M/S R.K.B.K. Ltd. Thru' Its ... vs Sushila Devi & 7 Others
2015 Latest Caselaw 1965 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

										A.F.R.
 
										Reserved
 

 
Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3886 of 2015
 
Petitioner :- M/S R.K.B.K. Ltd. Thru' Its Manager Ashok Kumar Rai
 
Respondent :- Sushila Devi & 7 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- A.C. Misra, Shailesh Kumar Tripathi
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Rahul Sahai
 

 
Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Gupta,J.

1. The petitioner has challenged an order dated 18.5.2015 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, whereby the application filed by the petitioner for review of the award dated 6.12.2010 passed in Claim Petition No.24 of 2009, has been rejected. It has been held that there is no clerical error in the award and there being no power with the Tribunal to review its award on merits, the application cannot be accepted.

2. The core question for consideration is regarding the nature and scope of the power of review of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 19881.

3. The facts in brief are that the first to seventh respondents filed a claim petition claiming compensation on account of death of Virendra Bahadur Singh Chauhan in a motor accident. The petitioner is the owner of the offending vehicle with which accident occurred and the eighth respondent is the Insurance Company with which the vehicle was insured. By an award dated 6.12.2010, an amount of Rs.8,48,482/- was awarded as compensation to the claimants. Although, it was found that the offending vehicle was insured with the eighth respondent but while deciding issue no.2, it was held that on 13.1.2009, the date on which the accident took place, the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid driving license. This was held to be in breach of the conditions of the Insurance Policy and consequently, the liability to pay compensation was fastened on the petitioner. The petitioner did not challenge the award by filing any appeal, as provided under Section 173 of the Act. However, it made an application on 11.1.2011 for review of the finding on issue no.2. In the review application, it was alleged that the finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on issue no.2 requires to be reviewed. It was alleged that by inadvertence, the Tribunal overlooked the fact that the license of the driver was renewed from 23.5.2008 to 22.5.2009 and the same being a result of a clerical error, deserves to be corrected.

4. Before this Court, a copy of the award dated 21.2.2013 in Claim Petition No.36 of 2009, which related to death of another person in the same accident, has been brought on record to demonstrate that therein, the Tribunal has held that the driver of the same offending vehicle was having a valid license and consequently, the liability to pay compensation was saddled on the Insurance Company. It is submitted before this Court that the Tribunal had, by inadvertence, ignored the stamp of renewal of the license and the same amounts to a clerical error and in relation to which the Tribunal had the power to make necessary corrections. It is alleged that the view taken by the Tribunal in the impugned order dated 18.5.2015 that it does not have the power of substantive review and, therefore, the application is not maintainable, is illegal, as the review sought by the petitioner was not a substantive review but for correction of a clerical error. It is alleged that the Tribunal under Section 169 of the Act is invested with the power to follow such procedure, as it thinks fit. Thus, its power and jurisdiction are not circumscribed by technicalities and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the review application should have been allowed.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company submitted that the application filed by the petitioner, if allowed, would amount to a substantive review, which is not permissible, as no such power is conferred on the Tribunal. It is further contended that according to allegations made in the application, there was an error apparent on the face of the record and it cannot be construed to be a clerical error as contended by the petitioner.

6. These rival contentions fall for consideration.

7. It is first principle of law that generally a Court or a Tribunal or quasi judicial authority, once it has pronounced the judgment, looses seisin over the matter; it becomes functus officio. Thereafter, it cannot arrogate on itself the power to alter, amend or modify the judgment except to the extent provided under the statute and certain well recognised principles of law, borrowed from the court of equity.

8. Every judicial or quasi judicial authority or tribunal is invested with the power to shield itself from fraud or misrepresentation. In United Industries Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh2 the Supreme Court held that every court or Tribunal has the power to "review its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension, as would affect the very basis of the claim." In Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.3 the Supreme Court recognized inherent power of National Consumer Forum to recall its judgment or orders if it has been obtained by fraud. It has been held, after referring to several judgments of the foreign courts, as under:-

"22. The judiciary in India also possesses the inherent power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business.

23. Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court, the courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order. (See: Benoy Krishna Mukherjee vs. Mohanlal Goenka AIR 1950 Cal. 287; Gajanand Sha & Ors. vs. Dayanand Thakur AIR 1943 Patna 127; Krishna Kumar vs. Jawand Singh AIR 1947 Nagpur 236; Devendra Nath Sarkar vs. Ram Rachpal Singh ILR (1926) 1 Lucknow 341 = AIR 1926 Oudh 315; Saiyed Muhammad Raza vs. Ram Saroop & Ors. ILR (1929) 4 Lucknow 562 = AIR 1929 Oudh 385 (FB); Bankey Behari Lal & Anr. vs. Abdul Rahman & Ors. ILR (1932) 7 Lucknow 350 = AIR 1932 Oudh 63; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma vs. Mammen Mammen, 1955 Kerala Law Times 459.) The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the Court (Ishwar Mahton & Anr. vs. Sitaram Kumar & Ors. AIR 1954 Patna 450) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. (Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary vs. Debendra Pd. Singh & Ors. AIR 1958 Patna 618; Smt. Tara Bai vs. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao AIR 1985 Karnataka 270)."

9. The second category of cases where the court or the Tribunal can make modifications in its judgment, award or order, are those where there has been a mathematical or clerical error. Such power has been given statutory recognition under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which stipulates that "clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties."

10. Most of the statutes creating special courts or Tribunals, by express word invest such power in them. Even where it is not provided expressly, such power is deemed to inhere in the court or Tribunal and is exercised ex debito justitiae to prevent abuse of the process of court.

11. Such power is exercised in recognition of the principles that (i) an act of Court shall prejudice no one (actus curiae neminem gravabit) and (ii) the record of Courts should represent the correct state of affairs. In Jayalakshmi Coelho Vs. Oswald Joseph Coelho4, the Supreme Court recognised such power in every Court or Tribunal "irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained under Section 152 CPC may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding."

12. The courts or Tribunals also have power to review their judgments, awards or orders on account of some defect in procedure. The court or quasi judicial authority or a Tribunal having jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a dispute, may, while doing so, commit a procedural irregularity, which goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently, the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by a court or a Tribunal, without notice to the opposite parties or under a mistaken impression that the notice has been served upon the opposite parties or the matter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its hearing, are some of the cases of the power of procedural review illustrated by the Supreme Court in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another5. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in such a case, "the party seeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on the face of record or any other ground which may justify a review. He has to establish that the procedure followed by the court or the quasi judicial authority suffered from such illegality that it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made therein, inasmuch as the opposite party concerned was not heard for no fault of his, or that the matter was heard and decided on a date other than the one fixed for hearing of the matter which he could not attend for no fault of his. In such cases, therefore, the matter is to be re-heard in accordance with law without going into the merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to be recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous, but because it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated by an error of procedure or mistake, which went to the root of the matter and invalidated the entire proceeding." Such a power has been recognised to inhere in a Labour court in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others6 ex debito justitiae. It was held that once it is established that the party was prevented from appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that the matter be reheard and decided again.

13. Some of the instances of such power specifically recognised under the Code of Civil Procedure is that under Order 9 Rule 7, Order 9 Rule 9 and Order 9 Rule 13.

14. The fourth category of cases where review of judgment or the award is permissible is where a court or tribunal is invested with the power to review its judgment or order on merits. It is an entirely different arena where the court or tribunal has been conferred with the power to re-examine or have a re-look at the controversy on merits on certain well recognised grounds namely, in cases were such exercise becomes necessary on account of discovery of new and important matter or evidence or where there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record which deserves to be corrected. This is power of review stricto sensu and has also been described in some decisions as the power of substantive review. It is now well recognised that power of substantive review can only be exercised if the court or quasi judicial authority or tribunal is vested with such power under the statute by express provision of law or by necessary implication. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others7, the scope of the power of substantive review has been summarized thus:-

"12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed is ultra-vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (vide: Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1457; and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 641).

13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273; Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1814; Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2186; State of Orissa & Ors. v. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, Cuttack & Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 162; and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 705, this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in absence of any statutory provision for the same is nullity being without jurisdiction."

15. The procedure and the powers of the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act have been given under Section 169 of the Act. For convenience of reference, Section 169 of the Act is reproduced below:-

"169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals. (1) In holding any inquiry under section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.

(2)The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (2 of 1974.)

(3)Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry."

16. Section 176 of the Act confers power on the State Government to make rules in relation to the following matters:-

"176. Power of State Government to make rules.--- A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:--

(a)The form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications;

(b)The procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter;

(c)The powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;

(d)The form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and

(e)Any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed."

17. In exercise of the said power, the State of Uttar Pradesh has framed the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998. Rule 221 of the Rules invests the Claims Tribunal with certain powers of the civil court. Rule 221 reads as follows:-

"221. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases:- The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI; Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII. "

18. Thus, under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has not been invested with the power of substantive review given to a civil court by Section 114 and Order 47 C.P.C. There is even no provision under the Act or the Rules wherefrom such power can be said to be impliedly conferred on a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Thus, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can only make changes in the award if the case falls under the first three categories delineated above and not where a substantive review is sought on merits.

19. Now it has to be examined as to under which category the application filed by the petitioner would fall. It has been alleged that the finding of the Tribunal, while making the award on issue no.2, requires to be reviewed, inasmuch as the Tribunal had inadvertently ignored from consideration the stamp relating to renewal of license for the period 23.5.2008 to 22.5.2009. A perusal of the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal reveals that while deciding issue no.2, the Tribunal, after examining the license of the driver Khusi Ram, has recorded a categorical finding in the following terms:-

Þpkyd vuqKfIr ds voyksdu ls ;g Hkh Li"V gS fd fnukad 27-4-07 ls 26-4-08 rd ,oa 1-6-09 ls 31-5-2010 rd okgu dk pkyd vuqKfIr oS/k jgk gS fdUrq fnukad 27-4-08 ls 31-5-09 ds e/; okgu pkyd vuqKfIr oS/k gksuk ugh ik;k tkrk gS tcfd nq?kZVuk fnukad 13-1-09 dks gksuk dfFkr gSA bl izdkj nq?kZVuk dh frfFk dks okgu dk pkyu vuqKk i= oS/k ,oa izHkkoh ugha jgk gS vr% ;g okn fcUnq udkjkRed :i ls okgu Lokeh ds fo#) fu.khZr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSAß

20. The Tribunal has thus held, after examining the license of the driver, that it was not valid on the date the accident took place. The petitioner now contends that the aforesaid finding has been rendered inadvertently and in ignorance of the endorsement of renewal made on the license. The petitioner thus wants the evidence to be re-examined. In the opinion of the Court, such a mistake, if committed by the Tribunal, even if apparent on the face of record, would be a case of substantive review and not correction of a clerical error. The other ground, though not pleaded before the tribunal, is that in Claim Petition No.36 of 2009, relating to the same accident, the license of the driver was held to be valid. Thus, the petitioner seeks to rely on a piece of evidence coming into existence after the award was rendered. This again can only be a ground of substantive review. Since, as noted above, the Tribunal does not have the power of substantive review and, therefore, in the opinion of the Court, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.

21. In U.P. SRTC Vs. Imtiaz Hussain8, the Supreme Court explained the distinction between power of Court or tribunal to correct accidental omission and mistakes, which is inherent, from the power to correct an error or omission, which is intentional. It has been held thus:-

"7............................The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 as if it is looking into it for the first time, for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party if at all is to file appeal or revision before the higher forum or review application before the very forum, subject to the limitations in respect of such review. It implies that the Section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing and applying the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of Code even after passing of effective orders in the lis pending before them. No Court can, under the cover of the aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Dwaraka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1999 (3) SCC 500) and Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181".

(emphasis supplied)

22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust Vs. Union of India9. In that case, in an appeal preferred before the Supreme Court against order of the Custom Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, it was contended that various points raised before the Tribunal were not considered by it in its order. The Supreme Court permitted the appeal filed before it to be withdrawn with liberty to file a proper application before the Tribunal. In pursuance of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court, an application was filed before the Tribunal, pointing out various facts, which though raised were not taken into consideration. The Tribunal treated the application as an application filed for rectification of mistake under Section 129 B of the Customs Act and rejected the same as barred by limitation, being of the opinion that an application for rectification can be filed only within six months. When the matter was subjected to challenge before the Supreme Court, it was held that the Tribunal had wrongly treated the application as one under Section 129 B of the Customs Act. It was observed that every Tribunal has inherent power to recall its order if sufficient cause is shown. Where it was shown to the Tribunal that it did not notice the pleas raised before it, which infringes the principles of natural justice, it ought to have dealt with such application on merits. The Supreme Court, while taking the said view, had placed reliance on the judgment in the case of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), which, as noted above, recognises the power of a Tribunal in case of procedural review. Thus, the Supreme Court, in the facts of that case, has found the application moved before the Tribunal to be a case of procedural review where the contentions and the facts of the case as obtaining, were not noticed. Thus, the aforesaid judgment would be of no assistance to the petitioner.

23. The next judgment relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is in the case of Pranab Dhar Vs. Rajesh Deb10 rendered by the High Court of Gauhati. In that case, it was held by the Gauhati High Court that where on account of mistake of the counsel of a party, valid permit could not be placed before the Claims Tribunal, such an error on account of a human error can be permitted to be corrected for doing substantive justice between the parties. In taking such view, the Gauhati High Court has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), which, as noted above, was a case of procedural review and would thus not apply to a case of substantive review.

24. Another judgment relied upon by the Gauhati High Court was in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), which again would not apply to facts of the instant case as it recognises the power of the Tribunal to make a review on account of defect in procedure. However, Gauhati High Court in Pranab Dhar Vs. Rajesh Deb (supra), after quoting the provisions of Section 169 of the Act, made observations to the effect that the Tribunal is invested with wide powers to make inquiry in such manner as it thinks fit. It has been noted that there is no provision under the Act, which debars the Claims Tribunal to make a review of its orders and awards in order to do substantive justice between the parties. It has been concluded thus:-

" .......... this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal has the power of review as the same is implicit in every Court of civil nature, even when the statute is expressly not armed with power of review, and also the Tribunal is free to follow the general procedure prescribed under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC as the legislature vested wide power to it under Sub-section (1) of Section 169 regarding what should be the procedure for holding inquiry under Section 168 of the Act."

25. This Court is unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Gauhati High Court in its aforesaid judgment. As noted above, most of the cases relied upon by the Gauhati High Court are those where a power of procedural review has been recognised. In taking the view that under Section 169 of the Act, the power of the Tribunal is very wide and in absence of any specific prohibition, it is free to follow the general procedure prescribed under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, as the legislature vested wide power to it under sub-section (1) of Section 169, the Gauhati High Court failed to notice the difference between the powers of the claim tribunal in relation to the procedure to be followed by it and the powers to be exercised. Sub-section (1) of Section 169 stipulates that 'in holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit'. Thus, subject to any rule framed under the Act, the procedure to be followed, has been left to the discretion of the Claims Tribunal. It has wide, unbridled powers to device the procedure as may be convenient to it, provided it is in consonance with principle of equity and fair play. However, the powers of the Claims Tribunal have been delineated in Sub-section (2) of Section 169 of the Act. It confers only some of the powers of a civil court on the Claims Tribunal. Further, under Section 176 (c), powers vested in a civil court can be conferred on a Claims Tribunal by rules made by the State Government. Thus, the Claims Tribunal is not a tribunal with unlimited powers. On the contrary, its powers are circumscribed by those provided under the Act or the Rules made thereunder, none of which confer power of substantive review on the Tribunal.

26. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court, while construing the power of the Labour court in making review, has noted the distinction between similar provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 11 (1) and (3) of the said Act, somewhat akin to Section 169 (1) and (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, have been held to operate in different field. Sub-section (1) of Section 11, it has been held, relates to matters of procedure, whereas Sub-section (3) of Section 11 relates to the powers of the Tribunal. For convenience of reference, Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, are reproduced below:-

"11 (1). Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think fit.

(3). Every Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal] shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-

(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects;

(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;

(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed,

and every inquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal] shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

27. The Supreme Court, after noting the distinction between Sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 11, held that the Labour court cannot be said to be invested with the power of substantive review under Sub-section (1) of Section 11, while being conferred with the power to devise "such procedure" as it "may think fit". The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in this regard in para 13 of the judgment are as under:-

"13. .... Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act, while the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of civil court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in Section 11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in sub-section (1) of Section 11 and not in sub-section (3) of Section 11. Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it, obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal."

(emphasis supplied)

28. It is amply clear that the decision in the case of Pranab Dhar (supra) omits to notice the distinction between the powers with which the tribunal is invested with, as compared to the procedure to be followed by it. Whereas the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal, the powers conferred upon it are clearly defined. Thus, this Court is unable to subscribe to the view that a Claims Tribunal, while deciding the dispute under the Act, is invested with the power of substantive review.

29. The next decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is in the case of Sandhya Vaish and another Vs. New India Insurance Company Ltd. and others11. In that case, an application was filed before the Tribunal for correcting an omission on its part in awarding interest from the date of the claim. The learned Single Judge of this Court, after noticing the provisions of Section 171 of the Act, which permits the award of the interest from the date of making of the claim, came to the conclusion that such a mistake could be corrected, being in the realm of procedure. It is noticeable that in that case, no review was sought in regard to any finding recorded in the award, but it was only for correction of the operative part of the award of the Tribunal. Although, in that judgment, certain observations have also been made to the effect that in the absence of any prohibition under the Act on the power of the Claims Tribunal to make a review of its orders and awards, such power has to be recognised, but ultimately the law laid down thereunder is that omission to award interest from the date of filing of the claim petition was a mistake, which can be corrected ex debito justitiae. Thus, the facts of the said case were distinguishable and the law laid down in the said decision would not apply to the facts of the instant case.

30. No other submission has been made by learned counsel for the petitioner.

31. The petition lacks merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.)

Order Date :-25.08.2015

SL