Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P.Throu.Its ... vs Satyendra Singh 223(S/S)2013 on 18 September, 2013
Bench: Uma Nath Singh, Mahendra Dayal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 687 of 2013
Appellant :- State Of U.P.Throu.Its Secy.Secondary Edu.Lko.& Ors.
Respondent :- Satyendra Singh 223(S/S)2013
Counsel for Appellant :- C.S.C.
Counsel for Respondent :- S.P.Singh,R.P.Singh
Hon'ble Uma Nath Singh,J.
Hon'ble Mahendra Dayal,J.
Order(Oral)
We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the pleadings of special appeal.
This special has been filed with a delay of two months. Shri H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondent does not have any objection to delay being condoned. Application is allowed and delay, as pointed out by the Registry, is condoned.
The one and only question that was pressed in service by learned counsel for State is that the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of powers under Article 161 of the Constitution, has commuted rest of the sentence of the respondent, who has been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC., with condition that he shall furnish two bail bonds to the satisfaction of District Magistrate, Sultanpur, for keeping peace in the remaining period of the sentence. Therefore, it is not a case of absolute and complete pardon, which will not operate as an stigma for the purpose of seeking employment.
On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent placed reliance on the Judgement of Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Nanavati v. The State of Bombay (now Maharashtra), [AIR 1961 Supreme Court 112].
Learned Single Judge relying on the said Judgement, has observed that after exercise of powers under Article 161 of the Constitution, conviction and sentence awarded by the Court, shall not operate as stigma.
We have also gone through the Judgement of Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Apex Court. We notice that as per the ratio of the Judgement, the sting of judicial orders granting punishment, ceases to operate after the operation of Article 161 of the Constitution, whereunder the Governor of a State can grant pardon etc. and suspend, remit or commute sentences.
It has been elucidated that the Executive Power exercised in regard to sentences passed by Courts, is in its very nature the exercise of constitutional authority, which negatives the orders of Courts. It is also held that the language of Article 161 of the Constitution is of widest amplitude and applies to various forms of clemency mentioned therein. It is also observed that two articles, namely, Article 142 and Article 161 of the Constitution, operate in two distinct fields, where different consideration for taking action apply. Their objects are also different and the language of each is restricted to its own object or subject.
Moreover, the language of Article 161 is general, and the power extends equally to all clauses of pardons known to law, whatever nomenclature used. Therefore, the power to pardon is absolute and exercisable at any time on the principle, which are quite different from the principles on which judicial power is exercised.
Article 161 of the Constitution is a later provision and when it was threaded, the Constitution Makers had already strung Articles 142 and 145.
In the premises discussed herein above, we do not find any substance in the special appeal.
Hence, it is dismissed.
Order Date :- 18.9.2013
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