Dhirendra Singh Bhadauria vs State Of ...
2013 Latest Caselaw 642 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

RESERVED
 
Court No. - 18
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 1022 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Dhirendra Singh Bhadauria
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thr.Prin.Secy.Irrigation Deptt.Lucknow & Others
 
Petitioner Counsel :- Ashwani Kumar
 
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.
 
And
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 1286 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Vijay Pratap Singh Chauhan
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thr.Prin.Secy.Irrigation Deptt.Lucknow & Others
 
Petitioner Counsel :- Ashwani Kumar
 
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.
 
					      And 
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 1282 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Jawahar Lal
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru. The Prin.Secy.Irrigation Deptt. & Ors.
 
Petitioner Counsel :- Ashwani Kumar
 
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.
 
					     And
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 1279 of 2013
 
Petitioner :- Prakash Chandra Gupta
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru. The Prin.Secy.Irrigation Deptt. & Ors.
 
Petitioner Counsel :- Ashwani Kumar
 
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.
 
Hon'ble Anil Kumar,J.

Heard Shri Kapil Dev, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Abhinav Narain Trivedi, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel and perused the record.

With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, Writ Petition No.1022 (SS) of 2013 " Dhirendra Singh Bhadauria vs. State of U.P. & Others", Writ Petition No.1282 (SS) of 2013 "Jawahar Lal vs. State of U.P. & Ors. & Ors.", Writ Petition No.1279 (SS) of 2013 "P.C.Gupta vs. State of U.P. & Ors.", and Writ Petition No.1286 (SS) of 2013 "V.P.Singh Chauhan vs. State of U.P. & Ors." are being heard together and decided by common judgment.

FACTS OF THE WRIT PETITION NO.1022 (SS) OF 2013

on 1.5.1978, Shri Dhirendra Singh Bhadauria, petitioner was appointed on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on ad-hoc basis in the Irrigation Department, State of U.P. Subsequently, in the year 1982, he was selected by the U.P. Public Service Commission on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) and in the year 1984, confirmed in the said capacity.

Lastly, when the petitioner was posted in the said capacity at Bhoganipur Division Lower Ganga Canal, Irrigation Department, Etawa, in the year 2012, elected as District President of District Etawa of Civil Diploma Engineers' Sangh, Irrigation Department, U.P. In the said capacity, due to illegal and arbitrary functioning of the opposite party no.4/5, rather victimization, exploitation, non-co-operation and harassing attitude meted out by him to the Junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers working at Etawa Division, Lower Ganga Canal on 22.1.2013, he made a complaint to the higher authorities, as such, the opposite party no.4/5 has become personally biased and prejudiced as a result of which opposite party no.3/Engineer-in-Chief (Parikalp & Niyojan), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow has passed the impugned order dated 4.2.2013 (Annexure No.1) thereby transferring the petitioner to Purvi Ganga Nahar Nirman Khand-5, Najibabad.

FACTS OF THE WRIT PETITION NO.1286 (SS) OF 2013

Shri V. P. Singh Chauhan/Petitioner was appointed on 7.7.2006 on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) through U.P. Public Service Commission, posted at Irrigation Unit, Mainpuri in the Irrigation Department, State of U.P. While he was working and discharging as Junior Engineer (Civil) at Irrigation Unit, Kannauj, in the year 2013, elected as District Secretary of District Kannauj of the U.P. Diploma Engineers' Sangh, Irrigation Department, U.P.

By means of the impugned order dated 4.2.2013 (Annexure No.1) passed by opposite party no.3/Engineer-in-Chief (Parikalp & Niyojan), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow, the petitioner has been transferred to Bhoganipur Prakhand Nicchali Ganga Nahar, Etawa.

FACTS OF THE WRIT PETITION NO.1279 (SS) OF 2013

Petitioner was appointed on 31.7.1977 on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on ad-hoc basis on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil), posted at Sharda Sahayak Khand-31, Raebareily. Subsequently, his services were regularized.

While he was working and discharging his duties as Junior Engineer (Civil) at Barriage Construction Division-I, Irrigation Department, Kanpur, by the impugned order dated 4.2.2013 (Annexure No.1) passed by opposite party no.3/Engineer-in-Chief (Parikalp & Niyojan), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow, the petitioner has been transferred to Etawa Prakahand Nicchali Ganga Nahar, Etawa in the interest of department, but according to the petitioner, the said ground is incorrect as he is the District President of District Etawa of Civil Diploma Engineers' Sangh, Irrigation Department, U.P., in the said capacity made a compliant against the opposite party no.4/5 in regard to his victimization, exploitation, non-co-operation and harassing attitude, so due to the said facts, he became personally biass and prejudice and persuaded the opposite party no.3, who has passed the impugned order of transfer.

FACTS OF THE WRIT PETITION NO.1282 (SS) OF 2013

Petitioner was appointed in the year 1979 on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on ad-hoc basis in the Irrigation Department, State of U.P., posted at Irrigation Construction Division, Charkhari, Mahoba, District-Hamirpur. In the year 1982, his services were regularized

While he was working and discharging his duties on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) at Barriage Construction Division-II, Kanpur, he was elected as District President of District Kanpur of the U.P. Diploma Engineers' Mahasangh by the impugned order dated 4.2.2013 (Annexure No.1) passed by opposite party no.3/Engineer-in-Chief (Parikalp & Niyojan), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow, the petitioner has been transferred to Etawa Prakhand Nicchali Ganga Nahar, Etawa.

While challenging the impugned orders of transfer in the instant cases, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the same have been passed only due to personally biased and prejudiced of opposite party no.4 as some of the petitioners who are elected representative of the Union made a compliant against the opposite party no.4 in regard to victimization, exploitation, non-co-operation and harassing attitude. So at the behest of opposite party no.4, opposite party no.3 has passed the impugned orders of transfer, as such, the same is not in the administrative exigency of service, but the same is mala fide exercise of power on the part of opposite party no.3 hence in contravention to the policy of transfer dated 22.3.2013 specially para 12 of the quoted herein below:-

"सरकारी कर्मचारियो के मान्यता प्राप्त सेवा संघो के पदाधिकारियों के स्थानांतरण :-

सरकारी सेवको के मान्यता प्राप्त सेवा संघो के अध्यक्ष/सचिव, जिनमे जिला शाखाओं के अध्यक्ष एवं सचिव भी सम्मिलित है, के स्थानांतरण उनके द्वारा संगठन में पदधारित करने की तिथि से २ वर्ष तक न किये जाये । यदि स्थानांतरण किया जाना अपरिहार्य हो तो स्थानांतरण हेतु प्राधिकृत अधिकारियों से एक स्तर उच्च अधिकारी का पूर्वानुमोदन प्राप्त किया जाय । जिला शाखाओं के पदाधिकारियों के स्थानांतरण प्रकरणों पर जिलाधिकारी की पूर्वानुमति प्राप्त की जाय ।"

In addition to the above said argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners also challenged the impugned orders of transfer on the ground that as per para 5 of the transfer policy, in case of Class-III posts, an annual transfer in respecto class-III post/present post should not exceed 15% of the total working strength of the employees of the Department and if the same, exceed more than 15% prior approval before transfer of the employees should be taken by the Ministry concerned.

In Writ Petition No.1279 (SS) of 2013 "P.C.Gupta vs. State of U.P. & Ors.", learned counsel for the petitioner, raised an argument that the impugned order of transfer is arbitrary in nature as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constition of Inida as the wife of the petitioner is seriously ill and getting specialized treatment at Kanpur from the Private Doctor. In this regard, he relied on the certain document annexed as Annexure No.3 to the writ petition.

Accordingly, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order dated 4.2.2013 passed by the opposite party no.3/ Engineer-in-Chief (Parikalp & Niyojan), Irrigation Department, U.P., Lucknow, while transferring the petitioner are not in the administrative exigency of service. So, liable to be set aside and the writ petitions be allowed.

Shri Abinav Narain Trivedi, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel, while defending the impugned orders, submits that it is totally in correct and wrong on the part of the petitioners to state that the impugned order of transfers have been passed by opposite party no.3 with a mala fide intention, rather the same has been passed in the administrative exigency of service after taking into consideration the material on record. Hence, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard is wholly in correct and wrong and if the petitioners wants to attribute mala fide on the part of the opposite party no.3 while passing the the impugned orders then in that circumstances, they should have impleaded the opposite party no.3/appointing authority by name and as the said exercise has not been done by the petitioners, while challenging the impugned orders on the ground that the same have been passed with mala fide intention by the opposite party no.3 with oblique motive and purpose only at the behest of the opposite party no.4, who is lower authority. So, keeping in view the law as laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Ratna Giri Gas and Power Private Limited vs. RDS Projects Limited and others (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 524, the argument in question advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners has got no forced, liable to be rejected.

Shri Abinav Narain Trivedi, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel further submits that guidelines/transfer policy is not binding in nature and the same is to be adhere and to be taken into consideration by the authority concerned while passing the impugned transfer orders. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pandey vs. Director General, Medical Health and Family Welfare, U.P. 1993 F.L.R. 945, the relevant portion is quoted herein below:-

"The second plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the Government order an employee can not be transferred till he completes five years service at a place. No such Government Order has been placed before us. That apart if there is any grievance to the effect that transfer order has been passed in violation of some policy of the Government the proper forum to raise the grievance against such order is the Government itself before which the person aggrieved should make representation. This Court cannot interfere with the transfer order unless a case is made out which has not been done in the instant case."

In view of the above said facts, he submits that the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that while passing the impugned orders, there is violation of the transfer policy, has got no force, even otherwise, while passing the impugned orders of transfer, the opposite party no.3 has prior taken approval by the higher authority. In this regard, he relied the averments as made in counter affidavit filed on behalf of official respondents. Thus, once the approval has been taken by the higher authority then there is no need to get a separate approval of District Magistrate as per clause 12 of the transfer policy by the opposite party no.3 prior to passing of the transfer order. So, the argument in question advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners that the transfer orders are in violation of Clause 12 the transfer policy is wholly incorrect, perverse in nature and contrary to the facts of the case, liable to be rejected.

Learned State Counsel submits that the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the transfer orders are in excess of 15% approve/sanction of the strength of the Junior Engineer in the department is wholly incorrect as total strength of Junior Engineer in the Irrigation Department is 4688 posts out of which only 248 incumbent working on the post of Junior Engineer have been transferred. So, the argument in question has got no force, liable to be rejected and the present writ petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records.

Every power, either statutory or under common law, must be exercised by the authority lawfully, reasonably and in good faith. If the power is exercised unlawfully, improperly, unreasonably or in bad faith, the exercise is bad and the action illegal, rather mala fide action

The concept of mala fide or bad faith eludes precise definition. It may, however, mean want of good faith, personal prejudice, grudge, ill-will, improper or oblique motive, ulterior purpose, or dishonest intention. (See Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764, Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India (2009) 2 SCC 592 and State of Maharashtra v. Sarangdharsingh Shivdassingh Chavan (2011) I SCC 577.)

Malice may imply spite or ill-will. Thus, the legal meaning of malice is ill-will or spite towards a party and any direct or improper motive in taking an action.

A power may be said to have been exercised mala fide if it is exercised maliciously, out of personal animosity, ill-will, with vengeance or with a view to achieve an object foreign to the statute.

In Jai Chand v. State of W. B. AIR 1967 SC 483, however, Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that :-

"a mala fide exercise of power does not necessarily imply moral turpitude......... It only means that the statutory power is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended. In other words, the power conferred by the statute has been utilized for some indirect purpose not connected with the objection of the statute or the mischief it seeks to remedy."

Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1968 P & H 406 held as under:-

Malice is the doing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification wilfully or purposely. Malice indicates varying shades of wickedness and includes cool depravity and hardness of heart, vindictiveness, perpetration of injurious acts without lawful excuse, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and regardless of one's obligation. It is a disposition which impels injury to another without cause, from a spirit of revenge, or from personal gratification. It may be implied from a deliberate intention to do a wrong without justification. It is not necessarily hate or ill-will, but it is a state of mind which is reckless of law and ot the legal rights of others. All acts done with an evil disposition or unlawful motive with an intention to cause injury and without a lawful excuse may be characterised as malicious. Malicious act is not one which is done accidentally, thoughtlessly or negligently but designedly, wilfully or wantonly. The term "bad faith" is a shade milder than malice, and implies breach of faith or wilful failure to respond to one's known obligation or duty. Bad judgment or negligence is not "bad faith", which imports a dishonest purpose, or some moral obliquity and implies conscious doing of wrong. It is much more than a mistake of judgment and is synonymous with dishonesty.

Every administrative authority must exercise power conferred on it legally, properly and in consonance with the object of the statute.

Lord Lindley in the case of General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtawn 1904 AC 515 held that I take it to be clear that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create power, namely, that the powers shall be used bona fide for the purpose for which they are conferred.

So, every action of a public authority must be based on utmost good faith, genuine belief and ought to be supported by reasons. If the action is contrary to law, it is mala fide and can be set aside on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience.

The administrative authority is free to act at its discretion if he deems necessary or if he or it is satisfied of the immediacy of official action on his or its part. His responsibility lies only to the superiors and the government. The power to act in discretion is not power to act ad-arbitrium. It is not a despotic power, nor hedged with arbitrariness, nor legal irresponsibility to exercise discretionary power in excess of the statutory ground disregarding the prescribed conditions for ulterior motive. If done, it brings the authority concerned in conflict with law. When the power is exercised mala fide, it undoubtedly gets vitiated by colourable exercise of power.

In the case of Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited vs. RDS Projects Limited and others (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 524 in paragraph nos.22, 25, 26 and 27 held as under:-

"Para 22- The challenge to the Board resolution dated 4th October, 2010 and communication dated 6th October, 2010 was withdrawn in toto, with liberty reserved to RDS to file a fresh petition for redress only in case the fresh tender to be floated by the appellant for allotment of the works in any manner sought to exclude RDS from participation in the same. This necessarily implies that if RDS was allowed to participate in the fresh tender process it would have had no quarrel with the annulment of the entire tender process based on the first tender notice. Conversely if the fresh tender notice sought to disqualify RDS from bidding for the works it could seek redress against such exclusion. Liberty granted by the High Court to file a fresh petition was in our considered opinion limited to any such fresh challenge being laid by RDS to its exclusion in terms of any fresh tender notice.

"Para 25 - Even otherwise the findings recorded by the High Court on the question of mala fides do not appear to us to be factually or legally sustainable. While we do not consider it necessary to delve deep into this aspect of the controversy, we may point out that allegations of mala fides are more easily made than proved. The law casts a heavy burden on the person alleging mala fides to prove the same on the basis of facts that are either admitted or satisfactorily established and/or logical inferences deducible from the same. This is particularly so when the petitioner alleges malice in fact in which event it is obligatory for the person making any such allegation to furnish particulars that would prove mala fides on the part of the decision maker. Vague and general allegations unsupported by the requisite particulars do not provide a sound basis for the court to conduct an inquiry into their veracity.

Para 26- The legal position in this regard is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. We may briefly refer to only some of them.

Para 26.1- In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222, this Court summed up the law on the subject in the following words:

"50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.

51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand."

Para 26.2 - We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 764 where the Court declared that allegations of mala fides need proof of high degree and that an administrative action is presumed to be bona fide unless the contrary is satisfactorily established. The Court observed:

56. ... ... ... It is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is on the person making the allegations and the burden is "very heavy". (vide E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974) 4 SCC 3) There is every presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been exercised bona fide and in good faith. It is to be remembered that the allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than made out and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high degree of credibility. As Krishna Iyer, J. stated in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 800 (SCC p. 802, para 2): "It (mala fide) is the last refuge of a losing litigant."

Para 27- There is yet another aspect which cannot be ignored. As and when allegations of mala fides are made, the persons against whom the same are levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to enable them to answer the charge. In the absence of the person concerned as a party in his/her individual capacity it will neither be fair nor proper to record a finding that malice in fact had vitiated the action taken by the authority concerned. It is important to remember that a judicial pronouncement declaring an action to be mala fide is a serious indictment of the person concerned that can lead to adverse civil consequences against him. Courts have, therefore, to be slow in drawing conclusions when it comes to holding allegations of mala fides to be proved and only in cases where based on the material placed before the Court or facts that are admitted leading to inevitable inferences supporting the charge of mala fides that the Court should record a finding in the process ensuring that while it does so, it also hears the person who was likely to be affected by such a finding.

In the case of Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited (supra) in paragrahph no..38, the relevant portion held as under:-

"If every step in the decision making process is viewed with suspicion the integrity of the entire process shall be jeopardized. Officers taking views in the decision making process will feel handicapped in expressing their opinions freely and frankly for fear of being seen to be doing so for mala fides reasons which would in turn affect public interest. Nothing in the instant case was done without a reasonable or probable cause which is the very essence of the doctrine of malice in law vitiating administrative actions."

Further, the person against whom personal mala fides or 'malice in fact' and 'malice in law ' is imputed should be impleaded as a party respondent to the proceedings and he should be afforded opportunity to meet with those allegations. In his absence, no enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations can be made. The reason is very simple. The principles of natural justice require that no person should be condemned unheard. Now if allegations have been made against a person who is not made party to the proceedings and the court proceeds on the basis of those allegations, the person against whom such allegations have been levelled is condemned unheard.

In the case of State of Bihar vs. P. P. Sharma AIR 1991 SC 1260, Hon'ble the Supreme Court held as under:-

"It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded eo nomine as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegations would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. ( All India State Bank Officers' Federation v. Union of India (1997) 9 SCC 151 and I. K. Mishra v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 228.)"

In federation of Rly. Officers Association vs. Union if India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1344, the Apex Court has held that the allegation of mala fide has to be specifically made and the person against whom such allegations are made has to be impleaded and in his absence such allegations cannot be taken into consideration. (See State of Bihar and anr. Vs. P.P.Sharma, I.A.S. & Anr., AIR 1991 SC 1260; DR. J. N. Banavalikar Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 89; All India State Bank Officers' Federation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 151; and I.K. Mishra vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 3740.).

In the instant case, opposite party no.3 who is competent authority has passed the transfer order, he is neither impleaded as a party in the writ petitions nor any malice has been pleaded against him. So, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that the transfer orders in question are suffered with mala fide action on the part of the opposite party no.3/appointing authority, has got no force, rejected.

So far as argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that after placing the reliance on the averments as made on the basis of the para 12 of the transfer policy, from the perusal of the impugned order of transfer it is clearly established that the prior to passing of the same, the opposite party no.3 has taken approval from the higher authority, so once the said approval has been taken and there is no need to take a further approval from the District Magistrate. Further, as the impugned order of transfer has been passed by him in the administrative exigency of service and in the interest of department. So, keeping in view the said facts as well as no government servant has got a vested right to remain posted at a particular place of his own choice nor can be insist that he must be posted at one place or the other. He is liable to be transferred in the administrative exigencies from one place to the other. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary. Accordingly, argument in question advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner has got nor force, rejected.

Further, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that in the present case, the transfer order passed by the opposite party no.3 exceed 15% of the total working strength of the employees, so the same is contrary to the transfer policy, liable to be set aside, is factual incorrect , as from perusal of the record, it establishes that 248 Junior Engineers have been transferred out of 4688 Junior Engineers in the irrigation department, so the same is rejected because it is well settled law that transfer being exigency of service can be effected by the employer concerned in accordance with administrative exigency, in the interest of administration and public interest at any point of time and that cannot be monitored and guided by this Court unless it may be shown that transfer order is vitiated on account of the contravention of the statute , or lacks jurisdiction or mala fide.

Law on the subject is clear. In the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

"A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer order issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day to day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration, which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders."

In the case of Union of India Vs. S.L. Abbas , AIR 1993 SC 2444, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :-

"The said guideline, however, does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right."

The said view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Roy Vs. Union of India another (1993) 1 SCC 148 wherein the Apex Court has held as under:-

"It is true that the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and dislocation in the family set up of the concerned employees but on that score the Order of transfer is not liable to be struck down. Unless such order is passed mala fide or in violation of the rules of service and guidelines for transfer without any proper justification the Court and the Tribunal should not interfere with the order of transfer."

And in the case of Bank of India Vs. Jagjit Singh Mehta, 1992 (1) SCC 306, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"The said observations in fact tend to negative the respondent's contentions instead of supporting them. The judgment also does not support the Respondent's contention that if such an order is questioned in a Court or the Tribunal , the authority is obliged to justify the transfer by adducing the reasons therefor. It does not also say that the Court or Tribunal can quash the order of transfer, if any of the administrative instructions/ guidelines are not followed, much less can be characterized as mala fide for that reason. To reiterate , the oder of transfer can be question in a Court or Tribunal only where it is passed mala fide or where it is made in violation of the statutory provisions." (See National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sri Bhagwan and another, AIR 2001 SC 3309).

Last argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner in one of the writ petitions that the wife of the petitioner is suffering from medical ailment for which she is getting specialized treatment from the private doctor and is also not sustainable in the present case as the transfer order has been passed by the competent authority in accordance with law keeping in view the administrative exigency of services and interest of justice. Further, from the material on record, it transpires that the medical ailment from which the wife of the petitioner/Jawahar Lal is getting a specialized treatment from private medical practitioner which get very well easily available to her from the place where the petitioner has been transferred.

For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 4.2.2013 passed by opposite party no.3 by which the petitioner has been transferred.

In the result, the all writ petitions are dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Order Date :- 10.4.2013

Mahesh