reported in (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 618 has examined the scope of Judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of detaining authority. Paragraph 21 of its verdict rendered in the aforesaid case, which is relevant for our purpose is being reproduced herein below"

"21. To decide the correctness or otherwise of the detention order, two issues of importance arise before this Court. The first is, regarding the documents and material on which reliance was placed by the detaining Authority in passing the detention order. Secondly, with those materials, the detaining authority was justified in arriving at a finding that the detenu should be detained under the National Security Act without any trial. In matters of this nature, this Court normally will not go into the correctness of the decision as such but will only look into decision making process. Judicial review, it may be noted, is not an appeal from a decision but review of the manner in which the decision was made. The purpose of review is to ensure that the individual receives a fair treatment."

We now proceed to examine some of the decisions of the Apex Court which may have relevance in determining in what manner such subjective satisfaction of the Authority must be arrived at, in particular on Section 3(2) of the National Security Act. In Fazal Ghosi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1987) 3 SCC 502, this Court observed that: "The District Magistrate, it is true, has stated that the detention of the detenus was effected because he was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent them from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order, but there is no reference to any material in support of that satisfaction. We are aware that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is subjective in nature, but even subjective satisfaction must be based upon some pertinent material. We are concerned here not with the sufficiency of that material but with the existence of any relevant material at all." (emphasis supplied) (Para 3).

In Shafiq Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Meerut, (1989) 4 SCC 556, the Apex Court opined :- "Preventive detention is a serious inroad into the freedom of individuals. Reasons, purposes and the manner of such detention must, therefore, be subject to closest scrutiny and examination by the courts." (emphasis supplied) (Para 5).

This Court further added:

"...there must be conduct relevant to the formation of the satisfaction having reasonable nexus with the action of the petitioner which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Existence of materials relevant to the formation of the satisfaction and having rational nexus to the formation of the satisfaction that because of certain conduct "it is necessary" to make an order "detaining" such person, are subject to judicial review." (emphasis supplied) (Para 5).

In State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, the Apex Court held:

"...the grounds supplied operate as an objective test for determining the question whether a nexus reasonably exists between grounds of detention and the detention order or whether some infirmities had crept in." (emphasis supplied) (Para 9).

In State of Rajasthan v. Talib Khan, (1996) 11 SCC 393, the Apex Court observed that:

"...what is material and mandatory is the communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu together with documents in support of subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority." (emphasis supplied) (Para 8).

The legal position what emerges from these rulings is that, there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order, and there must be material to support the same. The Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the Authority in coming to its conclusion, and accordingly determine if there is an objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction must be two fold. The detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the authority must be further satisfied that it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent from so acting.

In order to determine the validity of the impugned detentionorder in the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it will be necessary to examine the materials relied by the detaining authority while passing the impugned deteintion order. The documents relied upon by the District Magistrate mentioned in the grounds of detention are :-

1. Copy of the FIR lodged by one Chandra Bhushan on 06.02.2014, which was entered at G.D. No.27 at about 6.20 p.m. by S.I.- V.K. Shukla.

2. The report made by Chandra Bhushan Patel regarding recovery of the dead body of the victim from a well in village on 08.02.2014 which was entered at G.D. No. 29 at 6.10 p.m. on 08.02.2014.

3. Certified copy of the inquest report and other documents prepared during inquest.

4. Post mortem report of the deceased.

5. News items published in 10.02.014 editions of daily newspapers Hindustan and Dainik Jagran.

6. Statements of the informant Chandra Bhushan recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

7. Statement of witness Sunder recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C..

8. Copy of the site plan.

9. Report of the sponsoring authority, Superintendent of Police, Banda dated 30.07.2014.

We are conscious of the fact that the grounds stated in the order of detention are sufficient or not, is not within the ambit of the discretion of the court and it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is implied. However, the Apex Court in paragraph no. 28 of its judgment in the Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi (supra), has observed that if one of the grounds or reasons which lead to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority under the National Security Act is non existent, misconceived and irrelevant order, the order of detention would be in valid.

The Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yousuf Rather Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors. (AIR 1979 SC 1925) has observed that under Article 22(5), a detenu has two rights (1) to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which his detention is based and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against his detention. The inclusion of an irrelevant or non-existent ground among other relevant grounds is an infringement of the first right and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second right. No distinction can be made between introductory facts, background facts and `grounds' as such; if the actual allegations were vague and irrelevant, detention would be rendered invalid.

We have very carefully scanned the grounds of detention and the documents relied on by the detaining authority while passing the order of detention against the petitioner, and in our considered opinion grounds on which the detention order has been passed have no probative value and were extraneous to the scope, purpose and object of the National Security Act for the following reasons.

The documents mentioned at sl. no. 1, 2,3, 4 and 5 do not contain any reference to the petitioner as the petitioner's name as an accused in case crime no. 22 of 2014 had not surfaced till the dates on which the aforesaid documents had come to the existence. Chandra Bhushan, informant in case crime no. 22 of 2014, whose statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and which finds mention at sl. no. 6 herein above has not named the petitioner as an accused in the FIR. Similarly the document mentioned at sl. no. 8, site plan of the alleged place of incident was also wholly irrelevant for the purpose of subjective satisfaction of detaining authority. Same is the position with regard to the report of the sponsoring authority dated 30.07.2017 which is mentioned at sl. no.9 and which contains the same facts on the impugned detention is founded. The reliance placed by the detaining authority on the statement made by the only witness of the incident to the Investigating Officer after more than 2-1/2 months of the occurrence (sl. no.7) without any explanation for his failure to come forward promptly or at least within a reasonable period, cannot be said to be sufficient to form the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as it is settled law that the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be taken as sufficient grounds in the absence of any supportive or corroborative grounds. Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements are not considered as substantive evidence but can only be used to contradict the witnesses in the course of the trial as is evident from the wordings of Section 162(1) Cr.P.C. and has been so held time and again by the Apex Court.

In Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 7 SCC 378, the Apex Court laid down that:

"A statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence. In view of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 162 Cr.P.C., the statement can be used only for the limited purpose of contradicting the maker thereof in the manner laid down in the said proviso. Therefore, the High Court committed a manifest error of law in relying upon wholly inadmissible evidence..."

Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the statement of Sunder made to the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. relied by the detaining authority while forming subjective satisfaction, the facts stated by Sudner in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. do not suggest any positive or direct involvement of the petitioner in the commission of crime which was later made the basis for passing of order of preventive detention against him. The witness Sunder had simply told the Investigating Officer in his statement that on the date of the incident he had seen the victim sitting on the lap of the petitioner at about 5.20 p.m. and he suspected that the petitioner may have committed the murder of the victim. He has nowhere stated that he had either seen the petitioner raping the victim or throwing her dead body into the well in the village after throttling her to death. Apart from the aforesaid last seen evidence of Sunder which saw the light of the day after an inordinate delay and explained of more than 2-1/2 months, there is no corroborative or supportive material indicating at this complicity in the commission of the crime in question. There is further neither any allegation nor any material on record showing that the crime in question was committed by the petitioner in a daring manner and in full view of the public in a crowded place so as to disturb the public order or tranquillity of the locality.

Furthermore, as already observed none of the other documents substantiate the involvement of the detenu in unlawful activities as alleged in the detention order.

We have very carefully gone through the counter affidavits filed by the State and Union of India, there is nothing therein which may indicate that the prosecution has been enable to collect any further evidence which may indicate at the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the crime which has been made the basis for passing the impugned detention order apart from the statement of witness Sunder.

Thus, it is clear that there was no pertinent or relevant material on the basis of which, the detention order could be passed.

In the instant case the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner are under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code for which the normal law is sufficient to deal with the offence, if proved. The detaining authority, in our opinion has wrongly taken the easy way out and has resorted to an order of preventive detention, in order to avoid investigation of the case in which the petitioner was made an accused more than 2-1/2 months after the incident, on the basis of extremely weak circumstantial evidence.

The Apex Court in the case of Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima Vs. State of Manipur and others, 2012 (2) SCC 176, the Apex Court has held as hereunder:-

"27. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by this Court, the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order. An individual incident of an offence under the Indian Penal Code, however heinous, is insufficient to make out a case for issuance of an order of preventive detention."

Paragraphs 4,5, 8 and 9 of the judgement rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Mungauala Yadamma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in (2012)2 SCC386, in which the Apex Court has examined the parameters within which order of prevention detention can be passed are quoted herein below:-

"4. On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged that the ground taken for issuance of the detention order was improper and not available in view of the reasoned judgment of this Court in Rekha v. State of T.N. Where a similar question had arisen and in para 23 of the judgment, a three-Judge Bench of this Court was of the view that criminal cases were already going on against the detenue under various provisions of the Penal Code, 1860, as well as under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and that if he was found guilty, he would be convicted and given appropriate sentence. Their Lordships also indicated that in their opinion, the ordinary law of the land was sufficient to deal with the situation, and hence, recourse to the preventive detention law was illegal.

5. It has been submitted by Mr. Anil Kumar Tandale, learned advocate appearing for the appellant, that in the instant case also all the offences alleged to have committed by the husband of the appellant, were under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995, for which the normal law was sufficient to deal with the offence, if proved. He submitted that the detaining authority had wrongfully taken the easy way out and had resorted to an order of preventive detention in order to avoid having to investigate the cases filed against the appellant.

8. In fact, recently, in Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur we had occasion to consider the same issue and the three-Judge Bench had held that the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws, as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order warranting the issuance of such an order.

9. No doubt, the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant are such as to attract punishment under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, but that in our view has to be done under the said laws and taking recourse to preventive detention laws would not be warranted Preventive detention involves detaining of a person without trial in order to prevent him/her from committing certain types of offences. But such detention cannot be made a substitute for the ordinary law and absolve the investigating authorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes which the detenue may have committed. After all, preventive detention in most case is for a year only and cannot be used as an instrument to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial. Accordingly, while following the three Judge Bench decision in Rekha case we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 20.7.2011 and also quash the detention order dated 15.2.2011, issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh."

The Apex Court in paragraph nos. 13, 14, 15, 18, 29, 33 and 34 of its verdict given in the case of Rekha Vs. State of Tamilnadu through Secretary to Government and another, reported in (2011)5 SCC 244, which are being quoted herein below has again dealt with the circumstances under which the power of preventive detention can be exercised:-

"13. In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India which permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannot ordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the right to liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and without a trial. As observed in R Vs. Secy. Of State for the Home Dept.

14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty of a citizen is a most important right won by our forefathers after long, historical, arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realised its value because they had seen during the freedom struggle civil liberties of our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that is why they were determined that the right to individual liberty would be placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as the basic right of the people of India.

15. Right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 implies that before a person is imprisoned a trial must ordinarily be held giving him full opportunity of hearing, and that too through a lawyer, because a layman would not be able to properly defend himself except through a lawyer.

18. In State of of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 (para 23) this Court observed :

"...Personal liberty is a precious right. So did the Founding Fathers believe because, while their first object was to give unto the people a Constitution whereby a government was established, their second object, equally important, was to protect the people against the government. That is why, while conferring extensive powers on the government like the power to declare an emergency, the power to suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights or the power to issue ordinances, they assured to the people a Bill of Rights by Part III of the Constitution, protecting against executive and legislative despotism those human rights which they regarded as fundamental. The imperative necessity to protect these rights is a lesson taught by all history and all human experience. Our Constitution makers had lived through bitter years and seen an alien Government trample upon human rights which the country had fought hard to preserve. They believed like Jefferson that "an elective despotism was not the Government we fought for". And, therefore, while arming the Government with large powers to prevent anarchy from within and conquest from without, they took care to ensure that those powers were not abused to mutilate the liberties of the people. (vide A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271, and Attorney General for India Vs. Amratlal Prajivandas, (1994) 5 SCC 54."

29. Prevention detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution :14: of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous, historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (Indian Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal.

33. No doubt it has been held in the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha's case (supra) that even if a person is liable to be tried in a criminal court for commission of a criminal offence, or is actually being so tried, that does not debar the authorities from passing a detention order under a preventive detention law. This observation, to be understood correctly, must, however, be construed in the background of the constitutional scheme in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution (which we have already explained). Articles 22(3)(b) is only an exception to Article 21 and it is not itself a fundamental right. It is Article 21 which is central to the whole chapter on fundamental rights in our Constitution. The right to liberty means that before sending a person to prison a trial must ordinarily be held giving him opportunity of placing his defence through his lawyer. It follows that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for a criminal offence, but the ordinary criminal law (Indian Penal Code or other penal statutes) will not be able to deal with the situation, then, and only then, can the preventive detention law be taken recourse to.

34. Hence, the observation in para 34 in Haradhan Saha's case (supra) cannot be regarded as an unqualified statement that in every case where a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for a crime in a criminal court a detention order can also be passed under a preventive detention law."

Thus in view of the forgoing discussions, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned detention order cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed.

This habeas corpus writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned detention order dated 04/14.08.2014 (Annexure-10) as well as the order of the State Government dated 23.09.2014 confirming the detention order dated 04/14.08.2014 are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith if he is not wanted in any other case.

There shall however be no order as to costs.

Order Date:- 28/07/2015

Abhishek Sri.