Ajay Kumar Misra And 8 Ors. vs Hon'Ble High Court Of Judicature ...
2015 Latest Caselaw 2026 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

A.F.R.
 
RESERVED
 
Court No. - 24
 

 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5512 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Ajay Kumar Misra And 8 Ors.
 
Respondent :- Hon'Ble High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Thru R.G.& Ors
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajnish Kumar
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Manish Kumar,Upendra      Nath Mishra
 
AND
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5287 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Ratnank Mishra & Others
 
Respondent :- Hon'ble High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Thru R.G.& Anr
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sandeep Dixit,Vijay Dixit
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Manish Kumar,Upendra Nath Mishra
 

 
AND
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5288 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Sanjeev Kumar Sharma
 
Respondent :- Hon'ble High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Thru R.G.& Ors
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Y.S. Lohit
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Manish Kumar,Upendra Nath Mishra
 

 
Hon'ble Dr. Devendra Kumar Arora, J.

Heard Shri J.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Rajnish Kumar, Shri Sandeep Dixit assisted by Shri Vijay Dixit as well as Shri Y.S. Lohit, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Upendra Nath Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties.

As the lis involved in all the afore-captioned writ petitions is identical in nature, therefore, all have been clubbed, heard together and are being decided by a common order.

In the aforesaid writ petitions, petitioners initially had sought quashing of the order of rejection of joint representation dated 26.9.2011 vide Office Memorandum No. 9514/2012 dated 6.6.2012 as also the Office Memorandum dated 2.8.2013 and claimed regularisation/confirmation on the post of Routine Grade Clerk [in short referred to as "RGC"] with consequential benefits. Later on, through amendment they also sought quashing of the advertisement dated 19.7.2014 which was published to fill up the 70 posts of Routine Grade Clerk and 189+98 (backlog) posts of Assistant Review Officer.

Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that petitioners of Writ Petition No. 5287 (S/S) of 2013 were initially appointed on 10.07.2000 and 08.06.2001, on the post of Operator-cum-Data Entry Assistant/Routine Grade Clerk (RGC) on ad hoc basis in the establishment of High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, whereas petitioners of Writ Petition Nos. 5288 (S/S) of 2013 and 5512 (S/S) of 2013 were appointed on the same post in the year 2005 under the orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice issued in exercise of power under Rule 41 read with Rule 45 of the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 (in short referred to as '1976 Rules').

According to Sri J.N.Mathur, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners, one Abhishek Kumar was initially given ad hoc appointment, in January, 2001, on the post of RGC but later on, his services were regularised vide order dated 29.09.2001 passed by the Registrar General, Allahabad High Court. Therefore, similarly situated few petitioners, like Abhishek Kumar and others, preferred a representation, which according to the petitioner remained unattended and in the interregnum three more persons were appointed on the same post and their services were also regularized vide order dated 1.9.2004.

Elaborating his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that some persons, namely, Mrs. Nanda Priya, Sri Ashutosh Kumar Singh and Ms. Puja Srivastava were given regular appointment as RGC and on 01.09.2004, seven more persons were appointed on ad hoc basis on the post of RGC, namely, Sri Prahmeshwar Pandey, Sri Tej Singh, Sri Anand Pal Singh, Sri Ajit Kumar Srivastava, Sri Santosh Kumar Tewari, Sri Abhishek and Sri Sharad Kumar. The appointment of these persons was made with a rider that they will be regularized only if selected in the examination and test.

One Devendra Kumar Pandey questioned the appointment of the aforesaid seven persons and other persons, namely, Smt. Sushma Singh, Sri R.P. Patel, Sri Sandeep Kumar Ojha and Sri S.D. Goshwami and Sri V.T. Goshwami in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45922 of 2004; Devendra Kumar Pandey vs. Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others, before the Principal Seat at Allahabad, wherein an ad interim order dated 24.5.2005 was passed to the effect that appointment of the aforesaid persons (respondent Nos. 3 and 5 to 14 to the said writ petition) shall be subject to the outcome of the writ petition and they will not be regularized or confirmed until disposal of the writ petition.

It appears that against the ad interim order dated 24.05.2005, a Special Appeal bearing No. 987 of 2006 was filed, which was disposed off providing therein that impugned interim order has become unworkable and, as such, the parties are allowed to proceed in accordance with law. Thereafter, the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 45922 of 2004 filed by Devendra Kumar Pandey was heard and disposed off by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 27.07.2007, who recorded a categorical finding that the writ petitioners cannot be granted any relief and for the petitioners of the said writ petition, the petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge with a prohibition that the appointments made in exercise of powers conferred under Rules 41 and 45 of the 1976 Rules will not be confirmed and regularized. The paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said judgment dated 27.7.2007 read as under :

"21. Following the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, the Court expects that all appointments made by Hon'ble Chief Justice in exercise of his powers under Rule 41 and 45 of the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules 1976, will be subject to the regular selection by direct recruitment in accordance with the Rule 8 of these Rules and that these appointees will not be confirmed and regularized.

22. The writ petition is disposed of with these observations."

Not being satisfied with the said judgment and order dated 27.07.2007 of the learned Single Judge, Special Appeals were preferred by private respondents of the said writ petition and the High Court, which were clubbed and decided by a common judgment and order dated 20.09.2011, whereby the direction issued by the Hon'ble Single Judge in para 21 of the judgment dated 27.07.2007 with regard to prohibition for not confirming and regularizing the appointees, who have been appointed under Rule 41 and 45 of the aforesaid Rules was set-aside with a direction to the Registrar General for taking appropriate steps with regard to confirmation/regularization and consequential relief of the employees there-under. The Division Bench recorded a finding that Hon'ble the Chief Justice has ample power for making appointment as per provisions of Article 229 of the Constitution of India as well as Rule 41 and 45 of the Rules, which cannot be curtailed or interfered with. The relevant paragraph of the judgment passed in Special Appeal No.563 of 2008 is reproduced at the later part of this Judgment.

In pith and substance, the main assertion of all the learned counsel for the petitioners is that in compliance of the judgment and order dated 20.09.2011, the opposite parties ought to have considered the cases of all those persons working on ad hoc basis, who have been appointed in exercise of power conferred under Rule 41 and 45 of the aforesaid Rules but in an arbitrary manner only those persons, who were respondents in the writ petition no. 45922 of 2004 and few other persons in a pick and choose manner were considered, regularized and confirmed vide order dated 10.07.2012.

Inviting attention of the Court towards the order dated 10.07.2012, learned counsel for the petitioners stated that this order would establish the fact that all the aforesaid persons have been confirmed after completion of one year service from the date of their initial appointments, which were made under the provisions of 1976 Rules. Further by another order dated 10.07.2012, twelve persons out of 13, who were confirmed in compliance of the judgment and order dated 20.09.2011 on the posts of RGC were given further promotion and confirmed on the posts of Assistant Review Officer and later on, promoted and confirmed on the posts of Review Officer. It has further been pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners that some of the petitioners represented to the official respondents, on 12.09.2012, praying therein to extend benefit of the judgment and order dated 20.09.2011 passed in Special Appeal No. 563 of 2008, as in compliance of the Division Bench judgment, similarly situated persons have been regularized and confirmed and since the case of the petitioners is identical, they are also entitled for regularization and confirmation.

Clarifying the position, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that in view of Article 229, the appointment of employees of High Court is to be made by the Chief Justice or by such other Judge or Officer of the Court whom he may direct. The power, authority and jurisdiction in respect of appointment and regulating service conditions have been conferred exclusively on the Chief Justice and that is unfettered and is only subject to Article 229 and no other provision/rule. Rule 45 of 1976 Rules starts with non obstante clause which makes abundantly clear that despite anything contained in these Rules, the Chief Justice shall have power to make such order, as he may consider fit, in respect of recruitment, promotion, confirmation or any other matter.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also invited my attention towards State of Karnataka vs. M.L.Kesari [2010 (9) SCC 247], wherein the Apex Court while interpreting the term "irregular" and "illegal" observed that appointment is irregular if appointee possessed qualification at the time of initial appointment but procedure was not followed, but it is illegal if he was lacking in qualification. It was also held that an irregularity may be cured but an illegality may not be legalised. On this strength, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the appointment of the petitioners cannot be termed as back-door entries or ab initio illegal as they were appointed under the powers conferred by a statute on the competent authority. Besides it, petitioners are entitled for the benefit of the exception carved out in State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi; 2006(4) SCC 1, as the term "one time measure" used in the said judgment is to be treated as a continuing process till all existing strength is absorbed.

It has also been clarified that the Apex Court decision rendered in Renu and others vs. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hajari Court,Delhi; AIR 2014(SC) 247, is not applicable upon the petitioners as the said case is in relation to time bound ad hoc appointment whereas the appointment of the petitioners is not time bound,which was made strictly in accordance with law by the competent authority. Therefore,it has been urged that there exist material difference of facts and it may lead to a different conclusion and further a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically concluded therefrom. [See: Bhawnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd (2003) 2 SCC 111].

As regard the applicability of judgment given by the larger bench, It has been contended that the PIL is not maintainable in service matter except by way of writ of quo-warranto. The larger bench's (comprising five Judges) judgment dated 18.9.2013 is such a PIL where no one sought indulgence of the Court; instead, it is a suo motu PIL wherein cognizance was taken in the matter of class IV employees and it has no concern with regard to appointment on class III posts or any other posts.

It has also been urged on behalf of the petitioners that petitioners' case is on better footing in comparison to the persons who have been regularized vide order dated 10.07.2012, as in their appointment orders, there was a rider that they will be regularized and confirmed in service only after qualifying the written examination whereas no such rider was put in the appointment orders of the petitioners of writ petition No. 5287 (SS) of 2013 : Ratnak Mishra and others Vs. Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, lastly it has been vehemently contended by Sri Mathur, Sr.Adv. that impugned order dated 08 August, 2013, whereby a decision has been taken on the representation of the petitioners that they will be given relaxation in age in the next examination provided they possess minimum qualification for appointment, is absolutely unjustified and arbitrary being in breach of the judgment and order dated 20.09.2011 wherein a clear-cut direction was issued by a Division Bench of this Court to the Registrar-General for taking appropriate steps for confirmation and regularization of the employees, who have been appointed in exercise of power conferred under Rule 41 and 45 of the Rules. It has been claimed that the petitioners have preferential right for being considered for regularization and confirmation on the posts of RGC than the persons who have been subsequently appointed on the posts of RGC. Denial of such a benefit to the petitioners is not only arbitrary and unjustified but is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution as the present petitioners have been given hostile treatment in the matter of regularization. It has been vehemently argued that it is a classic case of discrimination in which different yardstick has been applied by categorizing the persons and putting them in three sets although all were adhoc employees and are govern by same set of service rules.

Mr. Sandeep Dixit, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners of writ petition No. 5287 of 2013; Ratnank Misra and others vs. High Court of Judicature,has drawn attention of the Court towards the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 and has submitted that said Rules have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (2) of Article 229 of the Constitution of India by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Rule 2 (n) deals with Appointment Authority and it means the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or Officer, as he may direct. Rule 8 (a) (i) of 1976 Rules governs the appointment of Routine Grade Clerk and provides that sources of recruitment for Routine Grade Clerks are by direct recruitment through competitive examination conducted by the Appointing Authority or in any manner so directed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

On placing reliance upon Rule-8 (a)(i) of 1976 Rules submission of Mr. Dixit is that from bare perusal of said Rule, it transpires that apart from the recruitment of Routine Grade Clerks through competitive examination, the recruitment on the post of Routine Grade Clerks can be made in any manner so directed by the Chief Justice, because word "or" has been inserted between the words "By direct recruitment through competitive examination conducted by the Appointing Authority i.e. Chief Justice" and "in any manner so directed by Chief Justice". His submission is that 1976 Rules are not comparable to any other Service Rule as Rule 8 (a)(i) gives abundant powers to the Chief Justice for appointment of Routine Grade Clerk by direct recruitment through competitive examination conducted by the Appointment Authority i.e. Hon'ble the Chief Justice or in any manner so directed by the Chief Justice. Therefore, the High Court cannot somersault from its stand which it had taken before the Division Bench dealing with the appeal and say that now in view of the Uma Devi's case and the decision of larger bench, the petitioners' services cannot be regularized.

Sri Y.S.Lohit, Advocate appearing in one of the writ petitions argued that the appointment of the petitioners cannot be termed as de hors the Rules and as such Uma Devi's judgment which specially deals with the appointments which are made de hors the Rules cannot be applied upon the petitioners. Further in Rudra Kumar Sain vs Union of India (2000)8 SCC 25 wherein the longevity of service was treated as material factor that after rendering the services for about a decade, it may not be termed as ad hoc, stop gap or fortuitous. Further in the case of Professor C.D.Tase vs. University of Bombay; 1989 Supp(1)SCC 273, the Apex Court has already propounded that similarly situated persons may not be relegated to another round of litigation even though they had not approached the court. He also clarified that the condition of appearing in examination was not in the order of approval dated 25.8.2005 referred to in the letter dated 25.8.2005 [Annexure-3 in WP No. 5288(SS) of 2013] but was communicated subsequently vide order dated 29.8.2005 [Annexure-4], this act and subsequent arbitrary act has resulted in dragging the petitioners in unnecessary litigation and they have been denied their legitimate claim by the respondents.

As regard the advertisement, it is contended that when the Court directed the opposite parties to produce the record and seek instructions in the matter, in furtherance thereof on 19.02.2014, the court was apprised that the case of the petitioners has been referred to a three members committee by the order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice but without waiting for the decision of Hon'ble Committee, the advertisement dated 19.07.2014 was issued whereby 70 posts of RGC have been advertised to be filled in by direct appointment. Therefore, the said advertisement is defective as the proper course available to the official respondents was to first decide the fate of the petitioners which was dependent on the report of the committee, then only would have proceeded for initiating selection process for the post of RGC.

It appears that on issuance of advertisement dated 19.7.2014, petitioners not only moved amendment application questioning the validity of the advertisement dated 19.7.2014 but also filed application for interim relief seeking stay on the said advertisement. The said applications were taken up on 7.8.2014 and the Court granted time to the respondents to file objections to the said applications.

On 25.8.2014, when the aforesaid writ petitions again came up for orders, an ad-interim order was passed to the effect that though the selection for the post of Routine Grade Clerk in pursuance to the advertisement dated 19.7.2014 may go on but the result of the same shall not be declared. The order dated 25.8.2014 reads as under:-

"Heard Sri Y.S. Lohit, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.5288 (S/S) of 2013, Sri Sandeep Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.5287 (S/S) of 2013, Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Rajnish Kumar for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.5512 (S/S) of 2013 and Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent-High Court in all the three writ petitions.

The contention of the petitioners is that earlier by order dated 06.06.2012 their joint representation dated 26.09.2011 for regularization was rejected. Subsequently, another order was issued in August, 2013, Annexure-1 to the writ petition, wherein, the names of the petitioners were mentioned, who are the same petitioners whose names also find mention in the earlier order dated 06.06.2012 and it was stated therein that the High Court had been pleased to pass an order that those who have become over age be given relaxation in age in the next examination provided they possess minimum qualification for appointment.

The learned counsel for the petitioners now submits that by the impugned advertisement the respondent-High Court is proceeding to hold selection by way of direct recruitment for the post of Routine Grade Clerk without considering the claim of the petitioners as directed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.09.2011 in Special Appeal No.563 of 2008 alongwith another connected special appeal. Time was granted to Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of High Court on 07.08.2014 to obtain instructions on the amendment application. He informs that he has also written to the High Court on 08.08.2014 seeking instructions but till date he has not received any instruction.

Learned counsel for the petitioners informs that the last date for submitting the application in respect of impugned advertisement dated 19.07.2014 is today itself, i.e. 25.08.2014.

Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel submits that other persons, identically situated as the petitioners, were regularized on the post of Routine Grade Clerk and on the same date they were promoted on the post of Assistant Review Officer as well as Review Officer on 10.07.2012 whereas in the case of the petitioners in spite of the order of August, 2013, no decision has been taken by the High Court and the petitioners are being discriminated.

In the connected writ petition No.5287 (S/S) of 2013, Annexure-9 has been filed which is the appointment letter of one Ajeet Kumar Srivastava on a Class-3 post which mention that he is being offered appointment subject to the condition that he will be permitted to appear in the examination/test to be held by direct recruitment of Routine Grade Clerk and his appointment shall be regularised and confirmed only if he is selected as per Rules. Thereafter, by an order dated 10.07.2012 certain persons have been regularised and confirmed on the post of Routine Grade Clerk in which the name of Ajeet Kumar Srivastava appears at Sl.No.7 and it is further pointed out that on the same date he has also been promoted as Assistant Review Officer and further as Review Officer.

In paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit, there is not even a whisper that these persons have been regularised after they had appeared in the examination for the post of Routine Grade Clerk.

The contention of the petitioners in all the three writ petitions through out is that large number of persons have been regularised without appearing in any departmental examination for the post of R.G.C. and only the petitioners are being ignored.

Considering all these facts, Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent-High Court prays for and is granted two weeks' time for filing counter affidavit to the amended writ petition.

Till the next date of listing, it is provided that though the selection for the post of Routine Grade Clerk in pursuance of the advertisement dated 19.07.2014 may go on but the result of the same shall not be declared."

Later on, respondents moved an application for vacation of stay order refuting the allegations made by the petitioners and stated that there is no illegality or infirmity in the advertisement dated 19.7.2014, which has been published under the direction of the Hon'ble Five Judges Committee with due approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The said committee had resolved in its meeting that all 70 posts for direct recruitment be advertised with a condition that appointment against last 16 posts shall be subject to the decision of the writ petitions.

Sri Upendra Nath Mishra appearing for the High Court vehemently contended that the allegations of the petitioners that they have been denied their legitimate claim and have been discriminated is wholly unsustainable and it is wrong to say that benefit of the Division Bench judgment was incorrectly not extended to them. It has been pointed out by him that Mrs Nanda Priya, Shri Ashutosh Kumar Singh and Ms. Pooja Srivastava were not appointed on ad-hoc basis but they were appointed on probation for a period of one year. After completion of probation period, these 03 employees were regularized. The service of other seven adhoc employees were confirmed in compliance of the judgment dated 20.9.2011. As far as present petitioners are concerned, according to him, the judgment dated 20.9.2011 passed in the Special Appeal was placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for seeking directions, who in turn, refer the matter to a two judges committee. Before the said committee the name of the petitioners were also placed. The committee in its report dated 31.5.2012 recommended that the petitioners cannot be granted benefits in terms of judgment dated 20.9.2011 and further recommended that their claim for regularization can be considered only after Hon'ble the Chief Justice makes any Rule for regularization or pass any order varying the Regularization Rules, 1979. Hon'ble the Chief Justice after examining the said report, passed an order dated 1.6.2012 referring the matter of the petitioners to the Hon'ble Rules Revision Committee comprising of Three eminent Judges. The Hon'ble Rules Revision Committee made its recommendation on 27.5.2013, which was approved by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The Office order dated 10.7.2012 was issued in compliance of the judgment dated 20.9.2011 together with the orders dated 1.6.2012 and 7.7.2012 passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

At the cost of repetition, Sri Upendra Mishra submitted that the representations of the petitioners for regularization/ confirmation of their services in the establishment of the Hon'ble Court was sincerely considered by the Hon'ble Rules Revision Committee and the Hon'ble Committee after deliberating upon the matter in its meeting dated 27.5.2013 resolved that the petitioners, who have become over age be given relaxation in age in the next examination provided they possess minimum qualification for appointment.

Giving factual background of the matter, Sri Upendra Mishra submitted that prior to the petitioner's appointment on ad hoc basis, similar appointments in administrative exigencies were also made in the past. On 17.4.2004 an advertisement was issued by the High Court for making selection on the post of RGC but in the meantime vide orders dated 26.7.2004, 1.9.2004 & 2.9.2004, the High Court appointed 12 persons on ad hoc basis in accordance with the procedure prescribed for regular selection under Rule 8 of the 1976 Rules. These appointments were assailed by one Devendra Kumar Pandey in Writ Petition No. 45922 of 2004. The court examined the issue in detail with regard to justification for making adhoc appointments by the Establishment of the Court even when a regular selection process was in progress to fill up Class-III post. The Hon'ble Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition vide it judgment and order dated 27.7.2007 took into consideration the verdict given by the Constitution Bench in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi ; 2006 (4) SCC 1. The operative portion of the order reads as under:-

"Following the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, the Court expects that all appointments made by Hon'ble Chief Justice in exercise of his powers under Rule 41 and 45 of the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules 1976, will be subject to the regular selection by direct recruitment in accordance with the Rule 8 of these Rules and that these appointees will not be confirmed and regularized."

Elaborating his submissions, learned Counsel for the High Court submitted that against the aforesaid judgment and order dated 27.7.2007, private respondents to the writ petition as well as Establishment of High Court preferred appeals, which were registered as Special Appeal No. 1152 of 2007; Barmeshwar Pandey and others vs. Devendra Kumar Pandey and others and Special Appeal No. 563 of 2008; Hon'ble High Court of judicature at Allahabad vs. Devendra Kumar Pandey & others. The Division Bench in its judgment and order dated 20.9.2011 examined the powers of the Chief Justice in relation to appointment and observed as under:-

"Upon hearing the parties, it can be construed that when the Chief Justice is empowered to appoint a person under the Rules framed in exercise of powers conferred under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution of India, the appointment of the person can not be said to be illegal or irregular. Against this background, for the purpose of satisfaction of our conscience another Constitution Bench judgement of the Supreme Court is seen. Such judgement is reported in AIR 1971 SC 1850 (M. Gurumoorthy Vs. The Accountant General, Assam and Nagaland and others). In such judgement the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that exclusive power is conferred on the Chief Justice by Clause (1) read with Clause (2) of Article 229 not only in the matter of appointments but also with regards to prescribing the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court by Rules. This is subject to any law of State Legislature but only in respect of conditions of services. The powers conferred on the Chief Justice under Clause (1) of Article 229 can not be abridged or modified in the matter of appointment. The approval of the Governor in the matter of Rules is confined only to sub-rules as relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pension. All other rules in respect of conditions of service do not require his approval. This Constitution Bench judgement of the Supreme Court is apparently binding unless any contrary judgement of similar Bench to that extent is passed with regard to the power of the Chief Justice to appoint the employees of the High Court under Article 229 of the Constitution. We do not find that the ratio propounded by the Supreme Court in M. Gurumoorthy (supra) has been touched by the subsequent Constitution Bench judgement in Uma Devi (supra). Therefore, it can be safely presumed that in view of the ratio of M. Gurumoorthy (supra) the power of appointment by the Chief Justice is outside the scope and ambit of Uma Devi (supra), wherein the question arose at the instance of an employer with regard to regularisation of service by the Court or tribunal of the persons who were appointed following any back door process. It is also pertinent to mention hereunder that when the Chief Justice has taken a decision to appoint some persons to serve the High Court, it can be presupposed that such appointments are made consciously for the benefit of the institution and a faith is required to be kept by all the Judges upon him in taking such decision. The Chief Justice, being head of the institution, will be definitely worried about the necessity of appointment of employees in the Court. It is a clear case that the advertisement earlier made was cancelled and subsequent advertisement was made for the purpose of filling up the posts only in the year 2006 that too only in respect of Assistant Review Officer not with the dead cadre in which the appointees herein were appointed as Routine Grade Clerk, which subsequently in 2005 merged with Assistant Review Officer. Thus, if the Chief Justice of a High Court, being administrative head of the institution, feels pressure in respect of the workload of the High Court either in the judicial side or in the administrative side, he can not be debarred from making appointments as per the relevant Rules. Rule is categorical that manner of appointment will be as per the direction of the Chief Justice. Therefore, source of appointment is neither in dispute nor contrary to the available Rules. In the process, who has been appointed can not be the subject matter of discussion. It is absurd to believe that a Chief Justice without examining the candidature of Class-III staffs is swayed away with favouritism. Criticism of the Chief Justice in making appointment either in the judicial side or in the administrative side should be followed by the principle of ''restraint'. We are bound by the ethics and judicial discipline. Merely because a judicial order of a Single Judge rule out even an administrative decision of the entire Full Court, such power should not be loosely applied. As per the ratio of 1998 (3) SCC 72 (High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and another), the Chief Justice has been vested with wide powers to run the High Court administration independently so as not to brook any interference from any quarter, not even from his brother Judges who, however, can scrutinize his administrative action or order on the judicial side like the action of any other authority. In dealing with the power of the Chief Justice of India a three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in 2006 (1) SCC 779 (Union of India and others Vs. Kali Dass Batish and another) has held that if Parliament has reposed faith in the Chief Justice of India as the paterfamilias of the judicial hierarchy in this country, it is not open for anyone to contend that the Chief Justice of India might have given his concurrence without application of mind or without calling for the necessary inputs. The argument, to say the least, deserves summary dismissal.

Following the same analogy, when the exclusive power is given to the Chief Justice of a State, being head of the State judiciary, under Article 229 of the Constitution of India and the rules framed thereunder for appointment of his own employees being one of the sources of recruitment, the same can not be abridged or modified."

On the aforesaid two planks, the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge was held to be erroneous and perverse. Consequently, the Hon'ble Division Bench allowed both the Special Appeals with the following observations:-

"Thus, in totality, both the appeals succeed and are allowed. The direction given by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph-21 of the impugned judgement dated 27th July, 2007 following the observations of the Supreme Court judgement in Uma Devi (supra) stands set aside. The writ petition is treated to be dismissed on the basis of the observations of the learned Single Judge himself in the earlier paragraphs of the impugned judgement. Registrar General of this Court is hereby directed to take appropriate steps with regard to confirmation/ regularisation and consequential relief of the employees hereunder. However, no order is passed as to costs."

Counsel for the High Court next submitted that in compliance of the aforesaid judgment dated 20.9.2011, a list of adhoc RGCs working in the Lucknow Establishment of the Court was sent to the Registrar General, Allahabad on 27.9.2011. In the interregnum, 7 persons, who were private respondents in the aforesaid writ petition of D.K.Pandey's case submitted a representation to the Hon'ble Chief Justice seeking regularization of their services in compliance of the judgment dated 20.9.2011 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice vide its order dated 30.9.2011 referred the matter to a Committee for consideration of their claim of regularisation/confirmation. The Committee made its recommendations on 31.5.2012, which have been brought on record as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit filed by respondents nos. 1 and 2. The Committee had considered the candidature of the petitioners for regularization but they were not found fit and as such their services were not regularized.

The claim of the petitioners herein is that since aforesaid thirteen persons, who were similarly situated like petitioners, have been given the benefit of regularization by the High Court establishment, whereas they have illegally been denied the said benefit, therefore, they submitted their representations for regularization before the High Court establishment on different date. Petitioner-Ajay Kumar Misra had given two representations, the first on 26.9.2011 which was rejected by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 1.6.2012 and communicated to the petitioner vide order dated 6.6.2012. Thereafter, nine petitioners of the leading writ petition had collectively submitted a representation/reminder dated 12.9.2012 reiterating their prayer for regularization/confirmation in deference to the judgment dated 20.9.2011 passed by the Division Bench. Similar representations were given by the five petitioners of Writ Petition No. 5287 of 2013; Ratnank Mishra vs. Hon'ble High Court of Judicture at Allahabad, so was the prayer of Sanjeev Sharma, petitioner of Writ Petition no. 5288 (SS) of 2013. All the aforesaid representations were duly considered and thereafter the establishment of the Court informed the decision taken on the aforesaid representations to the petitioners vide order dated 2.8.2013, wherein following observations were quoted:-

"Those who have become overage be given relaxation in age in next examination provided they possess minimum qualification for appointment."

As regard to the order of regularization/confirmation dated 10.7.2012, learned Counsel submitted that the same was passed by the Establishment in strict compliance of the judgment dated 20.9.2011 passed by the Division Bench in the Special Appeals. However, subsequently, a five Judges Bench of this Court, while considering the issue of regularization of Class IV employees also examined the issue with regard to the powers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice for making appointments under Rule 41 and 45 of the Rules of 1976 and disapproved the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in Devendra Kumar Pandey's case and observations of the full bench in High Court of Judicature vs. Diwakar Singh; 2010 (9) ADJ 292 .

In these circumstances, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment dated 20.9.2011, of which benefit and implementation is sought by the petitioners cannot be given after pronouncement of the verdict by the larger bench, which, no doubt, has primacy over the two judges Bench and the Establishment of the Court is bound to obey the law as propounded by the large Bench and existing at the relevant time.

As regard the assertion of the petitioners regarding discrimination in the matter of regularization as they have been denied regularization whereas similarly situated persons have been regularized as such the action is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, is also equally misplaced as at the relevant time when certain persons were regularized, the Division Bench's judgment was binding on the establishment of the court but after the judgment dated 18.9.2013 of five-Judges Bench, the entire scenario changed.The larger Bench had considered the applicability of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Uma Devi's case. In Uma Devi's case, the Apex Court while distinguishing the ratio of Pyara Singh's case 1992(4) SCC 118, refused to accept the contention that all adhoc, temporary or casual employees may be made permanent. Further, in paras 43 to 54 of the Constitution Bench judgment, exhaustive and elaborative directions were given as to how Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution are violated, when illegal appointments, which are back door entries and made de hors the Rules are sought to be regularized. The Constitution Bench in paras 49 and 50 of the judgment had also considered that in absence of any fundamental or legal right, it is not proper for the Courts to issue writ of mandamus in the matter of such regularization. In view of the said categorical mandate of the Constitution Bench, it is no longer possible for the petitioners to insist their regularization in absence of any statutory Rules.

On the strength of the decisions rendered in State of Haryana vs. Ram Kumar; 1997(3)SCC 321, State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh; 2000(9)SCC 94 and other cases, Sri Upendra Mishra, learned Counsel for the respondents contended that before invoking the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and seeking parity of treatment with others, petitioners have to demonstrate that it does not amount to negative parity because negative parity is impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution as two wrongs do not make one right. Doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable rights.

Elaborating his submissions, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that though in the case of UPSEB vs. Pooran Chandra Pandey; 2007 (11) SCC 92, it has been held that Uma Devi's Case cannot be applied mechanically without seeing the facts of particular case because a little difference in facts can make Uma Devi's case inapplicable but the three Judges Bench in a subsequent decision given in Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand & others; 2008(10) SCC 1 held in unambiguous words that in view of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgment of Constitution Bench in Uma Devi's Case is binding on all courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court till the same is overruled by a Larger Bench. He also pointed out that petitioner's case also does not fall under the exemption given in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Uma Devi's case as the very appointment of the petitioners on adhoc basis was made after 9.12.2004. Further, the Apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in Renu Vs, District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari; AIR 2014 SC 2175 has laid down specific directions with regard to filing up of any post in the High Court or subordinate judiciary. Therefore, it is no longer open for any Courts in the country to make appointments and regularization of services in contravention of the statutory Rules.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, learned Counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the limb of arguments advanced by the petitioners regarding parity of Division Bench judgment of Devendra Kumar Pandey's case and alleged discrimination qua other persons regularized on 10.7.2012 are not sustainable and cannot be accepted.

Lastly, learned Counsel for the High Court argued with vehemence that so far as the judgment and order dated 31.10.2014 given by a learned Single Judge at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 55500 of 2013; Dharmendra Singh Rathore vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice is concerned, the said judgment is per incurium as it failed to consider, the verdict given by the five Judges' bench, which was binding on the learned Single Judge. According to him, the five judges' Bench judgment perhaps was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge and that is why there is no reference of said judgment. He further clarified that against the aforesaid judgment dated 31.10.2014, the establishment of the High Court has preferred Special Appeal and vide order dated 12.12.2014, the Division Bench had stayed the operation of the judgment dated 31.10.2014 and the said appeal is still pending. Therefore, in view of the pronouncement given in A.R.Antuley vs. R.S.Nayak & anor; 1988(2) SCC 602, the judgment dated 31.10.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge being per incurium deserves to be ignored.

In these circumstances, learned Counsel for the respondents summed up his arguments by saying that the reliefs as sought for by the petitioners cannot be granted and the batch of writ petitions, aforesaid, is liable to be dismissed.

At the out set, I would like to point out that during the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that from perusal of the relief clause in the memo of the writ petition filed earlier by Devendra Kumar Pandey, would make it clear that the said petitioner has prayed for quashing the appointment orders of the respondent Nos. 3 to 14 and other similarly situated employees, if any. In this situation, the present writ petitioners are to be treated as party to the said writ petition as any adverse orders passed therein would have also affected the rights of the present writ petitioners. It has further been argued that there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge while disposing off the writ petition filed by said Devendra Kumar Pandey to direct that the ad hoc appointees should not be regularized/confirmed. Therefore, when the matter went in Appeal and the Division Bench disapproved the view expressed by the learned Singe Judge, the petitioners are also entitled for similar treatment as extended to others and the benefit of said judgment of the Division Bench ought to have been extended to the petitioners and denial whereof on any ground is wholly discriminatory and per se bad.

A perusal of the judgment rendered in the Appeal by the Division Bench would show that the said Bench had distinguished application of constitution bench of Uma Devi's case on the premise that the power of appointment by Chief Justice as held by another Constitution Bench judgment of M.Gurmumurthy vs. Accountant General,Assam and Nagaland;AIR 171 SC 1850, is outside the scope and ambit of subsequent Constitution Bench Judgment in Uma Devi's Case. In contrast, the Larger Bench comprising five Hon'ble Judges while considering the aforesaid issue as to whether the power of appointment by the Hon'ble Chief Justice is outside the scope and ambit of the Constitution Bench judgment of Uma Devi (supra) in view of the ratio of an earlier Constitution Bench judgment in M. Gurumurthy (supra) held as under:-

"We would like to clarify that the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Vs. Devendra Kumar Pandey (supra) to the effect that Uma Devi's case has not touched the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the Constitution Bench judgment of M. Gurumurthy (supra) is not correctly stated in the context of the Division Bench judgment, inasmuch as the decision in the case of M. Gurumurthy only spells out the powers of the Chief Justice but the same does not in any way hold that the Chief Justice can exercise powers that may run-counter to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution while making appointments in the establishment of the High Court. Consequently, the case of Uma Devi (supra) is a decision on the limitations prescribed while making appointment against public posts in terms of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. What Uma Devi's case has deprecated is back door appointment or appointment de-hors the Rules. The present is clearly a case which involves these issues and, therefore, the reliance by the learned Counsel for the High Court on the Division Bench judgment seeking to clarify the ratio of Uma Devi's case is misplaced."

The larger Bench further observed as under:

"The issue that still remains to be answered by us is the issue of regularisation. After the Division Bench judgment in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Class-IV Employees Association (supra), the law on this issue went a sea change with the pronouncement of the Apex Court from time to time. The judgment, which stares at the face of such claims of regularisation in matters of public employment, is the leading case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006)4 SCC 1. Practically for all purposes appointments without following the Rules and described as back door entries were clearly deprecated and it was held that no such rights exists for being enforced in view of the clear mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The ratio of the said decision has been spelled out in paragraph Nos. 43 to 54 of the said judgment. If the ratio of the said decision is applied herein, then the observations made in the Division Bench judgment in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Class-IV Employees Association (supra) would stand diluted. In the said circumstances, it would not be possible now to extend any benefit of regularisation in view of the mandate contained in the aforesaid judgment of Uma Devi (supra).

In view of the aforesaid legal proposition, this Court finds force in the submission of the High Court's counsel that earlier persons were regularized in compliance of the Division Bench judgment dated 20.9.2011 as it was fully implementable and binding precedent at the relevant time. After the judgment of the larger bench dated 18.9.2012, which considered the ratio of the Division Bench judgment rendered in Devendra Kumar's case and did not approve the issues i.e. non application of Uma Devi's case and unfettered power of appointment vested in the Chief Justice, the regularization in the matter of public employment has to be necessarily judged as per the law laid down in the case of Uma Devi's case. The relevant paragraph reads as under:-

"Having given out thoughtful considerations, but with due deference to the aforesaid observations of the full bench to Diwakar Singh's case and the division bench judgment in the case of High Court vs. Devendra Kumar Pandey (supra), we are the least persuaded to approve the same. The pronouncement appears to be authoritative but it lacks the substance of consideration of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Howsoever high a dignity may be, once the power conferred is governed by the Constitution, the laws made thereunder and the rules framed, then the authority is bound to act within the rules and not ascribe to himself an authority to act beyond it or else the exercise of power will be a camouflage to act arbitrarily in the solemn name of discretion."

It may be added that with regard to other directions contained in all previous judgments, it was clarified by the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi's case that all previous judgments on the subject are denuded of their status as precedent. Paragraph 54, which is relevant, reads as under:-

"54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedent."

At this juncture, it would be relevant to point that during the course of arguments much emphasis has been laid on Rule 8 (a)(i) of 1976 Rules by the parties, therefore, it would be apt to reproduce the aforesaid provision herein:-

" Rule 8 Source of recruitment to class III posts:- The sources of recruitment to the various class III posts in the establishment shall be as follows:-

(a) Routine Grade Clerks

(i) By direct recruitment through competitive examination conducted by the appointing authority or in any manner so directed by Chief Justice.

In my opinion, the phrase "in any manner so directed by Chief Justice" contained in Rule 8 (a)(i) of the Rules of 1976 is also a saving/residuary power, which had already been examined and dealt with by the larger Bench and observed that "residuary powers of the Chief Justice under Rule 8, Rule 41 and Rule 45 of the 1976 Rules are similar powers under the 2000 Rules are supposed to be exercised notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules, but the same cannot be construed to mean- notwithstanding the fundamental rights and obligation under the Constitution." Thus, it is clear that the residuary power has to be exercised in consonance with the provisions of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution in view of the law as propounded by the larger Bench and by the Apex Court in Renu' case where the court has examined the power conferred upon the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution, in detail.

It may be added that the phrase "any other manner so directed by Chief Justice" laid down under Rule 8 (a)(i) cannot be read in violation of Articles 14 and 16 and therefore appointments under Rule 8 (a) (i) read with Rules 41 and 45 of the 1976 Rules cannot be made without following the process of advertisement and selection. It is an admitted fact that before appointment of petitioners or the RGCs, who have been regularized pursuant to the judgment of Division Bench, no advertisement was issued. Now, since the judgment of Division Bench has been disapproved by the larger bench, the hands of this Court are tied and as such no direction contrary to the view expressed by the larger bench, can be issued for regularization of their services. Even the benefit of Regularization Rules or the benefit as contemplated under para 53 of Uma Devi's case can be extended to the petitioners as they do not fall under the cut-off date of regularization nor they have completed 10 years of service on the cut off date i.e.10.4.2006.

It may be noted that Article 16(1) of the Constitution provides for "equal opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." Therefore, every appointment has to be made only after adhering to the process of advertisement and selection. Issuance of advertisement for appointment is a pre-condition as held by the Apex Court and the High Court in umpteen cases. [See: National Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Somveer Singh; 2006(5) SCC 493, State of Bihar vs. Chandrewshwar Pathak; 2014(4) ESC 614 and Dr. Mahendra Shanker Singh Vs. Chancellor; 2014(2)UPLBEC 1593. Therefore, any appointment in government services, which is made without following advertisement and due process of selection, be it a regular appointment or an adhoc appointment or whatever term can it be given, would be in violation of the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, assertions of the petitioners made in this context that Rule 8 (a)(i) of the 1976 Rules, was not taken into account by the larger Bench is wholly erroneous and legally untenable. As a matter of fact, a perusal of the judgment of the larger bench reveals that it has considered all the residuary powers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice under Rule 8, Rule 41 and Rule 45 of the 1976 Rules in its judgment dated 18.9.2013.

As regard the contention of the petitioners that they have been grossly discriminated inasmuch as their services have not been regularized; whereas similarly situated persons have been regularized though they should have been treated equally in view of Article 14 of the Constitution, this claim is made on the ground that they should also be extended the benefit of Division Bench's judgment rendered in Devendra Kumar Pandey's case. As averred above, certain RGCs were regularized/confirmed in view of the Division Bench's judgment and before passing any order in respect of the petitioners the verdict of larger bench came into existence on 18.9.2013. Therefore, now it is not open for this court to issue directions contrary to the view expressed by the larger bench. During the course of arguments, it has been stated that if the petitioners are not entitled for regularization as they have no enforceable right as their appointment is said to be bad, then the persons who have been regularized, their appointment being also bad, they should also not have been regularized. In this context, I would like to observe that here the court is concerned with the matter of present petitioners as the persons who have been regularized are not party to the present proceedings and as such, this Court refrains itself from recording any finding in respect of nature of appointment and regularization of said persons.

The law is well settled that Article 14 provides for positive equality and not negative equality and is not meant to perpetuate an illegality. The Court cannot issue a direction that the same mistake be perpetuated on the ground of discrimination or hardship; any action/order contrary to law does not confer any right upon any person for similar treatment and; and an order made in favour of a person in violation of the prescribed procedure cannot form a legal premise for any other person to claim parity with the said illegal or irregular order.

The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly, judgment passed on wrong premise in favour of one individual does not entitle other to claim similar benefits.

At this juncture, it is imperative to refer the Apex Court's judgment rendered in Renu vs. District and Sessions Judge, Tis- Hazari; AIR 2014 SC 2175. In this case the Apex Court suo motu issued notice to Registrar Generals of all the High Courts and to the States for filing their response mainly on two points viz. (i) why the recruitment be not centralized; and (ii)why the relevant rules dealing with service conditions of the entire staff be not amended to make them as transferable posts. The Apex Court while observing that any appointment made in violation of mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is not only irregular but also illegal and cannot be sustained, held in paragraph 27 as under:-

"27. To say that the Chief Justice can appoint a person without following the procedure provided under Articles 14 and 16 would lead to an indefinite conclusion that the Chief Justice can dismiss him also without holding any inquiry or following the principles of natural justice/Rules etc., for as per Section 16 of General Clauses Act, 1897 power to appoint includes power to remove/suspend/dismiss. (Vide: Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, 1956 SC 285; and Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh &Anr. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 193).

But as no employee can be removed without following the procedure prescribed by law or in violation of the terms of his appointment, such a course would not be available to the Chief Justice. Therefore, the natural corollary of this is that the Chief Justice cannot make any appointment in contravention of the Statutory Rules, which have to be in consonance with the scheme of our Constitution."

The Apex Court further held in paragraph 29 as under:-

"Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that the powers under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution cannot be exercised by the Chief Justice in an unfettered and arbitrary manner. Appointments should be made giving adherence to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and/or such Rules as made by the legislature."

From the aforesaid legal proposition, it clearly emanates that in any way the Chief Justice cannot exercise such powers in contravention of the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution while making appointments in the establishment of the High Court. In these circumstances, assertions of the petitioners that the aforesaid case is not applicable upon the petitioners is wholly erroneous and unacceptable.

As regard the applicability of the judgment dated 31.10.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 55500 of 2013; Dharmendra Singh Rathore vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice is concerned, no doubt judicial discipline requires that there should be uniformity in the decision and as such judgment rendered in Dharmendra Singh Rathore's case ought to have been respected, but, as indicated above, there is no reference of larger bench judgment, which has binding effect, in the judgment rendered in Writ Petition No. 55500 of 2013 by the learned Single Judge and went unnoticed. Therefore, this court is unable to follow the same. Needless to say, that so long as the larger Bench Judgement stands, the dicta laid down therein are binding on single judges and Division benches. It would be subversion of judicial process not to observe judicial discipline and settled procedure.

It may be clarified that the learned Single Judge delivered the judgment on 31.10.2014 and prior to that the judgment of five judges bench had already been pronounced on 18.9.2013, which did not approve the view expressed by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 20.9.2011. With due respect, I would like to mention that perhaps the said judgment of larger bench was not brought to the notice of the learned single judge otherwise such a situation would not have arisen. It is necessary to add that the operation of the said judgment and order dated 31st October, 2014 passed by the Single Judge has been stayed by a Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 1109 of 2014 and it has been informed at the Bar that the said appeal is still pending. It may be added that even the judgment pronounced by the Apex Court in Renu's case [supra] was existing at that time as it was delivered on 12.2.2014.

In view of the aforesaid discussions and taking the holistic view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioners are not entitled for the reliefs as sought by them and all the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.

Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed and interim order is vacated. All the miscellaneous applications also stand disposed of accordingly.

Costs easy.

Order Date :- 31 Aug 2015

Tanveer/Ajit/MH