Kiran Yadav vs Commissioner, Lucknow & 2 Ors.
2013 Latest Caselaw 2193 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

									 Reserved
 
Court No. - 27     							   A.F.R.                                                                                     
 
Case :- MISC. BENCH No. - 1855 of 2004
 
Petitioner :- Kiran Yadav
 
Respondent :- Commissioner, Lucknow & 2 Ors.
 
Petitioner Counsel :- B.S. Yadav,Balram Yadav
 
Respondent Counsel :- R.K. Chaudhary,Shailendra Singh Chauhan
 

 
Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh,J.

Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II),J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II), J)

(1) This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with relief that

1-issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties especially Lucknow Development Authority (in short L.D.A.) to register the plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow in the name of petitioner and handover the possession of the said plot to the petitioner within the time specified by this Court and allow the interest as per bank rate on the amount deposited by the petitioner in 1991 with the L.D.A till the date of handing over the physical possession of the plot,

2 - issue or any other or further order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances of the case,

3-Award heavy cost of the petition in the favour of petitioner.

(2) Facts in short are that L.D.A. had launched a scheme in the year 1987 under the caption of Priyadarshini Avas Yojana Sitapur Road Lucknow (in short Yojana) and invited applications from the persons willing to purchase plots and construct residential house. Certain conditions were also prescribed for the applicants. Dr Lalji Prasad Yadav, father of the petitioner applied for allotment of a plot under the aforesaid scheme and deposited the prescribed amount as registration fee along with other requisites and application within time. An intimation vide allotment letter dated 25th April 1989 was sent by L.D.A. to Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav whereby it was intimated that a plot has been allotted to him at the draw held on 28th of March 1989 as per the details under the Yojana. The total estimated cost of the plot was one Rs. 1,76,400/- which was to be deposited in eight equal quarterly instalments of Rs. 21,175 each. Dr Lalji Prasad Yadav deposited the entire cost of the plot, Rs. 1,76,400/- in instalments. The plot size was 392 m² under the said Yojana. The registration number was 36,816. Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav, the original allottee, a resident of Gorakhpur, approached L.D.A. by means of his letter dated 26th April 1991 and requested them for the transfer and registration of the sale deed of the aforesaid plot in his favour as early as possible. Several letters were sent but L.D.A. did not pay any heed to the request made by Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav, so he requested L.D.A. through his letter dated 12th September 1985, to transfer the aforesaid plot in the name of his daughter, the petitioner. This request was accepted and the same plot was transferred in the name of the petitioner in the records of the office of L.D.A. and vide letter dated 15th of September 1995 addressed to Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav the transfer was confirmed. Thereafter the petitioner vide letter dated 8th July 1997 approached L.D.A. to take action in respect of registration of plot number A-1/1 area 14x28=392 Sq.meter in the said Yojana. L.D.A. acknowledged the receipt of the letter and also intimated vide letter dated 7th August, 1997 that another plot has been allotted to the petitioner in place of original one due to some dispute regarding the said plot, and L.D.A assured for early registration of the said changed plot. Since no action in this regard was taken by L.D.A. so she wrote several reminders. Vide letter dated 21st April 1998 she was intimated that previous allotment order has been changed and she has been allotted plot number B 5/260 Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar. Again vide letter dated 8th April 1999 she was intimated regarding change of that plot. Petitioner submitted several letters, 14th of December 1999, 21st of July 2001, 20th of September 2001, 28th November 2001, 29th September 2003, 5th of December 2003, 21st February 2004 and 26th February 2004 requesting L.D.A. to take expeditious action for registration of the plot in the name of the petitioner to enable her to get her house constructed as early as possible. In spite of the above noted letters made by the petitioner L.D.A. did not take any action.

(3) A short counter affidavit was filed by opposite parties no.2 and 3.

(4) A rejoinder affidavit was filed by petitioner and it was submitted that petitioner never requested to change her plot number A-1/1 in Priyadarshini Scheme Sitapur Road Lucknow. This was changed by L.D.A. suo moto due to some dispute with L.D.A and one other Samiti. Due to that L.D.A. allotted her plot number A-1/12 in the same scheme. This plot was inferior and lesser in the area so it was not acceptable to the petitioner and a request was made either to allot her a similar plot or in the Gomti Nagar scheme. As LDA had no vacant plot available in Yojana and Gomti Nagar Scheme was an upcoming scheme and it was convenient for LDA to allot a plot in Gomti Nagar scheme so LDA allotted her plot number B-5/260 Vineet Khand Lucknow. Later on when petitioner requested for possession and registration of the said plot, LDA again through letter dated 8th October 1999 intimated the petitioner that this plot was also disputed because of some dispute with Railway Department and another plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow, has been adjusted.

(5) In compliance of this court's order dated 22.2.2013 supplementary counter affidavit was filed by L.D.A. stating that the plot number A-1/1 in the Priyadarshini scheme was originally allotted to Dr. Lalji Yadav, father of the petitioner. There was a dispute between Lucknow development authority and the Lucknow Vikas Sahkari Awas Samiti (in short Samiti). A compromise was arrived on between the parties and in the year 1994, 79 plots were transferred to the Samiti including the plot allotted to Dr Lalji Yadav. As such the said plot could not be given to the petitioner. In place of the above, plot number 1/12 sector D Priyadarshini Scheme Lucknow was adjusted, but the same plot was a smaller in size and inferior so on the request of the petitioner dated 6th of September 1997, the then vice-chairman vide his order dated 7th April 1998 adjusted the petitioner in Gomti Nagar Scheme and office order dated 21st April 1998 was issued allotting plot number B-5/260. Plot number A-12 Priyadarshini Scheme Lucknow was later on allotted to Smt. Rekha Gupta on 15th of February 2002 and the sale deed was executed on 31st March 2010. Plot number B-5/260 Vineet Khand,Gomti Nagar, Lucknow was also in dispute with the Railway so the said plot of the petitioner in Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow was adjusted to plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow. Later on plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand was allotted to one Anara Devi through lottery on 27th of January 2003 and sale deed was executed in her favour on 31st of March 2004. In place of plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow, the petitioner was adjusted over plot number B-4/820 Gomti Nagar extension Lucknow on the previous rates applicable on the date and year of allotment of plot in Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow. As the original file was misplaced, L.D.A, vide letter dated 16th April 2012 requested the petitioner to submit the original documents/vouchers for verification. Due to change in layout plan plot number B-4/820 Gomti Nagar extension has been converted into plot number B-4/169 Gomti Nagar extension Lucknow. As the petitioner has not submitted the original papers/vouchers for amount deposited as such the verification of the documents and the vouchers could not be done and further formalities for execution of sale deed could not be completed. It was also submitted that photo State copies of the complete note sheet from Page 1 to 34 is being filed along with this supplementary counter affidavit.

(6) A supplementary rejoinder affidavit was filed alleging that for the first time LDA has through the supplementary counter affidavit informed the petitioner that 79 plots including the plot allotted to the father of the petitioner was transferred to a Samiti under the Priyadarshini scheme. LDA has never informed before filing of the supplementary counter affidavit that the above plot was transferred to the said Samiti. Even at the time of transfer of the above plot in the name of petitioner, petitioner was not informed about the alleged transfer in favour of the Samiti in the year 1994. In the counter affidavit filed in the year 2004 by LDA it has not been mentioned that 79 plots including the plot allotted to her father was transferred to the said Samiti. The plot allotted to her father was transferred in her name after furnishing all the original records related to the deposits, original challan and allotment letter etc. Her father was continuously requesting for registry of the said plot from 26th of April 1991 till May 1994 but the LDA never informed regarding the dispute and said transfer. The petitioner has requested vide letter dated 6th September 1997 that plot number B-1/12 is of inferior quality so she may be given the earlier allotted plot or she may be allotted a plot of the earlier allotted category in Gomti Nagar housing scheme. After repeated requests, after about two years the petitioner was adjusted against the plot number B-5/260 Vineet Khand without issuing any allotment letter. Petitioner acknowledged the above plot and requested to allot area about 392 m² but LDA did not respond and did not issue any allotment letter. Within a year the said plot was also again changed and the petitioner was adjusted against plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow without any allotment letter. Petitioner also accepted the said plot and requested to execute the registered sale deed. This plot was again changed to plot number B-4/820 Gomti Nagar extension scheme as the said plot was later on allotted to Smt. Anara Devi. No allotment letter was again issued for this change. The said plot was adjusted on previous rate of the plot situated in Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, though the entire cost of plot allotted in Priyadarshini Yojana was already paid by 26th April 1991.

(7) It was also submitted in rejoinder affidavit that deposits of whole cost of first allotted plot has already been admitted by the LDA and the challan numbers are already available on registration ID number 36816. Petitioner was even not informed about the change in layout plan and she came to know through the supplementary counter affidavit. No information about the adjustment of plot B-4/820 was ever given to the petitioner. It was further submitted that vide letter dated 21st of February 2013 issued by the Under Secretary of LDA the petitioner came to know that plot number B-4/169 Gomti Nagar extension has again been adjusted in the name of petitioner but the said later did not disclose the area etc.

(8) The second supplementary counter affidavit again was filed by Secretary, LDA admitting that petitioner's father Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav has deposited Rs.7000 as registration fee for allotment of plot in Priyadarshini Scheme Sitapur Road Lucknow on 15th of June 1987 through form number 04037. Lottery draw was held on 20the March 1989 and he was allotted plot A-1/1 sector D Priyadarshini Scheme Sitapur Road Lucknow, Plot area 392 m². Allotment letter dated 27th of April 1989 was issued and as per request of original allottee, the name of petitioner was mutated in place of original allottee vide order dated 15 September 1995. It was further submitted that a dispute between LDA and Samiti was going on for certain plots and a settlement was arrived at between them and LDA transferred 79 plots in the year 1994 to the Samiti including the plot allotted to Dr Lalji Prasad Yadav. In place of the above plot, another plot number 1/12 area 342 sq meter sector D Priyadarshini Scheme was adjusted. Intimation was sent to the petitioner. On request of petitioner that the said plot is smaller in size, vide order of vice-chairman dated 6th April 1998, office order dated 21st April 1998 was issued by which she was adjusted on plot number B-5/260 Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow plot area 288 sq meter. Due to dispute with Railways which is still pending, the petitioner was adjusted on plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand area 300sq meter vide office order dated 3rd February 1999. This plot was later on allotted on 27th of January 2003 through lottery to Smt. Anara Devi and the sale deed was executed on 31st of March 2004. In place of plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow, plot number B-4/820 Gomti Nagar extension area 300 m² was adjusted on previous rates applicable and petitioner was intimated vide letter dated 16th April 2004. Due to change in layout plan of Gomti Nagar extension, plot number B-4/280 was adjusted on plot number B-4/169 Gomti Nagar Extension, area 12 x 25=300 m² and petitioner was intimated vide letter dated 5th of July 2005. Original file was missing hence petitioner was intimated on 16th of April 2004 to submit the original documents so that process for execution of sale deed can be carried out. Petitioner was again requested vide registered letter dated 21st February 2013 for submitting original documents for formalities for execution of sale deed.

(9) Second supplementary rejoinder affidavit was also filed by the petitioner alleging that even after full payment of the cost amount of plot firstly allotted to her father, the registry of the plot was not executed and possession was not delivered to the petitioner. The petitioner had requested for providing possession of the earlier allotted plot in Priyadarshini Scheme and had given an option to provide a plot of the same area in the Gomti Nagar scheme and to execute the registered deed but nothing was done and no allotment letter specifying the area etc. was ever issued to the petition. No letter for the allotment of any plot except for the original allotted plot was ever issued. When the petitioner was readjusted against the plot number B-3/215 Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar, neither any allotment later mentioning the area and other conditions nor any information about any dispute with regard to plot number B-5/ 260 Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar, Lucknow was ever sent. Plot number B-3/215 was adjusted in the name of petitioner vide order dated 2nd February 1999 and petitioner was continuously trying for registry of the said plot and for possession of the said plot but no action was taken and subsequently in the year 2003 that plot was illegally and arbitrarily allotted by the then Vice Chairman, L.D.A. in the name of Smt. Anara Devi without any lottery or following the procedure of allotment. The petitioner was never intimated or informed about any change in the layout or renumbering of the plot. The petitioner was not ever informed about the area and other conditions of the said plot even through the letter dated 21st November 2013. The original file of the petitioner has been misplaced knowingly and intentionally with ulterior motive.

(10) From the perusal of above writ petition counter affidavits, rejoinder affidavits and supplementary counter and supplementary rejoinder affidavits it is evident and admitted to the opposite party's number 2 and 3 that firstly Dr Lalji Yadav was allotted a plot number A-1/1 sector D Priyadarshini Scheme Sitapur Road Lucknow in the year 1987. It has not been mentioned anywhere in any of the counter affidavits that as to when the dispute started between LDA and the Samiti. The only fact emerges from the supplementary counter affidavit is that a compromise was arrived in between LDA and the Samiti in the year 1994 and 79 plots including the plot allotted to the Father of petitioner was handed over to the Samiti. It is not clear from any of the affidavits as to why the possession of the plot was not given to Dr Lalji Yadav before 1994. It is also admitted that in place of Dr. Lalji Yadav, the name of petitioner was mutated over that plot in the year 1995. This clearly goes to show that petitioner's name was mutated on that plot even after the plot was handed over to the Samiti. Thus it appears that the petitioner was deliberately and wrongfully deprived of the plot of which she was legally entitled. It is also admitted that the plot which was given to the petitioner in lieu of earlier plot was less in size and the intimation was sent in the month of August 1997. It is also admitted that on request of the petitioner a plot in Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow area 288 m² was given to the petitioner vide order of the vice-chairman of LDA. It has also nowhere been denied that no allotment letter mentioning the area and other conditions was ever issued for other subsequent plots. It is admitted in the supplementary counter affidavit that this plot was in dispute with Railways. Petitioner was again adjusted on plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow area 300 m² vide office order dated 1999.

(11) It is very strange and painful to note that petitioner was twice allotted disputed plots. Plot B-3/215 area 300 Sqm. Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar, Lucknow which was adjusted in the year 1999, was later on allotted to one Smt. Anara Devi in year 2003 without considering the fact that this plot was given to the petitioner. What excuse is being given that petitioner was asked to submit the original documents/ vouchers in the year 2004 so that process of execution of sale deed can be carried out but original documents were never submitted by the petitioner. Admittedly petitioner was intimated on 16 April 2004 and before this date the LDA has never requested/directed the petitioner to submit the original documents. This clearly indicate that again the petitioner was deprived of her rightful plot.

(12) In first rejoinder affidavit it has been specifically submitted that all the original documents has been submitted to the authorities of L.D.A at the time of mutation. It has also been mentioned in the first rejoinder affidavit that she was never required to deposit any difference amount against the plot as she never wanted to change its originally allotted plot. In the supplementary counter affidavit filed on 27 February 2013 these facts have not been specifically denied.

(13) A perusal of the photo state copies of note sheet annexed with supplementary counter affidavit reveals that a report was submitted by one Ravinder Singh senior clerk dated 25th of March 2004 mentioning that as he has not received the file regarding the matter from the ex-EU and there is no record in the computer and property Department hence probably on the basis of vacancy the Vice-Chairman has allotted plot number B-3/215 Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar in favour of Smt. Anara Devi. This clearly goes to show that no allotment was ever made in favour of Smt. Anara Devi by the way of lottery. No document regarding lottery has been annexed with any of the counter affidavits. This fact is also evident from the letter dated 27th of April 2004 written by Upper Sachiv. Several papers annexed with the second supplementary counter affidavit are very material. Annexure SA-1 is the allotment letter dated 27th of April 1989 in favour of Dr Lalji Yadav. Annexure SA-2 is letter dated 7th of August 1997 addressed to the petitioner regarding change of plot in Priyadarshini scheme which mentions that due to some dispute, instead of plot number A-/1, plot number 1 / 12 is being allotted to you and regarding the Registry you will be informed very soon. Annex SA 3 is a letter written by the property officer addressed to Smt. Kiran Yadav dated 21st of April 1998, regarding change of plot in Gomti Nagar Scheme. By this later the petitioner was informed that the Vice chairman has permitted the change of plot number 1/12 D Priyadarshini Sitapur Road Lucknow to plot number B-5/260 Vineet Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow. The area has not been given and it has been mentioned that the remaining conditions shall be the same and you will be informed about the costing separately. Annexure SA4 is the information given by LDA to the petitioner dated 8.2.1999 informing her that due to dispute with Railways you have been adjusted on plot number B-3/215 Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar Lucknow. In this letter also any change in conditions are not mentioned. Annexure SA-5 is a letter by the incharge property officer LDA to the petitioner informing her that by the decision taken by Vice-Chairman, plot number B-4/820 in Gomti Nagar extension scheme has been adjusted on previous rate of allotment year in Vibhav Khand. For the first time vide this letter she has been asked to produce the documents relating to original allotment. Again Annexure SA-6 is a letter informing the petitioner that due to amendment in layout plan she have been adjusted on plot number 4/169 Gomti Nagar extension scheme in place of plot number 4/ 820. It was also mentioned that other conditions shall be the same.

(14) It was vehementally submitted by learned counsel for LDA that petitioner has not supplied the original documents despite repeated reminders hence the registration and possession could not be given. The submission made by Learned Counsel has no force as is it has nowhere been denied by the LDA in any of counter affidavit is that Dr Lalji Yadav has not paid the entire amount after the allotment of the plot in Priyadarshini Scheme Sitapur Road Lucknow.

(15) The case of Ghaziabad Development Authority. Vs. Balbir Singh (2004)5 SCC 65 relates to misfeasance in public office and jurisdiction of National Commission/Forums under the Consumer Protection Act. It was held that in granting compensation for misfeasance in public office, Commission/Forum must determine that the loss or injury suffered by citizen at the hands of said authorities is due to mala fide or capricious or oppressive act after recording finding that complainant is entitled to compensation for loss or injury or for harassment or mental agony or oppression from the Commission/Forum.

(16) The observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balbir Singh (supra), which seems to help the petitioners to claim compensation is reproduced below:

"5. ...The First Law Commission constituted after coming into force of the Constitution on liability of the State in tort, observed that the old distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions should no longer be invoked to determine liability of the State. Friedmann observed:

"It is now increasingly necessary to abandon the lingering fiction of a legally indivisible State, and of a feudal conception of the Crown, and to substitute for it the principle of legal liability where the State, either directly or through incorporated public authorities, engages in activities of a commercial, industrial or managerial character. The proper test is not an impracticable distinction between governmental and non-governmental function, but the nature and form of the activity in question."

Even Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. did not provide any immunity for tortuous acts of public servants committed in discharge of statutory function if it was not referable to sovereign power. Since house construction or for that matter any service hired by a consumer or facility availed by him is not a sovereign function of the State the ratio of Kasturi Lal could not stand in way of the Commission awarding compensation. We respectfully agree with Mathew, J. in Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan that it is not necessary, 'to consider whether there is any rational dividing line between the so-called sovereign and proprietary or commercial functions for determining the liability of the State' (SCC p. 695, para 20). In any case the law has always maintained that the public authorities who are entrusted with statutory function cannot act negligently. As far back as 1878 the law was succinctly explained in Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir thus:

"I take it, without citing cases, that it is now thoroughly well established that no action will lie for doing that which the Legislature has authorised, if it be done without negligence, although it does occasion damage to anyone; but an action does lie for doing what the Legislature has authorised, if it be done negligently."

Under our Constitution sovereignty vests in the people. Every limb of the constitutional machinery is obliged to be people oriented. No functionary in exercise of statutory power can claim immunity, except to the extent protected by the statute itself. Public authorities acting in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions oppressively are accountable for their behaviour before authorities created under the statute like the commission or the courts entrusted with responsibility of maintaining the rule of law. Each hierarchy in the Act is empowered to entertain a complaint by the consumer for value of the goods or services and compensation. The word 'compensation' is again of very wide connotation. It has not been defined in the Act. According to dictionary it means, 'compensating or being compensated; thing given as recompense;'. In legal sense it may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss..."

(17) Hon'ble Supreme Court further in the case of Balbir Singh (supra) while considering the question with regard to misfeasance in public office relied upon the Administrative Law by Wade and observed, to quote:-

"The moment the authority came to know of the mistake committed by it, it took immediate action by allotting alternative site to the respondent. It was compensation for exact loss suffered by the respondent. It arose in due discharge of duties. For such acts or omissions the loss suffered has to be made good by the authority itself. But when the sufferance is due to mala fide or oppressive or capricious acts etc. of a public servant, then the nature of liability changes. The Commission under the Act could determine such amount if in its opinion the consumer suffered injury due to what is called misfeasance of the officers by the English Courts. Even in England where award of exemplary or aggravated damages for insult etc. to a person has now been held to be punitive, exception has been carved out if the injury is due to, 'oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government' (Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts). Misfeasance in public office is explained by Wade in his book on Administrative Law thus:

"Even where there is no ministerial duty as above, and even where no recognised tort such as trespass, nuisance, or negligence is committed, public authorities or officers may be liable in damages for malicious, deliberate or injurious wrong-doing. There is thus a tort which has been called misfeasance in public office, and which includes malicious abuse of power, deliberate maladministration, and perhaps also other unlawful acts causing injury." (p.777).

The jurisdiction and power of the courts to indemnify a citizen for injury suffered due to abuse of power by public authorities is founded as observed by Lord Hailsham in Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972 AC 1027: (1972) 1 All ER 801] on the principle that, 'an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of law'. An ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. That is provided by the rule of law. It acts as a check on arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. In Rookes v. Barnard [1964 AC 1129: (1964) 1 All ER 367, 410] it was observed by Lord Devlin, 'the servants of the government are also the servants of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service'. A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of powers results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it. Compensation or damage as explained earlier may arise even when the officer discharges his duty honestly and bona fide. But when it arises due to arbitrary or capricious behaviour then it loses its individual character and assumes social significance. Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous. Crime and corruption thrive and prosper in the society due to lack of public resistance. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. An ordinary citizen instead of complaining and fighting succumbs to the pressure of undesirable functioning in offices instead of standing against it. Therefore the award of compensation for harassment by public authorities not only compensates the individual, satisfies him personally but helps in curing social evil. It may result in improving the work culture and help in changing the outlook. Wade in his book Administrative Law has observed that it is to the credit of public authorities that there are simply few reported English decisions on this form of malpractice, namely, misfeasance in public offices which includes malicious use of power, deliberate maladministration and perhaps also other unlawful acts causing injury. One of the reasons for this appears to be development of law which apart, from other factors succeeded in keeping a salutary check on the functioning in the government or semi-government offices by holding the officers personally responsible for their capricious or even ultra vires action resulting in injury or loss to a citizen by awarding damages against them. Various decisions rendered from time to time have been referred to by Wade on Misfeasance by Public Authorities..."

(18) In the case reported in (2011) 6 SCC 125: Humanity and another. Vs. State of West Bengal and others, relying upon the leading case reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489: Ramana Dayaram Shetty. Vs. International Airport Authority of India, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party as it would be contrary to public interest.

(19) We reproduce relevant portion of para 23, 24 and 25 of the judgement of State of West Bengal (supra), as under:

"23. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that in the matter of granting largesse, Government has to act fairly and without even any semblance of discrimination. Law on this subject has been very clearly laid down by this court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India. A three- Judge Bench in the said decision has recognized that the Government, in a welfare State, is in a position of distributing largesse in a large measure and in doing so the Government cannot act at its pleasure. This court perusing the new jurisprudential theory of Professor Reich in his article on the "The New Property" accepted the following dictum contained therein: (SCC p.505, para 11)

"11. ...That Government action be based on standards that are not arbitrary or unauthorised."

24. This court explained the purport of the aforesaid formulation by holding: (Ramana case, SCC p.505, para 11)

"11. ...The government cannot be permitted to say that it will give jobs or enter into contracts or issue quotas or licenses only in favour of those having grey hair or belonging to a particular political party or professing a particular religious faith. The Government is still the government when it acts in the matter of granting largesse and it cannot act arbitrarily. It does not stand in the same position as a private individual."

The aforesaid dictum in Ramana is still followed by this court as the correct exposition of law and has been subsequently followed in many other decisions.

25. In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J & K another three-Judge Bench relied on the dictum in Ramana and held that whenever any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest, it is liable to be struck down as invalid. This Court held that a necessary corollary of this proposition is that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party. Such an action will be contrary to public interest. (See SCC p. 13, para 14 of the Report)"

(20) In the case reported in (2011) 6 SCC 756: APM Terminals B.V. Vs. Union of India and another, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any change in decision making process must be free from arbitrariness, irrationality bias and malice, to quote relevant portion of para 69:-

"69. As was held in Shimnit Utsch India (P) Ltd. Vs. W.B. Transport Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd., the Government was entitled to change its policies with changing circumstances and only on grounds of change a policy does not stand vitiated. It was further held that the Government has the discretion to adopt a different policy, alter or change its policy to make it more effective. The only qualifying condition is that such change in policy must be free from arbitrariness, irrationality, bias and malice and must be in conformity with the principle of Wednesbury reasonableness."

(21) We cannot restrain ourselves from reiterating few paragraphs of the case Ganesh Prasad Vs. LDA (DB) 2011 (29) LCD page 2541, in which one of us (Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.P. Singh, J) was a member which are as follows: -

92. In the case reported in S.G. Jaisinghani. Vs. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1427, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that absence of arbitrary power, is first essential of 'rule of law' upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.

93.In the case reported in (2009) 10 SCC 388, Shanti Zenith Metal Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in case an applicant approaches the Court, complaint against statutory authority alleging arbitrariness, bias or favouritism, the Court being the custodian of law must examine the allegation as to whether there is any substance in those allegations. Hon'ble Supreme court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of S.G. Jaisinghani (supra) and ruled that State action must be bona fide and not be arbitrary or suffering from favouritism.

In the case reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2260: Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain, Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted the 'Rule of law' as under:

"205. Rule of Law postulates that the decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is not predictable and such such decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law."

94. In the case reported in (2011) 6 SCC 508: NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association. Vs. NOIDA and others, Hon'ble Supreme Court while emphasising for maintenance of rule of law in the country observed that public bodies or the State instrumentalities are trustees of the public property and their action must be in conformity with the Statutory provisions and also should be just and fair, to quote relevant portion:

"38. The State or the public authority which holds the property for the public or which has been assigned the duty of grant of largesse etc., acts as a trustee and, therefore, has to act fairly and reasonably. Every holder of a public office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State or public body is ultimately accountable to the people in whom the sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested in him are meant to be exercised for public good and promoting the public interest. Every holder of a public office is a trustee.

39.State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a "democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination". The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.

40.The Public Trust Doctrine is a part of the law of the land. The doctrine has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution. In essence, the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides, as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. The Rule of Law is the foundation of a democratic society. (Vide: M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 266; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1628; Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation, AIR 1988 SC 157; Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 537; and M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2468)."

95.A country should not be ruled by men but should be ruled by law. It means, the State action must conform to statutory provisions. The power must flow from Rules, Regulations and statutory provisions. In absence of powers conferred by the statutory provisions, State or its instrumentalities cannot divest a person from his or her property or abridge or dilute the right protected by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India safeguarding life, liberty livelihood or quality of life.

97.In (2005) 6 Supreme Court Cases 344, Salem Advocate Bar Association (II), Vs. Union of India, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where, there is abuse of process of law or litigants suffer for no fault on their part, then court must impose costs. In a recent judgment reported in 2011 (8) SCC 249: Rameshwari Devi and others. Vs. Nirmala Devi and others, Hon'ble Suprme Court held that, with regard to imposition of costs, courts have to take into consideration the pragmatic realities and should be realistic with regard to plight of litigants in contesting the litigation before different courts. Courts have to broadly take into consideration the prevalent fee structure of the lawyers and other miscellaneous expenses and factors under which a party has been compelled to contest a case in different courts. In the case of Rameshwari Devi (supra), litigant had contested for about four decades, the case filed in different courts. Their lordships awarded costs of rupees two lakhs in addition to Rs.75,000.00 award by the High Court, while dismissing the appeal with costs, to reproduce relevant paras 54, 55 and 56 as under:-

"54. While imposing costs we have to take into consideration pragmatic realities and be realistic what the defendants or the respondents had to actually incur in contesting the litigation before different courts. We have to also broadly take into consideration the prevalent fee structure of the lawyers and other miscellaneous expenses which have to be incurred towards drafting and filing of the counter affidavit, miscellaneous charges towards typing, photocopying, court fee etc.

55.The other factor which should not be forgotten while imposing costs is for how long the defendants or respondents were compelled to contest and defend the litigation in various courts. The appellants in the instant case have harassed the respondents to the hilt for four decades in a totally frivolous and dishonest litigation in various courts. The appellants have also wasted judicial time of the various courts for the last 40 years.

56. On consideration of totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any infirmity in the well reasoned impugned order/judgment. These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation. The appellants are directed to pay the costs imposed by this court along with the costs imposed by the High Court to the respondents within six weeks from today."

(22) Admittedly, the father of petitioner Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav has deposited the entire cost of plot by the year 1991. The entire cost deposited by the petitioner, is lying with the L.D.A. On the one hand, the petitioner or his daughter, whose name was mutated in place of Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav has suffered mental pain, agony and financial loss and could not get the possession of plot to construct his own house in the city of Lucknow, on the other hand, the money deposited by the Dr. Lalji Prasad Yadav,was invested by L.D.A. in its business. It is the instance of unjust enrichment. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (2011) 8 SCC 161: Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action. Vs. Union of India and others, has defined the "unjust enrichment as under:

"UNJUST ENRICHMENT

"152. `Unjust enrichment' has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.

153. Unjust enrichment is "the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." A defendant may be liable "even when the defendant retaining the benefit is not a wrongdoer" and "even though he may have received [it] honestly in the first instance." (Schock v. Nash, A.2d, 232-33).

159. Unjust enrichment is basic to the subject of restitution, and is indeed approached as a fundamental principle thereof. They are usually linked together, and restitution is frequently based upon the theory of unjust enrichment. However, although unjust enrichment is often referred to or regarded as a ground for restitution, it is perhaps more accurate to regard it as a prerequisite, for usually there can be no restitution without unjust enrichment. It is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.

Their lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court while reiterating the principle laid down in the case of Rameshwari Devi (supra), with regard to payment of cost, further ruled that it should be the concern of courts and endeavour to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. Courts must take realistic approach to award compensation in order to discourage the dishonest litigation. Courts should not shirk from its responsibility not only to remove a person from wrongful possession and restore the possession to lawful owner but also be compelled to pay for wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs. Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system. No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law and a party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs, to reproduce relevant paras 161, 162, 163, and 192 as under:

"161. The terms `unjust enrichment' and `restitution' are like the two shades of green - one leaning towards yellow and the other towards blue. With restitution, so long as the deprivation of the other has not been fully compensated for, injustice to that extent remains. Which label is appropriate under which circumstances would depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. The courts have wide powers to grant restitution, and more so where it relates to misuse or non-compliance with court orders.

162. We may add that restitution and unjust enrichment, along with an overlap, have to be viewed with reference to the two stages, i.e., pre-suit and post-suit. In the former case, it becomes a substantive law (or common law) right that the court will consider; but in the latter case, when the parties are before the court and any act/omission, or simply passage of time, results in deprivation of one, or unjust enrichment of the other, the jurisdiction of the court to levelise and do justice is independent and must be readily wielded, otherwise it will be allowing the Court's own process, along with time delay, to do injustice.

163. For this second stage (post-suit), the need for restitution in relation to court proceedings, gives full jurisdiction to the court, to pass appropriate orders that levelise. Only the court has to levelise and not go further into the realm of penalty which will be a separate area for consideration altogether.

192. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The court while rendering justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases."

(23.) In the Case of Ganesh Prasad (supra) this Court has further held that ;

102.In modern concept, the State and its instrumentalities including the development authorities, are involved in commercial activities under the garb of welfare polity. This has involved people directly with the welfare schemes of the State to meet out the requirement in different manner like allotment of flats, plots, land, houses etc. and other public utility services. The authorities empowered to function under the statutory obligations or under the statutory schemes, are expected to serve fairly and justly to discharge their obligations. While doing so, they discharge public duties. They have to act to sub-serve the general welfare and common good and while doing so, loss may accrue to citizen. Consumer Protection Act, 1986, deals with such matters but there, cases are also piling up either because of appointment of persons lacking capabilities to discharge their obligations or loss of work culture, sense of duty and commitment to serve the society or being appointed at the fag end of life. District and State Commissioners seem to have lesser interest to meet their obligations resulting I n piling of cases/complaints.

103.But the existence of these forums in the form of District and State Consumer Forum, created another problem. The State and its instrumentalities now do not discharge their duties to secure public interest while dealing with the peoples at their end. In the case of Balbir Singh (supra), their lordships of Supreme Court have taken a note of deteriorating situation as under:

"...It is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public-oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system."

104.Harassment of a common man by public authorities is social abhorring and legally impermissible. Crime and corruption thrive and prosper in the society due to lack of public resistance as well as work culture in system. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. The matters which require immediate attention, should not be allowed to linger on. The consumer must not be made to run from pillar to post. Where there has been capricious, arbitrary or negligent exercise or non-exercise of power by the State authorities or its instrumentalities, the forum must be provided in the department itself to hear the grievances and take a decision to redress the public grievance. In a welfare State, there should be immediate attention to public grievance and in case some injury is caused, the Government and its instrumentalities should not hesitate to compensate the sufferer and punish the wrong doer.

105.The individual welfare as well as the welfare of the society should be balanced and persons should not be compelled to knock the doors of the Courts or tribunals more so, when it is cumbersome process to approach the Courts for payment of compensation subject to payment of Court fee or lawyer's fees with regard to misfeasance by public authorities.

106.Ubi jus ibi remedium does not mean only the statutory remedy in the form of tribunal or court. The Government should act upon to provide a forum for the grant of compensation or redressal of grievance within its own hierarchy of system.

107.Wade in his book Administrative Law has observed that it is to the credit of public authorities that there are simply few reported English decisions on this form of malpractice, namely, misfeasance in public offices which includes malicious use of power, deliberate maladministration and perhaps also other unlawful acts causing injury. One of the reasons for this appears to be development of law which, apart from other factors, succeeded in keeping a salutary check on the functioning in the Government or semi-Government offices by holding the officers personally responsible for their capricious or even ultra vires action resulting in injury or loss to a citizen by awarding damages against them.

108.Now, time has come when the State Government should provide a form or create the post of "Complaint Authority" in all the development, bodies and its instrumentalities to hear the public grievance/complaints and take a decision within specified period for the payment of compensation, allotment of plots, land, houses, flats etc. Such forum or authority or post may be created if necessary by amending the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning Act, 1973 or making a provisions under the Rule or by issuing Government orders in pursuance of powers conferred by Section 41 read with 51 of the 1973 Act and other statutory provisions in force.

109.The spirit of Section 41 of the Act casts duty on the Statement to secure the public interest by issuing appropriate guidelines or taking policy decision for the effective implementation of Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973.

It is vehemently argued by Sri H.S. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners that the State Government often uses its power to secure individual interest for extraneous reasons. It is further submitted that the development authorities in the State of U.P., are not discharging their obligations fairly and peoples are running from pillar to post for allotment of plots and land even after depositing entire cost. Several matters are kept pending for one or the other reasons. Though the L.D.A., and alike bodies charge interest on account of delayed payment of dues but no interest or compensation is paid to allottees for inaction or delayed action on the part of the development authorities. The case in hand, affirms the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Other instances are cited but in absence of pleadings, we may not record.

110.However, keeping in view the startling revelation and plight of peoples like the present one, facing high handedness imparted by the development authorities, it shall be appropriate that to secure public interest, the Government may be directed to consider to create appropriate post or forum in development authorities, and there should be an officer having been authorised to deal with the public grievances and pay damages or compensation or take decision with regard to payment of interest in case the land or plot is not delivered immediately after deposit of cost by the allottees. Ordinarily in case after deposit of cost of plot or land, if possession is not delivered within three weeks consumers must be paid interest.

111.In a case reported in 2009 (10) SCC 374: U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Vs. M/S. Three Circles on 10 September, 2009, Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied upon the 55th Report of Law Commission of 1973 and held that in a lengthy litigation proceeding, there is no infirmity in awarding interest on costs while awarding damages for wrongful retention of money.

115.In the case of Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and another Vs. C.K. Rajan and others reported in (2003) 7 SCC 546, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved a court in his private interest and for Redressal of personal grievances, the court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil Vs. Dr. mahest Madhav Gosavi).

116.This view was further reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2005) 5 SCC 298, Ashok Lanka and another vs. Rishi Dixit and others, relevant paragraph 42 of which is being quoted below:

"Furthermore it is well settled that even in a case where a petitioner might have moved the Court in his private interest and for redressal of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice (see Guruyayoo Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, SCC para 50 and Prahlad Singh versus Col. Sukhdev Singh (1987) 1 SCC 727)."

The same view (supra) was again reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 2003 SC 4531, General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Limited, Sultanpur, U.P. versus Satrughna Nishad.

Again similar matter cropped up for consideration before this Court in 2006 (4) A.D.J. 106 (All.) (Full Bench), Suo Moto Action taken by the Court Versus I.C.I.CI. Bank Ltd. Allahabad and others. The Division Bench of this Court dealing with the habeas corpus petition framed certain issues of public importance involved in the case and referred the matter to Hon. The Chief Justice to register as P.I.L. to be decided by the appropriate court. The Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court constituted a Full Bench considering the case of Ashok Lanka and another (Supra). The Full Bench opined that in a matter the Court, while exercising power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with regard to private dispute, has got ample power to take suo-moto decision with regard to public interest and it shall not change the nature of the writ petition.

118.Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Gurvayur devasam managing committee (supra) and ICCI Ban Ltd. Alld. And other and Ashok Lanka Supra, in a case involving private dispute Court may pass appropriate orders to secure public interest.

(24) From the above discussion it is clear that petitioner and her father after depositing Rs. 1,74,400/- in the year 1991 could not get the possession of the plot originally allotted the petitioner's father since then she has been allotted several plots. But she refused to accept one plot at Priyadarshini Scheme Sitapur Road, Lucknow due to the plot being in lesser in size, the second plot which was allotted to her in Gomti Nagar Vineet Khand could not be delivered to her due to dispute with Railways. Possession of readjusted plot which was allotted to her in year 1999 was not delivered to her and she could not get possession and later on the plot despite being allotted to her was re-allotted to one Smt. Anara Devi in the year 2003, the next plot which was adjusted was in Gomti Nagar Extension Scheme but no area was provided. When the lay out plan was changed and it was renumbered then too the area was not specified. It is also noteworthy that when plot no.B-5/260 Vineet Khand was adjusted with the petitioner it was mentioned in the letter Annexure SA3 that all the remaining conditions will be the same and regarding payment, after costing, she will be informed separately. It is clear that again this plot was due to dispute with Railways was adjusted in Vibhav Khand Gomti Nagar, Lucknow as B-3/215. As per Annexure SA5, it was informed to the petitioner that another plot B-4/820 Gomti Nagar Extension, Lucknow has been adjusted to you and it was mentioned that the rate will be the same which was at the time of allotment of her plot at Vibhav Khand this means that the rate will be what was applicable on 23rd January, 1999. The petitioner has accepted that plot at Vineet Khand and wrote several letters for expeditious action. In view of this now the plot no.4/169 Gomti Nagar Extension whose area according to page 29-30 of the note-sheet annexed along with supplementary counter affidavit is 300 sqm has been readjusted.

(25) Considering the entire facts we are of the view that writ petition deserves to be allowed and is allowed in following manner (1) A mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to execute the saledeed of the plot no. 4/820 Gomti Nagar Extension, Lucknow which after change in plan is renumbered as 4/169 Gomti Nagar Extension area 300 sqm. on the rate which was prevalent in Vibhav Khand in the year 1999. The cost of the plot has to be calculated accordingly within a period of two months from the date of certified copy of this order is produced before them. Since petitioner's father deposited the entire amount with the LDA and plot was not allotted to him under the garb of asking for original documents which was deposited with the LDA at the time when the original plot was mutated in the name of petitioner, the petitioner is entitled for interest @ 12% per annum on the deposited amount from the date of last deposit till the date of intimation of calculation of cost is issued to the petitioner. The amount of interest shall be adjusted in the cost of the plot.

(26) Apart from this, for the lack lustre and callous attitude and blatant violation of Rule of law, we impose cost of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the respondents, out of which 50% will be adjusted in the cost of the plot no.4/169 Gomti Nagar Extension Scheme, Lucknow on the date of calculation and intimation and the remaining 50% shall be deposited in this Court within two months, which shall be remitted to Mediation and Conciliation Centre High Court Lucknow Bench, Lucknow.

(27) It shall be open to the State Government/L.D.A to recover the cost and interest by holding an enquiry, from the persons because of whose fault, the petitioner has suffered. In case of failure of deposit of cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue by the District Magistrate, Lucknow expeditiously say within a period of three months. After calculation of cost and after adjusting the above amount as per our directions, petitioner shall deposit the balance amount within 10 months in equal monthly instalments. After completion of instalments, sale deed shall be executed within one months thereafter, in favour of petitioner. If the petitioner shows her unwillingness then she can apply to refund of the deposited amount along with 12% interest per annum and Rs. 1,00,000/- as cost, as discussed above, within two months after her unwillingness is conveyed to the LDA.

(28) Subject to aforesaid directions and orders, the writ petition is allowed.

[ Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh,J.]

[Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II),J.]

Order Date :16.5.2013

Subodh/-

Judgement delivered today in chamber in pursuance to provisions contained in Chapter VII Rule 1 Sub-Rule (2) of Allahabad High Court Rules 1952.

[ Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh,J.]

Order Date : 16.5.2013

Subodh/-