The Supreme Court has ruled that High Court cannot invoke provisions to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to grant leave on mere asking by the tenent without material substance.
The Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice MM Sundresh stressed that legislative intent of the said Section is expeditious and effective remedy for a class of landlords, sans the normal procedural route.
Brief Facts of the Case
Two shops were leased out to the respondent orally way back in the year 1970 which continued for decades. After the demise of the original landlord, his son became the owner both by inheritance and by virtue of an award who too later passed away.
Subsequently, the appellant herein who claims through the award and inheritance by operation of law, filed the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act in the year 2014.
The respondent filed an application seeking leave to defend, inter alia, raising three primary contentions, namely,
(i) the appellant is not having title over the property;
(ii) the property actually belongs to the Government of India under the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as “Enemy Property Act”) and
(iii) there are alternative accommodations by way of other properties available for carrying out the business of the appellant as such the need of the appellant is not bona fide.
Rent Controller dismissed the application holding that the title of the appellant cannot be questioned by the respondent, the averments regarding the suitability of alternative accommodation are vague and the embargo under the Enemy Property Act would not be made applicable to the properties in question.
Aggrieved, the respondent approached the High Court of Delhi which despite holding that the respondent cannot question the title of the appellant allowed the Revision Petition on the premise that there are triable issues as the denial of the appellant on the defence of the appellant qua the issue of alternative accommodation is vague.
Submissions
Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction available to the High Court being limited and restrictive, the decision made without a specific finding on the reasoning of the learned Rent Controller would amount to exercising a jurisdiction not vested. The respondent has not made out a case even on facts. It is not for the respondent being a tenant to insist upon a particular property, especially when a clear statement has been made on possession. The appellant has specifically denied ownership of any alternate properties mentioned by the respondent in his application seeking leave to defend.
It was further submitted that the subsequent proceeding initiated under the Enemy Property (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “Amended Act”) was one without jurisdiction, especially when the earlier one was closed after conducting a preliminary inquiry. Reliance was placed on Anil Bajaj & ANR. Vs. Vinod Ahuja, 2014 Latest Caselaw 348 SC
Respondent on the other hand, submitted that there are triable issues involved and, therefore, the High Court was right in allowing the revision. There is a serious cloud over the title of the appellant as some of the owners of the properties are living in the neighbouring country of Pakistan. He placed reliance on slew of SC judgements including:
-M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma & Ors, 1981 Latest Caselaw 87 SC, -P.V. Papanna Vs. K. Padmanabhaiah, 1994 Latest Caselaw 88 SC,
-Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, 1986 Latest Caselaw 239 SC, -D. Satyanarayana Vs. P. Jagadish, 1987 Latest Caselaw 251 SC
- Liaq Ahmed & Ors Vs. Shri Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, 2000 Latest Caselaw 271 SC -M/S. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Ors Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, 2004 Latest Caselaw 14 SC
Supreme Court's Analysis
The Court at the outset took into notice various provisions of the Act and Section 14(1)(e) requires satisfaction on two grounds:
(i) the requirement being bona fide and
(ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation
When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied, the Court noted.
It referred to Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh, 2000 Latest Caselaw 665 SC, Anil Bajaj & ANR. Vs. Vinod Ahuja, 2014 Latest Caselaw 348 SC
to note that for availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising a triable issue.
"The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of a normal application for eviction."
Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant, the Court added.
"The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25B(8), denying a right of appeal."
The Court also referred to RAM KRISHAN GROVER vs. UNION OF INDIA, 2019 Latest Caselaw 1105 SC,
Section 25B(8): Legislative Intent and High Court Power
The Court commented that Section 25B(8) creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals, it added.
It went on to note that the provision gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
"Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature."
The appeal was thus allowed and impugned High Court order was accordiongly set aside.
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